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After almost two decades of implementing New Public Financial Management (NPFM) reforms, 
progress in reforming Public Financial Management (PFM) systems, processes and institutions 
in developing countries has been limited and uneven. This is in spite of the substantial financial 
and technical support from Development Partners. However, there is a lack of empirical 
evidence and often the evidence cited is anecdotal about the specific role of non-technical 
drivers in in explaining the state of PFM reforms in developing countries. This is in part, because 
each of the approach used to study PFM reforms has focused mainly on addressing only limited 
aspects of PFM, leaving many critical aspects unaddressed in the reform strategy. In response 
to the many challenges and shortcomings of current approaches, this study adopts a holistic 
approach,  using case studies and the process-tracing method to investigate the cumulative 
contributions of the underlying drivers to understand why progress in PFM reforms is limited 
and uneven in post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
This evidence-based study reveals the substantial progress made in upstream reforms is not 
enough to deliver on the promise of PFM reforms and has not trickled down to downstream 
service delivery elements of PFM. Partial implementation of reform initiatives has been typical 
in post-conflict Anglophone countries. The untypical progress made in some downstream 
reforms, such as Integrated Financial Management Information Systems is partly because 
politicians and civil servants have found ways to bypass core control and accountability 
mechanisms. It is easier to align the interests of International Partners and Country 
Governments in upstream and de jure reforms, but downstream and deconcentrated reforms 
areas remain the challenge. They are deeply rooted in the interests, incentives and power-
relations of Political Leaders and their appointees. The implications of this study, therefore 
suggest that strategic nuancing of PFM reform programming, through the holistic approach is 
needed, capable of addressing both the low-hanging fruits and more far-reaching reforms by 
expanding the reform space, engaging wider stakeholders and deepening reform of downstream 
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CHAPTER ONE  
LIMITED AND UNEVEN PROGRESS IN PFM REFORMS IN 




The Auditor-General and other stakeholders have questioned the commitment of 
the political leadership to the PFM reform process, especially during the period 
since 2010 onward. In the latest annual audit report (2013), the Auditor General 
commented as follows: “[The various issues giving rise to my qualified opinion] 
serve to further confirm the government’s widely held reputation of being unable 
to decisively deal with poor public finance management. As I have said before, 
with a stronger commitment and willingness to address public financial 
management reform and strong enforcement of existing well-established laws 
and regulations, the matters could be put right quickly as other countries have 
done. 
                             (Auditor General’s Annual Report for 2013, p. Vi47). 
 
The first thing this is a general [problem] for most African countries - we are nice 
at policies, good laws, but there are a lot of issues with implementation. There 
are political issues. Sometimes laws are written, but there is no political will to 
implement those laws 
       (A Senior Official in the Ministry of Finance in Liberia - Interview: XL301). 
 
 
The above quotations represent the views from constituent stakeholders about the 
state and the level of progress achieved after nearly two decades implementing Public 
Financial Management (PFM) reforms and the extent to which causal factors have 
contributed the state and level of progress achieved in post-conflict Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. While both statements do not give any indication about whether PFM reforms 
have led to better development outcomes in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the views 
expressed, however, underscore important points about PFM development in post-
conflict Anglophone countries that are germane to this research study. First, these views 





practitioners in the existing PFM reform literature (de Renzio and Dorotinsky, 2007; 
Andrews, 2010; de Renzio el al., 2010; Fritz et al., 2012; Fritz et al., 2014a). They point 
to the fact that significant progress has been made in some dimensions of PFM, such as 
enacting laws and having new policies in place, but not so much when compared with 
other dimensions of PFM. They further provide some insights as to why there has been 
limited and uneven progress in the implementation of PFM reforms in the two post-
conflict countries and across the dimensions of their PFM. Some of the reasons for the 
level of progress achieved include technical and contextual non-technical factors. Finally, 
the views expressed also highlight concerns about the dysfunction that exists in PFM 
institutions and the failure of the reforms to deliver on the overall promise of the 
reforms.  
 
Public Financial Management (PFM) reform as used in thesis is part of the broader New 
Public Management (NPM) reform agenda by International Partners in developing 
countries starting in the late 1990s. Thus, the phrases Public Financial Management 
(PFM) and New Public Financial Management (NPFM) are used interchangeably in this 
thesis and are part of the broader NPM agenda by International Partners.  In light of the 
foregoing, this study is broadly about Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms in the 
context of the definition put forward by Andrews et al (2014), which deals with how a 
government manages revenue and expenditures and the results - in terms of short, 
medium and long-term impact of its resources on the economy and citizens of a given 
country. It provides a broader perspective on the processes, systems, institutions, 





study, which is to investigate why is progress in the implementation of PFM limited and 
uneven in post-conflict Anglophone countries and dimensions of PFM.  
 
1.1 Approaches to Understanding the Drivers and Challenges PFM 
Reforms 
The points raised from the views expressed in the beginning of the previous only portray 
only a glimpse of the broader recognition in the literature of the limited and uneven 
progress in the implementation of PFM reforms in developing countries (de Renzio & 
Dorotinsky, 2007: 12-21; Pretorius & Pretorius, 2008: 17-18; Wescott, 2008:39-50; 
Andrews, 2010; de Renzio el al., 2010; Fritz et al., 2012; Fritz et al., 2014a; De Lay et al., 
2015: 7-12), despite the substantial financial and technical support from the 
International Partners supporting PFM reforms  (Allen & Last, 2007: 170-1).  This reality 
has led to the PFM landscape being marked by much controversy; with different ideas, 
approaches and models trying to find solutions to the initial challenges encountered and 
to understand what drives or impedes PFM reform progress in developing countries 
more broadly.  
  
In light of the foregoing, many approaches and models have been proposed to enhance 
the efficiency and effectiveness of PFM reform programming and lead to better 
development outcomes, such as contributing to state-building, macro-economic 
stability, efficient resource allocations and improved service delivery and building basic 
social infrastructure in developing countries. It started with Schick's model of Public 





World Bank's seminal PEM Handbook that developed a conceptual framework for 
thinking about what constitutes an effective PFM system. This conceptual framework is 
based on three levels of budgetary outcomes: aggregate fiscal discipline, strategic 
prioritisation and efficient and effective service delivery (World Bank, 1998: 17-30; see 
also Schiavo-Campo, and Tommasi, 1999: 3-7).  
 
In the early to mid-2000s the debate began to shift to the application of more technical 
issues such as the sequencing of PFM reforms. The sequencing approach and it variant 
models called for a logical and sequential approach to reform, instead of having a ‘big 
bang’ approach to PFM reforms in developing countries, where too many reform 
initiatives are carried out simultaneously within a short time frame (Brooke, 2003). 
Irrespective of the broad understanding from PFM practitioners and scholars on the 
sequencing of reforms, there is still the absence of any consensus on any model of 
sequencing of PFM reforms in developing countries. It owes primarily to variations in 
country contexts, suggesting that any attempt by International Partners to import a 
universal reform approach or objective, is likely to encounter severe problems and 
resistance in partner countries. This is so because these western normative paradigms 
or approaches to PFM were largely not suited to the contexts in developing countries 
(Quist, 2009; Schiavo-Campo, 2010:4; Diamond 2013:17).  
 
The debate began shifting more towards understanding the role of non-technical 
drivers/causal factors, which saw the emergence, within the PEFA movement in the mid-





2004:67-74; Betley, 2008; Allen, 2009:16-27). This approach emphasised the role of 
‘institutions’ as the basic leitmotiv of PFM reforms in developing countries, and that 
reforming PFM institutions was an art, not a science. That further implied reforming 
budgetary institutions was a continuous and never-ending process but also emphasised 
the importance of the detailed components of PFM systems such as human resources 
and technical expertise, information and business processes. This institutional 
perspective is shared by several scholars such as (Schiavo-Campo, 1994; Compos and 
Pradhan, 1998 and Schick, 1998a) who argue in favour of the critical role of what they 
described as ‘rules of the game’ in reforming PFM in developing countries. Tanzi (2000) 
similarly made a dichotomy between first-generation reforms and second-generation 
reforms’, noting that the later concerns reforming ‘institutions’ which are necessary to 
improve the quality of the public sector and to consolidate and sustain gains from the 
former. 
 
The debate has rapidly evolved in the last decade to focus on the political economy of 
reforms in developing countries. Although the concept of Political Economy Analysis 
(PEA) has been around much longer (Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Thomas and Grindle, 
1990; Geddes, 1991 & 1994; Nelson, 1990; Williamson, 1994; Bates and Krueger, 1993; 
Haggard, 2000; and Krueger, 2000), its application to PFM reforms has been limited and 
has only taken centre stage in the last decade, amidst ongoing challenges encountered 
by both donor partners and developing countries governments in reforming PFM 
institutions in those countries (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008).  The concept as applied 





World Bank through their models, such as the Drivers of Change Approach and the 
Expected Utility Stakeholder Model respectively (DFID, 2005a&b; World Bank, 2004a).  
 
Today, there is widespread appreciation and understanding among donors, 
practitioners and independent scholars that ‘thinking and working politically’ is relevant 
to improving aid effectiveness and to expand our understanding of the formal and 
informal political structures and processes, incentives and information that are critical 
to successful development interventions and PFM reforms in developing countries (DIFD, 
2005a&b; World Bank, 2004a; Goetz, 2007; Marquette and Scott, 2005; Bjuremalm, 
2006; Fisher and Marquette, 2014; Rocha Menocal, 2014; Unsworth, 2015; Wild et al. 
2015; Bain et al., 2016; Kelsall, 2016; Fritz et al., 2017; Hadley & Tilley, 2017; Hudson et 
al., 2018; Moshonas, 2018; Laws and Marquette, 2018).  
 
More recently, a new set of approaches have emerged referred to as ‘innovative’ or 
‘thinking out-of-the-box’ approaches to solving problems contributing to an 
understanding of the drivers of PFM and wider Public Sector (PS) and governance 
reforms in developing countries. These approaches range from the Problem-Driven 
Approach (Andrews et al., 2012; Blum, Manning, and Srivastava 2012; Andrews, 2013; 
Andrews et al., 2017; Bridges and Woolcock, 2017); power and systems approach in 
institutional change (Green, 2016; Mansoor and Williams, 2018; Wehner, 2018); the 
proposal for doing development differently (Booth, 2015); and Bottom-Up approaches 






1.2 Rationale of the Study and Research Questions 
The various approaches highlighted in the previous section have not considered PFM 
reform from a holistic standpoint. Each model has focused only in addressing some 
aspects of PFM, often leaving many critical aspects unaddressed in the reform 
programming calculus. Also, many of these approaches are prescriptive reform models 
rather than derived from formal analysis of empirical evidence from developing 
countries. They have mostly fallen short of creating an appropriate balance in addressing 
issues such as how and why specific reform initiatives or countries became successful 
when compared with others. PFM reform is itself a complex process, involving many 
interactive processes and with diverse stakeholders with different interests and 
incentives. The many shortcomings from the idiosyncratic nature of approaches to PFM 
reforms, the complex and interactive processes involved in PFM reforms, and the 
existence of different actors with varying interests and incentives imply the need for a 
holistic approach to understanding the cumulative contributions of drivers that 
underpin PFM reform progress in developing countries.   
 
Meanwhile, there is considerable agreement among practitioners, reformers and 
academics about the increasing role of non-technical drivers in PFM reforms in 
developing countries (Andrews, 2010; de Renzio et al. 2010; de Renzio et al. 2011; 
Andrews et al., 2012; Fritz et al. 2012; Lawson, 2012; Fritz et al. 2017). However, there 
is lack of a critical mass of empirical evidence and much evidence is anecdotal about the 
specific role of non-technical factors in shaping opportunities for change in specific 





and Marquette, 2018). De Renzio for example, notes "beyond broad generalisations, 
there is little knowledge of what precisely makes some PFM reform efforts more 
successful than others and how financial and technical support to PFM reform can most 
effectively be provided" (2009b, p. 5). According to Fritz et al. 
There is typically little systematic analysis of the wider political 
economy drivers and dynamics affecting the prospects for PFM 
reforms. Discussions of political economy and related nontechnical 
drivers are also not systematic in project documents. They are most 
commonly addressed in the risk section of program assessment, not 
always with a clear or substantial link to project design. 
(Fritz et al., 2017, p.3). 
 
For example, while there is agreement that Political Support for PFM reforms is 
fundamental to the state and level of progressed achieved and for the sustainability of 
the reforms, there is a lack of substantial specific empirical evidence about how and why 
politics or political economy factors shape opportunities for change in developing 
countries.  
 
There exist a small number of single case study evaluations (Betley et al., 2012; Folscher 
et al., 2012; Lawson et al., 2012) and as well as some multiple case studies conducted 
recently (Fritz et al. 2012; Lawson, 2012; Fritz et al. 2017) that attempt to explain the 
relationship between PFM performance and non-technical drivers of PFM reforms in 
developing countries. However, several of the above studies are donor evaluations of 
PFM reform interventions by International partners in developing countries. Moreover, 





technical drivers of efforts to strengthening PFM in developing countries are 
quantitative studies (Andrews, 2009; Andrews, 2010; de Renzio, 2009a; de Renzio et al. 
2010; de Renzio et al. 2011; Fritz et al. 2014a).   
 
There have been few efforts in the existing PFM literature to address, in a single study, 
the how and why aspects of PFM reforms in developing countries. This research study, 
therefore, adopts a holistic approach, which represents an important step in filling the 
emerging gap in much of the existing literature on PFM and NPM and institutional 
reforms in developing countries and dimensions of PFM.   
 
This research study attempts to answer the overarching research question why is 
progress in Public Financial Management reforms limited and uneven in post-conflict 
countries and dimensions PFM? In answering this question, this study draws mainly on 
empirical evidence from post-conflict Anglophone Liberia and Sierra Leone, and as well 
from similar single and multiple case studies and the broader literature of PFM to 
address the following sub-research questions:  
1) How and why do some post-conflict Anglophone countries perform better than others 
in the implementation of PFM reforms over time?   
2) How and why do some post-conflict Anglophone countries perform better in 
upstream and de jure dimensions than in downstream, de facto and de-concentrated 
dimensions PFM?   
3) To what extent have political support and country ownership; institutional and 
management arrangement of reforms; donor support and practices; and economic 





4) Which lessons of good practice may, therefore, be drawn regarding future PFM 
reform programming and implementation in post-conflict Anglophone countries?    
 
1.3 The Research Approach 
This research adopted a two-pronged approach to the research design. The design 
included a theoretical perspective and as well as a methodological perspective, which 
are set out in chapters two to four and Appendices A, B and C. Combining the two 
perspectives was critical to contributing to an understanding of the state and the level 
of progress achieved, how progress was achieved, and the underlying political economy 
factors and institutional dynamics enabling or impeding PFM strengthening efforts in 
the case study countries. The combined approach provided a more nuanced 
contribution to understanding PFM reforms, which is different from prescriptive reform 
models that have dominated PFM reform strengthening efforts in developing countries.  
 
The theoretical approach included justifying through the literature and analytical 
framework chapters the need for the holistic approach. A key feature of this approach 
was to also address the research questions, explore reasons for country difference and 
making the case for the case study approach to understanding the drivers of PFM 
reforms, especially in developing post-conflict countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
This theoretical perspective contributed to the study’s twin objectives through the 
following three points: 
 summarising and building on existing PFM literature to fully capture, critique, 





the drivers of PFM reforms, and to draw lessons from past reform experiences 
in both developed and developing countries;   
 justifying the need for a shift towards a holistic analytical framework that 
assesses the systemic changes in PFM reforms and the cumulative contributions 
of drivers proposed to underpin reform success or failure in developing countries 
over time; and  
 Identifying the need for more case studies to better understand the factors 
proposed to underpin reform success or failure in developing countries over time. 
 
The theoretical approach stated above, and the research questions needed to be met 
with an appropriate research design. Thus, this research study adopts an intensive 
research design (Lewis, 2003: 51-52), rooted in the ontological assumption that PFM 
reforms in developing countries have been driven by a myriad of causal factors. Political 
support and local ownership; economic factors; donor support and practices; and 
institutional and management arrangements will be specifically investigated to 
understand the limited and uneven performance in developing countries and across 
PFM dimensions. In accomplishing the task at hand, the thesis examines two post-
conflict Anglophone countries that have implemented PFM reforms, both of which are 
pursued in “the epistemology of causal mechanisms and the methodology of process-
tracing” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 129). The choice of case study countries is limited 
to post-conflict Anglophone countries to be able to provide a more contextualised 
analysis of the evidence that could provide some generalisable insights for International 
Partners, state authorities and researchers with interest in countries with similar 






The study combines a case study approach with the process-tracing method, which 
facilitated within-case and cross-case analyses to investigate the underlying causal 
mechanisms associated with the limited and uneven progress in the Implementation of 
PFM reforms in Liberia and Sierra Leone (see George and Bennett, 2005: 67-72; Hall, 
2006: 24-31; Collier, 2011:824). This combination of approach and method was mainly 
because of their combined ability to address the how and why research questions 
pursued in this thesis, address  a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context, 
their ability to achieve high conceptual validity and address complex causal relationships 
(George and Bennett, 2005:17-19; Yin, 2003:1 and 2014:4-24). This strategy fits well with 
the highly recognised contextual nature of PFM reforms (Schiavo-Campo & Tommasi, 
1999:2; de Renzio et al., 2010:59). Peterson for example argues that “PFM [reform] is 
contextual; it begins with context and ends with context” (Peterson, 2010, p.8). The 
choice of research approach and method was further justified as Yin writes when the 
“boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident” (2003, p.13). Again, 
this point was corroborated by the fact that some of the most comprehensive reviews 
(Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008; Wescott, 2008; De Lay et al., 2015) of PFM reforms have 
found little evidence or a very thin-line between PFM reform interventions and 








1.4 Research’s Aims and Contributions 
The researcher’s aim is that this study may contribute to an understanding of why 
progress in PFM reforms is limited and uneven in post-conflict countries and dimensions 
PFM dimensions. This study, therefore, contributes to the existing PFM reform literature 
in three different ways. These three-dimensional contributions include theoretical 
contribution, practical contribution and a methodological contribution. This research’s 
forward-looking approach through the holistic model, its related proposals and detailed 
specific implications for both theory development and practice can provide 
generalisable insights that are relevant to International Partners, local reformers and 
researchers with interest in countries with similar contexts. Like most studies on PFM, 
the study aims to make specific practical contributions and suggests implications that 
might be relevant to international partners and local authorities in partner countries 
with similar contexts.  
 
Perhaps this study’s most critical and unique theoretical contribution is expected to be 
to the ongoing debate on innovative or thinking out-of-the-box approaches (Andrews, 
et al., 2012; Andrews, 2013; Andrews et al., 2017; Krause 2013; Unsworth, 2015; Wild 
et al. 2015; Bain  et al., 2016; Green, 2016; Bridges and Woolcock, 2017; Welham et al., 
2017; Mansoor and Williams, 2018; Wehner, 2018) to providing solutions and 
understanding the drivers of reforms in developing countries. The dynamic nature of 
PFM problems presents an inherent limitation that no single approach listed above is a 
either a necessary or a sufficient condition for successful development outcomes in 





facilitates a better understanding of the drivers of PFM reforms and solve the dynamic 
PFM problems in developing countries.  
    
Also, the study hopes to contribute to the PFM literature by providing a comprehensive 
synthesis and critical analysis of various approaches and theoretical debates of PFM 
reforms in developing countries in one place. This research, therefore, expects to 
contribute explicitly to bridge the gap identified from the approaches summarised in 
section 1.3. To this end, it aims to examine both what factors drive and sustain PFM 
reform efforts (literature review chapter) and what success or failure looks like 
(analytical framework chapter). That is significant, in that, the study hopes it will open 
up new avenues of thinking and theorising about PFM reforms in developing countries 
more generally.  
 
This study also aims to make an empirical contribution by providing new empirical cross-
country data that might be useful for future researcher in explaining why is progress in 
Public Financial Management reforms limited and uneven in post-conflict countries and 
dimensions PFM (de Renzio, 2009a; de Renzio et al., 2010; Fritz et al., 2012; Fritz et al., 
2014a; Fritz et al., 2017). It will provide a more nuanced and systematic empirical 
examination of, and construct logical explanations about who and what has led to the 
initiation and support for PFM reforms, and in what ways have structural and non-
technical factors have enabled or impeded opportunities for change in the two case 






Finally, by combining the case study approach and the process-tracing method, the 
study aims to facilitate both within-case and cross-case analyses to investigate the 
underlying causal factors that drive and sustain PFM reforms in post-conflict 
Anglophone countries. It aims to provide a model for applying the process-racing 
method to provide mechanism-based explanations of fine-grain detailed analysis of 
evidence and as well as analysis of the role of non-technical drivers at the macro level in 
each case study country (Waldner, 2015; Pouliot, 2015). This study, therefore, hopes 
that especially in the new age of social science research, applying process-tracing to both 
within-case and cross-case analyses will also encourage other researchers to try new 
ideas, theories and methods from other disciplines in understanding the cumulative 
contributions of the drivers of  PFM reforms in developing countries.   
 
1.5 Summary of the design logic and structure of the thesis 
This section details the design logic and structure of this thesis, which is separated into 
three phases. These phases closely mirror the steps earmarked by George and Bennett 
(2005:73) as a necessity for case study design for developing theories and as well as 
testing theories about a phenomenon in a real-life context.    
 
Phase One: This phase highlights the two-pronged approached the thesis adopted to 
provide a more nuanced contribution to an understanding of the state of PFM, the level 
of progress achieved, how progress was achieved, and the underlying political economy 
factors and institutional dynamics enabling or impeding PFM strengthening efforts in 





and a methodological perspective to contribute to our understanding of PFM reforms, 
that is different from prescriptive reform models that dominate PFM reform 
strengthening efforts in developing countries.   
 
The theoretical perspective covers the literature review and analytical framework 
chapters (chapters two and three respectively). Both chapters seek to justify the need 
for a holistic approach to the research questions and as well as the need for more 
evidence-based cross-country case studies. Also, both chapters provide a synthesis of 
the existing literature on PFM and the broader PS and institutional reforms, including a 
review of various theories, concepts, approaches and the practical implementation 
experience in developing countries. That includes, assessing both what success or failure 
looks like and as well as accounting for the factors proposed to underpin reform success 
or failure in developing countries.  
 
Chapter Four covers the methodological perspective of the combined research approach. 
It combines the case study approach and the process-tracing method that facilitates a 
within-case and cross-case analyses to investigate the underlying causal mechanisms 
associated with the limited and uneven progress in the Implementation of PFM reforms 
in post-conflict Anglophone Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
Phase Two: This phase comprises detailed background notes about the PFM reform 
processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which are provided as an appendix in this thesis 





in the case study countries. They provide what methodologists describe as  “soaking and 
poking” (Fenno, 1978, In George and Bennett, 2005:89), which helps both the researcher 
and readers get a grip of PFM reforms in each case study country, and set the basis for 
any process-tracing conducted and the findings set out in Chapters Five and Six in this 
thesis.  
Phase Three: The first segment of this phase includes analysis of the empirical data from 
the fieldwork in the case study countries. Through the process-tracing method, this 
segment analysis the interviews, which are triangulated with data from other sources. 
The empirical results are further analysed, interpreted and presented in Chapters Five 
and Six.  
 
The analytical presentations and discussions also include structured and focused 
comparisons between the two cases, peer reviews with small and large N studies on 
PFM reforms and with wider theories on PS and institutional reforms in developing 
countries. The objective is that the analytical presentations in Chapters Five and Six may 
transform specific causal narratives about PFM reforms from the case studies into more 
general theoretical concepts about PFM reforms and theories about reforms in post-
conflict Anglophone countries more generally. The second segment of this phase 
includes, drawing on the findings and implications presented and discussed in Chapters 
Five and Six to write-up the conclusions chapter (Chapter Seven). This chapter, therefore, 
summarises the main research findings and presents the research contributions and 
implications for both theory development and practice in post-conflict Anglophone 







TOWARDS A HOLISTIC APPROACH FOR UNDERSTANDING THE 




Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms as the term is used in this thesis are part of 
the broader New Public Management (NPM) reform agenda by International Partners in 
developing countries starting in the late 1990s. Thus, the phrases Public Financial 
Management (PFM) and New Public Financial Management (NPFM) are used 
interchangeably in this thesis and are part of the broader NPM agenda.  
 
A few attempts have been made to synthesise the current Public Financial Management 
(PFM) Reforms landscape,  but those efforts often divert in different directions, focusing 
either on the main debates and about the drivers of PFM reforms (Pretorius and 
Pretorius, 2008) or relating to International Partners’ evaluation of their PFM reform 
interventions in developing countries (de Renzio, 2009b). Too often also, the focus has 
been on investigating the drivers and challenges of specific technical reform initiatives 
such as Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF) (Oxford Policy Management, 
2000; de Renzio and Smith, 2005; Wynne, 2005; Schiavo-Campo, 2008; World Bank, 
2013b), Performance or Programme Budgeting (Robinson, 2007a; Robinson and Last, 





Khemani, 2005; Hendriks, 2012; Combaz, 2015), expenditure tracking and monitoring 
through Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) (World Bank, 2002a), etc. 
 
These in part, have culminated to a very daunting exercise for researchers attempting 
to review the NPFM reform literature. The state of the NPFM literature is also the result 
of the diverse disciplinary backgrounds of the authors, ranging from accountants, 
economists, political scientists, development experts, and practitioners writing on PFM 
reforms in developing and post-conflict countries. The latter are mainly working for 
international financial institutions or bilateral donor agencies such as the World Bank, 
IMF, DFID, OECD, and to name but a few. Moreover, contributions from these 
international financial and bilateral donors have mostly been driven by their different 
development agendas, principles, interests, and other bilateral relations.  
 
The review in this chapter focuses on the drivers and challenges of introducing NPFM 
reforms in developing and post-conflict countries. However, references are made to the 
broader NPM and NPFM reform literature in elsewhere, where the evidence directly 
relates to the research questions and objective of this study. This review considers both 
theory and practical implementation experiences of International Partners and 
developing and post-conflict countries in PFM reforms since the emergence of the new 
wave of reforms in the late 1990s up to 2018. This new wave of reforms means PFM or 
NPFM reform initiatives undertaken following the World Bank’s 1997 annual report The 
State in a Changing World (World Bank, 1997), the seminal paper on Contemporary 





subsequent World Bank’s PFM Handbook in that same year, paving the way for what is 
today known as NPFM reforms (World Bank, 1998).   
 
This review builds on earlier reviews (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008; de Renzio, 2009b; 
Simson et al., 2011; De Lay e al., 2015) in synthesising the contributions of the various 
theoretical approaches to informing our understanding of the drivers and challenges 
PFM reforms, what lessons can be drawn from them, and linking theory and reform 
experience in developing and post-conflict countries. These lessons and implementation 
experiences may range from how the various approaches to the assessment of the 
drivers and challenges to the introduction of NPFM reforms have influenced both 
thinking and practice in developing and post-conflict countries on ‘best practice’ or one-
size-fits-all normative views of PFM reforms. The lessons and experiences may also 
concerns the role and importance of politics, governance, institutional dynamics and 
economic factors in enhancing better development outcomes.  
 
In moving towards a holistic approach is assessing PFM reform progress, less emphasis 
is dedicated to defining what success or failure looks like, instead the focus is on 
examining the drivers PFM reform success or failure over time in developing and post-
conflict countries (Andrews, 2010; de Renzio, 2009a; de Renzio, et al., 2010; Fritz, et al., 
2012; Fritz, et al., 2014; Fritz, et al., 2017). The former (what success or failure looks like), 
is covered in the next chapter (analytical framework chapter) by building on the work by 
the PEFA Secretariat (2005, 2011, 2016) and de Renzio (2009b) to define what success 





PFM institutions, geared towards providing comprehensive and appropriate measurable 
minimum criteria for assessing the quality of PFM systems across countries.  
 
Unlike de Renzio (2009b), by combining both what factors (i.e., the drivers) determine 
reform success or failure (this chapter) together with what success or failure looks like 
(chapter three), this study builds a much broader and inclusive analytical framework to 
address the research questions set out in Chapter One. This review therefore, aims to 
build a holistic framework, offering an inclusive and comprehensive assessment of what 
success or failure looks like and the cumulative contributions of the drivers in shaping 
opportunities for change that is different from prescriptive reform models or evaluation 
of specific donor programs in developing and post-conflict countries. 
The objectives of this chapter are two-fold:  
1)  Summarising and building on existing PFM literature to fully capture, critique, 
appreciate and understand the evolution of theoretical and policy debates over time, 
and to draw lessons from past reform experiences in both developed and developing 
countries;   
2)  Justifying the need for a shift towards a comprehensive analytical framework that 
assesses systemic changes in PFM reforms and the cumulative contributions of various 
factors theorised to underpin reform success or failure in developing countries over time.  
 
To achieve the above set objectives, this chapter seeks to review technical and academic 
articles and books, evaluation assessment reports, country governments PFM 
assessment reports, development practitioner guides and handbooks in PFM. It must be 
emphasised that most of the materials are practitioner materials, written by PFM 





institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, DFID, AfDB, etc. Although the views expressed 
in those materials are those of the authors, they are, however, mostly a reflection of the 
programs and policy positions of the institutions they represent. Most of their work have 
centred, in the last decade and half on the three levels of budgetary outcomes 
advocated by World Bank (World Bank, 1998).  
 
Also, it is noteworthy that the review does not intend to cover the specialised individual 
dimensions of PFM reform initiatives, systems and mechanisms such as MTEF, IFMIS, 
and performance or programme budgeting, transparency and accountability, gender-
responsive budgeting and the role of civil society, etc. As stated earlier in this section, 
too often the focus has been on specific and technical reform initiatives, which in part, 
has contributed to apparent failure to provide (which is the focus of this research) a 
holistic understanding of the underlying drivers and challenges of PFM reforms.   
 
2.1 The Rationale and Scope of the NPFM Reforms in Developing and Post-
conflict Countries 
Partial success in a few highly developed countries such as New Zealand, led many in the 
World Bank and other organisations to view managerial changes, such as privatisation,  
contracting-out, the move from public service to service delivery, etc., a single set of 
universally desirable innovations; the “best practice” of the New Public Financial 
Management (NPFM). Sometimes, oblivious to the pitfalls of transplanting institutional 
models, staff of international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF 





to the endpoint of institutional change in their PFM (Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi, 1999 
and Allen, et al., 2004). Even with the early recognition of the unrealistic nature of 
importing western normative concepts and practices to developing countries, the World 
Bank and partners and other development agencies believed it was still important that 
the fallout against NPFM did not discourage the adaptation of NPFM innovations that 
are more likely to be suitable to developing countries (Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi, 
1999 and Schiavo-Campo, 2007). 
 
The above line of thinking precipitated a shift in the worldview of what constituted and 
the role of PFM reforms in promoting better development outcomes in developing 
countries. NPFM came to the spotlight when the World Bank in its well-known 1997 
annual report The State in a Changing World included PFM reform, as part of its overall 
public sector reform strategy in the fight against poverty and achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in developing countries (World Bank, 1997). At the same 
time, it should be noted that PFM reforms in developing countries had been in existence, 
dating back to the colonial state and continued to the post-colonial era (see for example 
Caiden, 1980; Caiden & Wildavsky, 1980; and Schiavo-Campo, 2007). 
 
PFM reform interventions in developing and post-conflict countries have continued to 
evolve considering the complexities and changing development landscape, often 
responding to emerging issues at specific points in time. Since the late 1990s, PFM 
reform initiatives have been tied to a number of development agendas such as the 





joint World Bank and IMF HIPC and MDRI Initiatives, IMF Code of Good Practices and 
Fiscal Transparency and Good Governance, and the World Bank’s 2000 and 2012 
reforming public institutions and strengthening governance Strategies respectively (See 
IMF 2001; Schiavo-Campo, 2007; Shah, 2007; World Bank, 2000; Bunse and Fritz, 2012). 
The World Bank’s 2000 public sector strategy for example, emphasised for a “more 
efficient use of public resources for development through improved public expenditure 
analysis and management” (World Bank, 2000, p. 60), while the HIPC Initiative required 
recipient countries to re-orient limited resources towards education and health to 
qualify for debt relief (Schiavo-Campo, 2007).  
 
Against these backdrops, effective public expenditure management became a 
centrepiece for managing limited resources for poverty reduction and promoting 
economic development and as well as a frequent requirement to meet donor 
conditionality in recipient countries. In this regard, a comprehensive budget was 
required for coherency of donor programs, coordination of donor interests and 
interactions, to effect basic economic policies, allocation of finite resources to sectors 
and programs and monitoring of all donor projects (Schiavo-Campo, 2007). 
 
However, the specific objective, entry points, scope, and intensity of reform initiatives 
were different from one country to another or between different groups of countries. 
Schiavo-Campo (2007) for instance, suggests that a primary objective for post-conflict 
countries might be to protect the money – ensuring accountability for public resources, 





conditionality such as “No Aid without a Program, No Program without a Budget” 
(Schiavo-Campo, 2007, p. 437). That implies, conflict and post-conflict countries had to 
accept far more stringent conditions in return for much-needed resources for post-
conflict reconstruction and recovery efforts. On the other hand, reform efforts in other 
countries like South Africa and Ethiopia were borne out of local desire. With South Africa, 
for example, reforming its budgetary institutions as a requirement in its constitution in 
the early 1990s (Schiavo-Campo, 2007), while Ethiopia’s reform agenda as part of its 
decentralisation program (Peterson, 2010).  
 
All the above invariably led to the influx of many uncoordinated donors and the 
subsequent problems that came with them, such as the creation of gaps, fragmentation 
of programs, duplication and enfeeblement of local ownership (Schiavo-Campo, 2007). 
Those developments led to the first global coordinated approach, through the joint 
World Bank, and IMF led PEFA attempted at the first comprehensive assessment of PFM 
systems (PEFA Secretariat, 2005). Also, the above shortcomings  further contributed to 
the shift of focus of reform initiatives towards the use of country systems and donor 
alignment and harmonisation through General Budget Support (GBS), which are set out 
in target five(a) of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 (OECD, 2005) and 
the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008 (OECD, 2008). The changing agenda is reflective of 
the initial failures from the donor-led approach to PFM reforms, which resulted in 
increased donor pressure (Wescott, 2008) and financial support (Allen and Last, 2007; 






Irrespective of the huge donor financial and technical support, limited gains were 
reported in the years running up to the early 2000s, resulting in serious concerns from 
both donors and recipient country governments (Wescott, 2008). These initial setbacks 
led to the emergence of many approaches to PFM reforms, with different ideas and 
models in a bid to understand to the drivers and challenges of introducing NPFM reforms 
in developing countries.  These approaches and models form the basis of the discussions 
in the next section. 
 
2.2 Approaches to Understanding the Drivers and Challenges of Introducing 
NPFM Reforms in Developing and Post-conflict Countries  
This section reviews the existing NPFM reform literature, accounting for the various 
theoretical approaches, policy debates and practical implementation experience to 
contribute to an understanding of the drivers and challenges that underpin country 
differences in the implementation of PFM reforms and the dimensions of PFM in 
developing countries. The review and theoretical discussions about the various 
theoretical approaches to understanding the drivers of PFM reforms and their impact 
on reform success or failure are designed to address the first three research questions 
set out in Chapter One. The theoretical approaches range from technical models to 
political economy and innovative/out-of-the-box approaches to understanding the 
drivers and challenges of introducing NPFM reforms. The basic premise of the review of 
the various theoretical perspectives is that each emerged in direct response to the initial 
challenges encountered in the introduction of NPFM reforms in developing countries, 





to those challenges. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the review focuses on 
the drivers and challenges of introducing NPFM reforms in developing and post-conflict 
countries. However, references are made to the broader PFM and PS reform literature 
and draws on lessons of from the various perspectives and past reform experiences in 
both developed and developing countries, where the evidence directly relates to the 
research questions and the objective of this study. These lessons may range from how 
the various approaches have influenced both thinking and practice in developing 
countries, regarding ‘best practice’ or one-size-fits-all normative view of PFM reforms, 
to the role and importance of donor-partners, politics, governance, and institutional 
arrangements and country contexts in enhancing better development outcomes from 
the implementation of PFM reforms. Concepts, good practices and implementations 
experiences from these approaches will be combined with some aspects of Chapter 
Three to develop the analytical framework that will guide the conduct and analysis of 
findings from the empirical fieldwork.  
 
It is noteworthy that the reviews of the more technical approaches are shorter than 
those that tend towards addressing non-technical drivers of PFM reforms, or both. The 
exception to the nontechnical models is the innovative approaches, which are only 






2.2.1 Schick’s Getting the Basics Right and The World Bank Public Expenditure Management 
Contributions Toward Understanding the Drivers and Challenges in NPFM reforms in 
Developing and Post-conflict Countries 
Getting the basics right by Schick (1998a&b) and the World Bank’s Public Expenditure 
Management (PEM) (World Bank, 1998) are the first of the approaches to understanding 
the drivers and challenges on implementing NPFM reforms in developing countries. 
Allen Schick in his seminal paper, argued that developing countries should focus on 
getting what he termed ‘the basics right’ rather than trying to replicate the more 
advanced New Zealand and other PFM models. His concept of modern Public PEM 
emphasises substantive policy outcomes at the three levels of budgetary outcomes, 
which he specified as aggregate fiscal discipline, allocation of resources per policy 
priorities and efficiency of public service delivery. He noted that every developing 
country government should strive to achieve these three levels of expenditure 
outcomes. His conceptual model of modern PEM remains influential to date and 
continue to form the bedrock for NPFM reform models such the PEFA Framework (PEFA 
Secretariat, 2005, 2011 & 2016). However, he maintained, it is not enough for 
governments to always expect optimal outcomes once these budgetary outcomes have 
been set, rather country governments should recognise that PEM extends beyond the 
routine budget processes to include institutional and management arrangements, 
information, and incentives, which should be properly managed and aligned (Schick, 
1998a).   
 
Schick, therefore, argued against importing market institutions to traditional PEM 





most developing countries should not try the New Zealand reform model (Schick, 1998b). 
He noted that developed and developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are on 
the opposite end of the continuum of PFM reforms, with the objectives of the former 
being mainly to restore fiscal discipline in the budget process and to ensure efficiency 
and value for money in public service delivery. For Schick (1998a) developing SSA 
countries suffer from inherent problems, among others, such as poverty, low revenue 
generation base, economic instability and low political mobilisation that make them less 
amenable to the transfer of western normative views of PEM.    
 
Against this backdrop, Schick (1998a) therefore, recommends that in striving to achieve 
the three levels of budgetary outcomes, developing countries governments should first 
focus on getting the basics right. Specifically, that, “reformers should focus on the basics 
on which reform is built, not on particular techniques” (World Bank, 1998, p. 8). His 
argument is summarised in the World Bank Public Expenditure Management Handbook 
as follow: 
Box 2.1: Getting The Basics Right 
Source: Public Expenditure Management Handbook - World Bank (1998, p. 8) 
In elaborating his argument for "Getting the Basics Right," Schick states: 
 Foster an environment that supports and demands performance before introducing 
performance or outcome budgeting. 
 Control inputs before seeking to control outputs. 
 Account for cash before accounting for accruals. 
 Establish external controls before introducing internal control. 
 Establish internal control before introducing managerial accountability. 
 Operate a reliable accounting system before installing an integrated financial 
management system. 
 Budget for work to be done before budgeting for results to be achieved. 
 Enforce formal contracts in the market sector before introducing performance 
contracts in the public sector. 
 Have effective financial auditing before moving to performance auditing. 
 Adopt and implement predictable budgets before insisting that managers efficiently 





Following Schick’s paper, the World Bank released its PEM handbook which specified 
broad principles including comprehensiveness and discipline, legitimacy, predictability, 
contestability, honesty, information, transparency and accountability and more 
importantly institutional arrangements to foster sound budgeting and financial 
management in developing countries. Those principles also heavily influenced the initial 
PEFA framework (PEFA, 2005). Given the former, the Bank noted both formal and 
informal institutional arrangements are indispensable in achieving budgetary outcomes 
at the three-levels of aggregate fiscal discipline, allocative of resources in accordance 
with policy priorities and operational efficiency in the use of resource and service 
delivery (World Bank, 1998; see also Schiavo-Campo, and Tommasi, 1999). 
 
In reforming PFM in developing countries, the World Bank (World Bank, 1998) 
specifically advocated for the following to achieve the three levels of budgetary 
outcomes (World Bank, 1998): 
 The introduction of performance measures in PEM; 
 Linking policy to planning and budgeting through the introduction of MTEF and 
program budgeting; 
 Accounting and financial management information systems such as IFMIS; 
 Aligning PEM with overall public sector processes and activities and governance 
issues; 
 To recognise country capacity; 
 The balance between comprehensiveness and simplicity; and  






Though Schick’s basics first model and the World Bank three levels of budgetary 
outcomes and its list of configurations received broad endorsements from donors (see 
Petrei, 1998; Schiavo-Campo, and Tommasi, 1999; Allen and Tommasi, 2001; Shand, 
2001), they did not prove popular among developing and post-conflict countries in  SSA 
and PFM Practitioners (Wescott, 2008; Diamond, 2013). The early introduction of IMTEF 
and program budgeting in many developing and post-conflict countries in SSA was 
regarded by many as untimely and failed to deliver the desired results. A recent 
implementation status report by Worthington (2013: ix) shows none of the developing 
and post-conflict countries in SSA where MTEF and program budgeting were introduced 
has a full-fledged system in place that is in line with all the MTEF guidelines.  
 
Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi (1999), for example, noted that the sequence from fiscal 
discipline to resource allocation and operational efficiency should only hold in 
developing SSA countries with weak revenue forecast and cash management systems. 
Thus, the primary emphasis should be on expenditure control before moving the next 
two levels. They argued that this chronology should be followed strictly but emphasised 
the same should not hold true for developing countries where expenditure control and 
cash management are fairly acceptable. In those countries, the three levels should then 
be implemented concurrently and not in isolation. Both Schick (1998a) and Schiavo-
Campo and Tommasi (1999), however, agree on having a coherent planning and road 






However, Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi (1999) do recognise the unique challenges 
associated with achieving allocative efficiency, especially in developing and post-conflict 
countries, suggesting that it is less amenable to technical reforms than aggregate fiscal 
discipline and operational efficiency. This interdependency amongst the three levels of 
budgetary outcomes is what the World Bank noted as perhaps the most powerful 
discovery in modern PEM (World Bank, 1998). However, Allen and Tommasi (2001) 
suggest the optimal mix of these three levels of budgetary outcomes depend on the 
country context, and there should be a clear road map to ensuring that progress at one 
level does not compromise progress in another level.  
 
Other critiques (Stevens, 2004; Allen, 2009; Browne, 2010 and Diamond, 2013), of 
‘getting the basics rights’ approach, for example, argue that initial poor performance by 
developing countries is primarily because donors and country government officials do 
not have a common understanding of what constitutes ‘the basics’. Perhaps, noting the 
lack of clarity in the definition, often leading to reform initiatives based on the western 
normative view of PEM that are doomed to stall and fail in developing countries. In the 
same vein, Andrews (2006) argues that too much emphasis on the basics may promote 
overly focus on expenditure control, which will invariably hinder deeper PFM reforms. 
He further reckoned the lack of plausibility in the basics first approach, arguing there is 
no guarantee that getting the basics right will lead to better performance in other 
budgetary outcomes or other performance-related reform initiatives. He, therefore, 
submitted that, in the presence of political will and the right institutional management 





line with the ‘asics or without the basics first approach. While Roberts (2004) criticises 
the strict application of the basics first approach, he, however, recognises that 
performance-based reform initiatives may be inhibited by economic instability and 
excessive informal rules in developing countries. 
 
2.2.2 Sequencing of Reforms: The Platform Approach and It Variant Models to 
Understanding the Drivers and Challenges to NPFM Reforms in Developing and Post-
Conflict Countries 
Following Schick’s basics first approach, the PFM reform debate continued in search of 
an appropriate balance or optimal way to sequence reform initiatives in developing 
countries. These debates dominated the NPFM reform literature for most of the 2000s 
(Brooke, 2003; Peterson, 2007 and 2010; and Bietenhader and Bergman, 2010; Diamond, 
2013). They ensued as a result of the growing recognition in the early 2000s of the 
relevance of using country systems and capacities, the use of donor budget support, the 
influence of politics and governance issues in the budget process and much later, the 
Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness.  
 
The initial response by donor partners to these debates was the introduction of series 
of diagnostic instruments (such as PERS, ROCS, PEFA, and later Gap Analysis) to examine 
the role of drivers of the drivers of PFM reforms and to assess progress and challenges 
to provide a common ground for discourse by the donor community and recipient 
country governments (see Braun 2008; Bergmann 2009; and Bietenhader and Bergman, 
2010). What is clear from the literature, and all the above mentioned instruments is the 





that should be implemented in order of priority, leaving both the donor community and 
country governments to figure out the appropriate mix of reform programs (Allen, 2009; 
Tommasi, 2009 and Bietenhader and Bergman, 2010).   
 
Brooke’s initial proposal of the platform approach involves logical sequencing of reform 
initiatives, which he argues “considers an appropriate and sustainable package of 
measures rather than one that is focused on individual measures… reform should be 
considered as a series of realistic step changes (‘platforms’). …. The important thing is 
that each platform establishes a clear basis for launching to the next” (Brooke, 2003, p. 
2). Brooke went further to suggest examples of possible measures that fit into the initial 

















Box 2.2: Examples of Possible Measures That Might Fit Within an Initial Platform 
Source: Brooke (2003, p. 3) 
Brooke, however, cautioned that the above example should not be taken as blueprint 
approach in sequencing PFM reform initiative, country government and the donor 
community should apply a degree of judgment of what appropriate measures to include 
in the initial platform. Pretorius and Pretorius (2008) reinforce this point, showcasing 
BUDGET PLANNING 
 Macro budget framework/ model for planning and controlling overall resource 
management. 
BUDGET FORMULATION 
 Greater comprehensiveness of coverage ((improvements in capture of significant 
public resources and deployment) Simple and targeted performance data that flows 
from what already exists 
BUDGET EXECUTION 
 Budget risk management plan (to minimise impact of unforeseen difficulties, but 
including monitoring of significant commitments)  
 Basic improvements of controls within key transaction processing systems (e.g. 
payroll and procurement processes)  
 Simple but meaningful aggregate statements bringing financial and service 
performance together  
 Some initial delegation and flexibilities based on assessed ‘readiness’ of budget units 
to assume responsibility. 
ACCOUNTING 
 Basic reconciliation between central accounts, local accounts and bank balances 
 Simple data aggregation techniques 
 Classification improvement within existing code structures (better identification of 
object) 
 Recovery of backlog of accounting statements 
 Providing access to financial management training based on ‘demand pull’ – linked 
to ‘readiness’ based incentives) 
SCRUTINY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 Fund flow tracking exercises (to be systematically repeated) 
 Sample joint procurement reviews (with SAI) 
 Sample joint transaction reviews (with SAI) 
 Acceleration of production of audit reports. 
 More effective follow up arrangements for audit recommendations. 
INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES 
 Targeted staffing improvements in key areas 






the fact that different countries, such as Kenya, Cambodia, Uganda, etc. have applied 
the platform approach in their state-building efforts rather differently.  
 
The dichotomy between Brooke’s platform approach and Schick’s basics first is that the 
platform approach offers a broader perspective to state-building and flexibility to 
reformers and country authorities to select reform initiatives and present a more 
sustainable approach to the reform process (Bietenhader and Bergman, 2010 and 
Diamond, 2013). The Cambodian experience is a clear manifestation of the need for local 
ownership, appropriate prioritisation and flexibility in deciding what and what not to 
include in a platform and realistic duration for implementation of each platform (DFID 
2005c). Similar experiences were found in other country studies on the platform 
approach in Cambodia (Taliercio, 2009 and 2010) and Russia (Olander, 2007).  
 
Though Brooke did not specify any timeline for completion of the initial platform, critics 
(Allen, 2009; Tommasi, 2009; and Schiavo-Campo, 2010) have questioned his 
prioritisation of reforms. Case studies have also raised concerns about overloading of a 
particular platform with a long list of activities and the relatively short timeframe set for 
completing those activities. The Kenya and Cambodia cases have been cited as examples 
where the platform approach has been seriously flawed, owing to its disregard for 
institutional and management arrangements and politics (Taliercio 2009 and 2010).  
 
Diamond (2013) while raising a lot of questions on the sequencing of reforms, such as 





technical factors and the vast difference between countries, also suggests the need to 
sequence PFM reforms. He argues for reforms to succeed there must be at least a 
“notional reform path, no reform can define what it is ultimately attempting to achieve, 
and certainly cannot define the steps to be taken on the way to achieving this” (Diamond, 
2013, p. 7). His argument is significant given the holistic nature of PFM reforms initiatives, 
but which cannot be implemented altogether at once. Rather we are left with little or 
no choice to prioritise and create a road map for reforms.  Moreover, the absence of a 
prescribed reform path and specific reform objectives is a recipe as Diamond puts it for 
“Band-Aid, Quick-Fix, dealing with symptoms, and reforms will be difficult to sustain” 
Diamond (2013, p. 7).  
 
Other scholars, such as Peterson (2007 and 2010) have also suggested similar 
sequencing models. Peterson argues for what he called ‘an evolutionary approach,’ 
which is based on the Ethiopian experience to PFM reforms (Peterson, 2007). Peterson’s 
approach though varying in content, shares similar design and objective with Brooke’s 
‘platform approach.’ A subsequent report by Peterson (2010) further highlights the 
Ethiopian model of sequencing PFM reforms into what he described as ‘plateaus.’ For 
Peterson, PFM lies at the heart of the state and its sovereignty, and therefore not an 
appropriate arena for foreign aid intervention, rather the objective of PFM should be to 
build ‘sustainable plateaus’ in line with local context, owned by local authorities, with a 






While Quist (2009) uses what he called the ‘PEFA Reform Sequence Model Framework’ 
as a basis for sequencing PFM reforms, noting that this presents a broader perspective 
and planned activities into sequencing because it covers all the PFM dimensions. He 
argues PEFA indicators (all 74 sub-indicators) will serve the purpose of showing the 
interdependencies of the various dimensions to achieving the three levels of budgetary 
outcomes. Although his approach is more country-specific in deciding on the reform 
sequence, his model has been criticised for several reasons.  
 
First, the determination of interdependencies could be questioned, since such a notion 
of interdependency will mean given priority to a specific dimension, which can 
undermine his systems mode (Schiavo-Campo, 2010). Second, PEFA indicators are given 
equal weightings, though, in reality, some are derivatives – measuring only the 
performance of other indicators (Tommasi, 2009). And third, Diamond (2013) further 
notes the additional complications that will emerge from the application of Quist’s 
model, by having to transition countries from one level to another, given that a 
particular indicator might cover separate levels of the PEFA framework. 
 
Moreover, a study by Andrews of 31 African countries, draws on the PEFA indicators to 
classify countries into what he called performance leagues. He divides the PEFA 
framework into three broad dimensions which he labelled those that are easier to reach, 
those in the middle and those that are furthest to reach. Because African countries at 
different performance leagues (ranging from 1 – 5) were mostly scoring high in the basic 





is not an appropriate model for sequencing reform since it does not specify which basic 
reform measures should come before others, given the reform experience of the 
countries covered.  
 
It is, however, noteworthy that both Quist (2009) and Andrews (2010), like many other 
scholars, recognise the influence of non-technical factors in the reform process. Quist 
for example, specifically notes that sequencing should, “like all change management, 
take into account several considerations: political as well as functional technical factors, 
and formal as well as informal institutional elements, capacity as well as governance 
structures” (Quist, 2009, p.7). 
 
2.2.3 The Strengthened Approach to Understanding the Drivers and Challenges of NPFM 
Reforms in Developing and Post-conflict Countries 
Drawbacks from the ‘basics first,’ the various ‘platform’ approaches inspired other 
scholars such as Richard Allen to advocate for what has been nominated The 
Strengthened Approach to PFM reforms, especially in developing SSA. The approach 
emphasised the role of technical factors and institutional drivers of NPFM reforms. The 
objective of the framework proposed by Allen (2009) is to exemplify some of the critical 
technical and institutional drivers that developing countries’ government and donor 
agencies, especially International Financial Institutions (IFIs) must consider in reforming 
PFM institutions. His framework is rooted in the framework developed by North, Wallis, 
and Weingast (2006) that classified state development into three: ‘primitive states,’ 
‘natural states’ and ‘open-access societies’, characterised by politics and market 





budgetary institutions closely mirror the development of political and economic 
institutions. Though the logic of development from political to economic and budgetary 
institution should make sense, in reality, Allen (2009) unlike North, Wallis, and Weingast 
(2006) however do not suggest the adherence to such a strict chronology.      
 
He argues developing countries are ‘natural states’ characterised by powerful elites and 
politicians with primary and unlimited access to resources, who are willing and able to 
manipulate their political systems to their advantage.  What is needed is appropriate 
‘institutions’ and political will if PFM reforms were to be successful in these countries. 
His concept of ‘institutions is based on the original theory of ‘institutions’ set out by 
North (1991), who defined ‘institutions’ as both formal laws, rules and informal 
procedures, codes, customs, etc. that govern and regulate the structure and behaviours 
of public officials and organisations.  
 
This institutional perspective in understanding the drivers and challenges to NPFM 
reforms is also shared by a number of scholars such as (Schiavo-Campo, 1994; Compos 
and Pradhan, 1998 and Schick, 1998a) who argue in favour of the critical role of what 
they described as ‘rules of the game’ in reforming PFM in developing countries. Tanzi 
(2000) also made a dichotomy between first-generation reforms and second-generation 
reforms’, noting that the later concerns reforming ‘institutions’ which are necessary in 
order to improve the quality of the public sector and to consolidate and sustain gains 






Given the experience and available evidence in assessing PFM reforms in developing 
countries, Allen (2009) in trying to find a way out of the failure in the reform efforts by 
both donors and developing country governments, suggest the following measures. First, 
he suggests institutional constraints as the key challenge responsible for the limited 
progress in SSA countries. This institutional constraint represents an important factor 
especially, in the so-called ‘natural states,’ where politicians and powerful civil servants 
dominate and resist NPFM reforms if they threaten their interests and security. That, in 
turn, is heightened by the supply-driven nature of the NPFM reform efforts in 
developing and post-conflict countries by their western donors, which often come with 
enormous influence that may distort national priorities and be untimely, given the 
developmental state in developing and post-conflict countries (see also Schiavo-Campo, 
2010).  
 
The second factor is attributed to the tendency of western donors to undermine local 
ownership in NPFM reform efforts by getting involved in setting priorities and designing 
action plans. Too often, these plans are over-simplistic and too optimistic in their time 
scales for achieving the deliverables therein. These plans usually take a two to five-year 
timeframe, often tied to funding programs of bilateral donors with absolute disregard 
for local realities, at least as reform experiences in developed countries suggests (Allen, 
2009).  
 
The third, and the final reason which Allen (2009) mentioned include the excessive focus 





as the implementation of MTEFs and IFMIS. For example, a stock-take by Wynne (2005) 
on the MTEF experience in Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana shows mixed results. The mixed 
performance in ‘big-ticket’ reforms such as the MTEF and IFMIS is also noted in the 
following studies (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008, Wescott, 2008; and Hove and Wynne, 
2010). Several other studies have, however, shown lessons of some progress but not 
without significant costs resulting in the complete disregard for local ownership, fiscal 
constraints, and inefficiency in spending and premature implementation of MTEF and 
IFMIS reforms (Brumby, 2008 and Schiavo-Campo, 2008).  
 
Practices such as separation of capital and recurrent budgets, perpetuated by the Public 
Investment Programs (PIPs) has been described by Lienert and Sarraf (2001) as being a 
major contributor to the failure to link policy, planning and budgeting and poor 
performance in the three levels of budgetary outcomes. While the use of diagnostic 
tools such as PEFA, PERs, CFAA, etc., which have been largely described as inadequate 
for assessing PFM institutions and systems quality. They have been criticised, 
particularly because of their inability to assess the underlying institutional drivers and 
challenges that are critical to NPFM reform success (Andrews, 2007; Betley, 2008; Allen, 
2009; Hedger and de Renzio, 2010).  
 
Allen, therefore, summarises as follows: “weak institutions and sometimes ill-focused 
interventions by IFIs and donor partners largely account for the poor progress of 
developing countries in reforming their budget institutions, which, in many cases, 





against these experiences and shortcomings that Allen (2009) proposed his 
Strengthened Approach to NPFM reforms in developing countries. He advocated a 
tentative hierarchical structure of PFM reforms in developing countries similar to the 
Platform Approach by Brooke (2003). His four-level hierarchy of budgetary levels (with 
level 1 being the most basic PFM systems and level 4, the most developed requirements 
that depend on the efficient and effective implementation and the existence of sound 
Level 1 to 3 systems). He, however, maintained the Strengthened Approach is 
nonetheless different from the Platform Approach and other approaches in the 
following ways. 
 
It emphasises that reformers give priority to institutional issues as the basic ‘leitmotiv’ 
of reform before engaging on the technical aspects of reforms. For Allen (2009), all other 
constraints such as human resources and other capacity constraints such as ICT 
infrastructure are secondary factors. Though these issues certainly matter and have to 
be addressed, institutional factors/drivers and overly technocratic approach to 
institutional analysis must be eschewed to advance the implementation of NPFM 
reforms in developing countries.  Rather, the analysis of institutional drivers of NPFM 
must be approached from a much broader perspective, taking into account the core 
objectives of NPFM in developing and post-conflict countries to the role and 
accountability of decision-makers, reformers and development partners.  
 
Like many scholars (Brooke, 2003; Quist, 2009; Diamond, 2013), Allen (2009) also agrees 





sequence should only apply in ideal situations and applicable only in a technical sense. 
He argues, sequencing should not follow such a strict chronology, it should instead be 
informed by the given political and institutional contexts in the respective developing 
country. That means, it is possible to implement, for example, some elements of level 3 
together with some elements of level 1 or 2. Like other sequencing models, the problem 
with this approach is that it does not spell out deliverables and indicators that need to 
be achieved before moving the next levels in the leader of hierarchy. 
 
A third unique attribute of the Strengthened Approach is that it is based on a breakdown 
of the elements of PFM systems into series of categories and processes, emphasising 
the importance of detailed components of PFM systems such as human resources and 
technical expertise, information and business processes. Allen advocates the systematic 
diagnosis and analysis to determine which PFM areas are ‘weak’ and which ones are 
‘strong’ to further inform reform interventions towards the former. The diagnostic 
assessments should be carried out across the following sub PFM systems to include 
existing laws and regulations and organisational and management arrangements and 
business processes, human resources and the available technical expertise and training 
facilities and ICT systems (Allen, 2009).  
 
Finally, the framework differs from other sequencing models in that it recognises that 
PFM reforms in developing and post-conflict countries go beyond reforming PFM 
systems and processes alone. PFM reforms should provide the incentive structures to 





and action plans geared towards achieving the set objectives. Allen (2009, p. 22) went 
on to identify core objectives for developing countries, which he notes are only 
indicative that developing countries might follow: 
 Protecting public money from theft and misappropriation; 
 Budgeting in a transparent way; 
 Ensure public funds are spent consistently with the approved budget; 
 Strengthening the link between public priorities and the budget, for example, 
integration of capital and recurrent budgets, and improved medium-term 
perspective in the budget process; 
 Providing sufficient flexibility of decision-making and program management 
combined with accountability within NPM, leading to efficiency in delivering of 
public services; and  
 Monitoring the results of spending in terms of the access to, and quality of public 
services, and injecting some external accountability through citizens and public 
sector users for effectiveness. 
 
2.2.4 Political Economy Analysis (PEA) Approach to Understanding the Drivers and 
Challenges of NPFM Reforms in Developing and Post-conflict Countries 
The debate has rapidly evolved in the decade to discussions around the political 
economy of NPFM reforms, especially in developing countries and in challenging or post-
conflict environments. Although the concept of Political Economy Analysis (PEA) has 
been around much longer (Grindle and Thomas, 1989; Thomas and Grindle, 1990; 
Geddes, 1991 & 1994; Nelson, 1990; Williamson, 1990; Bates and Krueger, 1993; 
Haggard, 2000; Krueger, 2000), its application to NPFM and budget reforms is limited 
and has only taken centre stage in the last decade, amidst ongoing challenges 





The initial NPFM reform models, such as the Basics First, Sequencing of Reforms and The 
Strengthened Approach, which are covered in previous sections, by donor partners were 
overly technocratic (including the introduction of ‘big-ticket reforms’ such as the MTEF 
and IFMIS), and did not address the fundamental role and impact underlying country 
dynamics, institutional and political economic drivers in the reform process (Pretorius 
and Pretorius, 2008).   
 
The concept as it is applied to NPFM was pioneered by DFID and the World Bank through 
the Drivers of Change (DoC) Approach and the Expected Utility Stakeholder Model 
respectively (EUSM) respectively (DFID, 2005a&b; World Bank, 2004a). The DFID DoC 
approach seeks to combine institutions (both formal and informal), a country’s 
underlying structural features and agents to understand the interactions between them. 
The model posits that both structural features and agents affect each other but rely on 
institutions to regulate the effects that each has on each other. The approach does 
recognise the inappropriateness of using a single model in understanding drivers of 
change and, therefore, emphasis broadening the scope and analysis of the dynamics of 
change into six dimensions, to include basic country analysis, medium-term dynamics of 
change, role of external forces, link between change and poverty reduction, operational 
implications and DFID’s operations including its organisations incentives for using 
country systems (DFID, 2005a&b). For example, a report on the use of DoC 
commissioned by AusAID on Vanuatu, earmarked among others, political obstacles to 
the country’s economic performance, but falls short of providing any remedies on how 





The World Bank uses its EUSM to factor political realities into the design of its reform 
programs. The EUSM model was based on the premise that “Successful public sector 
reforms require understanding and addressing political realities” (World Bank, 2004a, p. 
1). The model does not only predict stakeholders’ preferences in forming coalitions in 
favour of or against a particular reform, it goes further to provide an empirical 
assessment of the likelihood of reform success and the level of political support for the 
results therein, through consistent and systematic framework for analysing stakeholder 
preferences and predicts how bargaining dynamics play out over time (World Bank, 
2004a). Other variant models by the Bank include Agent-Based Stakeholder Model 
(ABSM) used by the East Asian Pacific (Green et al., 2010). 
 
The emphasis on PEA by both DFID and the World bank symbolises a growing consensus 
of the inseparability of politics in development discourse in general, and its relevance, 
to understanding the drivers and challenges in introducing NPFM reforms in developing 
countries. As Marquette and Scott (2005) write, such moves by DIFD and the World Bank 
also ignited interests from academics in both political science and development studies 
in the recent years. As evidence also suggests, if reform has nothing to do with politics, 
politics obviously has something to do with PFM reforms progress and these models are 
a step in the right direction, since both contribute to our understanding of stakeholder 
preferences and interests and power relations, rather than simply playing a blame-game 
that lack of political will negatively impact reform success. However, the World Bank 
model, in particular, relies heavily on high-quality data that requires expert knowledge 





More so, the World Bank model falls short of providing a rich picture of a country’s 
political system, rather it is limited to only a snapshot of the country’s current 
government and political parties at a point in time, which has been argued requires 
broadening through the application of other models of political analysis that can garner 
more support and applicable to local the contexts. It, therefore, does not address the 
fundamental elements of the research questions of how and why certain factions of 
political actors form opposition to reform efforts in developing countries (Marquette 
and Scott, 2005, see also Killick, 2005).  
 
The DFID DoC approach, irrespective of its focus on donor understanding of the history 
and political economy of a country or a given situation and its flexibility (both 
thematically and in terms of its applicability, not just at country level, but also at regional 
and sectoral levels), suffers from a number of caveats. These caveats include, among 
others, its lack of country ownership, which like the EUSM it is also not all-encompassing 
as it does not include in the analysis vital stakeholders such as civil society organisations. 
The latter is particularly vital, given the different perspectives, various groups do bring 
into the analysis in determining support or obstacles to change. Similarly, the DoC like 
the EUSM, is also limited in its ability to provide answers as to why certain agents and 
structures drive or block opportunities for change in NPFM reform efforts in developing 
countries (Marquette and Scott, 2005).   
 
Other variant models of PEA have also been put forward by academics and experts in 





for example, unlike many scholars, argues that the reasons for cross-countries 
difference or failure of governance reforms in some developing countries, are not 
entirely as a result of absence of top-level ‘Political Will’, rather she opines what is 
fundamental to decoding reasons for success or failure in different countries lies in our 
understanding of the incentives facing both politicians and civil servants when deciding 
whether or not to support reforms. For politicians, on the one hand, she maintains their 
position is influenced by the incentive to maintain existing patronage systems and rents 
and the incentive to generate political support and alliances.   
 
Bureaucrats or reformers, on the other hand, are influenced by the existence of informal 
rules and practices to compensate those who stand to lose from NPFM reforms; the 
nature of society-state relations, which inform the extent of intervention by political 
parties and other intermediary organisations in shaping consensus around reform 
objectives; and the political agency and skills required to deal with the design and 
implementation of reforms, including their type, scope and pace and sequencing issues 
etc., so that resistance is undermined.  
 
In light of the above propositions, she concludes by categorising  the factors that 
influence reformers to take political risks into structural features of politics and society, 
that determine adaptability of social institutions to change, including depth of 
institutions, composition of governing elites and composition of civil society 





reform sequence, space and timing of reform, existing technical capacity of the civil 
service, the extent of decentralisation and monitorability of reform programs.  
 
The later distinction by Goetz emanates from what had been labelled first-generation 
and second-generation of reform, further known as policy reforms and governance 
reforms respectively (Naim, 1994 and 1995; Tommasi and Velasco 1996; and Burki and 
Perry 1998). The focus here is on the latter, but the former is mostly associated with 
reforms efforts in the following the economic crisis in the 1980s and the Washington 
Consensus. The main arguments and findings of these set of reforms are summarised in 
the following literature (Nelson, 1990; Williamson, 1990; Bates and Krueger, 1993; 
Haggard, 2000 and Krueger, 2000). However, what is central to these debates is that 
crisis is the single driver of these set of NPM reforms (Rodrik, 1996).  
 
With regard second-generation governance, institutional and administrative reforms, 
there is consensus among academics and observers that these sets of reforms are 
relatively more difficult to implement and manage, complex and may require longer 
time period to realise their benefits (Naim, 1994, Haggard 2000). As evidence suggests, 
the reality is that in the words of Kaufman, “it may be easier to alter government policy 
than to change the institutional rules through which policy is made” (Kaufman 1999, P. 
360). 
 
Using a different approach, Grindle and Thomas (1989) and Thomas and Grindle (1990) 





procedures for setting reform agenda, policy decision making and implementation as 
critical to our understanding of the drivers and challenges that account for how, why, 
and when policy and institutional changes happen in different contexts. Specifically, they 
seek to address the following questions: “how did the issue of reform get on the agenda 
of government decision making? Why were political, bureaucratic, and technical criteria 
important in promoting or inhibiting the process of change? And what drivers led to the 
sustainability or abandonment of reform initiatives?” (Grindle and Thomas, 1989, P. 
214).  
 
In combining both theory and practice, they argue the following, that: first, politicians 
and bureaucrats play important roles in shaping policy and institutional progress, but 
they also reveal the concrete ways in which contextual factors constrain the leverage 
available to these politicians and bureaucrats. Their case studies further reveal that 
elites influence reform initiatives through a blend of their values, experiences, and 
perceptions with the historical, political and institutional contexts of their respective 
countries, and by responding to both domestic and external pressures for change 
(Grindle and Thomas, 1989).  
 
Second, they posit that circumstances unique to a particular reform initiative affect the 
dynamics processes of decision-making, although they do not necessarily determine the 
outcome of that process in different countries. The critical consideration is whether a 
reform initiative is perceived as in response to a crisis or under conditions which Grindle 





reform initiatives in different contexts, who are the decision-makers and the timing of 
their decision and to what extent are the level of change. The politics-as-usual, of which 
PFM reforms are a part, are particularly relevant to the current debate of NPFM reforms, 
in that, they exhibit essential characteristics that are worth noting. These characteristics 
include the fact that they are dispersed and accrue benefits over the long-term; they are 
highly technical and require adequate technical expertise and takes longer to implement 
(Grindle and Thomas, 1989). 
 
And finally, they argue that the characteristics of particular reforms determine the type 
of resistance they are likely to face during implementation. From their empirical findings, 
Grindle and Thomas (1989) further argued that the characteristics of a particular reform 
initiative has significant implications for the continuance, sustainability and the intended 
outcome (see also Thomas and Grindle, 1990). 
 
What Grindle and Thomas (1989) did uniquely in terms of their approach, is that, they 
avoid the usual risk of running into one of the extreme positions taken by other scholars 
either making broad generalisation of a particular PEA framework, often becoming 
meaningless or adapting their models to a specific country context or situation, which 
like the former, too often becoming idiosyncratic. Although they avoided either 
extremes, their framework is based on country experiences and intended to also 
stimulate further debate and research into the PEA of NPM reforms in developing 
countries. Another important point from Grindle and Thomas (1989) and Thomas and 





and implementation of NPM reforms, which they argue reform initiatives should not be 
limited to whether they are successful or unsuccessful. Instead, reform programming 
should focus on achieving policy outcomes and must be accompanied with a strategic 
plan of implementation. Robinson (2007b) made similar conclusions that affirm the 
findings of Goetz (2007), arguing that critical to reform progress is the nature of the 
political agency, in the form of high-level commitment to reforms, but also show of 
efforts to address existing opposition to NPFM reforms. He also added that other drivers 
of NPFM reforms may include the level of technical capacity of the civil service and the 
degree of insulation from political and societal pressures, sequencing and timing of 
reform initiatives must be conducive for sustainable reforms in developing countries. 
 
On the basis of their case study findings, Grindle and Thomas (1989) and Thomas and 
Grindle (1990) conclude that governance and institutional reforms are continuous 
processes that differ between developing countries in significant respects, and that will 
require intimate knowledge of a country's environment, historical and existing context 
to enable a fuller analysis and understanding as a basis for launching NPFM reform 
initiatives. While Robinson (2007b) generally agrees with Goetz (2007) in many respects, 
he, however, went further to maintain that donor support though essential, but it should 
remain moderate and requires flexibility, at least in the short-term and should be 
domestically driven and incremental over the long-term.  
 
Unlike Grindle and Thomas (1989 and 1990) and Robinson (2007b), Geddes (1991 and 





effect of electoral and party systems for initiating and sustaining reforms in several 
countries in Latin America, which practitioners and observers of NPFM reforms in 
developing countries continue to draw from (Fritz et al., 2009; Fritz et al., 2017).  Her 
initial findings reveal that: a) reforms are more likely to be initiated in countries where 
the two dominant political parties have equal opportunity to the patronage systems; b) 
that reforms stand higher chance of being followed and sustained in countries where 
electoral power of the dominant parties are relatively even and stable; and c) other 
characteristics of the  political systems, such as open list proportional representations 
and the role of legislators and party leaders may also increase or decrease the chances 
of reform initiation and survival (Geddes, 1991). Also, through the adoption of rational 
choice theory, Geddes (1994) argues understanding the compelling dilemmas facing 
politicians is critical for explaining the potentials for reform success.  
 
On the one hand, Geddes argues that while party leaders tend to believe that competent 
civil service is fundamental to efficient and effective public management, political 
realities invariably lure them to reward powerful party cohorts, undermining long-term 
capability and proficiency in the civil service. On the other hand, Geddes also shows how 
bureaucrats become more effective if they are protected from partisan pressures and 
operate through transparent merit-based hiring and promotion policies.  
 
Today, there is widespread appreciation and understanding among donors, 
practitioners and independent observers of NPFM in developing countries that thinking 





understanding of the formal and informal political structures and processes, incentives 
and information that are critical to successful development interventions and NPFM 
reforms in developing countries (Fisher and Marquette, 2014; Rocha Menocal, 2014; 
Unsworth, 2015; Wild et al. 2015; Bain, Booth, and Wild 2016; Kelsall, 2016; Fritz et al., 
2017; Hadley & Tilley, 2017; Moshonas, 2018; Laws and Marquette, 2018).  
 
It, therefore, becomes imperative that this study seeks to find out how the PEA to policy 
and governance reforms applies to PFM and budget reforms, or more broadly to NPFM 
reforms in developing and post-conflict countries? How have the above political 
economy models helped shape our understanding of, and the implementation practices 
and overall impact on NPFM reforms in developing and post-conflict countries? The 
above review of some the perspectives of PEA to policy and governance reforms shows 
a clear link and the importance of political economy drivers for successful 
implementation of NPFM reforms in developing and post-conflict countries. 
 
 Considering the above, some scholars and observers of NPFM reforms in developing 
countries opine, for example, that good governance concepts such as transparency and 
accountability are fundamental to NPFM reform success (Campos and Pradhan, 1999 
and Diamond, 2006). This link has even propelled others to argue that NPFM reform 
should be integrated into overall public service reform, noting that the latter is broader 
in scope and will complement PFM reform efforts in developing countries (Stevens, 2005; 






Additionally, others claim that support from civil society represents another essential 
mechanism for NPFM reform progress, even in the absence of reliable governance 
apparatus (Robinson, 2009 and de Renzio and Krafchik, 2007). Having said these, readers 
of this thesis should, however, be wary of the fact that good governance is not a panacea 
for successful NPFM reforms, especially in developing countries. Circumstantial 
evidence from many case studies show that the existence of good governance in 
developing countries does not guarantee the acceptance and sustenance of PFM 
reforms. In fact, reforms do thrive in the presence of other drivers even with weak 
governance systems (Goldsmith, 2007). We should, therefore, be warier in the light of 
these contradictions, and the first instance will be to seek a better understanding of 
these complexities in order to accurately predict the direction of causality between good 
governance and PFM reforms.        
  
Primarily, both the political economy approach to governance reforms and the apparent 
uneven and limited progress with high-level technical reform initiatives such as the 
MTEF and IFMIS have led to the growing recognition that developing countries’ political 
systems are critical for successful implementation of NPFM reforms. Indeed, as Shah 
(2006), Campos and Pradhan (2007), DFID (2007), Wehner et al. (2007) and Wescott 
(2008) note both institutional and the political context must be considered PFM reform 
programming and implementation in developing countries.  On this front, the various 
debates and empirical findings on the application of PEA to NPFM reforms are presented 





to policy and governance assessments earmarked by Schneider (2006). See also the 
World Bank independent evaluation by Wescott (2008).  
 
Quantitatively, many studies such as Kaufmann et al. (2003 and 2005) and IBP (2006) 
based on establishing broad correlations have emerged. As usual, they can be replicated 
elsewhere, and precise, comprehensive to some degree and are good at offering 
comparability over time of various PFM reform components in a specific country and as 
well as facilitates cross-country comparisons.  The common grounds have been cross-
country comparisons of similar countries often reveal weaknesses and strengths that 
reformers to consider, while within-country comparisons of governance components 
over time often showed relative progress. 
 
Like all other quantitative analysis, the validity and reliability of these studies have come 
under a lot of scrutiny, especially in light of the complex relationships and confounding 
variables involved, which often lead to inaccuracy of indicators and the aggregation and 
weighting of these indicators are themselves flawed and may wrongly indicate the 
directions of causal relationships.  Marquette and Scott (2005) and Acosta and de Renzio 
(2008), for example, argue that these complex statistical analyses have, however, been 
criticised because of the shared complexity, the multi-dimensional nature of reforms 
and as well as the limited technical expertise in developing SSA countries. Regarding the 
direction of causality, Goldsmith (2007) highlights an inverse relationship between 
better governance institutions and NPFM reform progress, arguing that some 





Additionally, in the words of Acosta and de Renzio (2008, p. 1) “contrary to established 
findings for rich countries, the uncontested executive authority has counterproductive 
effects on fiscal balances in the context of aid-dependent and resource-rich countries”.  
However, as Wescott (2008) points out, the caveat from Goldsmith’s argument is that 
we are left with no clues as to which governance reforms are more influential, 
considering the sequencing of NPFM reforms and country-specific context.  
 
Others such as Besancon (2003) and Hood (2007) have criticised these quantitative 
models sighting the challenges in replicating them over time, and because of their focus 
on interviewing mostly outsiders, who may not have sound knowledge of the local 
context and other errors arising from interpreting these results. See also critiques of 
these models from Arndt (2006).  
 
Qualitatively, it is noteworthy that the relevant studies were commissioned on the basis 
that they provide historical and explanatory accounts and present a rich-picture of 
country-specific applications of political economy analysis of the drivers and challenges 
of NPFM reforms. This section now presents a summary of the accounts of the relevant 
qualitative studies. Primarily, evidence from PEA now shows that budget decisions and 
policy execution reflect the underlying power dynamics, which are in turn shaped by 
political dynamics and as well as institutional factors in developing countries. The 
political aspects of the budget process mainly drive and shape the rules of the game, 
their ownership, sequence of reforms and timing and the commitment to reforms by 





2006; Campos and Pradhan, 2007; and De Renzio, 2009).  Country specific and cross-
country case studies also point out the influence of politics and party systems in driving 
and sustaining PFM reforms in developing countries (Dixon, 2005 and Grindle, 2007).  
Other seminal country case studies of the PEA in Mozambique by (Hodges and Tibana 
2004), Malawi by Rakner et al. (2004) and in Ghana by Killick (2005) are fundamental to 
our understanding of the political implications to PFM reforms in developing countries. 
Together, the writers agree that PFM is not only a technical process but is also a political 
process; and that informal rules and norms (the actual budget process) often dominate 
the formal institutions (the ideal budget process). The latter is often regarded as a 
mechanism of keeping western donors happy.  
 
Other scholars and observers have adopted more complex statistical models, such as 
simulation software to be able to explain the incentives facing both politicians and 
bureaucrats in determining the feasibility and sustainability of policy and governance 
reforms in developing countries (Reich and Cooper, 2000 and Nunberg and Green, 2004).  
However, Duncan et al. (2012) without using a statistical software also carried out a 
similar analysis in order to predict the underlying factors that influence politicians in 
deciding whether to support or oppose certain PFM reform efforts.  
 
Also on the linkages between governance and PFM reforms in developing countries, 
Hedger and Agha (2007) in a conference report from the Centre for Aid and Public 
Expenditure (CAPE) note that there is sometimes a disconnect between the two, arguing 





They, however, emphasised the role of political leaders, aided by their top bureaucrats 
in enhancing reform implementation. Duncan (2014) confirms this assertion in his report 
on Kiribati that the ‘room for manoeuvre’ for reform emanated from the leader’s 
interests in reforming large government parastatals, coupled with a small group of 
senior bureaucrats with similar vision as the leader. One could, therefore, reasonably 
infer that both politics and institutional dynamics have negative and positive 
consequences on PFM reform efforts in developing countries. In the words of Tomassi 
“budget politics offer both challenges and opportunities. Politics is not only a risk to 
mitigate but also an opportunity to seize” (Tommasi, 2009, p. 11). 
 
What stands out from the above review of the quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
the confounding and contingent nature of governance and policy choices means a 
standard model promoting specific political indicators is unlikely to be satisfactory for 
policy and governance reforms. Regarding PFM reforms, De-Lay et al. note “the holistic 
nature of PFM systems does not suit a “medical model” investigating links between 
specific “treatments” and specific results” (De-Lay et al., 2015, p. 12). Moreover, Acosta 
and de Renzio (2008) suggest that the political dynamics behind good governance must 
be analysed to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the budget process and 
that additional and improved quality data is required to measure the impact of politics 
and institutional factors on PFM reforms in developing countries. As the evidence 
suggests, this is also true not just for the impact of politics of PFM reforms, for which 
De-Lay et al. (2015) further argue establishing reliable attributions in PFM reforms, in 





Amidst these complex relationships, is there any practical relevance of PEA on budget 
reforms? Although there is still lack of clarity as to whether these sophisticated analyses 
have culminated into operational strategies and programmes, the researcher disagrees 
with the argument by Marquette and Scott (2005) that political economy models such 
as DFID’s DoC have barely had any practical implementation relevance in reforming 
budgetary systems in developing countries. Instead, this study argues that indeed the 
PEA to governance and PFM reforms have created significant awareness on the part of 
donors that, a country’s political elite, top-level bureaucrats and party-systems are 
critical to the planning and sustainability of reforms. The researcher, however, does 
agree on the one hand, with Fisher and Marquette (2014) on the lack of efficacy of PEA 
to governance and budgetary reforms, primarily as a result of methodological concerns 
and the nature of the approach itself. They argue “PEA has today become a tool or 
product ‘sold’ to donors and ‘done’ externally, and it is no longer fit for 
purpose. …tracing its evolution from a transformative approach to policymaking to a 
discrete instrument that is applied to specific ‘problems’, usually by external consultants” 
(Fisher and Marquette, 2014, p. 3). On the other hand, the researcher argues the request 
by Fisher and Marquette (2014) seems to suggest for the complete abandonment of PEA 
to the thinking politically agenda to governance and budget reforms contradicts the 
overwhelming evidence and recognition by scholars and experts about the impact of 
this approach.  
 
So, what does donor support tell us about the application of PEA to governance and PFM 





of donors in reforming Mozambique’s governance and budgetary systems through their 
support to reformers within the central government (Hodges and Tibana, 2004). They, 
however, note that such international influence undermines the accountability of local 
institutions, further worsening capacity and accountability for public resources by the 
central government to its citizenry. See also a report on the performance of Programme 
Aid Partners in Mozambique by Killick, Castel-Branco and Gerster (2005).  Shah (2006) 
also highlighted the adverse effects of international intervention in NPFM reforms in 
developing countries on reform success as a result of the proliferation of high-level tools 
and assessments and uncoordinated advice by donor-partners.  
 
So, how has international intervention shape thinking and practice in PFM reforms in 
developing countries? Evidence from Tanzania suggests the manipulation of donors by 
bureaucrats, often presenting ‘shop windows’ through speaking the language of good 
governance, contrary to the ‘smoke-filled room’ of the country’s political systems and 
ruling elite where the real policy and budget decisions are made (Kelsall, 2002). He 
further argues that donor-supported reforms including PFM tend to disregard political 
considerations, which as in the case of Tanzania undermined the interest of political 
elites, and when they did, they often run the chance of being resisted.    
 
Similarly, other developing countries such as Ghana have been found to be using the 
annual budget process as a façade to establish trust and keep donors happy, given the 
fact that the budgets were fundamentally flawed and biased towards specific areas of 





donors, often leading to the usual complaints of weak political commitment.  In the 
same vein, Hydén (2005) in a study of Tanzania added that donors have mainly 
succeeded in institutionalising formal rules in pockets where they are active. Hydén 
writes, “informal practices found at the policy implementation level have their roots in 
society. They, rather than formal institutions constitute the principal threat to the 
reform effort. …because they are embedded in society and its culture; they will remain 
‘necessary evils’ that the donor community can at best contain, not erase altogether” 
(Hydén, 2005, p. 17).  
 
Consequently, this study concludes that understanding the political economy drivers 
remains fundamental to PFM strengthen efforts in developing and post-conflict 
countries. This point was emphasized by Allen, Hemming and Porter, who made similar 
conclusions that politics is critical in the PFM reform process in developing countries, 
and that they “anticipate that, over the next ten years, the importance of political 
economy analysis as applied to PFM will continue to grow both as an area of research 
and in its practical application.” (Allen, Hemming, and Potter, 2013, p. 6). 
 
 
2.2.5 Innovative or Thinking Out-of-the-Box Approaches to Understanding the 
Drivers and Challenges of NPFM Reforms in Developing and Post-conflict Countries 
More recently, a new set of approaches have emerged known as “innovative” or 
“thinking out-of-the-box” approaches to problem solving in developing and challenging 
or post-conflict environments. However, these approaches are mostly entrenched 
within the existing institutional, policy and governance approaches to reforms, including 





approaches range from the Problem-driven Approach (Andrews et al., 2012; Blum, 
Manning, and Srivastava 2012; Andrews, 2013 & 2017; Bridges and Woolcock, 2017), 
power and systems approach in institutional change (Green, 2016; Mansoor and 
Williams, 2018; Wehner, 2018), the proposal for doing development differently (Booth, 
2015) and Bottom-Up approaches (Welham et al., 2017).   
 
Among these innovative approaches, the problem-driven model has gained more 
prominence in efforts to strengthen PFM in developing countries. The problem-driven 
approach argues against current policy reforms by donor partners, which according the 
authors lead to isomorphic mimicry and capability-traps in reforming PFM institutions 
in developing countries. Instead, the authors emphasis the need for solving problems, 
instead of selling solution, which must include the engagement of wider national 
stakeholders, and must be done through an iterative process that facilitates rapid 
experiential learning (Andrews et al., 2012). Apart from its application on ten donor-
funded projects in Malawi (Bridges and Woolcock, 2017), and in PS reforms in Sierra 
Leone (Srivastava & Larizza, 2013), the problem-drive approach is still emerging and 
based on the prescriptive propositions made by the pioneers. Building on their findings 
from Malawi, Bridges and Woolcock (2017) have also argued about the limit of reforms 
that are driven-externally, instead calling for more home-grown solutions to locally 
identified development challenges.  
 
However, critiques (Krause, 2013) of this approach cite its failure to recognise the 





take for developing countries (especially post-conflict countries) to develop the capacity 
to learn and adapt. Moreover, some of the specific proposals of the problem-driven 
approach appear to be untenable to development partners or unattractive in the current 
policy landscape of interventions by development partners in PFM reforms in 
developing countries.  It calls for radical changes such as abolishing the current log-
frame approach used by international partners. This request takes away the control 
mechanisms of development partners. However, it also does not help donor partners, 
amid the increasing calls for higher results and accountability in development assistance.  
 
 
2.3 The Role of Theory vs Practical Implementation Experience in Understanding the 
Drivers and Challenges in PFM Reforms in Developing Post-conflict Countries 
This section examines how theory versus practical implementation experience in the 
implementation of PFM reforms have contributed to both an understanding of the 
drivers and challenges and how those experiences have further guided the development 
of new models and practice in developing countries. It is no longer surprising when 
Pretorius and Pretorius (2008) in their synthesis of the NPFM literature note that there 
has been a thin line between reform experience and theoretical PFM models in 
developing countries. An even broader review covering 197 studies by De Lay et al. (2015) 
shows significant challenges in acquiring robust evidence. Their evidence mapping 
analysis in terms of liking PFM interventions to results, shows that evidence on 
outcomes was ‘patchy’ (De Lay et al., 2015). This study notes that the list of studies 
covered is not exhaustive, as there were many exclusions which they note was based on 
the study’s terms of reference and presumably as a result of the overwhelming 
realisation by both academics and PFM observers about the difficulties in acquiring 






Unlike Pretorius and Pretorius (2008), the evidence mapping by De Lay et al., (2015) 
went further to show a much thinner evidence as one tends to look deeper down the 
budget cycle or what they described as softer intervention areas.  The lack of clear 
evidence of impact perhaps, could be linked to the recent resurgence in political 
economy analysis and another meta-analysis such as the strengthened approach to PFM 
reforms, which emphasis political factors, country context and other implementation 
issues. Meanwhile, there are still fewer studies on, for example, political bodies or on 
implementation stages and other downstream areas of the PFM cycle (De Lay et al., 
2015; Mills and De Lay 2016). Perhaps, because of their complexity as they involve 
multiple actors and challenging to observe by external stakeholders (Andrews, 2011). 
Allen (2008) suggests this is because donors and consultants are unable to see beyond 
PFM institutions and PFM systems or the limited coverage might have in part 
contributed to poor performance of these downstream dimensions of PFM.  
Furthermore, as Pretorius and Pretorius (2008) also highlight the feasibility of 
establishing any useful links becomes complicated, in part, also because of the cyclical 
relationship between PFM models and reform experience. PFM models are often 
informed and guided by reform experience in developing countries, leading to the need 
to continue to tailor PFM models with country-specific contexts.  
 
Meanwhile, the PFM literature continues to point to the fact that reform programmes 
or immediate outcomes often are construed differently from one country to the other. 





definitions from both academics and practitioners of PFM. For example, the use of 
brolly/umbrella terms such as linking policy to budget, are most often attributed to PFM 
intervention areas such as MTEF, or performance budgeting. However, the actual make-
up or elements of any of these in PFM jargon may be interpreted differently from one 
expert, or from one country to the next. Linking budgets with policy objectives, most 
often to PRSPs as per donor recommendations especially for HIPC countries led to 
attributions, and among others, the budget mostly failed to cover non-priority areas and 
questionable expenditure groupings, which invariably led to unreliable budgets 
(Tommasi, 2009). Also, both Andrews (2006) and Tommasi (2009) highlighted the 
confusion created using the terms ‘best practice’ and Schick’s basics first approach. Thus, 
improper understanding of these programmes meant introducing inadequacies in the 
budget preparation and implementation processes in developing countries. 
 
However, what does the above background tell us in terms of reform experience? In 
part, we can deduce that even with the massive influx of many donors and higher 
resource flows to PFM (World Bank, 2018:9-11), progress has been slow and uneven 
(Dorotinsky and Floyd, 2004; IMF, 2007; Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008; de Renzio et al., 
2010; Fritz et al., 2012; Fritz et al., 2014). It is reported that there are at least 50 donors 
worldwide supporting PFM, averaging at least seven donors per country. With the World 
Bank alone having 25% or more of its total project cost, with a PFM component 
increasing from 110 over the period 1987-99, to 202 over the period 2000-2006 (Allen 





Bank amount to $32billion, with developing countries SSA accounting for more than a 
third with 409 approved funding and the largest beneficiary (World Bank, 2018:9-11).  
 
Irrespective of the above development, most of the success stories cited by the World 
Bank Independent Evaluation Group study are in developed and transitional countries, 
apart from a few developing countries in Asia, the North America (Wescott, 2008).  In 
developing countries, and in SSA countries in particular, the slow and uneven progress 
could be accounted for in respect of the fact that the early experience in Uganda for 
example, shows that actual immediate outcomes were worse than budgetary 
allocations would imply because of leakages in the transfer of funds from the centre to 
service delivery units, thus constraining efforts in improving outcomes. This early 
ground-breaking research in PFM led Ablo and Reinikka (1998) to argue that budgetary 
allocations are inappropriate in explaining outcomes in PFM and policy decisions 
especially in developing SSA countries with weak institutions (see also DFID, 2007; 
Wehner et al., 2007). This early development also led to the rise of anti-corruption 
measures, mostly as donor requirement through HIPC and other programmes. However, 
Heilbrunn (2004) was quick to repudiate such efforts, by arguing that the creation of 
anti-corruption programme is a token effort that lacks substance, without advancement 
in PFM reforms in developing countries. 
 
Additionally, early studies suggest a long list of triggers - donor pressure and post-
conflict situations were the main drivers of NPFM reforms in developing and post-





driven by political change (Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi, 1999). Some PFM observers 
such as Lienert (2004) suggests, that colonial heritage is influential in driving PFM reform 
efforts and make specific distinctions between Francophone and Anglophone countries 
in SSA (Lienert 2004). Some have also argued that differences in historical, legal and 
institutional contexts are significant drivers of PFM reforms for countries at similar levels 
of income, complexities which might complicate aid modalities (de Renzio, 2009a; 
Andrews et al., 2010). 
 
As noted earlier, reform experiences have mostly guided PFM interventions and models 
in developing and post-conflict countries. For instance, experience with some post-
conflict countries meant that some countries had to go through more robust reform 
efforts when compared with others. One such case is Liberia which went through a more 
robust, radical and controversial reforms in PFM through its governance and economic 
management programme - GEMAP (Shah, 2007).  
 
Also, Schiavo-Campo (2007) in his review of budgetary institutions in post-conflict 
countries suggests that a first entry point for these countries was to protect the money 
– ensuring that public resources both external and domestic resources are correctly 
accounted for. More so, post-conflict countries often accepted much tougher conditions 
such as no aid without a program, no program without a budget, in return for much-







Apparently, after years of reviews of PFM interventions in developing countries by the 
donor community, there seems to be an overwhelming agreement that the influence of 
non-technical factors dominate in the efforts in reforming budgetary institutions in 
developing and post-conflict countries. However, as Diamond (2013) argues, the 
challenge has been the lack of a consensus on what these non-technical drivers of PFM 
reforms in developing and post-conflict countries are, which presumably could also be 
as a result of country differences. Scanning through the previous sections of this chapter 
reveals a long list of drivers, within the broad ambit of politics and ownership of reforms, 
institutional dynamics, economic factors, support from international partners and other 
contextual factors.  
 
A survey of the contributions from some PFM reform observers Bergmann and 
Bietenharder (2010) reveals a consensus in the critical role of what they described as 
softer factors in efforts to improve and sustain NPFM reforms in developing countries. 
Andrews (2011) also finds these softer factors, or what he called de facto, downstream 
and de-concentrated dimensions of reforms to be less amenable to externally driven 
PFM reforms. The finding of these PFM reform observers corroborates earlier proposal 
by Brooke, who in addition to proposing the platform approach, emphasised political 
context, process development, motivational development, capacity development, and 
institutional development as critical factors in advancing PFM reforms in developing 
countries. For Tommasi, the optimal mix of measures to improve PFM performance 
depends on country context including, among other elements, “human resources 





culture and the institutional and political context” (Tommasi, 2009, p.9). In the same 
vein, Quist points to the political context, the maturity and level of activity by civil society, 
the level of donor harmonisation, the degree of ownership of reform strategy along with 
the ‘political will’ as drivers of PFM reform progress (Quist 2009:7). 
 
Among many studies, De Renzio et al.  (2010) and Fritz et al. (2014) represent to date 
the most comprehensive quantitative studies of the list of drivers of PFM or the factors 
that may have been responsible for cross-countries difference in PFM performance and 
across the dimensions of PFM over time. These cross-country econometric analyses 
show that economic factors such as income levels and continuous economic growth 
have higher explanatory power than aid-related factors. Countries with larger 
populations, higher levels of per capita income and better recent economic growth 
records, generally have a high-performance rate. Donor support and presence of long 
donor engagement are only minimally associated with reform progress, because a 
marginal increment in donor support, for example, corresponds to an average PEFA 
score rise by half-point, even after applying several robust statistical checks. By contrast, 
they find that resource-based economies and state fragility (mainly countries in conflicts 
or post-conflict situations) and to be negatively associated with PFM reform 
performance (see also Andrews and Turkewitz, 2005; de Renzio and Dorotinsky, 2007; 
Andrews, 2010).  
 
Andrews (2011) also challenged the usual excuse given by donors whenever their 





interventions need time to produce good results, even when these results sometimes 
will never come. Often, they associate these failures to inadequate capacity in 
developing countries and lack of donor focus (Andrews, 2009 and 2011). These Andrews 
and Turkewitz (2005, p. 210) note are usual suspects for public sector reform failure. 
They further argue that reforms mostly fail because of the approach to change in the 
public sector, including the international-led approach to NPFM reforms in developing 
countries.  
However, we must take exception to Andrew’s treatment of the importance of time 
factor as a pinch of salt for PFM reform success in developing countries. Time does 
matter in reforms not only in PFM, as Pretorius and Pretorius (2008) have shown, the 
literature generally agrees in the long-term perspective and the continuous process of 
PFM reforms. Unrealistic timescale has been cited by many as one of the contributing 
factors of reform failure such as in the implementation of IFMIS (Diamond, 2013). 
Andersson and Isaksen (2003) earlier argue that ‘things take time’, and this is true with 
the experience in PFM, with often higher targets to be accomplished in three-years, 
whereas a twenty-five-year time frame would be ordinarily appropriate. It is a truism 
that budget reforms in developed countries took many decades to develop; Allen (2009) 
argues that timing was dependent on the evolution of the country’s’ economic and 
political institutions. In fact, as Allen points out: it took, for example, France 217 years 
to develop its budgetary systems from the introduction of Accounting Office reporting 
to parliament in 1791 to  full medium-term expenditure framework in 2008; UK 217 
years, from establishing the consolidated fund in 1787 to  fully operationalising  resource 





Accounts in 1776 to the introducing Accrual accounting for all federal entities in 1990  
(see table one in Allen, 2009, p. 4).  
 
Finally, what is also valid for developing countries (especially post conflict countries) is 
that their PFM institutions are in their infancy, they do not possess the necessary 
infrastructure – therefore any significant progress in their reform will need time to fully 
materialise (Schick, 1998a; Shah, 2007; Diamond, 2013). 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The review in this chapter has mainly examined, from a two-dimensional angle, the 
drivers and challenges in the introduction of NPFM reforms in developing and post-
conflict countries. The first of the two-dimensional angle has examined the various 
theoretical perspectives and policy debates in understanding the drivers and challenges 
that underpin country differences and differences in performance over time and across 
dimensions of PFM. The second aspect examined the role of theory versus practical 
implementation experience in understanding the drivers and challenges, but also how 
practical implementation experiences have further guided both policy and practice.  
 
Having reviewed the different drivers and challenges and being informed by the thin line 
between theory and practical implementation experience, this study makes the 
argument that no single driver or group of drivers provide definitive answers to the 
research questions or account for cross-country differences and the differences in 





literature between technical approaches such as the sequencing of reforms and non-
technical approaches such as PEA is even less helpful in contributing to an understanding 
of the drivers and challenges of introducing PFM reforms in developing countries. No 
single perspective to understanding the drivers and challenges of PFM reforms can 
explain what works or what does not work and why. Many of the perspectives and 
solutions are merely prescriptive reform model, which are not derived from formal 
analysis of empirical evidence in developing and post-conflict countries. Moreover, the 
most influential studies covered in the review have not provided an appropriate balance 
in addressing the central idea of the research questions examined in this thesis, which 
are how and why specific reform initiatives or countries became successful in their 
implementation of PFM reforms, when compared with others.   
 
While the review in this chapter shows a long of list of drivers of PFM reforms in 
developing countries, this thesis groups these drivers into five major categories namely, 
technical factors; local ownership and political factors; economic factors; institutional 
dynamics; and the role of international partners. A relevant point to note also is the fact 
that, while these drivers/factors may be present in many countries, their role and 
influence in shaping opportunities for change may vary in different contexts. 
 
There is, therefore, no single practical solution that is both a necessity and a sufficient 
condition for improving development outcomes through PFM reform interventions in 
developing and post-conflict countries. So, while the review shows a growing consensus 





drivers, such as the political economy and institutional factors, this study further argues 
their role and influence in determining what works, how and why could only be fully 
captured if they are examined together with technical drivers and the interactions 
between them within a given country context.  
 
This thesis further makes the case that PFM or PFM reform itself is a complex and 
iterative process that involves broader stakeholder engagement, which makes it less 
amenable to any single approach that explains the drivers and challenges and as well as 
proffer practical solutions that might be relevant in specific context and future 
interventions in PFM. Thus, this thesis concludes that in order to understand both the 
drivers and challenges of PFM reforms and to proffer practical solutions that will 
improve development outcomes through PFM reforms in developing and post-conflict 
countries, the study of PFM reform should be approached holistically. This means 
examining both the technical and non-technical drivers and the interactions between 
them within a given country context. This is what the researcher describes in this thesis 
as moving towards a holistic approach. This holistic approach to PFM will facility the 
investigation of the cumulative contributions of the underlying drivers and challenges 
that underpin how and why do some developing countries perform better than others 










UNDERSTANDING WHAT SUCCESS/FAILURE LOOKS LIKE IN PFM REFORMS IN 
DIFFERENT CONTEXTS AND THE NEED FOR CROSS-COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This study has established in the previous chapter that all the approaches are, prima 
facie, fundamentally different, no one approach tells us everything about the drivers 
and challenges of NPFM in developing and post-conflict countries. None of them 
provides all the answers to facilitate a deeper understanding of the underlying technical 
issues, economic, political and institutional dynamics that drive and sustain reform 
efforts in developing countries. When taken in isolation, each perspective/approach also 
falls short of creating an appropriate balance in addressing issues such as how and why 
specific reform initiatives or countries are successful when compared with others. The 
why and how aspects of PFM reform performance are fundamental to the research 
questions this thesis attempts to answer, which are addressed in this chapter. Moreover, 
the approaches reviewed in the previous chapter leave us with little or no evidence as 
to the specific roles of political actors and country ownership, management and 
institutional arrangements and the specific role of donor partners in enhancing PFM 
reforms in different contexts, such as in post-conflict and other challenging 
environments.  
 
That is not to say that the various approaches reviewed in the previous chapter are not 





fact, these different approaches, together provide the configurations needed in 
developing a more holistic approach to PFM reforms that this study espouses. Correctly, 
these approaches have identified the relevant technical and non-technical drivers 
needed to be considered in developing the analytical framework, which is set out later 
in this chapter. 
 
This chapter, therefore, builds on the work by the PEFA Secretariat (2005, 2011, and 
2016) and that of de Renzio (2009b) amongst others to first, define the quality of PFM 
institutions, by establishing a comprehensive and appropriate measurable minimum 
criteria for assessing the quality of PFM systems (what success or failure looks like) 
across different developing countries. Second, it examines the reasons for differences in 
PFM reform performance in different contexts. And third, it establishes the need for 
more cross-countries empirical case studies by capitalising on the apparent thin line 
between the various approaches in understanding the drivers of PFM reforms and 









3.1 Conceptualising and Understanding Public Financial Management  
3.1.1 Defining PFM – Its Principles, Objectives and Processes and Defining PFM Systems 
Quality  
A starting point in conceptualising PFM is to try to understand as De Renzio (2009b) 
suggests what budget institutions are, defining their quality, how they can be measured 
and how their progress can be tracked over time. It is noteworthy that this section will 
not delve into the history and evolution of the various perspectives of what a budget is 
Public Administration Perspective (Coe, 1989 and Guthrie et al. 2005); Public Finance 
Perspective (Musgrave 1959); Political Economy Perspective (North 1990 and Campos 
and Pradhan 1996, cited in De Renzio, 2009b); and the Principal-Agent Model (Forrester, 
2002). It is, however, worth reiterating the fact that the various perspectives listed 
above have offered contrasting and often overlapping definitions of what constitutes 
‘better’ or ‘strong’ budget systems. Like De Renzio, conceiving budgeting as “a process 
for systematically relating the expenditure of funds to the accomplishment of planned 
objectives”(Schick, 1966, cited in De Renzio, 2009b, p. 9), the political economy 
perspective would tell us that budget is a political process where decisions about public 
funds are made. The public administration perspective would describe the institutional 
and management arrangements needed to accomplish budgetary decisions. And the 
public finance perspective would attempt to measure the likely impact of these 
budgetary choices on the broader public.  
 
Similar arguments can be put forward regarding the continuing confusion in defining 
Public Expenditure Management (PEM) or PFM.  The former is associated with a system 





Europe to manage, forecasts and authorise the annual receipts and expenditures of the 
state. Wildavsky (1975) (cited in De Renzio, 2009b, p. 8) however noted that the 
overwhelming trend nowadays among scholars is the claim that “government budgets 
are fundamental instruments of economic policy-making and arenas where major 
political battles are fought”.  Rubin (1997) also added that Public Expenditure 
Management (PEM) could range from collecting revenue, allocating limited resources, 
spending, debt management and maintaining an appropriate balance with other 
functions of government that, are associated with the budget cycle, that may have a 
significant influence on the overall management of the economy of any country.   
 
Allen Schick elucidated on the differences between the conventional idea of PEM and 
contemporary view of PFM. Given the former, he noted the focus is on traditional 
procedural rules or norms, while the latter emphasised substantive policy norms or 
outcomes and covers wide-ranging institutional and management arrangements, not 
just those traditionally associated with conventional PEM. Schick went further to 
suggest that the first difference between modem PEM and conventional budgeting is 
that PEM moves from strict adherence to procedural rules to achieve the three levels of 
budgetary outcomes: aggregate fiscal discipline, allocation of resources in accordance 
with government policy priorities and efficiency in the use of public funds (Schick, 1998a).      
 
Others have contrasted paradigms of conventional budgeting such as ‘probity’ and 
‘propriety’ to modern PFM paradigms such a policy and efficiency of performance. The 





Campo, 2007; Tommasi, 2009; see also Stewart and Ranson, 1988 and Witt and Müller, 
2006). See also Premchand (2007) for a detailed history and evolution of PFM.  
 
What has emerged clearly from the literature is that PFM covers revenue collection, 
allocation of public funds by policy priorities, expenditure execution, recording and 
accounting for public resources (See Tommasi, Allen, Schiavo-Campo and Garrity, 2004).  
Furthermore, there is a growing recognition that PFM goes beyond technical accounting, 
reporting and audit issues, but instead extends to include overall tax administration, 
spending and debt management, management and institutional arrangements, complex 
and involve multiple actors and inter-related processes (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008).  
  
This lack of consensus in defining budgets or PFM is probably as a result of the differing 
theoretical approaches and the long-time intervals between the different accounts (Key 
1940; Schick 1988, cited in De Renzio, 2009b; for budgetary theory and discourses see 
also Neuby, 1997; Gianakis and McCue, 2002; Hackbart and Ramsey, 2002; and LeLoup, 
2002). These controversies, therefore, reinforce our basis for a more integrated 
approach, such as that put forward by PEFA, in defining PFM and its institutional and 
management arrangements and the characteristics of PFM quality that countries should 
aspire towards; arguing that having these differing perspectives only lead to ascribing 
different, but often overlapping meanings to PFM.  
 
At this juncture, the starting point in defining PFM systems quality will be to identify its 





Sundelson (1935) to include, comprehensiveness, clarity, prior authorisation, 
appropriation, specification, comparability, unity, annularity, accuracy and publicity. 
One of the most influential writers on budgetary reforms, Wildavsky defended these 
principles, arguing that they bring consistency into and satisfy the various needs of the 
actors in the budgetary process (see Jones, 1996). These principles have remained in 
force and still, though in slightly different terminologies, being widely applied in 
modern-day PFM literature. That is clear in our review of the World Bank PEM Handbook, 
which stipulates different principles including comprehensiveness, legitimacy, 
predictability, contestability, honesty, information, transparency and accountability and 
more importantly institutional arrangements in order to foster sound budgeting and 
financial management in developing countries. These are measurement attributes of 
PFM systems quality which should enable cross-country assessment of reform progress. 
 
A second criterion for defining what makes up a quality budget system is to look at the 
objectives/outcomes of PFM, which have evolved as given in the table below: 
Table 3.1: Different definitions of budget objectives and outcomes 
Musgrave (1959)                 Schick (1966)                   Schick (1998) & World Bank (1998)                 
Allocation                              Control                              Aggregate fiscal discipline 
Distribution                            Management                   Resource allocation    
Stabilisation                           Planning                             Operational efficiency    
Source: adapted from De Renzio (2009b, p. 11) 
Again, the key differences lie in the authors underlying theoretical perspectives, but 
there is a clear link at various levels among the three models presented in the above 






Informed by the political economy perspective, the third criterion of desirable 
characteristics of PFM systems quality will be to identify and address comprehensively, 
the processes of the budget cycle, including its nature and the iterations among various 
actors involved. What forces go into the budget-making process or What factors govern 
the decisions of budgetary officials. Moreover, what roles does the legislature and 
centre/ministry of finance play? etc. Key (1940:1144). (See also Wildavsky, 1964; 
Wildavsky and Davis et al. 1966, cited in De Renzio, 2009b; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1986). 
The importance of budgetary processes and the iteration among various actors on a 
country’s fiscal position have also been established in a number of studies in Latin 
America and other Countries (see Hagen and Harden, 1995; Hallerberg and von Hagen, 
1997; Alesina et al., 1999; Hallerberg, 2004 and Von Hagen, 2006, cited in De Renzio, 
2009b).    
 
Underscoring the argument of Wildavsky (1961), the analytical framework I present at 
the end of this chapter is rooted in the view that until we know something about the 
underlying contexts in which budgetary actors find themselves, any reform efforts are, 
therefore, based on woefully inadequate understanding (Wildavsky, 1961: pp. 189-190; 
see also Jones, 1996). Wildavsky has argued that failures in the introduction of 
budgetary reforms such as performance budgeting and zero-based budgeting in the 
United States can be attributed to the lack of root in the thorough understanding of the 






In response to Key’s answer to the question “on what basis shall it be decided to allocate 
X dollars to Activity A instead of Activity B” (Key 1940: p. 1138), Wildavsky argued that 
Key had in fact, asked the wrong question. Instead, the question should have been who 
decides whether to allocate X funds to activity A and not Activity B. For Wildavsky, the 
answer was clear for the simple reason because the budget process was inseparable 
from the political system (Wildavsky, 1961). In his Political implications of budgetary 
reforms, Wildavsky further argues successful reform initiatives would invariably alter 
the budgetary process and its outcomes. Moreover, since such change has political 
implications, a sensible thing to do in attempting to understand the implications of 
reforms efforts will be to increase our understanding of the budget process (Wildavsky, 
1961 and 1992).  
 
Borrowing Wildavsky’s proposition, this study argues that explaining the three levels of 
budgetary outcomes (fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency and operational efficiency), 
for example, requires accounting for the operations and outcomes of the budgetary 
process. Thus, what is needed in determining PFM systems quality will be to describe 
the power relations among budgetary players, provide an explanatory of the account of 
why some actors perform better than others and account for circumstances and other 
intervening variables under which specific measures or reforms become useful or not, 
thereby accounting for regularities in the budgetary process. A vital aspect of the 
analytical framework presented later in this chapter will, therefore, be to provide an 
explanatory account of not only what, where and why, but how? Individual countries or 





Unfortunately, any attempt to rely, in isolation on anyone the three categories of 
desirable characteristics of PFM systems quality (principles, outcomes/objectives and 
comprehensive understanding of the budget process) set out in this section is not 
without its inherent problems. For example, the focus on principles alone may lead to a 
long mechanistic list of desirables, inflexibility and will undoubtedly ignore the 
underlying mechanisms that may shape the level of adherence to budgetary principles 
from one country to another. At the same time, the exclusive focus on the three levels 
of budgetary outcomes, is a recipe for contradictions or sequencing issues among them, 
with little or no regard for the complex political, institutional and management 
arrangements of the budget process. Likewise, focusing on processes alone will almost 
certainly turn to be futile, because of too much emphasis of form over substance and 
risk of not being able to assess the quality of different budgetary institutions (Dee Renzio, 
2009). For example, Alesina and Perotti reiterated the trade-off with fiscal discipline, 
stating that… “hierarchical institutions are more likely to deliver fiscal discipline … they 
produce budgets that are titled in favour of the majority… Collegial institutions have 
opposite features…. They guarantee rights of the minority and emphasis checks and 
balances, moderation and compromise…” (Perotti, 1996, p. 402). While Campos and 
Pradhan (1996) lamented on the possible contradictions that might arise in the 
simultaneous pursuit of multiple objectives. Moreover, Stasavage and Moyo (2000) in 
their study of Uganda and Zambia demonstrate how reform efforts aimed at achieving 
fiscal discipline through the mechanism of ‘cash budget’ adversely affected resource 






A more recent definition of PFM that perhaps, offers the broadest perspective to 
approaching PFM reforms is that put forward by Andrews et al. (2014). Their 
conceptualisation of PFM is particularly relevant to the holistic approach taken in this 
study, as it deals with how a government manages revenue and expenditures and the 
results therein- in terms of short, medium and long-term impact of its resources on the 
economy and citizens of a given country. Their definition of PFM offers flexibility in 
studying PFM processes, systems, institutions, policies and governance arrangements 
that are fundamental to the main idea of this study. The latter being, to investigate the 
reasons for the limited and uneven progress in the implementation of PFM reforms in 
developing countries.  However, such a preference for this broader perspective offered 
by definition from Andrews et al. (2014) does not mean this study will not utilise the 
various perspectives and insights provided by earlier definitions and PFM principles 
reviewed in this section.  
 
3.1.2 How Can FPM Systems Quality be Defined and Measured? 
In light of the differing perspectives highlighted in the previous section, this thesis still 
faces the question of how can we, therefore, assess the quality of PFM systems, or 
determine what success or failure looks like across different countries? The response to 
this question warrants asking another question: how can the quality of PFM institutions 
be defined and measured? The answer certainly further warrants the need for a more 
integrated and comprehensive approach that will account for all of the three spheres of 





will be to ratify the minimum set of criteria suggested by De Renzio of defining what 
good PFM looks like De Renzio (2009b, p.13): 
 It should be broadly in line with budgetary principles, while at the same time 
allowing for sufficient flexibility; It should be policy-neutral, in order to limit 
potential normative bias; 
 It should be applicable and comparable across countries and historical, legal and 
institutional contexts; and 
 It should be amenable to empirical measurement. 
This set of criteria will form the basis for the analytical framework set out at the end of 
this chapter and inform the selection of appropriate dimensions of PFM in order to be 
able to assess and measure the overall quality of PFM systems over time and across 
countries. Unlike de Renzio’s three dimensions (comprehensiveness and transparency; 
linking budgeting, planning and policy; and control, oversight and accountability), we 
will follow a much comprehensive approach by adopting the six critical dimensions of 
PFM performance specified by the PEFA Framework of 2005, revised in 2011 to include 
(PEFA, 2005 and 20111):  
 The credibility of the budget - The budget is realistic and is implemented as 
intended           Comprehensiveness and transparency - The budget and the fiscal 
risk oversight are comprehensive and fiscal, and budget information is accessible 
to the public.     Policy-based budgeting - The budget is prepared with due regard 
to government policy.    
 Predictability and control in budget execution - The budget is implemented in an 
orderly and predictable manner, and there are arrangements for the exercise of 
control and stewardship in the use of public funds.    
                                                          
1 The analytical framework has been limited to the 2005 and 2011 PEFA frameworks because most 
countries, including the choice of case study countries didn’t have PEFA assessment based on the 2016 





 Accounting, recording and reporting – Adequate records and information are 
produced, maintained and disseminated to meet decision-making control, 
management and reporting purposes.  
 External scrutiny and audit - Arrangements for scrutiny of public finances and 
follow up by executive are operating   
 
Our analytical framework will assess PFM systems quality against the above broad 
dimensions of PFM in order to further assess their likely impact on the three levels of 
budgetary outcomes. Therefore, we can define strong PFM systems as those that exhibit 
credibility, comprehensiveness and transparency, policy-based, predictable and based 
on controls, accountable and provide consistent and accurate records and reports and 
subject to external scrutiny. The reverse should hold for weak PFM systems, 
characterised by lack of budget credibility, comprehensiveness and transparency, 
detached from policy and planning and suffer from systemic weaknesses in recording, 
reporting and accountability. The researcher is nonetheless aware of the inherent 
difficulties in adopting these intermediate outcomes in the analytical framework 
presented later in this chapter. For example, there is a growing recognition among 
scholars that not all these intermediate outcomes will be particularly relevant for some 
countries at different stages of their adoption and implementation of NPFM reforms.   
 
Once NPFM reforms are adopted, countries will naturally be pursuing different sets of 
outcomes – gradually moving from conventional budgeting concerned with controls and 
procedural rules to a more policy-oriented budgeting geared towards improving 





that the analytical framework is designed in the first instance, to be able to provide a 
detail and historical account of how countries have been able to transcend over time 
from one continuum of their reform cycle to another in their drive of the ultimate goal 
of achieving the three levels of budgetary outcomes espoused by NPFM.    
 
The 2005 and 2011 PEFA framework have been chosen not only because it presents the 
most comprehensive and generally acceptable measure of assessing PFM systems 
quality, but also because as De Renzio (2009b:13) argue it satisfies with first three 
minimum criteria of good/strong PFM systems. The PEFA framework has also been 
chosen in part, because it provides us with the opportunity to increase the time frame 
of the study covering periods before operationalisation in 2005, by retrofitting of the 
2005 PEFA indicators with indicators of other diagnostic tools such as the HIPC AAP 
framework.  Meanwhile, in-depth discussions on PEFA and other diagnostic tools and 
how the final minimum criterion of measuring a well-functioning PFM system can be 
met will be covered in the following section.  
 
3.2 Country Differences in PFM Reform Performance and the Need for a Cross-
country Case Study Approach to PFM Reforms 
Perhaps, the most important objective of developing the analytical framework is to 
provide the foundation to be able to carry out qualitative cross-country analysis of PFM 
systems quality over time and to assess whether PFM reforms are contributing the 





guide a detailed investigation of the underlying mechanisms that drive and sustain PFM 
reform progress in the selected case study countries.   
 
To this end, assessments of PFM systems, since the advent of PEFA, have mostly been 
quantitative studies and desk reviews (De Renzio and Dorotinsky, 2007; De Renzio, 
2009a; Andrews, 2009 and 2010; Fritz et al., 2014a). Apart from a small number single 
country case-studies that exist (Dixon, 2005; De Renzio, 2007; Peterson, 2007 and 2010; 
Betley, Bird and Ghartey, 2012; Folscher, Mkandawire and Faragher, 2012; Lawson, 
Chiche and Ouedraogo, 2012; Fritz et al., 2012; Tavakoli, Cessay and Cole, 2015), the 
majority qualitative studies have geared towards assessing the performance of specific 
PFM interventions such as MTEFs (Oxford Policy Management, 2000; Le Houerou & 
Taliercio, 2002; Holmes & Evans, 2003; de Renzio and Smith, 2005; Wynne, 2005; 
Schiavo-Campo, 2008; World Bank, 2013b), Performance or Programme Budgeting 
(Robinson, 2007 and Robinson and Last, 2009), IFMIS (Diamond and Khemani, 2005; 
Hendriks, 2012 and Combaz,2015), PETS (World Bank, 2002a); or evaluation of PFM 
interventions of specific donors (Andersson & Isaksen, 2003; AusAID, 2004; Westcott, 
2008). 
 
The most influential and comprehensive cross-country quantitative studies were 
conducted by de Renzio et al. (2010) and Fritz et al. (2014a) to assess the factors that 
influence reform progress, or that may have been responsible for cross-country 
differences and variations over time. Their evaluation draws mostly from HIPC, PEFA and 





the HIPC data. They also collected data on donor support to PFM reforms and other 
economic, political and institutional variables for the countries covered in their studies.   
 
The cross-country econometric analyses by de Renzio et al. (2010) and Fritz et al. (2014a) 
generally reveal that economic factors such as income levels have higher explanatory 
power than aid-related factors. Countries with larger populations, higher levels of per 
capita income and better recent economic growth records, tend to have high PFM 
performance rates. Donor support and presence of long donor engagement are only 
minimally associated with reform progress, because a marginal increment in donor 
support, for example, corresponds to an average PEFA score rise by half-point, even 
after applying several robust statistical checks. Modelling their data to reflect 
developing countries only revealed positive associations between both donor funding 
and long donor technical support and reform progress, but only with upstream and 
concentrated dimensions of the budget cycle, perhaps, reflecting the idea that donors 
tend to focus more on upstream dimensions, rules and procedural norms of PFM. The 
most prominent downstream reform measure associated with donor support is the 
IFMIS, which perhaps, can be attributed to the huge amount of donor resources directed 
in this area.  By contrast, de Renzio et al. (2010) and Fritz et al. (2014a) find that state 
fragility (mainly countries in conflicts or post-conflict situations) to be negatively 
associated with PFM reform performance.  
 
However, both studies have been quite wary about the findings and therefore, 





associations with donor funding may reflect the reverse, whereby donors supported 
countries with better financial management systems rather than countries with weak 
budget systems.  De Renzio et al. (2010) concludes that: 
PFM reforms in developing countries are still largely unfinished business …, 
further work is needed. Qualitative case studies will be fundamental, too, to 
complement and address the many shortcomings of quantitative analysis, 
most notably the difficulties in explaining not only if and when donor PFM 
support has had an impact on PFM systems, but also why and how it has, 
taking into account the differences in country context in which PFM reforms 
take place (De Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 2010, p. 59). 
 
Andrew (2011) had earlier challenged the excuse usually given by donors whenever their 
projects fail to yield the appropriate results. They argue that their interventions need 
time to produce good results, even when these results sometimes will never come. 
Often, they associate these failures to inadequate capacity in developing countries and 
lack of donor focus (see also Andrews and Turkewitz, 2005). Andrews applied 
institutional theory on isomorphism and quantitative data from PEFA scores of 31 
African countries to conclude that western normative PFM reform initiative faces 
significant limits in developing countries, especially where countries institutional and 
management characteristics are “difficult to observe externally, core to the organization, 
and involve actors with whom the externally defined change agenda is unlikely to 
resonate normatively” (Andrews, 2011, p. 132; see also Andrews, 2009). Andrews (2011) 
proposes conclude that there are generally poor performances in downstream, de-
factor, and de-concentrated set of actors and professional deficient dimensions of the 





PFM, adding that progress in upstream and de jure budget systems are mostly as a result 
of developing countries trying to buy legitimacy from the foreign donors.    
 
Meanwhile, there have been limited cross-country qualitative analysis of PFM systems 
quality over time. Thus, “beyond broad generalisations, there is little knowledge of what 
precisely makes some PFM reform efforts more successful than others and of how 
financial and technical support to PFM reform can most effectively be provided” (De 
Renzio, 2009b, p. 5). In light of this, most of the significant reviews and empirical studies 
in assessing PFM reform progress (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008; Wescott, 2008; de 
Renzio et al., 2010; Fritz et al., 2014a) and even more recently  evidence mapping of  129 
developing countries by De Lay, et al., (2015) have recommended the need for 
comprehensive and qualitative cross-country case studies to be able to provide a more 
vibrant picture or detail explanatory accounts of the underlying drivers and challenges 
of PFM reform progress in developing countries.  
 
In response to these recommendations (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008; Wescott, 2008; 
De Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 2010; Fritz et al., 2014a and De Lay, et al., 2015), a 
synthesis of three country evaluations (see Betley, Bird and Ghartey, 2012; Folscher, 
Mkandawire and Faragher, 2012; Lawson, Chiche and Ouedraogo, 2012) of Burkina Faso, 
Ghana and Malawi prepared by Lawson (2012) was the first giant step in filling this gap 
through addressing the twin research objectives: a) “Where and why do Public Finance 





budget systems?; and b) Where and how does donor support to PFM reform efforts 
contribute most effectively to results?”(Lawson, 2012, p. 18).  
 
Although the final evaluation by Lawson (2012) was drawn mainly from the 
recommendations by de Renzio et al. (2011), it however, did not address the following:  
 their influential finding on why progress in PFM reform is uneven across the 
budget cycle - with countries performing better in upstream dimensions than in 
downstream dimensions; and  
 the treatment of donor support in the evaluation framework as the primary 
driver of reform progress undercut the importance of some of the most critical 
factors, such institutional and management arrangements, politics and economic 
factors that have mostly been associated to PFM systems quality. That could be 
interpreted as, perhaps, because it was a joint donor evaluation of PFM reforms. 
 
Unlike the above joint donor evaluation, this study is an academic research project and 
intends to cast the net widely on factors theorised to be associated with PFM systems 
quality, instead of treating donor support as the primary driver of reforms in developing 
countries. Moreover, given the unmet gap in the literature, this study is also primarily 
informed by the recommendations (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008; Wescott, 2008; de 
Renzio et al., 2010; de Renzio et al., 2011; Fritz, et al., 2014a; De Lay, et al., 2015) for 
more comprehensive cross-country case studies.  Also, it further seeks to broaden and 
deepen on the findings of the joint donor evaluation, which Lawson writes “it is hoped 
that [this study]… may also lead to further country studies – in Africa, Asia, …, which 
should serve to deepen its findings and clarify the extent of their applicability 





3.3 Some Caveats in Comparing PFM Systems across Developing and Post-conflict 
Countries 
In light of this study’s cross-country assessment of PFM systems quality over time, the 
researcher is, however, mindful of the fact that such cross-case analysis must be based 
on understanding some of the crucial issues that will underpin the development and 
operationalisation of the analytical framework. These caveats and limitations have been 
succinctly summarised by de Renzio (2009b). They arise for example, from the fact that 
the PFM reform landscape has been fraught with different understanding and 
theoretical perspectives. These differing understanding and perspectives stem from the 
diverse backgrounds of various experts and academics, the international pursuit of 
reform agenda versus local understanding and PFM practices in different contexts.  
 
Some of these caveats have long been recognised when Key (1940) initially observed 
that budgetary systems are made up of complex and interrelated processes involving 
many players (see also Wildavsky and Davis et al. 1966). Naomi (1980) soon afterwards 
argued that these complex and interrelated processes might not be amenable to a single 
set of prescriptions for all countries (cited in de Renzio, 2009b, p. 23).  Irrespective of 
this reality, this study’s review of the current PFM literature reveals the continuing 
transplant of western normative models of what constitutes ideal PFM systems and 
practices to developing countries. This is glaring in the OECD's seven key institutional 
features necessary to effectively control public expenditures, stated by Blöndal to 
include: “medium-term budget frameworks; prudent economic assumptions; top-down 





transparency; and modern financial management practices”(Blöndal, 2003,p.10). De 
Renzio identified similar papers (Brumby, 1999; Diamond, 2002; and Rubin and Kelly, 
2007) which promoted such normative models that other countries should follow in 
reforming their PFM institutions (de Renzio, 2009b). A typical example of the transfer of 
western normative models to developing countries can be traced to the forceful push 
by western donor institutions, such as the World Bank of dominant reforms models such 
as the MTEF, IFMIS and performance budgeting (see World Bank 1998, Schiavo-Campo 
and Tommasi 1999, IMF 2007).  
 
Other important caveats worth noting in comparing PFM systems across countries is the 
fact that countries are at different ends of the development continuum. That leads to 
significant difficulties, for example, comparing wealthy versus developing countries 
(Wescott, 2008). Adding to this argument, Caiden and Wildavsky (1980) (cited in De 
Renzio, 2009b, p. 24) argues that poor countries suffer from inadequate ‘functional 
complex redundancy’ that enhance smoother working of budgeting in rich countries. 
Schick (1998a) explicitly stated that developing countries suffer from among others, 
poverty, low revenue generation base, economic instability and low political 
mobilisation that make them less amenable to the transfer of western normative views 
of PEM.  Schick, therefore, specifies essential preconditions for developing countries to 
follow, if they were to successfully adopt the New Zealand model of PFM reform. That 






The PFM reform experience also shows potential complexities owing to differences in 
historical, legal and institutional contexts, even with countries at similar levels of income. 
Lienert (2004), for example, highlighted the difficulties that could be encountered in 
comparing African Anglophone countries. Also, the review of PFM reform experience in 
chapter two reveals for example, that post-conflict countries such as Liberia were 
subject to more stringent measures such as “no aid without a program, no program 
without a budget” (Schiavo-Campo, 2007, p. 436).  
 
Thus, tremendous precaution is needed in comparing countries. The reason for this is 
probably because as De Lay, et al., (2015, p. 12) observe is that “different solutions in 
different countries make comparative studies difficult”. Perhaps one of the most 
fundamental challenges in assessing and comparing PFM systems across is the problem 
of attribution. This is rooted in the fact that PFM reforms interventions have mostly been 
implemented simultaneously, and it, therefore, becomes very difficult or sometimes 
impossible to track which interventions led to which outcomes or objectives. That is 
more so because as it has been argued because of the inadequate data and lack of 
statistical tolls to attribute results to specific interventions (De Lay, et al., 2015).  
 
3.4 The Research Questions and the Analytical Framework 
Drawing on the points raised in the literature review and in the previous sections in this 
chapter, this study seeks to both test and build theory about the drivers proposed to be 
associated with or may have influence PFM reform progress in different countries and 





chapter show PFM reform progress in developing countries and across PFM dimensions 
over time is predisposed by technical and non-technical drivers, but non-technical 
drivers collectively have a more significant influence in driving and sustaining efforts to 
strengthen PFM reforms in developing and post-conflict countries.  
 
There have been few efforts in the existing PFM literature to address, in a single study, 
the how and why aspects of PFM reforms in developing countries. This research study, 
therefore, adopts a holistic approach, which represents an important step in filling the 
gap in much of the existing literature on PFM and broader PS and institutional reforms 
in developing countries.  
 
This research study, therefore, attempts to answer the overarching research question: 
why progress in PFM reforms has been limited and uneven in post-conflict Anglophone 
countries and across the dimensions of PFM. In order to answer this question, this study 
draws mainly on empirical evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone, and as well as from 
similar single and multiple case studies and the broader literature of PFM to address the 
following sub-questions:  
1) How and why do some post-conflict Anglophone countries perform better than others 
in the implementation of PFM reforms over time?   
2) How and why do some post-conflict Anglophone countries perform better in 
upstream and de jure dimensions than in downstream, de facto and de-concentrated 
dimensions PFM?   
3) To what extent have political support and country ownership; institutional and 
management arrangement of reforms; donor support and practices; and economic 





4) Which lessons of good practice may, therefore, be drawn regarding future PFM 
reform programming and implementation in post-conflict Anglophone countries?    
 
The empirical investigation in the selected cases and the results therein will be analysed 
using the analytical framework in Figure 3.2 below. The holistic analytical framework has 
been developed to cover the entire PFM systems and it associated institutional and 
management arrangements. It builds on the work developed by Lawson and de Renzio 
(2009) in part B of their approach and methodology paper for the evaluation of donor 
support to PFM reforms in developing countries. The framework by Lawson and de 
Renzio has been used widely by researchers and practitioners, including more recently 
by the World Bank in the evaluation of its PFM for development intervention (World 
Bank, 2018). It captures the most important elements and drivers of PFM systems 
quality, but also foster a broader analysis of both the technical and non-technical causal 
factors associated with PFM systems quality. It further facilitates the detail investigation 
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Political & governance factors: state fragility, ownership, type of political system and composition, level of political commitment, regime change, influence of NSAs 
Economic Factors: government economic & finance policies and interventions; GDP growth; income levels; rentier state/fiscal state; debt levels; aid dependency, etc. 
Institutional factors & management arrangement: PFM status at outset; strength & weaknesses; long period of donor engagement; colonial heritage, etc. 
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. Improved planning & Policy-based 
budgeting 
. Predictability & control in budget 
execution strengthened  
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 Development partners’ role: financial support, technical assistance & capacity-building and coordination mechanism 
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Unlike the evaluation framework of Lawson and de Renzio (2009:32), the above 
analytical framework in Figure 3.2 provides a more holistic perspective into the 
investigation and analysis by capturing the role of international partners as only one of 
the potential drivers of PFM reform progress in developing countries. It puts the role of 
international partners in PFM on a par with other non-technical drivers and 
systematically maps out the ways each driver affects the reform process. Moreover, the 
role of international partners in PFM in developing and post-conflict countries has 
become so profound and entrenched into the local institutional and political economy 
dynamics that is must not be treated as a one-off exogenous factor in the investigation 
into the reasons for country differences in performance and variations across 
dimensions of PFM.  
 
In as much as PFM reform is contextual, every reform intervention must, therefore, start 
with a comprehensive understanding of the underlying factors that underpin PFM 
reform success or failure. As such, the above adapted analytical framework facilitates, 
at the outset of any reform intervention, a data gathering and analysis that go beyond 
the usual technical analysis. Instead, it provide a more inclusive framework for 
investigating the underlying economic and political contexts, formal and informal 
institutional and management arrangements and the role of development partners to 
understand how and why some countries and/or PFM reform efforts are more 







By focusing on providing a robust, systematic and a more profound examination of the 
underlying drivers of PFM reform progress, the framework will, therefore, create 
enough flexibility for innovation and also make it amenable to application in different 
contexts, including in the selected post-conflict Anglophone countries. 
 
However, the researcher knows the applicability of the above analytical framework, like 
any other framework must be treated with caution. As noted in a study by CABRI/AfDB 
(2008), a single analytical framework may not always be suitable in the investigation and 
analysis in different contexts or specific issues with every country’s PFM systems. It may 
not be desirable since the various perspectives to understanding the drivers and 
challenges of PFM covered in the previous chapter may be difficult to integrate into a 
single analytical framework, thus preventing any analytical hegemony. As Bjuremalm 
(2006) argues, a particular donor might develop an analytical framework that is mostly 
geared towards evaluating a particular project, intervention(s) or thematic area of 
interest in PFM, which might have less relevance and applicability to another donor-











RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION 
 
4.0 Introduction 
Both the literature review and analytical framework chapters have presented the 
evidence and theoretical perspectives about drivers and challenges of PFM reform and 
what success or failure looks like in the implementation of NPFM reforms in developing 
and post-countries. The above was achieved by presenting and discussing the relevant 
theoretical perspectives and practical implementation experience about the drivers and 
challenges of PFM reforms in developing countries in Chapter Two. Chapter Three 
provided a conceptual understanding of what constitutes effective PFM systems and 
more importantly laid a pathway to a holistic approach in assessing not only what 
success or failure looks like (which have been the focus of most studies in PFM), but also 
discussed the reasons for cross-country differences and made the case for the need for 
a case study approach to understand PFM reforms in developing countries.   
 
This chapter examines how the research questions will be answered in order to achieve 
the overall research objectives, while also illustrating the overall methodological fit. This 
methodological fit means streamlining the nature of the phenomenon being studied 
with the research approach and choice of cases selected to ensure the validity of the 
research findings. To further illustrate this methodological fit, this chapter specifically 
provides the detailed analytical procedures, data gathering and analysis on how and why 





PFM reforms. The methodological challenge, however, is to be able to trace back how 
developing countries implemented NPFM reform models and systems back to their 
formative years. This challenge is addressed by the application of the process-tracing 
method, which is discussed later in this chapter.  
 
As shown in chapters two and three, the premise of this study is rooted in the ontological 
assumption that PFM reform in developing and post-conflict countries have been or may 
have been driven by a myriad of technical and nontechnical drivers/factors. These 
factors are then specifically investigated to understand the uneven performance across 
countries and variations in performance across dimensions of PFM. In order to 
accomplish this task, the thesis examines two developing and post-conflict Anglophone 
countries that have implemented PFM reforms in the last 15 years, both of which are 
pursued in “the epistemology of causal mechanisms and the methodology of process-
tracing” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 129).   
 
It is also important to note here that discussions of the two cases in this chapter and 
throughout the thesis should not be interpreted as a traditional comparative design (Hall, 
2006: 24-31). Instead, the design combines within-case analysis of each case with a 
cross-case analysis in order to investigate claims of causal relationships in the selected 
cases. To achieve this, this thesis has been situated within a broader design frame that 
aspires to:  
 first, describe the effects to be explained (covered in the previous two chapters 





 Investigate and present the evidence from both cases; and 
 interpret, discuss, ensure the validity of findings from the empirical fieldwork, 
and relate these findings to cases elsewhere and theories on PFM and the 
broader public sector reform literature.  
 
 
4.1 The Research Design Logic and it Links to the Research Questions and Research 
Strategy 
Like all scientific research, this study is also based on a mode of reasoning from which 
we expect to derive logical conclusions based on a set of premises. These premises are 
what Mahoney described as “facts from the case [s] and one or more pre-existing 
generalizations that can be applied to these facts” (Mahoney, 2012, p. 14). In light of the 
overarching research question, which is to investigate why is progress in PFM reforms 
limited and uneven in post-conflict Anglophone countries and across dimensions of PFM, 
the task here is to differentiate between two inferential models in social science 
research; namely “effects of causes” or “causes of effects” (Bennett & Elman, 2006: 457; 
see also Brady, 2002: 3; Mahoney and Goertz, 2006: 229), and the “forward versus 
reverse causal inference” (Angrist & Pischke, 2008:4-8; Gelman, 2011:955).   
 
Effects of causes and forward causal inference are concerned with selecting variables in 
advance to be tested, while ‘causes of effects’ and ‘reverse causal inference’ are 
concerned with finding and assessing the relevance of the causes. Typical questions 
based on the inferential model of ‘effects of causes’ or ‘forward causal inference’ might 
be what are the effects of PFM reforms on developing countries’ PMF systems? On the 





might be how and why some developing countries perform better than others in the 
implementation of PFM reforms? This thesis, therefore, adopts the inferential model of 
“causes of effects” or reversal causal inference. The reason for espousing this model is 
because of its association with how and why questions, which are fundamental to the 
research questions in the thesis.  
 
These ‘causes of effects’ are the mechanisms that make things happen or events to 
happen. The methodological challenge, then, is to trace back how these mechanisms 
contributed or may have contributed to the variation in performance among developing 
countries and across the budget cycle in the implementation of PFM reforms. In order 
to achieve this methodological objective, the thesis adopts an intensive research design 
situated in a real-life context (Lewis, 2003: 51-52).  
 
Specifically, the research design combines a case study strategy with the ‘process tracing’ 
method.  The two approaches are covered in subsequent sections of this chapter. Given 
our holistic approach which forms the basis for our analytical framework set out in 
Chapter Three, the strict application of either an inductive or a deductive mode of 
inference will not accomplish the purposes of this thesis. Inductive inference, on the one 
hand, is useful in establishing “limited generalizations about the distribution of, and 
patterns of association amongst, observed or measured characteristics of individuals 
and social phenomena” (Blaikie: 2010: 83); while deductive inference, on the other hand, 
is useful in finding “an explanation for an association between two concepts by 





of inferences limit the scope and undermine the full application of the analytical 
framework and the purposes of the research. For example, given this study’s theory-
driven research, it is likely that findings from the empirical investigations in the selected 
cases might not have been capture in the analytical framework in chapter three. Thus, a 
deductive approach only attempts to prove or disproved the analytical framework, but 
any findings outside this framework will remain unexplained or unaccounted for, and 
thereby limiting the prospects for theory development. An inductive approach alone 
similarly lacks the theoretical and conceptual validity to fully operationalise our 
theoretical and analytical framework (Habermas, 1972:113-139; Thomas, 2013:122-
124). Thus, given the nature of the phenomenon under consideration, which exhibits 
both transitive and intransitive aspects of knowledge (Bhaskar, 1975:21-30; Danermark 
et al., 1997:22-24) it becomes apparent that using either approach in isolation falls short 
of achieving the object of this research.  
 
Against this backdrop, this thesis, therefore, adopts the middle-ground approach; 
namely abduction and retroductive inferences to be able to fully operationalise our 
analytical framework and achieve the purpose of the research. Abduction on the one 
hand I argue is fundamental to theory-driven research, not only because it provides the 
leverage to move between theory and data like deductive inference (De Vaus, 2001:5-8, 
1972; Danermark et al. 1997:73-114; Hall, 2006:29-30), but also because it addresses 
the criticism that deductive nomologies are not capable of logically identifying any 
unintended artefacts of the empirical data (Meyer & Lunnay, 2013:2). These attributes 





framework by not only making it amenable to discoveries beyond the theoretical frame 
but also guard against the potential bias of deduction through providing greater 
transparency in the research process. Thus, as Meyer & Lunnay (2013:2) further argue, 
abduction facilitates an iterative research process that allows the researcher to expand 
the preliminary theoretical propositions through investigating unknown findings in the 
data collection, analysis, and thereby facilitating comprehensive understanding of the 
theoretical frame. This comprehensiveness is one of the hallmarks of our theoretical 
framework and holistic approach espoused in this thesis. 
 
Retroduction on the other hand, though not a formal mode of inference (Danermark, et 
al., 1997: 73-114), is rooted in the premise that “social reality consists of structures and 
internally related objects, but we can only attain knowledge of this social reality if we go 
beyond what is empirically observable…” (Meyer & Lunnay, 2013:3). That is what 
Danermark, et al. (1997:96-106) described as knowing the conditions fundamental to 
the phenomenon under study. Thus, retroduction in this thesis will involve 
conceptualising, by identifying the circumstances, the underlying institutional dynamics, 
governance systems, the actions or inactions of political leaders and bureaucrats, etc.  
that underpin strong or weak PFM systems. In order to operationalise the concept of 
retroduction, I apply (in chapters 5 & 5) in this thesis two of the four strategies 
(Counterfactual thinking and comparison of different cases) specified by Danermark, et 






By combining abduction and retroduction, the researcher, therefore, argues in line with 
Danermark, et al. (1997) and Meyer & Lunnay (2013) that these are complementary 
tools which facilitate the comprehensive analysis of theory-drive research. Thus, this 
makes it possible to have a more holistic assessment of PFM systems quality in 
developing countries over time and across the budget cycle. When used in conjunction, 
the preceding also demonstrates how the two modes of inference are particularly 
relevant and could be applied to case studies and the process-tracing method discussed 
in the next sections.           
 
4.2 Research Strategy: Case Studies and the Process-Tracing Method 
4.2.1 Why a Case Study Approach – rationale, advantage and caveats 
The choice of strategy and method has been made to ensure that the evidence acquired 
allows the researcher to answer the research questions as explicitly as possible, given 
the purpose of the research and within the current PFM reform landscape in the context 
of the individual cases. That turns our attention to the link between research approach 
and research questions in social science research, where Robson notes the latter is 
“concerned with turning research questions into projects” (Robson, 2002, p. 79). For 
Thomas, “research approach should be the servant of your research question, not its 
master” (Thomas, 2013, p. 116). Taking a philosophical stance and then subsequently 
identifying your research to one of the Q words, before the research questions and 
approach amounts in Thomas’s words to “a cart-before-the-horse mentality” (2013, p. 






Given the objective of the research and ensuing research questions stated on page eight 
in chapter one, it therefore, becomes imperative to adopt a case studies approach, 
which Yin describes “are the preferred strategy when how or why questions are being 
posed, when the investigator has little control over events and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon with some real-life context” (Yin, 2003, p. 1; see also 
Lijphart, 1971; Yin, 2014:4-24). Thus, the case study approach according to George and 
Bennett (2005:17-18) gives a detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode 
to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalisable to other events. The 
case study approach is vital to understanding PFM reforms process, as Peterson argues, 
PFM is contextual, it begins with context and ends with context (Peterson, 2010:8; see 
also Schiavo-Campo & Tommasi, 1999:2; de Renzio et al., 2010, p. 59). Still in line with 
Yin, case studies are considered particularly useful when the “boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not evident” (Yin, 2003:13). Again, this can be 
corroborated by the fact that some of the most comprehensive reviews (see Pretorius 
and Pretorius, 2008; De Lay et al., 2015) of PFM reforms have found few evidence linking 
PFM reform interventions and approaches with practical reform experience in 
developing and post-conflict countries.   
 
Following Lijphart (1971), it became apparent that case studies and other designs each 
have advantages in answering certain kinds of questions. Considering this, George and 
Bennett in their award-winning book: Case Studies and Theory Development in Social 
Science highlight the specific advantages of this method that are particularly relevant in 





their potential for achieving high conceptual validity; their strong procedures 
for fostering new hypotheses; their value as a useful means to closely 
examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of 
individual cases; and their capacity for addressing causal complexity (George 
and Bennett,  2005, p. 19).  
In a bid to achieve a high conceptual validity of the research, attention will be dedicated 
in chapters five and six to identifying and piece together the finest grains of evidence 
that adequately explain each of the causal factors within each case. This speaks to the 
fact that causal factors may operate differently within each context, which means their 
impact in one context may not always be the same in another. To remedy this situation, 
thesis study provides contextualised comparisons across cases, which are inherent in 
case studies given their ability to give detailed considerations of the contextual factors, 
which may otherwise be extremely arduous to accomplish by statistical studies.   
 
Also, through both case studies, it is hoped that new causal factors and hypotheses will 
be identified thus, reinforcing the holistic approach espoused by the analytical 
framework. This heuristic identification of new causal factors will be made during the 
fieldwork in both cases – through interviewing key government officials, experts and 
other stakeholders with an interest in PFM and by examination of various policy 
documents and reports from both donors and country governments. Thus, when I ask a 
question, and I get an unexpectedly different answer from a respondent, it makes sense 
to earmark this new variable(s), which can then be tested elsewhere through formerly 






However, to avoid the criticism of case studies running into an unending list of new 
variables, the data analysis will focus on identifying key patterns/themes from the 
empirical findings using data analysis software, discussed in section 4.4.2.3 below. This 
was an important element that came out from my first-year panel review – to make the 
research objectives more focused and manageable. That resulted in the revised research 
approach and research questions stated in chapter one. 
 
Finally, case studies are particularly relevant given the complex decision-making 
processes and networks of different stakeholders involved in PFM – through examining 
complex causal and sometimes reciprocal causal mechanisms or scope conditions that 
should be prevalent in order to activate causal mechanisms, which otherwise will be 
difficult to do by statistical studies (Yin 2003: 2; George and Bennett, 2005:21-22; 
Gerring 2007: 43-48).  
 
However, case studies suffer from a number of limitations and caveats, ranging from 
their problems in selecting cases (resulting in the potential for over-generalisation of 
results from the study) and their focus on achieving high conceptual validity which 
impose restrictions to any broader generalisation of results to other cases studies 
(George and Bennett, 2005:22). A further consequence of these limitations means 
trading-off the desire of generalising the findings from the empirical fieldwork to 
broader populations and achieving internal validity and historical explanations from 
each case studied. Also, a significant limitation for this study is the weak capability for 





Bennett, 2005:22). These limitations and caveats are addressed in part, by the approach 
to case selection and logical structures adopted and by the nature of the research 
objectives of this thesis. 
 
However, what does each case represent in this thesis? To answer this question, I turn 
attention to George and Bennett who state that a case presents “an instance of a class 
of events” (2005, p.17) or as Yin puts it, a case is a “phenomenon of interest (2003:12-
13). The instance or phenomenon of interest in this thesis is PFM reforms in developing 
countries. However, the choice of cases could well be instances of many classes of 
events within the broader PFM reform agenda, but the concern in this thesis is on 
providing an explanatory account of the causal mechanisms associated with the uneven 
progress across cases and dimensions of PFM. 
 
4.2.2 Application of Process Tracing: definition, rational - both theory testing and theory 
building, Advantages and limitations and caveats 
To adequately address the purpose of the research and provide the most plausible 
explanatory account to our research questions, our case studies approach covered in 
the previous section would require extensive process-tracing evidence to document and 
address the complex interactions in the PFM reform processes in the case study 
countries. This George and Bennett (2005:22) note would otherwise be impossible 
through statistical methods without a large sample size, even with which, models of 
nonlinear interactions often become complex and challenging to interpret (see also Hall, 






The process-tracing approach adopted in this thesis is fundamental to research that is 
based on theory or an analytical framework, which Hall referred to as theory-oriented 
process-tracing (Hall, 2006, p. 27-30). It is a method well regarded by many (Brady, 
Collier & Seawright, 2006; Collier, 2011; Bennett & Checkel, 2015) for its suitability for 
both theory testing and theory development about phenomena that are particularly 
affected by multiple interactions effects or equifinality - where it is tough to provide 
plausible explanation of outcomes in the presence of many independent variables. 
Traditionally, the method of process tracing is used to “identify the intervening causal 
process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable 
(variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 
206). A more recent and nuanced definition by Bennett and Checkel (2015:9) tends to 
eliminate the concept of intervening variable and replaced it with what they argue that 
process-tracing involves investigation and analysis of ‘diagnostic pieces of evidence’ 
about processes, events and sequences within a case to either develop or test 
hypotheses about mechanisms that might explain the cases covered.  
 
Given the various perspectives and the varying degree of the factors theorised to be 
associated with PFM systems quality in our literature review chapter, process tracing 
has also been theorised to be especially relevant not only because it serves the purpose 
of the research but also because it compels the researcher to take seriously the concept 
of equifinality, through casting the net widely and considering the processes through 
which a country’s PFM systems could have improved or deteriorated. In line with our 





presentations Chapters 5 & 6 will help facilitate the mapping out of different causal 
paths that lead to improvement or deterioration of PFM performance across the cases 
examined and the conditions under which these outcomes occur.    
 
In light of the above, the starting point for the process-tracing method will be the 
mapping out of all the detailed contexts (historical, political, institutional and 
management arrangements and economic factors), inputs, processes and interventions 
in reforming each country’s PFM systems, through primary and secondary data 
collection sources covered in the section of data sources and collection methods below. 
In the context thesis, process-tracing will thus provide explanations for each of the cases 
examined in Chapter five followed by cross-case comparisons and implications to the 
broader literature on PFM reforms in Chapter Five. That brings us to an essential 
distinction between within-case comparisons and traditional comparative methods 
(Lijphart, 1971; Hall, 2006:20-30). In this vein, Bennett and George (2005: 205-232) 
argue that within-case analysis combined with process tracing can facilitate cross-case 
comparisons, which serve as an alternative to controlled comparisons and conventional 
comparative methods. For this purpose, they define a case study approach as adopted 
in this thesis to include: 
both within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons of a small number 
of cases, since there is a growing consensus that the strongest means of 
drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within-
case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study or research 






It is, therefore, noteworthy to state that combining case studies with the process tracing 
method, in the context of this thesis is different from the traditional comparative 
method, which involves comparisons among small-n by looking at causal inference from 
a correlational perspective (Hall, 2006:25-26). Thus, Hall argues “small-n can be used as 
terrain for process-tracing in which many facets of the causal chain are examined, … 
[thus], small-N research designs can be valuable for testing causal propositions if [the] 
method [of process-tracing] is applied…” (Hall, 2006, p. 27). By using process analysis 
combined with within-case analyses, the thesis takes full advantage of the wealth of 
detail that enquiry of a small number of cases offers in securing more compelling 
grounds for causal inference than what a conventional comparative method might offer, 
especially when supplemented with within-case analysis (see also Collier, 2011:824).       
Finally, application of process tracing and within-case comparisons in this thesis will be 
guided by the standard set of criteria of what constitutes a systematic, operational and 
transparent application of the process-tracing method, as set out by Bennett & Checkel 
in the following table: 
Table 4.1: Process Tracing Best Practice 
1 Cast the net widely for alternative explanations 
2 Be equally tough on the alternative explanations 
3 Consider the potential biases of evidentiary sources 
4 Take into account whether the case is most or least likely for alternative explanations 
5 Make a justifiable decision on when to start – for example, the signing of the first PFM 
reform agreement between donor and country governments 
6 Be relentless in gathering diverse and relevant evidence, but make a justifiable decision 
on when to stop 
7 Combine process tracing with case comparisons when useful for the research goal and 
feasible 





9 Use deduction to ask, “if my explanation is true, what will be the specific process leading 
to the outcome?” 
10 Remember that conclusive process tracing is good, but not all good process tracing is 
conclusive 
Source: Adapted from Bennett & Checkel (2015, p. 21). 
Meanwhile, as they suggest this thesis will not be subject to the strict application of 
these best practices, instead it will continuously modify, and adapt these criteria as 
necessary to serve the context and purpose of the study (Bennett & Checkel, 2015: 260-
269). 
 
4.2.2.1 Exploring Causal Mechanisms: Scope Conditions and Necessity   
Process tracing, as applied in this thesis is not about testing or establishing causal laws; 
rather it is about identifying and explaining causal mechanisms. These causal 
mechanisms are the drivers of PFM reform efforts that provide more detailed and 
fundamental explanations about the uneven progress in developing countries and 
across PFM dimensions than causal laws do. The central focus in applying process-
tracing (Appendix C and in chapters 5 & 6) in this thesis will be on investigating the 
hypothesised roles of the drivers/causal factors, which have emerged from the literature 
review and analytical framework chapters.  
 
Thus, in order to increase confidence in the research results, theories and assumptions 
about the causal factors according to George and Bennett (2005:147) must support each 
step of the hypothesised role of these factors for each of them to form a historical 
explanation of the cases studied, at both micro and macro levels (see also Pouloit, 





process-tracing technique will involve interviewing critical stakeholders involved in the 
PFM reform process and budget cycle, examining various policy documents and the 
historicity of the reform process itself to be able to determine whether the observable 
implications of the hypothesised roles of each causal factor are in fact present in the 
causal chain in each case study. 
 
Considering what has been said above about causal mechanisms or causal factors and 
their hypothesised roles, it does become necessary to define what a causal mechanism 
or causal factor means as applied in this thesis. Following Bhaskar (1975:45-62) who first 
places causal mechanisms at the ontological level, the thesis adopts a more viable 
working definition of causal mechanisms put forward by George and Bennett (2005). 
They define causal mechanisms as “…unobservable, physical, social, or psychological 
processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific 
contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities. In so 
doing, the causal agent changes the affected entity’s characteristics, capacities, or 
propensities…” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 137).    
 
Two critical points could be gathered from the above definition; one being that causal 
mechanisms are unobservable and, secondly that, causal mechanisms operate only 
under certain conditions. For example, one could argue that donor policies and reform 
efforts could only be meaningful where they are supported by local actors and provided 





mechanisms, both Mahoney (2012:15-18) and George and Bennett (2005) agree on the 
unobservable nature of causal mechanism or causal factors.  
 
However, unlike Mahoney (2012:15-20) who seems to suggest that mechanisms, when 
activated under specific contexts, become sufficient to generate an outcome of interest, 
George and Bennett (2005:145-147) on the other hand, went further to argue that 
though causal mechanisms operate under certain conditions, their effects are however 
dependent on their interaction with other causal factors that make up each case studied 
or context. To this end, they opine that specific causal factors may be necessary 
conditions but need not be sufficient in order to explain a phenomenon of interest. The 
other factors that make up each context are also of interest to this thesis and these are 
what Checkel (2005:8-9; 2006:364) described as ‘scope conditions’, which serve as 
intervening variables and/or conditions that must be present for the hypothesised 
causal factors to be effective. Therefore, in identifying the observable implications of 
the hypothesised role of the causal factors, this thesis considers the different roles 
played by these factors; whether a variable was complementary, endogenous or 
exogenous (Bennett and Checkel, 2015:10-38). 
 
Additionally, the position argued above by George and Bennett (2005:25-30) is also 
essential in two respect: first, because it throws light on two crucial concepts – necessity 
and sufficiency, which are fundamental to explaining the hypothesised role of the causal 





four process-tracing tests of causality by Evera (1997), which are also relevant in 
explaining the causal significance of the hypothesised causal factors in this thesis.  
These four tests of causality are set out in the table below: 
Table 4.2. Process Tracing: Four Tests for Causation Sufficient to Establish Causation 
   




Straw in the Wind  Smoking Gun 
 
                 NO 
Passing affirms the relevance of the 
hypothesis but does not confirm it. 
Failing suggests hypothesis may not 
be relevant, but does not eliminate it. 
 Passing confirms the 
hypothesis. Failing does 
not eliminate it. 
               YES Hoop  Doubly Decisive  
 Passing affirms relevance of the 
hypothesis but does not confirm it. 
Failing eliminates it.  
 Passing confirms 
hypothesis and 
eliminates others. 
Failing eliminates it.  
Source: Adapted from Van Evera (1997:31-32). 
 
Thus, combining case study and process-tracing provides a more robust approach in 
identifying the scope conditions under which the hypothesised causal factors operate 
and in examining accounts about causal necessity or sufficiency in each of the cases 
studied. However, even combining case study and process-tracing provides little 
opportunity to assess the causal weight of each factor or their average causal effects as 
statistical methods do. Thus, George and Bennett (2005:25) note the fundamental 
question should be whether and how a variable mattered and not how much it mattered?  
In this regard, the focus of the thesis will be on examining whether and how each causal 
factor mattered in explaining the variations in PFM performance in developing countries 






In addressing the causal necessity and/or sufficiency, we also turn attention to the 
concept of conjunctions of variables, in order to determine which of the factor(s) explain 
each case in the presence of other factors. For example, international partners could 
only influence a country’s PFM performance in the presence of political support and 
local ownership and effective institutions. Thus, we can infer that donor support 
together with political and local ownership effective institutions are sufficient to 
positively influence a country’s PFM performance. This further implies having only the 
last two factors is not sufficient to positively influence a country’s PFM performance. 
What is clear from this hypothetical scenario is that there can be numerous situations 
emerging from each case of interest – meaning a causal factor can be necessary or 
sufficient, or either necessary or sufficient in a case. However, even with the application 
of counterfactual argument in the process-tracing analysis, it will still be difficult to 
justify with certainty that a causal factor is necessity or a sufficient condition in 
explaining a case. That in part, emanates from the fact that in social science research it 
is almost impossible to have one variable alone explaining a case.  
 
That being said, in the presence of the interaction of many variables and the potential 
for different causal paths, a more appropriate causal argument the thesis makes will be 
as George and Bennett argue “to settle for a more defensible claim that the presence of 
a variable “favours” an outcome, [otherwise] term[ed] a ‘contributing cause’, which may 
or may not be a necessary condition” (George and Bennett, 2005: 27). A final caveat 
regarding causal mechanisms that this thesis will consider is the fact that any 





factors in any of the cases studied will not automatically transcend into a broader claim 
of its effect in the second case and beyond (see also Checkel, 2015:97).  
 
4.3 Case Selection 
Unlike most case studies that select cases based only on the dependent variable 
(Bryman, 2008: 55-57; Thomas, 2013:151-155), the case selection in the context of this 
thesis has been made both on the basis of the dependent variable (PFM systems’ quality) 
and from a selection of a number of independent variables (donor support to PFM 
reforms, state fragility/stability, colonial heritage, consistent and high levels of 
economic growth and countries CPIA2 score), for which quantitative data is available.  
The cross-country evaluation of donor support to PFM reforms in three developing 
countries (Ghana, Malawi and Burkina Faso) by Lawson (2012) is the only study that 
based its case selection on both the dependent and independent variable. Unlike this 
study, the case selection by Lawson (2012) was based on a single independent variable, 
donor support. Given that PFM systems’ quality over time has been hypothesised to be 
affected by many factors, and because of the availability of more and high-quality data, 
the case selection in this thesis has been carried out to include other independent 
variables.  
 
Like De Renzio (2009b:19-19), PFM systems quality over time has been assessed by 
retrofitting PEFA and HIPC scores from 2001 to 2018 to determine countries whose PFM 
                                                          
2 World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) – measures countries performance 
against 16 criteria grouped across four clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for 





systems have improved and those with weak PFM systems as at the most recent PEFA 
assessment for each country included in the data set (see also De Renzio & Dorotinsky, 
2007:8-10). The scores for both HIPC and PEFA are available at the World Bank HIPC and 
PEFA Secretariat websites 3respectively. Results of the quantitative data analysis for 
HIPC and PEFA scores across all six 4core PFM dimensions and all the independent 
variables are available with the researcher for the records. However, the analysis of the 
HIPC and PEFA for all 29 countries are available in Appendix E. Also, the final grouping 
of all 29 Sub-Saharan African countries across the dependent and independent variables 
is present in the following table:    
Table 4.3: Grouping of Countries by Dependent and Independent Variables
Source: prepared by the Author from analysis of HIPC & PEFA scores and the 
independent variables 
                                                          
3 https://pefa.org/  





The above table highlights a couple of important points. First, most countries with 
improved PFM systems are Anglophone countries, while most countries with poor PFM 
systems are Francophone. Of the performing countries, Mali and Sierra Leone are the 
only countries categorised as conflict/post-conflict countries. However, there are 
fundamental difference in the PFM systems, institutional wider authorising environment 
between Anglophone and Francophone countries (Lienert, 2004), which might affect 
any form of structured and focused comparison (George and Bennett, 2005) between 
the two post-conflict countries. Also, given practical constraints such as communication 
barrier for an English-speaking researcher, together with the cost involved to hire an 
interpreter and the current security situation in Mali, the focus was, therefore, turned 
to Liberia, which is also a post-conflict country but with a relatively moderate PFM 
reform performance when compared with Sierra Leone.   
 
Moreover, Sierra Leone shares essential similarities with Liberia across most of the 
independent variables such as their post-conflict status, both are English-speaking and 
enjoys high economic growth before the Ebola Outbreak and more importantly they 
share border with similar cultural and social backgrounds. Considering these similarities, 
I, therefore, find Sierra Leone and Liberia to be particularly intriguing cases and they 
both present opportunities to investigate the four broad drivers proposed in the 
literature to drive or impede PFM reform progress in developing and post-conflict 
countries. Hence, Liberia and Sierra Leone are selected for the study. The PFM 
performance ratings of the two countries and the reasons for the state and level of 





Chapter Five. These cases also present significant opportunities for application of the 
process-tracing method irrespective of their similarities. As one would expect they both 
have their own unique public administrative systems, different political systems, formal 
and informal institutional arrangements and different country priorities. Thus, 
suggesting that different causal factors or mechanisms will be prevalent in each case.  
 
Although the primary aim of the thesis is not to generalise results from the thesis to 
other countries, the mere shift from Francophone Mali to Anglophone Liberia means 
the results from the case studies must be treated with caution and not overgeneralised 
to Francophone countries and developing countries more generally. The impact of this 
shift on any attempts to generalise to francophone countries only becomes relevant 
where it can be established there is little or no difference in the PFM systems, 
institutional setup and in the design and implementation of PFM reforms between 
Anglophone and Francophone countries. 
  
It is noteworthy that the cases have also been selected as part of the ‘building block’ 
(George and Bennett, 2005:76-78) approach adopted in this thesis, which uses Liberia 
and Sierra Leone as subtypes or instances of PFM reforms in developing countries and 
post-conflict countries more specifically. The objective of this ‘building block’ approach 
is to identify common patterns within the two cases, through a heuristic process in order 
to provide contextualised and contingent conclusions that might be relevant to 






Against this backdrop, the case selection has been narrowed down to developing post-
conflict countries in Sub-Saharan Africa – all of which have implemented PFM reforms 
over the last decade with some form of donor support. Narrowing down the cases to  
developing post-conflict countries is beneficial to this thesis, as it has been argued it 
fosters better results through avoiding a broad definition of the phenomenon of interest, 
but also provides a more circumscribed generalisation in particular, about causal factors 
of PFM reform progress, theories and concepts about reforms in general. Thus, as 
George and Bennett (2005:78) suggest that the usefulness and validity of the research 
results will not depend upon results from studies of other cases elsewhere of PFM 
reforms in general. This is achieved in part, by providing more analytically equivalent 
cases, but given due consideration to the contexts within each case. However, as Gorard 
(2013: 18) argues, irrespective of the chosen design what is important in this thesis is 
that the design presents the most plausible explanation to the research questions (See 
also De Vaus 2001: 9; Thomas, 2013).   
 
An apparent issue that this thesis takes seriously and addresses in this section is the 
concept of case selection bias. Given the non-random approach used to select the cases, 
which often present significant risks (Seawright and Gerring, 2008:295), several 
measures have been taken to remedy the effects of potential selection biases in this 
thesis, whether done wittingly or not. First, the case selection has been done on both 
the dependent and independent variables. But more so, the variation in the dependent 
variable is particularly important to this thesis because it facilitates the identification of 





2003:127-142). This prior knowledge of the variables has been argued might precipitate 
a potential bias towards hypothesised variables considered in the case selection from 
case study researchers (King, et al., 1994:122-126), but such a prior knowledge has also 
been argued to enhance a much stronger design, especially when applied in within-case 
processing-tracing provides a more robust test of a theory (George and Bennett, 
2005:22-25). In addition, researchers selecting cases can benefit from knowledge of the 
findings of existing studies and be guided by estimations of whether the theories of 
interest are robust and previously tested or new and relatively weak (Laitin, 1995: 546). 
 
As mentioned overleaf, the second and most important remedy against any case 
selection biases is the fact that the cases have been selected as part of the ‘building 
block’ approach, with the specific objective of increasing the conceptual validity of the 
research results – through providing a more contingent and contextualised 
generalisation. Thus, to avoid any case selection biases or possibly any 
overgeneralisation from the research results, the thesis makes a trade-off between 
achieving high internal validity from the findings against any generalisations of the 
findings to other cases that have implemented PFM reforms and wider theories and 







4.4 Fieldwork, Data collection and Analysis 
4.4.1 Practicalities of the Research 
This study included a field research activity in the selected post-conflict countries: 
Liberia and Sierra Leone from December 2016 to May 2017. This fieldwork lasted for 
five-months but with only one visit to Liberia lasting for five weeks as opposed to two 
visits that were originally planned. This was largely because it was very difficult to 
establish trust and gain the confidence of potential interviewees in both countries. 
Consequently, I spent almost 6 weeks in Sierra Leone and almost 3 weeks in Liberia to 
obtain my first interviews. The realities on the ground in terms of gaining the trust and 
confidence of interviewees fell far below expectations, even as a native from Sierra 
Leone, not just those associated with cost savings from having to conduct a fieldwork in 
my country origin, but also in terms of having access to potential interviewees and other 
methodological benefits. The latter is what methodologists (Reinharz, 1983; Robson, 
2011; Gorard, 2013; Robson & McCartan, 2016) described as ‘researcher knowledge’ in 
the choice of cases selected. That meant the researcher had a comparative advantage 
to better understand the local contexts and use existing local connections. More 
importantly, this local knowledge and connections are useful to cast the net widely and 
facilitate the application of the process-tracing method more effectively. However, 
caution will be taken to address the issue of ‘reflexivity’, which Crotty (1998) argues is a 
threat to validity because it serves as a source of unreliability such the introduction of 






The fieldwork in Liberia, on the other hand, was a lot easier, primarily because of the 
support and reliability of one of the contacts at the Liberia Ministry of Finance. His 
intervention, commitment and reliability proved to be the difference between the two 
countries. However, this should not be taken to mean that the local knowledge and 
relationships in Sierra Leone were not significant as well.  The learning point is that to 
conduct an effective field-research, what is required irrespective of any prior knowledge 
and relationships, is to have someone (or people) who believes in your research, has the 
influence and authority and can effectively translate your research ideas and interests 
to your potential interviewees.  
 
Another critical leaning experience from the field-research was the marked difference 
in the level of openness of interviewees and less bureaucracy in Liberia’s public 
administrative system. Some I interviewed related this to the colonial heritage of each 
country, with Sierra Leone’s public administrative system being more bureaucratic and 
conservative.  Again, this is hard to prove definitively given the influence of my contact 
in Liberia in securing the trust and confidence of the interviewees in that country.   
 
Meanwhile, the researcher did recognise that the field-research in both countries also 
presented specific design and ethical considerations that needed to be considered as an 
‘involved researcher’ or ‘researcher-as-instrument’ (Reinharz, 1983:166-174; Robson, 
2011:133; Robson & McCartan, 2016:148; Gorard, 2013:165-6). Specifically, 
considerations were given to design elements such as intervention and positionality and 





two ethical dimensions: procedural ethics and ethics in practice (see Carolyn 2007:3-26; 
Guillemin and Gillam, 2004: 263-274). The procedural ethics phase involved seeking the 
necessary approval from the university ethics committee, through filling various forms 
and complying with other formalities required. Because the research design involves 
human participants, my submissions to the ethics panel focused on explaining the 
methodologies, description of participants and context of the research in both cases, 
and how specific unexpected outcomes will be addressed (Crotty, 1998:20-2; Atkinson, 
2005:425-433; Robson & McCartan, 2016:145-9). I eventually had a successful ethical 
review and was given approval to conduct fieldwork in November 2017.  
 
Ethics in practice on the other hand concerned “the everyday ethical issues that arise in 
the doing of research” (Guillemin & Gillam 2004, p. 263). Here I address series of ethical 
dilemmas ranging from soliciting informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality and 
privacy, etc. (see Bryman, 2008; Carolyn, 2007:3-29; Lincoln, 1995; and Macfarlane, 
2010:19-21). To this end, each participant was given an information sheet and a consent 
form before the actual interview (see appendix D), explaining some of the issues like 
anonymity, confidentiality, data protection, etc. and how they are addressed in this 
thesis.  
 
Given the combined within-case analysis and process-tracing approach to each country, 
specific practical considerations will also be given to issues such as getting access to 
participants, the kind of evidence that will be sought and how those different kinds of 





these notes, (Bennett and Checkel, 2015:263) suggest turning attention to experts for 
advice on what archives are available, recruiting appropriate interview participants and 
due considerations on the specific country contexts where the field work will be carried 
out.  
 
A final practical consideration in this thesis concerns what (Dunning, 2015:228) 
describes as ‘transparency’ in the application of the process-tracing method. This will be 
addressed in this thesis through disclosing as best as possible evidence from the process-
tracing field interview transcripts, published and unpublished policy documents and 
reports and other archival documents in the process-tracing analyses. However, given 
the fact that both countries emerged from civil conflicts, and as expected the researcher 
was challenged with some poor data and record keeping management typical of such 
settings, which might have some effects on the research’s ability to conduct a rigorous 
process-tracing (See Lyall, 2007:186-207). This scenario has been experienced by the 
researcher in both countries, and a typical evidence of this has been an internal report 
produced by a former PFM expert who worked for DFID in the early stages of PFM 
reforms in Sierra Leone. This report was referred to by many as having a very detailed 
and comprehensive analysis of PFM reforms undertaken in Sierra Leone but is yet to be 






4.4.2 Data Collection Sources and Data Analysis 
4.4.2.1 Application of process tracing:  forms of evidence 
Regarding the data collection and analysis, both primary and secondary data have been 
collected. This section, therefore, presents these data collection sources, their analysis 
and how they will be used to support the process-tracing investigation in this thesis.  
Applying process-tracing to investigate causal mechanisms of the hypothesised factors 
associated with cross-country differences and variations in PFM performance PFM 
dimensions, the imminent questions became what kind of data should be collected and 
how evidence should be examined? To answer these questions, the process-tracing 
method adopted here involves: 
 examining various policy documents and reports on PFM reforms from both 
donors and country governments; 
 tracing the history of how PFM reform got to the forefront of donors and 
government agendas; 
 examining the accounts from interviewees about various events and decision-
making processes in both the design and implementation of PFM reforms; and  
 Investigating other sources considered necessary in identifying the observable 
implications of the hypothesised causal factors in each country.  
 
The preceding implies conducting a thorough process-tracing requires gathering data 
from various sources (both primary and secondary data sources). Secondary data 
sources included data from published sources such as books, technical and academic 
articles, donor evaluation reports, donor manuals, handbooks and databases on PFM, 
and publications and national accounts from the countries examined. Primary data 
collection, on the other hand, involved semi-structured interviews during the fieldwork 





Thus, the various sources will complement each other in order to make up for 
deficiencies in any of the sources. For example, process-tracing evidence will involve 
examining historical accounts as Langley puts it of “events, activities, and choices 
ordered over time” (Langley, 1999:692) during the pre-design, design and reform 
implementation stages. However, as mentioned earlier deficiencies in some data 
sources create reliability problems, regarding for example, issues like timing of events 
and activities in the reform process, who said what and who said it first, which document 
or policy action came first, how reliable and truthful the accounts from various interview 
participants, etc. This reliability concern will be addressed, in part by triangulating the 
various data sources in chapters 5 to 8. Many (Denzin, 1978; Creswell, 2003:203; Yin, 
2003:97-98; Tansey, 2007:766) have argued that triangulation is an effective means to 
enhancing the validity of research findings. This will be accomplished in this thesis 
through combining accounts from experts, reformers and other stakeholders and factual 
data in ways that support better theoretical construct.       
 
4.4.2.2 Semi-Structured Interviews and the Process-Tracing Method 
In line with our holistic approach to assessing the factors that may have influenced cross-
country differences and variations in PFM performance across PFM dimensions, semi-
structured interviews are a quintessential example of research techniques that 
facilitates effective process-tracing of historical events and decision-making processes. 
To this end, semi-structured interviews help identify new variables and hypothesis 
beyond the hypothesised causal factors (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009:27). For example, as 





did Y,” and gets the answer, “No, I was thinking Z,” (George and Bennett, 2005: 20) 
presents a scenario wherein if the answer is different from any of the hypothesised 
factors, then we can be confident this is a potential new variable or factor that needs to 
be explained. The interviews are also particularly relevant to answering the how and 
why questions posed in this thesis, because of their ability to provide detailed historical 
accounts of events and activities during the pre, design and post-implementation stages 
of the reforms.  
 
Although the questions were orderly and carefully worded, a specific set of questions 
targeted a specific set of participants (for example, reformers, implementers, donors, 
civil society, etc.). However, what remained central to the interview was the opportunity 
for flexibility in the interview process, through allowing interviewees to describe their 
perceptions and develop their thoughts (Gillham, 2005:3-4; Denscombe, 2007:176; 2014: 
186). The interview focus with each participant was defined beforehand, and questions 
followed sequentially, but in reality, the interview process invariably moved back and 
forth along a scale or a continuum, with the interviewer controlling the interview 
process (Dunne, Pryor and Yates, 2005:30-1 and Gillham, 2000:45-7, 2005:72-3). The 
interview topic guide is available in Appendix F. The interview process took the form of 
a continuum between structured and unstructured forms of interviewing (Kvale, 1996: 
133-135; Kvale, 2007:19-22; Dunne, Pryor and Yates, 2005:28). This further implies the 
interviewees took the lead role, while the interviewer discovered new insights from 
their stories (Arthur & Nazroo, 2003: 110). That is what Kvale & Brinkmann describe as 





interviewer was to prompt and then probe the interviewee to be able to gain an in-
depth understanding based on interviewees’ contexts and experiences of the 
phenomenon being studied, (Gillham, 2005:45). It must be noted that accounts from 
interviewees will be analysed and interpreted in Appendix C and chapters 5 & 6 with 
hindsight of their personal, professional and political affiliations, role and interests. This 
means the data analysis will involve some form of ‘meaning-making’ and not just the 
mere extraction of information from interviewees. But in doing so, care will be taken to 
ensure little or no dilution of accounts of the interviewees (Holstein & Gubrium, 
2004:150; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009:17-9).   
  
In conducting the interviews, due consideration was also given to practical and ethical 
issues such as length of the interview, managing the interview process, informed 
consent from the interviewee, confidentiality and anonymity (Carolyn 2007:3-26; 
Bryman, 2008; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009:109-123; Macfarlane, 2010:18-25). The first 
two practical concerns were particularly challenging to the researcher – this is evident 
from varying degree of time taken to interview interviewees (ranging from half an hour 
to one-hour thirty-minutes). However, the variations were also in part to the nature of 
some of the interviews, the experience and depth of the interviewees on the subject 
matter and sometimes due to the research’s continuous probing for more information 
from the respondents.  
Meanwhile, a key question that the researcher was initially confronted with was the 
issue of who should be interviewed during the fieldwork in both countries? However, 





the PFM reform process in the two countries and the budget cycle and what are the 
strategies for identifying them? How easy or challenging will it be to identify relevant 
participants? Regarding who was interviewed, the focus was on relevant actors and 
stakeholders involved in key decision-making processes during the pre-design, design 
and implementation phases of PFM reforms in each case, implementers of the reforms 
and those involve in the routine budgetary process, and other stakeholder outside of 
government – such as the private sector, civil society and experts in PFM. Table 4.4 
below shows the categories of interview participants, split between the two countries 
and the respective coding structure for each category of participants.  
Table 4.4: List of interview Participants 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
Participants by Country & 
Category5 
Coding Structure by 
country & Category 
Sierra Leone Liberia Sierra Leone Liberia 
Key Ministry of finance officials (current and 
ex-officials – where applicable) 
 8 persons                         8 persons XX301-309 XL301-309 
Officials from key Ministries, Agencies and 
departments (current and ex-officials from at 
least two sectors) 
3 persons                                6 persons                                XX401-XX XL401-407 
Local Council/county Officials  2 persons                               1 person XX501-502 XL501 
Parliamentarians and their staffers: members 
of the finance and public accounts committees  
 2 persons                             1 person XX601-601 XL601 
Civil Society Organisations with interest in PFM 2 persons                               3 persons XX701-702 XL701-703 
Private sector Actors  0 persons                              0 persons                              XX801 XL801 
PFM Experts 1 person 0 persons                              XX201 - XL201 - 
Donor representatives (drawn from the World 
Bank, AfDB, DFID, IMF & Sida) 
4 persons                                           3 persons             XX101-107 XL101-103 
                                 TOTAL - 45  24 persons                             22 persons   
Source: prepared by the author 
                                                          
5 Some participants were counter in different categories and one participant represented two countries, 
which is refletive in the coding structure in the above table and main text in subsequent chapters and 
appendices. However, the number of persons interview was 45, representing actual partcipants 





In total 45 participants were interviewed during the fieldwork from both countries – 
with a complete list of the interviewees is available with the researcher and omitted 
from this thesis to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees. Both current and former 
officials in each case involved in the reform process were interviewed. For this reason, 
techniques such as snowballing (see Tansey, 2007:770; Robson, 2011:275-6; Gorard, 
2013:84) was used to identify those former officials and stakeholders.  
 
It must be emphasised here that the interviewees do not themselves represent 
independent variables in this thesis as in market and statistical research. Rather, they 
are those actively involved in the reform process, while others represent key 
stakeholders in the routine budget cycle. The study, therefore, is only interested in their 
perspective and not to treat them as objects of the study. Consequently, measures such 
as sampling of potential participants were avoided in favour of identifying and selecting 
participants with valuable insight into PFM reforms and the routine budget processes. 
As Tansey (2007: 766-7) argues, the objective in using interviews to facilitate a process-
tracing method is not to generalise about participants’ attributes, values, believes, or 
their actions to the wider population of various actors involved. Rather, the goal is to 
use accounts from those actors who were actively involved to construct a theoretically 
informed explanation of critical events, activities and decision-making processes during 
the reforms in each country. Thus, a key strategy in identifying relevant participants was 
to holistically look at their positions, interests, objectives and reputations in selecting 
them for the interviews. Again, in line with Tansey (2007: 767) different categories of 





process, but who may be however influential and might provide a critical perspective 
that may not apparently be known ex-ante. 
 
Talking about the relevance of interviews in enhancing robust process-tracing evidence, 
interviews are useful in addressing two important caveats of the process-tracing method. 
First, causal mechanisms even if hypothesised beforehand may not always be 
observable even through the most robust process-tracing method. Thus, as George and 
Bennett argue the only remedy for process-tracing research will be to push inquiry “to 
the outer boundaries of what is observable” (as George and Bennett, 2005, p. 143). 
Second, although the key focus in Appendix C and chapters 5 & 6 will be to eliminate as 
best as possible rival explanations. But given the multiple causal factors hypothesised to 
be associated with the PFM reform progress, a piece of process-tracing evidence need 
not eliminate all rival explanations or potential contributing causes or factors. Meaning, 
where multiple causal factors are involved, a single process-tracing evidence linking 
cause to an outcome might invariably turnout to be incomplete or a misrepresentation 
of more complete interaction of events and processes (George and Bennett, 2005:143). 
 
Interviews play important role in addressing the above caveats. First-hand accounts 
from interviewees may provide insights into causal factors, even those not originally 
anticipated, through perceptions about sequences and interconnections of events and 
activities, thereby identifying chains of unobservable processes during the reforms. With 
the respect to the second caveat, interviewees were given the opportunity to judge or 





decisions taken during the reforms in ways that other methods, such as archival research 
alone, may have found it difficult to achieve (Checkel, 2005:11). The interviews 
therefore formed an important element in enhancing the validity of the research 
findings, through using interviewees’ perspectives to checkmate any priory perceptions 
of the researcher, in order to uncover any causal chains through ordering, weighting and 
interpreting supporting and contradictory evidences from interviewees with that of the 
researcher’s intent.  
 
Finally, three important points regarding the usefulness of interviews to facilitating 
robust process-tracing are discussed in the following paragraphs. First, the interviews 
focused on the background, interests and internalised elements of participants. As part 
of the objective in the process-tracing analysis and Chapters 5 and 6 will be to verify 
perceptions about internalised aspects of the interviewees’ perceptions, their role and 
views of their organisation, etc. Thus, specific questions were designed to target areas 
such as their work routines, processes and relationships with other units or departments. 
The second and most important aspect relates to interviewee’s accounts of the historical 
development of PFM reform design and implementation. Again, the process-tracing 
evidence conducted used the interviews to establish when key events and activities 
happened, establish the various actions that took place and decision-making points in 
determining what factors drive and sustain PFM reforms, and thereby confirm or refute 






To facilitate quality data analyses and interpretation, accounts from interviewees will be 
critically examined to eliminate any potential biases and increase the reliability of their 
various accounts sought in Appendix C. But what we do know from the methodology 
literature (Seldon & Pappworth, 1983; Kramer, et at., 1990:212-218; Kvale, 1996:34; 
George and Bennett, 2005:102) is that interviewees are most-likely inclined to 
sometimes downplay or overstate their role or that of others, dilute or omit certain 
aspects from their accounts, or present some more colourful and logical explanation. In 
dealing with these dilemmas, I refer in chapters 7 & 8 to the following questions put 
forward by George to include “Who is speaking?”  “Who are they speaking to?” “For 
what purpose are they speaking?” and “Under what circumstances?” (George, 
1973:107-121, In George and Bennett, 2005:99-100). Others (Dexter 1970, Davies, 2001: 
77-9) have forward similar frameworks for assessing the evidentiary value of data from 
interviews. 
 
4.4.2.3 The Two-stage Process-Tracing Analysis in Appendix C: 
The process-tracing evidentiary analysis started by identifying and defining critical 
statements gathered from the interviews about the drivers and challenges of 
implementing NPFM reform efforts and variations in PFM performance across countries 
and dimensions of PFM. These statements are identified through the data coding 
exercise performed in NVivo. These statements assumptions that represent what has 
been theorised in the recent literature on PFM. That enables the process tracing 
adopted in this thesis to proceed through a combination of inductive, deductive and 





warrants this mix of logical conclusions on PFM performance and the ongoing theorising 
on the potential impact of non-technical drivers on PFM reform progress. The 
consideration of a considerable number of assumptions/hypotheses is made possible 
through the inductive application of process tracing, which employs a much wider lens 
than deductive reasoning on possible non-technical drivers, and in the analysis the 
observable implications of each of the assumptions or hypothesised macro-level country 
characteristics on the non-technical drivers of PFM reform efforts.   
 
The process-tracing analysis unfolds by grouping observations/statements from 
interview participants and from other data sources about a specific driver or aspects of 
PFM performance, which test he plausibility of assumptions/hypothesis explored in the 
process tracing exercise. Word frequencies and other query searches in NVivo data 
analysis software were used to identify and gather the various observations/statements 
and from other available data sources elsewhere.  
 
The detailed process tracing analyses and tests of causal inference of each set of 
statements/observations are presented in Appendix C. In line with Fairfield (2013), the 
presentation of the process analyses tests of causal inferences in Appendix C represents 
a significant departure from many practitioners of process-tracing, who often leave 
these analyses implicit and informal, partly to manage constraints with word limits. 
The two-stage process, which comprises combining process-tracing through NVivo data 
analysis together with process-tracing through CPOs applied in this appendix, is 






Stage One: Process-Tracing and NVivo Data Analysis Software 
This stage involves data coding exercise in NVivo, and it proceeds in stages. Firstly, it 
involves unpacking the data from various sources (including transcribing the interview 
audios) and grouping the evidence into manageable database, using NVivo software to 
manually code the data in an organised and systematic manner, manage and query the 
data and ideas, and extract reports from the data (Gibbs, 2002:10-12; Bazeley, 2007:2-
3). The NVivo software is particularly relevant because it allows the grouping of data 
from various sources (for example, interviews and from published sources), enabling a 
complete, rigorous analysis of the data and regular comparisons within a case and across 
cases.  It must be emphasised here that the use of NVivo was limited (see Bazeley, 2003; 
Gilbert, 2002:222) to grouping the evidence about hypothesised role(s) of causal 
mechanisms from the various data sources, mapping these across the stages of the 
reform process or analytical framework and identifying key themes emerging from the 
various evidentiary sources. The detailed and thorough explanations of the evidence 
from various sources will be done manually and outside the NVivo software, as Bazeley 
(2007:3) argues computer software cannot make up for inability of the researcher to 
adequately interpret and analyse data. Detailed explanations of the specific advantages, 
disadvantages and limitations of the software can be found in Gibbs (2002:11-12) and 
Di Gregorio and Davidson (2008).   
 
Stage two of the process-tracing and data analyses will involve drawing from the key 





analytical and chronological (Langley 1999:694-706; Gerring 2006:76-8) across the 
stages of the analytical framework. The flexibility of the thematic coding (Holloway and 
Todres, 2003; Braun and Clarke 2006) of the interviews is based on the research 
questions, hypothesised non-technical drivers, objectives of the research and other 
relevant areas of PFM reforms that are of interest to the researcher, chosen for further 
analysis.  However, a key challenge for the researcher was how to transform the detailed 
historical accounts into analytical explanations? This challenge was addressed in this 
thesis in part, by transforming the detailed descriptive and historical accounts in 
Appendices A and B into the logical explanations presented in Chapters Five and Six. By 
so doing, both the researcher and readers can make a more informed analysis of the 
reform processes in each case, ascertain how and why performance in PFM varies across 
the selected cases and dimensions of their PFM.   
 
The objective in switching from the detailed historical accounts to logical explanations 
will be to transform specific causal narratives into theoretical concepts about reforms 
set out in the theoretical framework in chapter three (see George and Bennett, 2005:92-
4).  The researcher took precaution to ensure that valuable data was not lost in the 
process, especially during the data coding and analysis in NVivo. The objective was to 
ensure that the framework was broad enough to account for elements of the 
hypothesised causal factors and other contextual conditions, in explaining PGM reform 
outcomes in each case. As stated in section 4.2.2.1 about causal mechanisms – whether 





what is necessary or not, and whether elements of the hypothesised causal processes 
are evident across the cases under consideration (George and Bennett, 2005:25-7). 
 
The researcher carried out further analysis of the coding, recognising recurrent features 
in the data and applying the codes to other data sources. Moreover, the third stage 
involved categorising - identifying patterns, similarities and differences in the data. 
Word frequencies and other query searches in NVivo data analysis software were used 
to identify and gather the various observations/statements and from other available 
data sources elsewhere. The latter provided the basis for the application of process 
tracing in the next section, which was done through identification and grouping 
observations/statements from interview participants and other data sources about the 
patterns, similarities and differences in the data, but also about the non-technical driver 
or aspects of PFM performance. The objective of this exercise was to increase or 
decrease the plausibility of assumptions/hypotheses explored in the process tracing 
exercise. 
 
State Two: Process-Tracing and Causal Process Observation (CPO) 
The analyses of observations/statements from interviews and other data sources 
grouped in the previous section about how and why PFM performance (PFM reform 
progress) varies across countries, the budget cycle (PFM dimensions) and overtime is 
carried out through CPOs (Bennett, 2010; Collier, Brady, & Seawright, 2010; Collier, 2011; 
Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). That involves careful and in-depth analysis of diagnostic 





assumptions/hypotheses explored in this section for each of the case studies combined.  
Through my analyses of these observations I do not only demonstrate the relevance and 
application of process tracing to provide mechanism-based explanations based on 
analysis of fine-grain detail or individual level of analysis of evidence, but I also show 
how it could be done thorough analysis of hypothesised causal mechanisms at the macro 
level for each case study country (Waldner, 2015; Pouliot, 2015). 
 
The researcher also shows that the application of the CPOs is consistent with the thesis’s 
overall objective, which is to inductively build theory and as well as explore the 
observable implications of the hypothesised non-technical drivers of PFM reform 
progress. As I have already presented in section 4.2.2.1, the remainder of the process-
tracing in appendix C explored the four approaches to evidence-based causal inference: 
Straw-in-the-Wind Test; Hoop Test; Smoking-Gun Test; and Doubly-Decisive Test (see 
Van Evera, 1997; Bennett, 2010; Collier, 2011; Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). These tests 
are based on logic connecting diagnostic pieces of evidence and the 




This chapter has examined how the research questions will answered and illustrated the 
methodological fit between the theoretical approach laid out in Chapters Two and Three 
and the research approach and the choice of cases selected for the study. This chapter 





context of the phenomenon being studied, I.e., PFM reforms and justifying the 
philosophical and logical reasoning behind the research approach. Because of the 
methodological challenge of tracking back how the case study countries implemented 
NPFM reform models and systems back to their formative years, this chapter has 
explained how this challenged was addressed during the study, through combining the 
case study approach and the process-tracing method. This combination of the case study 
approach and the process-tracing method was mainly because of their combined ability 
to address the how and why research questions pursued in this thesis,  their ability to 
address  a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context and their ability to 
achieve high conceptual validity of the research findings and as well address complex 
causal relationships between PFM reforms and the drivers proposed in the literature. 
The choice of case study countries was limited to post-conflict Anglophone countries 
(Liberia and Sierra Leone) to be able to provide a more contextualised analysis of the 
evidence that could provide some generalisable insights for International Partners, state 
authorities and researchers with interest in countries with similar contexts. But also, not 










HOW AND WHY PFM REFORM PROGRESS VARIES IN POST-
CONFLICT LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE  
 
5.0 Introduction: 
This chapter provides analytical interpretations of the pieces of evidence and analysis 
drawn from different sources about how and why PFM reform progress varies in the 
two case studies and across the dimensions of their PFM over time. The findings in this 
chapter and the next one is derived explicitly from the empirical findings during 
fieldwork in post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone and the process-tracing analysis of the 
evidence carried out after the field work. The evidence is triangulated with evidence and 
discussions of PFM reforms from other case studies and large-N studies from elsewhere 
and theories in the existing literature of PFM and broader institutional and public sector 
reforms in developing countries. There is more detailed background material in the 
appendices for readers who may be interested in the detailed historical accounts of PFM 
reforms in the case study countries. These additional materials could serve as reference 
point for readers who may want to cross-check references to some of the arguments or 
gain further insight into the evidence presented. 
 
There exist a small number of single case study evaluations (Betley et al., 2012; Folscher 
et al., 2012; Lawson et al., 2012) and as well as a multiple case studies conducted 
recently (Fritz et al., 2012; Lawson, 2012; Fritz et al., 2017) that attempt to explain the 





however, and this thesis, in general, provide a more nuanced approach to exploring the 
connections between PFM systems quality and reform progress over time and 
underlying factors enabling or impeding efforts to strengthen PFM in the case study 
countries.  
 
The approach in this chapter and the thesis generally is oriented towards exploring the 
role played by structural and non-technical causal factors in enabling or impeding PFM 
reform efforts, when, where and on which specific PFM dimensions they have the most 
significant causal impact. Irrespective of the lack of focus on the detailed technical 
aspects of PFM reforms or the search for ‘better fit’ reform models, the process-tracing 
evidentiary analysis, however, considered in great detail the interactions of these 
structural and non-technical factors with technical reform models in this chapter and 
the next one.     
 
The analytical framework developed in Chapter Three provides the guiding framework 
for the within-case and cross-case process-tracing examinations. The within-case 
examination covers tracing the specific processes through which PFM strengthening was 
pursued, the stakeholders involved, the quality of PFM systems and expected outcomes, 
and progress in PFM reforms and their relationships with structural and non-technical 
factors. That means, accounting for both the challenges with PFM reforms and as well 
as successes, and the specific factors associated with both. The study combines the 
within-case process-tracing with cross-case analysis to map out to what extent reform 





factors are associated with better or worse PFM systems across the two countries. 
Alternatively, if an element was present and affected a reform or PFM system in one 
country in a certain way, was also present in another country, and whether it affected 
PFM quality is the same way or not.   
 
The above two-pronged approach (within-case and cross-case analysis) which accounts 
for both successes or failures and  the specific factors associated with both, presents the 
best approach in answering the how and why aspects that run through the main 
research question and sub-questions. Accordingly, the presentations and analyses of the 
empirical evidence in this chapter have been tailored to address the first three sub-
questions set out in chapter one as follows: 
1) How and why do some post-conflict Anglophone countries perform better than others 
in the implementation of PFM reforms over time?   
2) How and why do some post-conflict Anglophone countries perform better in 
upstream and de jure dimensions than in downstream, de facto and de-concentrated 
dimensions PFM?   
3) To what extent have political support and country ownership; institutional and 
management arrangement of reforms; donor support and practices; and economic 
factors contributed to these issues?   
 
The remainder of this chapter has, therefore, been stylised into sections to address each 
of the above sub-research questions as best as possible. However, while each of the 
remaining three sections attempt to answer one sub-question, the distinctions are not 
always clear-cut given the overlapping nature of reforms and the multiple interaction 





Section 5.1 addresses sub-question one by presenting and discussing the evidence that 
portrays the state and level of progress achieved in PFM in the two case study countries 
and why. Section 5.2 addresses sub-question two by presenting the evidence, analysis 
and discussions of how current levels of PFM reform progress have been made in the 
two countries and why. Finally, section 5.3 conceptualises the evidences in sections 5.1 
and section 5.2 to explain the causal effects of the non-technical factors (sub-research 
question three above) on the overall level of achievements or progress in PFM reforms 
over time in the two case study countries.   
 
5.1 The State and Level of PFM Reform Progress  
This section looks at the available evidence that portrays the status of PFM performance 
and level of progress achieved in Liberia and Sierra Leone to answer the research 
question how and why some post-conflict countries perform better compared with 
others in the implementation of PFM reforms over time. The evidence about state and 
level of progress made are drawn from evidence collected during fieldwork and from 
published sources, including PFM reform project implementation assessments and 
reports from country governments and donor-partners and independent publications 
from scholars and observers of PFM and analysed. I then triangulate this with PEFA 
reports and the World Bank’s CPIA on quality of budgetary institutions.  
 
As maintained throughout in this thesis, the presentations and discussions about the 
state and level of progress achieved in PFM are not intended to address the specific 





picture of PFM performance, backed by detailed analytical interpretations and 
discussions of the underlying factors enabling or impeding efforts to strengthen PFM in 
the two case study countries.  In some instances in this and in subsequent sections, this 
study makes reference to specific reform initiatives such as MTEF, IFMIS, or distinctions 
between downstream vs upstream reforms to explain the effects and role of the 
underlying factors in enabling or impeding efforts to strengthen PFM in the two cases 
study countries.   
Figure 5.1 and 5.2 below summarise the state of PFM systems in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
and level of progress achieved over time in the two case studies. It uses both PEFA scores 
and CPIA, given the unique advantages each brings to our understanding of the overall 
state and depth of PFM systems quality and comparisons between two countries over 
time respectively.  
Figure 5.1: PFM Performance of Sierra Leone and Liberia 2004 -2018 
 
Source: Calculated by the author from HIPC AAP and publicly available and verified PEFA 
scores6 
 
                                                          
6 Liberia https://www.pefa.org/country/liberia and Sierra Leone https://www.pefa.org/country/sierra-























Figure 5.1 presents PFM performance of Liberia and Sierra Leone from 2004 to 2018 by 
combining both HIPC AAP and PEFA scores. The combined HIPC AAP and PEFA scores 
were determined by retrofitting the HICP AAP scores with the equivalent PEFA scores. 
This concept is borrowed from de Renzio and Doritinksy (2007), who first retrofitted 
HIPC APP with PEFA scores to expand the scope of their study to capture PFM 
performance before the advent of PEFA. The detailed analysis of the PFM performance 
of both countries is available in Appendix E.  As shown in Figure 5.1, the analysis covers 
five assessments for Sierra Leone on the left and three for Liberia on the far right in 
Figure 5.1 above. The HIPC AAP scores are available only for Sierra Leone and form the 
starting point in 2004, the highest average score the country recorded during the period 
under consideration. Liberia does not have HIPC AAP scores, which were no longer in 
use at the time of the country’s preliminary HIPC assessment in 2008.  
 
Sierra Leone’s PFM performance improved significantly in the years immediately after 
the civil war, scoring its highest level in 2004 based on the HIPC AAP scores. Its overall 
score did decline slightly in the first PEFA score in 2007 before improving, again, 
marginally in 2010. Since 2010, Sierra Leone’s overall PFM systems quality declined in 
the last two assessments (2014 and 2018).  Liberia, on the other hand, had a steady, but 
marginal improvements in its overall PFM systems quality.  
 
In comparing the two countries, Sierra Leone’s has had more advanced PFM systems 





steady, but marginal progress while the quality of Sierra Leone’s PFM systems declined 
over time. As things stand, the most recent PEFA assessment for each country (2016 and 
2018 PEFA assessments for Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively) shows Liberia has 
overtaken Sierra Leone, with overall advanced PFM systems and process when 
compared with Sierra Leone. It is noteworthy that the most important consideration of 
this thesis is not to pinpoint, based on any single assessment, which of the two countries 
has the best PFM system. Rather, the analysis in this section and in subsequent sections 
in the chapter and the next is about how each country’s PFM systems improved or 
declined or both over time. Thus, the focus of the analysis is on how and why Sierra 
Leone’s PFM systems declined over time, in spite of its overall more advanced PFM 
systems and processes when compared with Liberia over time as shown in Figure 5.1 
above.  
 
Also, considering the inclusion of different assessments (HIPC AAP and PEFA), different 
PEFA framework (2005, 2011 and 2016 framework),  and the nature of the performance 
and context in each country, Figure 5.1 may, therefore, not explain the full picture of 
the status and trend in PFM performance in the two countries.  I further draw on the 
analysis of PFM performance of twenty-nine SSA counties to lend credence and help 
explain the current status and trend in PFM performance in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
First, the analysis of PFM performance, excluding the most recent PEFA of twenty-nine 
SSA countries in Appendix E shows Sierra Leone had an average score equal to the 
regional average, while Liberia’s performance was below average with twelve other 





al., 2014a; Fritz et al., 2017:2), Sierra Leone only recorded an average performance while 
Liberia scored above average, when their latest assessment is included in the analysis. 
These results show that Sierra Leone’s rating has been declining over time but continues 
to compare favourably with other countries in SSA and globally. Liberia, on the other 
hand, has made gains, especially in the last few years than Sierra Leone has.   
 
Notwithstanding Sierra Leone’s better starting point than that of Liberia, both countries 
did make initial progress, especially when they emerged from more than a decade of 
conflict. Their PFM performance when compared with other countries in the sub-region 
ranked even better when the World Bank’s CPIA assessment is used, as shown in Figure 
5.2 below.  Based on their CPIA 13, which shows the quality of budgetary and financial 
management rating of countries, Sierra Leone consistently maintained scores above the 
regional average and superior to Liberia’s CPIA 13 score over the period 2005 to 2017. 
Since its first CPIA assessment in 2009, Liberia has made rapid progress, with scores 
equivalent to the regional average in the last five years to 2017.  
Figure 5.2: World Bank CPIA-13: Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management 
(2005-2017) 
 
Source: computer by the author from World Bank WDI7 
                                                          





The initial picture that emerged from the above presentations and analysis is that Liberia 
and Sierra Leone recorded significant gains immediately after the end of their civil 
conflicts, with a somewhat declining trend for Sierra Leone, but with a steady and 
marginal improvement for Liberia as shown in Figure 5.1. Irrespective of the significant 
gains immediately after the civil conflicts, overall PFM systems quality in the two 
countries are still relatively low. This total stagnation or somewhat declining trend in the 
level of progress in the two countries is similar to the PFM performance in SSA and low-
income countries generally (Fritz et al., 2014a; Frtiz et al., 2017:9).  
 
However, all three types of assessments (HIPC AAP, PEFA and CPIA) involved some level 
of subjectivity, which means both the scores from the assessments and reasons for 
changes in the scores given by experts who conduct these assessments may not always 
reflect the status, progress achieved or capture the real reasons why ratings have 
changed. By extension, they may fail to accurately reflect the underlying PFM dynamics 
in countries where these assessments are carried out. These reasons, therefore, warrant 
further discussions of two crucial points: 1) how progress in PFM performance is 
constructed by stakeholders in the two countries and its implications for ongoing PFM 
strengthening efforts, and 2) a detailed examination of the reason(s) for the significant 
gains recorded immediately after the civil conflicts, and stagnation or declining trend in 
PFM performance in the two case study countries over time. I discussed these points in 
the next two subsections. The evidence and detailed analytical work to support the 





are derived from the process-tracing analysis in Appendix C of the first two 
claims/arguments as following: 
 progress in the implementation of PFM reforms in developing countries has been 
generally substantial but limited in the delivery of real change or improved 
service delivery. 
 countries generally perform better in upstream and de jure PFM 
reforms/systems than in downstream, de-facto and de-concentrated reforms or 
dimensions PFM 
 
5.1.1. Different Interpretations of PFM Performance and Implications for the Level of 
Progress and Future PFM Strengthening Efforts 
In terms of the PFM state and level of progress achieved in the two case study countries, 
the process-tracing analysis tests the evidence as they relate to the above 
claims/argument, coupled with evidence from published sources show a mixed picture. 
Also, the analysis of the evidence shows progress in efforts to strengthen PFM in the 
two countries is constructed differently, at different levels and by different groups of 
stakeholders consulted. They discussed the status and progress in PFM reform efforts in 
terms of three broad perspectives: in terms of project deliverables and level of 
investments; based on PEFA results and other relevant assessments; and in terms of the 
overall impact of PFM on service delivery and poverty reduction. While the distinction 
is not always clear-cut, representatives of donor-partners and officials from government 
mostly judge PFM performance in terms of the first two perspectives. For example, a 
number of donor reports and PFM assessments, including from the Liberian government 





(World Bank, 2009a, p. 37; Bank, 2011a, p. 1; AECOM, 2016; MFDP, 2017), but critics 
believe progress has been slow and limited compared to the level of investments made 
by donor partners and the GoL (Chessen and Krech, 2006; Hope Sr, 2010). Hove and 
Wynne (2010) also made similar points in their review of the MTEF and IFMIS experience 
in SSA relative to the level of investment and efforts directed in pushing these reforms.  
 
On the other hand, representatives from civil society/NSAs, officials from line ministries 
and local government spoke about PFM performance in terms of its role in enhancing 
service delivery. Out of many instances is the account from a NSA representative in 
Sierra Leone, who characterised the reforms as “If you look at the number of 
interventions as against the impact, I can say it is still low in terms of the reforms” 
(Interview: XX701). The impact from the standpoint of NSAs means the extent to which 
reforms have contributed to improvements in the services and the living standards of 
people in these countries.  
 
These differences in interpretations and focus are, perhaps, not surprising as each group 
of stakeholders view PFM with regards to how it affects their work and interests. A 
World Bank study on PFM reforms in eight post-conflict countries found ‘intermediate’ 
and ‘substantial’ progress in Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively (Fritz et al., 2012:5). 
Similarly, accounts from a number of interviewees and from publish sources about PFM 
reforms in both countries describe the level of progress achieved in ways such as 
substantial, limited, slow, inconsistent and uneven (REPIM, 2007 and 2010; Coffey Ltd, 






Also, the implementation completion and results report for the Sierra Leone IPFMRP 
rates the overall outcome of the project as moderately satisfactory (World Bank, 2015). 
Again, only 34% of the PFM indicators in the joint Performance Assessment Framework 
(PAF) for the MDTF, which funds PFM reforms for Sierra Leone were achieved (Ecorys 
and Fiscus, 2016:66). The summary of the 2016 independent PEFA assessment for 
Liberia shows uneven and weak results in many PFM dimensions (AECOM, 2016:7). At 
the same time, the response from NSAs, officials from line ministries and subnational 
government, who view PFM from the perspective of its impact on service delivery may 
give a different impression about PFM performance.  
 
The evidence found from the within-case analysis reveals these different perspectives 
and the varying focus on PFM performance have significant implications on the status, 
level of progress, and ongoing efforts to strengthen PFM in the two countries. 
Meanwhile, irrespective of these different perspectives of PFM performance in the two 
countries, there is a general sense among those interviewed and from recent studies of 
the apparent failure of current PFM reform efforts to improve service delivery and 
poverty reduction efforts. Recent PFM reform projects in Sierra Leone (PFMICP) and 
Liberia’s Public Financial Management Reforms for Institutional Strengthening Project 
are clear indications of the growing realisation by stakeholders of the need to re-strike 
the balance between efforts to strengthen PFM and the focus on improved service 






The PFMICP in Sierra Leone is primarily driven by a desire to consolidate the initial gains 
and deepen efforts towards service delivery areas (World Bank, 2017a). While the PFM 
for Institutional Strengthening Project signed in June 2019 in Liberia has for the first time, 
a specific component (component 4) dedicated at improving ‘upstream and 
downstream PFM service delivery systems in selected sectors’ (World Bank, 2019:6).   
 
The differing perspectives of stakeholders in the previous paragraphs have significant 
implications on the state, progress achieved and ongoing efforts to strengthen PFM. Two 
examples stand out. First, a World Bank study characterised PFM performance in Sierra 
Leone as ‘substantial’ (Fritz et al., 2012:5). Second, much earlier by the World Bank’s 
CFAA in 2002, characterised PFM as ‘working surprisingly well’ (World Bank, 2002b). 
These two instances show at best, the authors’ characterisation of the state and level of 
progress achieved were taken out of context, or worse failed to assess PFM in terms of 
its overall goal as a machinery to improve service delivery and enhance shared 
prosperity in the two countries.  
 
By judging the quality of a country’s PFM systems on the basis of tools such as the CFAA, 
HIPC AAP and PEFA, means those  in charge of driving efforts to strengthen PFM in these 
countries approached PFM as an end in itself, and not as a means to improve service 
delivery and overall poverty reduction. As I show in the process-tracing analysis, donor-
partners and their local counterparts have been very focused on meeting the short-term 
objectives of efforts to strengthen PFM in the two countries. The project intervention 





assessment tools such as CFAA, HIPC AAP and PEFA provide a perfect mechanism and 
incentives to measure short-term performance and justify future efforts to strengthen 
PFM.  For example, the PFM reform process in Liberia has generally been categorised 
according to the World Bank into three phases. Phase one (2003-2005) was mostly about 
restoring the status quo ante before the war broke out in 1989. Phase two (2005-2008) 
was about consolidating gains under phase one, while also enforcing tight control and 
accountability in PEM notably through GEMAP. And phase three (2009 and beyond) is 
characterised by a more structured, coherent PFM reform agenda and long-term 
institutional development capacity building efforts (World Bank, 2012b:1-2). Often, the 
experience in these countries have not been linear.  
 
A further consequence of this short-term perspective of PFM performance was the 
treatment of PFM reform efforts as a transactional process.  The evidence from the 
process-tracing analysis shows this transaction approach to PFM strengthening happens 
at two levels: between donor-parts and central finance officials and the between the 
central finance agency and the lines ministries and subnational authorities. On the one 
hand, donor partners propose a series of reforms programs (mostly through assessment 
reports and recommendations as to the basis for new PFM reform programs) in 
exchange for developing countries promise to implement those programs. These reform 
programs often come with conditions/triggers which recipient countries are expected 






On the other hand, central government (mainly the Ministry of Finance) roll-out reform 
programs to Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and local government for 
implementation, often with no real ownership and commitment from MDAs and 
subnational government to finance and sustain those reforms in the future. The ultimate 
result from such a transactional nature of these reforms was the fact that the focus kept 
changing from one reform program to the next pressing reform activity. Local 
authorities spend considerable time and resources on activities that are less pertinent 
to the survival and sustainability of gains already made, in favour of short-term results 
that benefited them, and as well as meet the objectives of donor-partners. This pattern 
of intervention in PFM continue to create perverse incentives for local authorities to 
direct their efforts to meet donor conditions, especially with reform programs attached 
to budget support triggers.  
 
Finally, the evidence shows what could be characterised as substantial progress now 
may not only fail to explain what progress means (in terms of its primary goal of 
contributing to improved service delivery), but it could undercut future PFM 
performance and efforts to strengthen PFM in countries with low capacity and weak 
institutions. As I show in subsection 5.2.2, critical PFM dimensions which observers and 
reformers regard as the basics in the two countries continue to rank among the worst-
performing areas in the two country case studies. The experience in these countries 
weakens the claims of key PFM models such as sequencing approach and the ‘basics first’ 
strategy, or that local reformers may have misapplied ideas from these models. Through 





evidence shows efforts to strengthen PFM in the two countries kept shifting from one 
short-term objective to the next, or from one project to another without measures to 
consolidate gains made and ensure the sustainability of the reforms.  
The results in the two countries reflect what Schick (1998a) feared, when he noted that 
it was not enough to have new rules, build new institutions and roll out new systems 
and expect them to deliver results, without taking appropriate steps to create an 
environment that fosters improved performance in the long-term. 
 
5.1.2:  Rapid Initial Progress Achieved, but steady or a somewhat Declining Progress 
I discuss under three headings the factors that account for the rapid initial progress 
achieved and somewhat stagnating or declining trend in PFM progress in the two 
countries presented in section 5.1 above: 1) structural factors or macro-level country 
characteristics; 2) the nature of PFM reform interventions; and 3) capability traps and 
Isomorphism. While I do not expect that only one factor might have contributed to the 
rapid initial progress and somewhat declining trend in PFM strengthening efforts, I 
discuss under each sub-section the evidence from the process-tracing analysis of how 
each section contributes to the state and trend in PFM performance in the case study 
countries.  
 
5.1.2.1 The Impact of Structural Factors and their Interactions with other Country Characteristics on 
the State and Trend in PFM Performance 
The evidence presented in this section and the ensuing analytical interpretations and 
discussions relates mostly to macro-economic variables, their interactions with other 





trend in the two case study countries. These analytical interpretations and discussions 
do not include how specific country characteristics, such as the role of institutions, 
governance structures, political commitment and how the role played by international 
partners affect specific aspects or dimensions of PFM systems.  
 
The PFM performance, as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 for Sierra Leone and Liberia 
respectively improved immediately after their civil wars. The immediate gains in PFM 
also coincided with significant improvements in economic dynamics such as ODA, GDP 
growth rate, domestic revenue, and declining government debts.  Apart from this initial 
pattern, there is no clear relationship between PFM performance and the four economic 
variables considered in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 above. The PFM performance in the two 
countries remained on average, relatively low and did not change significantly over time.  
Beyond these broad patterns, it seems almost impossible to be able to draw any 
meaningful inferences regarding the nature of any possible causal relationships 
between PFM performance and the economic dynamics covered in the below figures. 
However, the two countries experienced similar events over the period under review 
that might provide more context into how economic dynamics might have directly or 
indirectly influenced PFM performance, the level of appetite or commitment to PFM 
reforms, or vice versa. Specifically, the two countries had gone through post-conflict, 
received debt reliefs through the HIPC and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives (MDRI),  
recovery and development, external shocks (global economic crisis in 2008 and the fall 





2015). I discuss these events under two broad categories - post-conflict phase and the 
recovery and development phase. 
Figure 5.3: Sierra Leone's PFM Performance and Economic Variables 2002-2017                                            
 
Source: IFM Article IV Reports and WEO; Figure 5.1; OECD’s CRS & World Bank’s WDI 
Figure 5.4:  Liberia's PFM Performance and Economic Variables 2002-2017 
 
Source: IFM Article IV Reports and WEO; Figure 5.1; OECD’s CRS & World Bank’s WDI  
Post-conflict Phase (2002 - 2008) 
First, the period immediately after the civil conflicts saw improvements in all the 
economic dynamics and increased efforts towards PFM strengthening. Emerging from 
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civil conflicts, both countries started from a low base, and suddenly recorded significant 
improvements in economic dynamics. The immediately post-conflict period witnessed 
increased PFM reform activity brought about by the PRSP agenda and the HIPC debt 
relief initiative. As part of the HIPC debt relief initiative, these countries had to 
implement several PFM reforms in return for debt cancellations (see HIPC decision and 
completion points documents for both countries (IDA/IMF, 2002, 2006, 2008 & 2010).  
 
The reforms initiated in the immediate post-conflict environment in these countries 
were part of the new wave of reforms, promoted by activists and civil society, such as 
pop star Bono and Pope John Paul and international financial institutions (mainly the 
World Bank and the IMF), through debt relief and PRSPs (Easterly, 2002; Busby, 2007; 
World Bank, 2009a, p. 3). At the HIPC completion points, aid flows to the two countries 
had reached their highest level, with declining government debt, reaching its lowest 
levels in the history of the two countries in 2006-2007 and 2008 in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia respectively. As with many post-conflict countries, there was also improved 
economic activity with rising GDPs. It is, therefore, hard to delink aid and the promise 
for debt relief with the initial pace in the reform process reported in these countries in 
the immediate post-conflict and recovery phase.  
 
Moreover, interviews and information from published sources and the process-tracing 
analysis provide compelling about how GBS under the Multi-Donor Trust Fund in the 
two countries have been the main instrument used by donor-partners to drive PFM 





related to PFM reforms (Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016, p. 21). Local authorities, in turn, saw 
PFM reforms as an essential aspect to attract foreign aid. In the words of one local 
consultant who also worked in the Ministry of Finance in Sierra Leone “the government 
needed the structures for decentralisation and PFM reforms because the only way to 
have more money [from donor-partners] is when you have structures and PFM reforms 
and getting various financial management acts” (Interview: XX105_303). Even before 
the MDTFs, PFM was used in the two countries as a platform to protect international 
development assistance, but also as a mechanism to foster peace-building efforts in 
Liberia through GEMAP (Dwan and Bailey, 2006, p. 21-25; Atkinson, 2008; Zounmenou, 
2008, pp. 4-5; Farrall, 2010, pp. 338-9) and support decentralisation efforts in Sierra 
Leone through the World Bank Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) 
(GoSL, 2004 World Bank, 2004d; Thompson, 2007:20; World Bank, 2011d).  
 
Because of the bulk of the causal significance comes from within-cases analysis, the 
above evidence presents a stronger claim of the impact of aid and the promise of debt 
relief on the rapid initial progress in PFM than those claimed by Fritz et al. (2014a) in 
their quantitative analysis. Even with the high levels of aid and support to many 
developing countries, averaging $1.3 billion in the early 2000s and reaching its peak at 
$1.9 billion in 2009 after the financial crisis (figures from OECD Creditor Reporting 
System). The amount of significance or confidence one can have on the causal impact of 
aid or support to PFM and the promise of debt relief on the initial PFM success can be 
limited. In part, because there is no direct connection between aid and support to PFM 





5.4. Also, as Fritz et al. (2014a) found many low-income countries that did not benefit 
from debt relief also recorded significant initial progress even after starting from a 
similar low-base.   
 
Based on the above analysis, the evidence is not conclusive about the overall impact of 
aid and the promise of debt relief level on progress achieved. Undoubtedly, it is 
permissible to claim the role of foreign assistance, and the promise of debt relief in the 
initial progress made Liberia and Sierra Leone. This relationship is easy to discern, as it 
has direct bearing with the nature of the initial reforms implemented in the two 
countries discussed in the next subsection.    
 
Recovery and Development Phase (2009 - 2017) 
The recovery and development phase in the two countries experienced decline in the 
economic variables examined. However, PFM the performance on average remains the 
same in Sierra Leone and with some marginal improvements in the case of Liberia. Like 
in the immediate post-conflict phase, the relationships, if any, between these economic 
variables and PFM performance are less clear. Unlike the post-conflict period, the 
recovery and development witnessed different set of economic dynamics (the global 
financial crisis, increased domestic revenue from mining exports and the Ebola Outbreak) 
that elucidate on our understanding of the relationships between efforts to strengthen 






This study presents the empirical evidence from the process-tracing analysis to explain 
the relationship between PFM performance and macro-economic variables in the 
recovery and development phase. Through process-tracing, the researcher analysed the 
evidence from both countries, which is then triangulated with other sources to either 
increase support or reduce support for the argument/claim that: improvements in 
economic variables could lead to improvement in PFM systems. The empirical evidence 
from Liberia and Sierra Leone shows less support for the hypothesis that improved PFM 
systems are associated with strong economic performance as initially claimed by some 
scholars and observers of PFM reforms (de Renzio et al., 2010; de Renzio et al., 2011; 
Fritz et al., 2014a).  
 
In response to this statement/claim, the evidence points to a reverse causal relationship 
between improvements in economic and PFM systems. This proposition is mostly true 
for growth in resource-based revenues, which tend to undermine PFM reform progress 
in the two countries.  Expanding revenues in these countries seem to have triggered the 
impulses of political leaders to more than proportionately double their promises or build 
their political clouts through exponential levels of spending towards their ‘political roots’. 
There was a natural tendency by politicians to announce large expenditure promises 
with the expectation that revenue streams from mining will continue to flow. That led 
to fiscal indiscipline with large extra-budgetary expenditures and declining PEFA scores 
for budget credibility and frequent in-year revisions of budget ceilings during that period 





suggests that resource-based countries tend to have weak PFM systems or poor PFM 
performance (de Renzio et al., 2010; Fritz et al., 2014a; Fritz et al., 2017).  
 
There is also evidence from the two countries that expanding resource-based revenues 
tend to promote rent-seeking behaviours which undermine specific aspects of PFM, 
such as budget credibility, planning, budgeting and execution, procurement reforms, 
lead to frequent in-year revisions to the budget ceilings and promoted large extra-
budgetary expenditures. The large inflows from mining exports even undermined efforts 
towards bolstering domestic tax-based revenue mobilisation in the two countries. 
Mining contracts signed in the two countries were filled with tax concessions that led to 
the loss of billions of US dollars that might have been used to finance critical services.  
 
Similarly, a report funded by the UK Charity Christian Aid and its partners estimated that 
revenue losses from tax incentives in 2011 and 2012 amounted to 13.7% and 8.3% of 
GDP respectively, with an annual average loss of $199 million between 2010 and 2012. 
The report further projected that revenue losses were estimated to rise to $131 million 
in 2012-2014, fuelled almost entirely as a result of revenue losses from the five mining 
companies (BAN Sierra Leone, 2014). The impact of these losses could, perhaps be seen 
from the fact that Sierra Leone ranks 3rd from the bottom, on tax-revenue collection 
among 23 African countries according to an IMF report (IMF, 2012, p. 18). These findings 
resonate with earlier propositions about the impact of rent-seeking behaviours on 
reform implementation, especially in resource-based economies (Khan and Jomo 2000; 






Also, the surge in resource-based revenue from mining has direct implications on 
procurement reform efforts in the two countries. In-year revenue collections from 
mining companies caused unplanned expenditures, which were often, treated as 
emergency procurements. That could be seen from the drop in PEFA score for indicator 
19 for competitive procurement from C in 2010 to D in 2014 assessment (see PEFA 
website for ratings relating to 2010, 2014 and 2018 assessments)8. According to the 
Joint-donor Progress Assessment Framework (2013) for PFM reforms in Sierra Leone, 
73% (by value) of all government procurement 2012-2013 were conducted through non-
competitive practices such as sole-sourcing or as emergency procurements (PAF 2013, 
in Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016:63). Liberia had similar PEFA scores for indicator 19, with an 
increase in non-competitive procurement practices reported in the 2014 assessment, 
covering the mining boom (2011-2013). Its PEFA scores relating to competitive 
procurement methods dropped from C in 2009 to D in 2014 assessment (GoL, 2014) 
 
Inflows from mining revenues also had implications on other PFM dimensions. It 
resulted in increased unreported extra-budgetary expenditures, but also sparse multi-
years perspectives in planning, budgeting, and execution. The PEFA scores for indicators 
7(a) and 12 (a, c & d) for Sierra Leone consistently underperformed (averaging D scores) 
during the mining boom. Several interviewees from both countries recounted several 
instances of how mining revenue lead to reckless spending and over promises, which was best 
capture from the statement of a donor presentative in Sierra Leone as follows: 
                                                          





 …so it is that when economies grow, they support PFM. I can tell you this is 
not necessarily yes, because we saw the economy grew around 20% in 2012 
and 2013 that was around the time when government was most reckless 
because expectations grew and they thought that the mining was going to be 
forever. The increased the salaries of parliamentarians by 100% in this 
country. And if you look at the PEFA scores it was very horrible (Interview: 
XX101). 
 
Even with increasing domestic tax-based revenues, the evidence suggests the adverse 
effects of improvements in resource-based revenues on PFM systems and overall PFM 
performance surpassed by far, any potential benefits that might have resulted from 
improvements in tax-based revenues in the two countries. Moreover, the conditions 
(increased public pressure for better services and demand for greater accountability) 
under which improvements in domestic tax-based revenue according to Moore (2004) 
and Prichard and Leonard (2010) could lead to gains in PFM performance were almost 
non-existent in the two countries. Citizen’s participation, according to the open budget 
survey, continue to the weakest link among the open budget indicators across the two 
countries. The scores for participation in the most recent open budget survey were 6 
and 11 out of 100 points for Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively (IBP, 2015a&b; IBP, 
2017a&b).  
 
Also, results from PEFA assessments show that accountability dimensions within PFM 





countries from PEFA website). The evidence from the two countries points to a reverse 
causal relationship between improved economic performance and PFM reform progress. 
This means that, improvements in PFM performance leads to improvements in some 
economic variables. For example, several reforms, especially improvements in revenue 
reforms, were cited for having contributed to the improved economic performance in 
the two countries. Liberia’s superior revenue administration capabilities were expressly 
noted to have added to its superior domestic tax-based revenue as a % of GDP over 
Sierra Leone (Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016:41).  
 
While there is a general recognition that the fall in commodity prices and the Ebola 
Outbreak did affect the economic conditions of both countries, a direct impact on PFM 
performance is less obvious. I primarily based this on the fact that PFM performance in 
Sierra Leone began declining during the mining boom (2011-2013) as shown in Figure 
5.1. Based on the evidence, I argue the fall in commodity prices and the Ebola Outbreak 
could have only worsened the situation because the governments in the two countries 
had already promised too ambitiously than they could deliver in anticipation of the 
increasing inflows from mining exports. The experience in Liberia further supports that 
argument - the country did have moderate improvements after the decline in 
commodity prices and during the Ebola outbreak. However, Liberia’s resilience to the 
twin-shocks was mostly because of its reliance on external aid, which helped cushion 







The relevance of inflows from ODA was not uncommon to Liberia alone. I traced its 
significance to the PFM reform processes in the two countries and across all phases 
(post-conflict, recovery, and development). International partners used ODA finance as 
a countercyclical measure or a response to external shocks that supported government 
functions immediately after the civil wars, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
and following the decline in commodity prices and the Ebola Outbreak. Even where ODA 
did not increase, inflows from debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC and MDRI Initiative 
was critical to the economies of the two countries (Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016:52).   
 
A pattern, therefore, emerged as shown in figures 5.3 and 5.4 wherein, PFM 
performance improved following every spike in external financial support, especially 
during the post-conflict era and after ODA receipts following the global financial crisis. 
However, every spike in ODA or inflows from debt relief created disincentives that 
affected domestic tax-based revenue mobilisation efforts, especially In Sierra Leone (see 
also Poate et al. 2008; Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016: 51). That in turn, as I have shown above 
and in the detailed process-tracing analysis of group-five arguments/claims in Appendix 
C, negatively affected the quality of PFM and overall progress made in the two countries.  
 
5.1.2.2 PFM Reform Intervention Approach and its Effect on the State and Level of Progress Achieved 
PFM interventions in the immediate post-conflict environment in the two countries, as 
with many post-conflict countries were primarily about ensuring tight control of public 
expenditure management and accountable use of donor resources to (Schiavo-Campo, 





initial efforts to strengthen PFM in the two countries were undertaken as part of the 
more substantial state-building efforts. The first major PFM reform program in Sierra 
Leone was part of the broader governance and decentralisation program, through the 
IRCBP - 2004-2011 (GoSL, 2004a; World Bank, 2004d: 2; World Bank, 2011d). PFM 
intervention in Liberia started in 2006 as part of the GEMAP after former president 
Sirleaf came to office (Dwan and Bailey, 2006; World Bank, 2012b, pp. 1-2).  
 
Notwithstanding the different commentaries from observers and practitioners 
regarding the appropriateness of those reform programs (World Bank, 2011b) and their 
overall impact on PFM strengthening efforts in post-conflict countries generally 
(DeGroot, 2011, p. 20), those programs are considered highly ‘embedded’ PFM reform 
programs. This embeddedness is what Fritz et al. (2017) describe as the extent to which 
a PFM reform program is part of broader governance or public sector reform efforts. 
Moreover, they claim such embeddedness is vital to the overall success of PFM reform 
interventions. While the evidence from the two case study countries is not enough to 
prove that embedded PFM reform programs were more successful than stand-alone 
programs, the former at least served as engines that helped the successful 
implementation of the broader development agenda in the immediate post-conflict 
environment.  
 
However, there were several other PFM reform efforts, which were part of other 
governance programs, while some were stand-alone projects. The DFID support to the 





unit in the ministry of finance and the EU support to the Accountant General’s 
department in Sierra Leone are among several other small PFM strengthening efforts in 
the post-conflict environment in Sierra Leone. The evidence gathered during the field 
work shows there was a consensus among experts, practitioners, donor-partners and 
local authorities on the substantial transaction costs associated with implementing 
different PFM reform programs in the two countries. That later led to the setup of the 
Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) in the two countries to support a comprehensive 
approach to PFM reforms.  
 
The lack of conclusive evidence to claim the impact of having embedded PFM reforms 
on the overall PFM performance immediately after the conflicts does not entirely 
weaken how much confidence readers can place on the effects of embedded PFM 
reforms in the two case study countries.  In part, this is because of the declining or 
somewhat slow pace of PFM progress following the implementation of comprehensive, 
but stand-alone PFM reform projects in the two case study countries.  
 
The study also draws on the experiences from other countries that implemented 
embedded PFM reform programs to increase confidence in the evidence from the two 
case studies. Ethiopia’s initial PFM success was mainly attributed to the reforms been 
part of the country’s decentralisation programs (Peterson, 2007 and 2010). While South 
Africa’s initial PFM success was linked to its implementation as a requirement in the 





Campo, 2007). A more recent assessment by the World Bank shows some benefits of 
having embedded PFM reforms in Georgia (Fritz et al., 2017:51-2).   
 
5.1.2.3 The Effect of Isomorphism and Capability Traps on the PFM Status and Level of Progress 
Achieved 
In this section, I show how the effects of isomorphism and capability traps have shaped 
the status and level progress achieved in the two case study countries presented in 
section 5.1.1. Isomorphic Mimicry is a concept in public sector reform that depicts “the 
tendency to introduce reforms that enhance an entity’s external legitimacy and support, 
even when they do not demonstrably improve performance, [and after several projects] 
programs add up to capability traps - a dynamic in which governments constantly adopt 
reforms to ensure ongoing flows of external financing and legitimacy yet never actually 
improve” (Andrews et al., 2012, p.2). As discussed below, I argue based on the evidence 
from the two countries that the potential impact of isomorphic mimicry and capability 
traps on PFM reforms may vary between countries, and that depends on several factors 
or conditions.  
 
First, I show that the influence of isomorphic mimicry on capability traps and overall 
quality of a country’s PFM may be less visible where reforms are piecemeal and 
embedded within a specific and broader government development program. However, 
the evidence from comparing reform programs implemented at different periods (post-
conflict phases and the recovery and development phase) in the two countries, shows 





reforms is significantly higher when country governments and their development 
partners attempt at implementing comprehensive and stand-alone PFM reforms.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, the level of embeddedness of PFM reforms is the 
extent to which reform programs are entrenched within a broader and specific 
governance, state-building, or decentralisation program. The distinction of the level of 
embeddedness could be seen from the nature of the initial reforms (GEMAP in Liberia 
and IRCBP and the DFID Governance Reform in Sierra Leone) compared with the 
Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Programs (IPFMRP) that followed the 
MTDF in the two case study countries. The latter were stand-alone reform programs, 
irrespective of expressions of support to PFM in the respective PRSPs and the Agenda 
for Transformation (AFT) in Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively.  
 
The IPFMRPs were the first attempts at implementing comprehensive and integrated 
reforms in the two countries. Those programs for the first time included technical PFM 
reform models such as sequencing approach, harmonisation of international support to 
PFM and the use of country systems into the design and implementation. While these 
measures were positive steps, the experiences from both countries suggest trying to 
implement comprehensive, and integrated ‘best-practice’ solutions in countries with 
local capacity and weak institutions, and without a clear understanding of underlying 
institutional dynamics and political interests and incentives could exacerbate the 
potential for capability traps. The chances of this full-blown approach leading to 





programs. The design and implementation of those comprehensive and integrated 
reforms (such as the IPFMRPs in both countries in the recovery and development phase) 
were particularly problematic, given the apparent lack of a critical mass of evidence 
which reformers could capitalise on to design and implement reform programs that 
would be more likely to work the under specific contexts (Srivastava & Larizza, 2013: De 
Lay et al., 2015).  
 
While this study does not fundamentally disagree with the proposition of isomorphic 
mimicry and capability traps suggested by Andrews et al. (2012), it argues that capability 
traps do not always have to be a cumulative process, whereby countries accept new 
reforms, one at a time, which then add up over time and lead to capability traps. Even if 
increasing acceptance of new reforms lead to capability traps, their potential effect on 
PFM reform progress takes much longer and is less severe than governments attempting 
to carry out full-blown reform programs. Especially, when reforms are integrated with 
advanced reforms models like sequencing approach and trying to use country systems 
at the same time. The IMFPRP 2009-2014 is a typical example of such reforms, and 
among the first projects in many developing countries that had the concept of 
sequencing fully integrated into its design (Word Bank, 2009b; Tavakoli, 2012:17; World 
Bank, 2015).  
 
Comprehensive and integrated reforms were often, implemented with the expectation 
that completion of a series of measures in one platform (which was typically the case in 





in the next platform.  That resulted in higher capability traps than those created from 
implementing small-scale, incremental, and embedded reforms in the immediately 
post-conflict environment. Sierra Leone, for example, had great PFM success in the 
immediate post-conflict environment with weak institutions and low capability 
compared to later periods on any measure. That happened even with the introduction 
of more sophisticated reforms such as MTEF and IFMIS (World Bank, 2002b; World Bank, 
2004d: 18-20).  
 
Trying to implement comprehensive and integrated ‘best-practice’ PFM solutions 
together with advanced models like the sequencing approach, harmonisation of support 
to PFM and use of country systems in developing countries with low capability have a 
more significant impact on capability traps and on efforts to deepen reforms. Such full-
blown and integrated reforms may exacerbate the ‘superficial completion’ of measures 
and activities in one platform to move to the next platform. The evidence is particularly 
strong in Sierra Leone, where with several reform programs having been completed, 
there are ongoing efforts by donor-partners and local authorities to come back to the 
‘basics., as evidenced in the focus of the most recent projects: The EU State-building 
Project and the DFID Building Core Systems project and the government’s PFMICP (DFID, 
2014; EU, 2014; GoSL, 2014b). I, therefore, argue in this thesis that having a reasonably 
manageable and incremental approach is very significant for countries with low 






Secondly, the PFM experience in the two case study countries also suggests the impact 
of isomorphic mimicry on capability traps and level of progress achieved is somewhat 
less evident where similar countries engage in peer learning or sharing experiences and 
technical capabilities. As shown in the process-tracing evidence in the second group of 
arguments, Liberia’s flagship PFM reform program - the IFMIS was launched following a 
learning visit by the IFMIS team to Sierra Leone in 2010. Authorities from both countries 
interviewed singled out the significance of the learning visit before the IFMIS launch in 
Liberia. The noted that the design and implementation of Liberia’s flagship PFM program 
benefited tremendously from the failings, challenges, and lesson learned from 
implementing similar programs in neighbouring Sierra Leone.  By the time of the 
fieldwork, Liberia has surpassed Sierra Leone, both in terms of the roll-out and on the 
functional improvement of IFMIS.  
 
More importantly, much of the gains made on IFMIS in Liberia is being driven by Sierra 
Leonean experts who also designed and implemented IFMIS in Sierra Leone. The IFMIS 
Technical Lead in Liberia at the time of the fieldwork was a Sierra Leonean who worked 
on IFMIS in Sierra Leone and is now providing technical support to the IFMIS roll-out in 
Liberia. Sharing of technical expertise between the two countries was vital in 
understanding the technical requirements for implementing such an advanced system 
in a country with even a weaker infrastructure and institutional environment than Sierra 
Leone has. Moreover, the IFMIS technical experts from Sierra Leone had the experience 





that are likely to undermine the implementation of such as expensive and sophisticated 
financial management system.  
 
The experience gained from the learning visit and exchange of technical expertise might 
not be the only reason for Liberia’s success with IFMIS. However, the knowledge sharing 
and exchange of technical expertise were vital in helping local reformers in Liberia to 
have a more realistic plan - in terms of costs, expertise needed, infrastructure and 
institutional arrangement than they would have without the experience gain from Sierra 
Leone. The advantages Liberia had from the learning from Sierra Leone in the words of 
Sierra Leone’s top PFM reformer, who was head of the PFMU at the time of the fieldwork 
was that: 
When [the first PFM reform in Sierra Leone] IRCPB was formed, the 
kind of funds that were allocated to IFMIS was so small. So, Liberia had 
to learn from that and did not need to micromanage projects like IFMIS. 
What did we do? We wanted to implement [IFMIS] at the AG’s 
department, but what did they do? [They had] WAN, LAN, you [and 
bought] all the equipment - servers, computers, UPS… you then 
implement the project. Now we want to roll-out to the four big MDAs, 
so we had to come back and start everything all over. You see we are 
micro-managing and it is so scattered. Liberia came and studied, and 
when they went back, they did a complete infrastructure. They did all 
the WAN. So, it is a matter of just connecting the WAN. So, it is easier 
for them (interview: xx305).   
 
The evidence and experiences indicate the effects of isomorphism on capability traps 





expertise between countries with similar context, even where the countries involved are 
developing countries with low technical capabilities, inadequate infrastructure, and 
weak institutional environment.  
 
Moreover, Liberia’s IFMIS success remains the main driver of its continued progress, 
which is exhibited by its highest PEFA scores in two dimensions: predictability and 
control in budget execution; and accounting, recording, and reporting. The country’s 
ratings for these dimensions are higher than the regional average for SSA and with a 
steady upward trend than comparable scores for Sierra Leone.    
 
The peer learning experience between Liberia and Sierra Leone has implications for the 
ongoing efforts to promote the agenda of doing development different (promoted in a 
2015 ODI Workshop on Doing development differently: can it be managed? And ideas 
such as problem-driven solutions, working politically, etc. promoted by several 
academics and practitioners (Andrews, 2013; Andrews, et al., 2012; Blum, Manning, & 
Srivastava, 2012; Andrews, 2013; Booth & Unsworth, 2014; Booth, 2015). The 
experiences underscore the benefits of peer learning as a tool to promote more realistic 
solutions in developing countries. PFM reformers in Liberia were able to learn from the 
challenges and bottlenecks encountered in Sierra Leone to design a system that focused 
on delivering results, instead of processes and addressing the specific issues before and 
after launching IFMIS. The Liberian authorities were able to set up an IFMIS 
infrastructure that considered the specific challenges emanates from trying to micro-





The experience gained from peer learning also introduced realism into the PFM reform 
process in Liberia, which led Liberia to approach its IFMIS roll-out differently, than the 
usual roll-out process in Sierra Leone and elsewhere. Instead of doing the usual roll-out 
of IFMIS to the subnational government with deficient capabilities and poor 
infrastructure, Liberia created Financial Management Centres/county treasuries (service 
centres) which provide direct financial services to ministries, agencies, departments and 
health centres in Counties. At the time of the fieldwork, the country was piloting the 
IFMIS roll-out to four counties with county treasuries/service centres. These financial 
management centres provide essential functions of the Controller General’s Office such 
as budgeting, accounting, procurement, and audit to the ministry of internal affairs 
(which is the county government), health centres and schools in the pilot counties.  
 
Before the IFMIS roll-out to counties, local authorities had to travel to Monrovia, 
sometimes spending days to request funds from the ministry of finance to procure 
essential goods and services. In words, one country treasury officer interviewed, “before 
we used to come to Monrovia for everything, sometimes we had to spend 5 to 6 days to 
get there. Now for all goods and services, we get them locally. Now counties like mine 
have their budget lines for nearly everything ranging from services, fuel, and general 
admin expenses. Our job now [the country treasuries/service centres] is to help them 
follow the procedure and solicit their funds directly from the Ministry of Finance” 
(Interview: XL501). Such a different approach in light of the realities in Liberia is not only 
providing realistic solutions to the country’s efforts to improve service delivery to 





have results from rolling-out such as a complex system in regions with no capacity and 
poor infrastructure.  
 
While the contribution of peer learning in promoting realistic solutions and eliminating 
the focus on processes instead of form, is acknowledged in the literature on peer 
learning (Andrews and Manning, 2015), the impact of the exchange of the technical 
expertise has been given little attention.  
 
Having experts, such as the IFMIS Consultant from Sierra Leone working across the two 
countries was also critical to the success of IFMIS in Liberia. The experts from Sierra 
Leone had the first-hand experience in dealing with political dynamics that can 
potentially undermine reforms like IFMIS. However, they also provided invaluable 
advice on how to deal with donor-partners on pre-design and funding allocations 
needed for expensive programs like IFMIS given their experience in Sierra Leone. More 
importantly, the actual exchange of technical expertise was critical in contexts like 
Liberia with little or no human resource expertise to implement IFMIS. Having expertise 
from Sierra Leone with all their knowledge, experience in the contexts in both countries 








5.1.3 Summary of Findings 
Throughout section 5.1, I have presented the evidence, analytical interpretation, and 
discussions of the status and level of PFM progress in the two country studies. This 
section draws on the evidence about the state and level of progress achieved in the two 
countries from PFM assessments, such as PEFA, HIPC AAP and the World Bank’s CPIA on 
quality of budgetary institutions. The analytical interpretations and discussions also 
relied on PFM assessments reports from donor-partners and local governments, and 
independent publications from scholars and observers of PFM.  
 
The evidence from the two countries show rapid initial progress in their immediate post-
conflict environment, but with somewhat steady and marginal progress in Liberia and a 
declining trend in Sierra Leone. The high-level of subjectivity involved meant those PFM 
assessments did not always reflect the actual status and level of progress achieved. 
Which also meant those assessments were incapable of capturing the real reasons why 
scores have changed, and by extension, accurately reflect the underlying dynamics in 
the two countries.  
 
The above reasons and previous analyses of the state and level of progress in PFM, 
therefore, warranted further discussions of two crucial points.  
 
First, a review of how progress in PFM performance is constructed by stakeholders in 
the two countries and its implications for ongoing PFM strengthening efforts. Second, a 





stagnation or declining trend in PFM performance in the two case study countries. 
Regarding point one, the critical point to note from experience in the two countries is 
that there is a need for consensus and a better understanding by all stakeholders of the 
essence of PFM reforms. Which means, steps must be taken to re-strike the balance 
between efforts to strengthen PFM and the focus on improved service delivery and 
overall poverty reduction.   
 
I then presented analytical interpretations and discussions of the evidence to explain 
point two under three headings:  structural factors and country characteristics; the 
nature PFM reform interventions; and the effect of isomorphic mimicry and capability 
traps. Regarding structural and economic variables, the evidence shows less support for 
the hypothesis that improvements in economic variables could lead to improvements in 
PFM systems over time.  
 
However, among the structural factors examined, aid and debt relief did contribute to 
the initial successes in the two countries. Rising domestic revenues only created 
negative incentives for political leaders, which adversely affected PFM systems quality. 
Instead, advancements in revenue administration in Liberia was expressly noted to have 
contributed to its superior domestic tax-based revenue as a % of GDP when compared 
with Sierra Leone. In terms of the nature of PFM reform interventions, the evidence 
suggests it is preferable to have embedded and incremental reforms than large-scale 





technical PFM reform models such as the sequencing approach and the use of country 
systems.  
 
While efforts to strengthen PFM reforms did lead to isomorphic mimicry and created 
capability traps, large-scale stand-alone PFM projects heightened both the scale and 
pace of isomorphic mimicry and capability traps in the two countries. However, 
experiences in the two case study countries suggest the impact of isomorphic mimicry 
on capability traps and level of progress achieved is somewhat less evident, where 
similar countries engage in peer learning or sharing experiences and technical 
capabilities. Moreover, authorities from both countries interviewed singled out the 
significance of the peer learning and exchange of technical expertise to the significant 













5.2 Analytical Interpretations and Discussions of How Progress has been made and 
Why? 
In contrast to section 5.1 which focused on the PFM state and level progress achieved, I 
provide in this section a within-case and cross-case analytical interpretation of how 
progress has been made and why. In order to achieve this, I examine the nature PFM 
reform intervention areas in the two case study countries (the extent to which they are 
homogeneous or dissimilar), the pattern of the progress achieved or the extent to which 
progress made vary across the two countries and the dimensions of their PFM.  
 
The analysis of each of these aspects includes detailed analytical presentation and 
interpretations derived from the process-tracing evidentiary analysis carried out to 
answer the second research question How and why do some developing countries 
perform better in upstream and de jure dimensions than in downstream, de facto and 
de-concentrated dimensions PFM. To specifically address the why aspect of the research 
question, the process-tracing analysis carried out also included analysis and 
interpretation of the evidence about the underlying factors that account for such 
similarities or differences in intervention areas and pattern of progress achieved. As in 
section 5.1, the analysis included extensive use of evidence with regard to specific PFM 
reform programs, dimensions (downstream and upstream reforms) or specific aspects 
such as MTEF, IFMIS, etc., to explain the effects of non-technical factors and their 
interaction with technical and structural factors in shaping how progress has been made 






5.2.1 How Big are The Variations in PFM Performance Between Liberia and Sierra Leone 
and Why? 
In this section, this thesis examines how homogeneous or dissimilar are reform 
interventions, and how widespread are the variations in PFM performance and why? 
The process-tracing analysis of the evidence (data from interviews and background 
notes in the appendices) conducted firstly examined the nature of PFM reforms or 
reform packages in the two case stud countries. This analysis of the evidence reveals 
PFM reform intentions or interventions in the two case study countries have remained 
relatively homogeneous over time.  
 
Unlike similar findings of homogeneous reforms in other countries (Andrews, 2009, 
2011; Andrews et al., 2012; Fritz et al., 2014a; Fritz et al., 2017), the similarities of reform 
intentions in the two case study countries are striking. Apart from the usual list of 
around ten reform areas that have mostly been implemented across developing 
countries, PFM reform intentions in the two countries have evolved in a similar fashion. 
The reforms initially focused on ensuring tight controls in budget execution. And then 
reform intentions went from establishing tight control to maintaining a stable macro-
economic environment and medium-term fiscal planning and budgeting, to building 
PFM institutions and PFM legal and regulatory environment and much later to such as 
transparency and accountability, revenue administration and other cross-cutting areas 
such as debt management, managing state-owned enterprises and public investment 
management (Chessen and Krech, 2006; Shah, 2007; Schiavo-Campo, 2007; Tavakoli, 






The uniqueness of the sequence of intervention areas in the two case study countries is 
explained mostly by their contexts and the interest of donor-partners to initially institute 
mechanisms that ensured accountability for development assistance. The context in the 
immediate post-conflict environment in Liberia and Sierra Leone was characterised by 
weak institutions and low capacity as shown in Appendices A and B, and which in the 
views of some observers and PFM stakeholders interviewed warranted exceptionally 
measures from donor-partners.  
 
However, there were some fundamental differences in the governance structures and 
institutional arrangements between the two countries that led to some nuanced aspects 
in the initial PFM strengthening efforts. A specific example of this was the effort to 
restore Sierra Leone’s decentralised governance system, which led to the creation of a 
local government in 2005 and efforts to strengthen PFM at the subnational level 
featured prominently in the first major PFM reform project - the Institutional Reform 
and Capacity Building Project (GoSL, 2004a; World Bank, 20011d).  
 
A somewhat surprising contrast in the initial reform intentions (which was mainly about 
ensuring tight control in budget execution) was the early introduction of MTEF reforms 
- just at the end of the civil conflicts in 2002 and 2003 in Sierra Leone and Liberia 
respectively. The researcher traced this to the broader development agenda at the time, 
through the PRSPs and the HIPC initiative - which had some of its indicators (indicator 6 





expenditures and introduced a medium-term perspective into the planning and 
budgeting process (IDA/IMF, 2002, 2006, 2008 & 2010). 
 
Apart from the slight initial differences in reform intentions and reasons thereof, much 
of future efforts to strengthen PFM in the two countries became more homogeneous 
over time. Unlike, the influence of local contexts in shaping the nature of PFM reform 
intentions in the immediate post-conflict environment in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the 
increased standardisation of reform packages was driven mainly by the need to show 
results by donor-partners (detailed process-tracing of the desire by international 
partners to show results is available in Appendix C for argument 4c). This was best 
explained by a donor-partner representative who also worked in the Ministry of Finance 
in Sierra Leone, challenging me if I could come up with even a single reform initiative 
that was initiated and funded by the government. He remarked as follows “I am 
throwing that at you, you are the researcher. Go and pinpoint to each and every reform 
and try to see which donor was behind this. I can guarantee, you are going to correlate 
100% to donors. If you correlate below that then...”. (Interview: XX101).  
 
The international desire to show results has used mechanisms such as the PEFA 
framework and Schick’s three-level budgetary outcomes - fiscal disciple, allocative 
efficiency and operational efficiency to strengthen PFM in developing countries (Schick, 
1998a; PEFA Secretariat, 2005, 2011 and 2016). PFM reform projects in both countries 
during the recovery and development phases have followed a stylised approach 





were similarly streamlined to address all three levels of budgetary outcomes advanced 
by Schick (see, for example, the components in the IPFMRPs and PFM strategies in both 
countries). However, the emergence of models and concepts in international 
development interventions, such as the 2005 Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda 
for Change also helped shape PFM reform intentions and intervention areas. I process-
trace their effects, for example, on the MDTF that supported PFM reforms in the two 
countries, which increased focused on harmonisation, the use of country systems, and 
aligning programs within a country’s development agenda.    
 
Liberia’s PFM reform efforts became increasingly like efforts in Sierra Leone. Thus, I 
describe the reforms in Liberia as ‘carbon-copy’ of PFM reforms in Sierra Leone. The 
relevance of the homogeneity in reforms across the two countries has long been 
discussed in the institutional reform literature (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; North, 1990; 
Powell and DiMaggio, 2004). While homogeneous reforms may not always yield the 
desired results, the evidence from Liberia seems to weaken arguments advanced by 
critics of having standardised institutional development across countries (Andrews at al., 
2012; Andrews, 2013; Blum, Manning, and Srivastava 2012; Krause 2013; Brinkerhoff 
and Brinkerhoff, 2015). I argue in this thesis, that there must be room for some form of 
knowledge transfer and sharing of experiences in terms of what works or what does not 
work between countries with similar contexts.   
 
Moreover, Liberia has, in recent years, benefited enormously from the experiences from 





advances a more nuanced approach to PFM and institutional reforms, which is to drive 
the discussion in terms of what works and what does not between peers or countries 
with similar contexts. Up till now, the debate has been about how successes in advanced 
economies can be replicated in developing countries.  Emphasis should now be directed 
to firstly, trying to understand what has worked or what has not worked in countries 
with similar experience and contexts, and how those experiences can then be tried in 
similar countries. In attempting to understand what works or what does not work in the 
two case study countries, the study shifts the analysis of the evidence from these 
countries to show how widespread are the variations in PFM performance and why?  
 
With regards to how these homogeneous reform intentions performed in the two case 
study countries, the quantitative results (see Figure 5.5 below) and the evidence from 
the process-tracing analysis show widespread variations. These variations in 
performance happen between the two countries and across PFM dimensions. Figure 5.5 
below shows PFM performance by dimensions under the 2011 PEFA framework across 
the different assessments for Liberia and Sierra Leone. The scores, however, only include 
three assessments for Liberia. The PFM performance for Sierra Leone across all five 
assessments declined by comparing its initial scores with scores from the most recent 
PEFA assessment.  
 
Also, Sierra Leone’s performance fluctuated across all six dimensions between the initial 
and final assessments. Liberia also experienced similar variations but a somewhat 





trend for Liberia, Sierra Leone still maintains the upper hand in terms of overall state of 
its PFM systems across most dimensions. 
Figure 5.5: Liberia and Sierra Leone’s HIPC/AAP and PEFA Assessments by PFM 
Dimension  
 
Source: Computed by Author from World Bank/IMF HIPC Database and PEFA Database  
 
Figure 5.5 above shows the PFM performance (by dimensions of PFM) of Liberia and 
Sierra Leone for last three publicly available PEFA assessments. The PEFA scores are 
presented on a scale of 1 to 4 and the dimensions are based on the 2011 PEFA 
framework.   
Specific patterns could be observed in figure 5.5 above, irrespective of the 
implementation of homogeneous reform packages across the two case study countries, 
























Moreover, the PFM results vary significantly between the two countries and across all 
the dimensions of PFM. While these findings reflect the broader results of inconsistent, 
contradictory and variable PFM performance between countries and across their PFM 
dimensions (de Lay et al., 2015; Fritz et al., 2017: 10-11; Mills, 2018), the process-tracing 
analysis of the evidence from the two countries traced these to many reasons.   
 
First, beyond the quantitative displays of the variations in PFM performance, the 
process-tracing analysis also reveal the partial implementation of reform packages, 
projects and programs was the norm across the two countries. Both the quantitative 
data and accounts from interviewees illustrate many instances of partial 
implementation, but I refer to examples relating to the MTEF and IFMIS as two major 
reforms being implemented in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The MTEF for example, was 
launch in 2002 and in the words of a donor-partner representative who is also a Sierra 
Leonean “the MTEF is supposed to be a medium-term but, in actual fact, the budget is 
on a yearly basis…[asked about the annual budget process only involving adding 10 per 
cent to the previous year budget]. That is the issue, they are not really following the 
MTEF principles. And there are also weak costed sector strategies. Now they are trying 
to get more budget officers to help with costing sector strategies to augment the MTEF 
process itself”. (Interview: XX107).  Similar observations were given regarding the IFMIS. 
In particular, the was not only partial roll-out to MDAs, but the process-tracing analysis 
of the evidence shows significant differences between the number of IFMIS roll-out and 






The partial implementation observed in the case studies takes different shapes and form, 
and could be seen for example, from the detailed process-tracing analysis of the nature, 
types of reforms and reform outputs. Further detailed background notes of the various 
reforms implemented in case study countries are available in Appendices A and B. Other 
instances of partial implementation that stood out include the partial implementation 
of laws, processes and even activities and interventions in the various PFM reform 
programs in the two countries. Similar experiences of partial implementation were 
found by the following studies (Curristine, Lonti, and Joumard 2007; Robinson and Last 
2009; Lienert 2012; Moynihan and Beazley 2016).  
 
The process-tracing analysis specifically looked at the how long were reforms on the 
agenda before they were adopted and implemented or failed to be implemented 
despite commitments made. The evidence shows with some exceptions (such as the 
failure to even initiate TSA in Liberia and the refusal of the legislature in Sierra Leone to 
transfer leadership of the PAC to the opposition MP), most reform programs, packages 
or measures on various plans and strategies get adopted/initiated. Even the most 
complex and most expensive reforms such as IFMIS also gets adopted, and their 
implementation at least gets initiated. However, the extent to which reforms are 
implemented in practice has been the challenge. The evidence from the two case study 
countries suggests, whether a reform program/project, package, or a mechanism/tool 
such as MTEF gets implemented (fully implemented, partial/incomplete or not 





 The number/level of stakeholders involved in the implementation of specific 
reform package or tool. For example, upstream reforms with fewer stakeholders 
are more likely to be fully implemented than de factor, downstream and 
deconcentrated reforms packages;  
 The extent of the impact of a specific reform package or tool on political 
accountability and survival; and 
 The extent of the impact of a specific reform package or tool has on the freedom 
or leverage political actors have over the resource envelope (specific examples 
include internal audit, procurement and TSA). 
 
However, there is little or sometimes no clear-cut distinction between the above three 
factors. Specific reform programs, packages or tools may have an impact on political 
accountability and survival and as well as on the freedom/leverage of political actors on 
the resource envelope. At the same time, the actual implementation of such measures 
or reform tools might fall into one or two categories identified under point one. For 
example, while the inclusion of a component to establish a new PFM law in a PFM 
project constitutes a de jure reform, the actual implementation of the said PFM law is 
then categorised as a de facto dimension, and it might also take several years to fully 
implement that PFM law. As the evidence from the two case study countries show, the 
new PFM laws and regulations are mostly partially or selectively implemented, which is 
evidence for example, from the lack of implementation of audit recommendations in 





do not go through the normal parliamentary approval as enshrined in the PFM laws and 
regulations (GoSL, 2016; GoSL, 2018).  
 
The cumulative effect of the above three factors is that most reform programs, packages 
or tools that get fully implemented are mostly upstream and de jure reforms, and those 
that do not require greater political accountability or limit the freedom/leverage 
political actors have on the resource envelope. The long delay in the conception and 
introduction of TSA in Sierra Leone and the complete failure, at the time of the field 
work to introduce the TSA in Liberia are typical examples of the combined effects of the 
three factors listed above. As Fritz et al. (2017:56) also found, some reform packages 
like TSA have even more significant effects on the three factors above and may even 
take longer to progress from conception, design and implementation. A notable 
exception to these propositions is the success of IFMIS reforms in the two countries. 
Irrespective of IFMIS being a downstream reform, involving deconcentrated entities and 
actors, and its use as a mechanism to instil control, limit the discretion of political actors 
and ensure accountability in the use of public resources, its implementation is regarded 
as a great success story in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Fritz, 2012:35-38; Tavakoli et al., 
2015: 347). The evidence regarding the progress made on the IFMIS front contradicts 
earlier findings by Andrews (2010) who found limited progress made on IFMIS and 
budget execution generally in his analysis of how far PFM reforms have come in Africa.   
 
The process-tracing evidence from both countries, however, shows the progress on 





its control, transparency and accountability mechanisms. Unlike the IFMIS, the process-
tracing evidentiary analysis shows a different effect on the implementation of MTEF 
reforms in both case study countries. The MTEF process in both countries has been 
undermined in part, by the divergent interests and excessive discretions of political 
leaders, such as ministers and those at the highest level of state authority. Several 
observations were made by interviews regarding the political interference in the MTEF 
process, such as the frequent changes in ministers in key ministries who often come with 
different agendas. The new ministers often abandon previous medium-term plans or the 
challenges with the funding envelope, which often result in lack of funding for programs 
in the medium-term and even beyond. 
  
While this might not be the actual reason for the partial or lack of implementation of 
reform packages or measures, there appear to be some misconceptions about what 
constitutes full implementation or partial implementation. There are numerous 
instances across wide-ranging reform measures in the two countries where such 
misconceptions happen. For example, MTEF was described by many, as among the first 
reform packages that were implemented.  However, there were several admissions from 
stakeholders interviewed within and outside government that there is nothing to write 
home about MTEF. Planning and budgeting remain an annual process, where MDAs only 
add 10 percent to their previous year budget. This point was explicitly made by senior 
government official in the Liberia Ministry of Finance as follows: 
For the MTEF, I honestly do not think we have implemented anything in 





budget and the forward estimates.  But if you do an empty plan for three 
years.... take for example, a type of expenditure that spans over some 
years such as road construction contracts. The problem with this kind of 
arrangement is that the ministries, agencies and departments do not 
know whether the next chunk of money to undertake certain 
development programs are going to be approved (Interview: XL306). 
 
The progress with IFMIS was also frequently mentioned in terms of the number of the 
roll-out, without any facts about the functionality of the system itself.  For example, 
IFMIS has been rolled-out to 36 MDAs in Sierra Leone, but the IFMIS system at the time 
of the fieldwork only had a couple of modules that were up and running. Moreover, I 
found in one of the critical ministries the system was down for at least nine months 
before the field visit undertaken for this research.   
 
The implications of having partial implementation and the misconceptions therein about 
what constitutes full or partial implementation are that they lead to overstatements of 
the benefits from specific reforms and undercut the applicability of practical PFM reform 
models such as the sequencing approach.  
 
In terms of the overstatements of the potential benefits of certain reform measures or 
mechanisms, the accounts from interviewees about the successes of IFMIS, as it relates 
to the number of rollouts and its usage as a control and accountability mechanism are 
overrated. For example, too much emphasis was placed on the number of IFMIS roll-out 





But also, the IFMIS system in both countries do not have audit trails and according to a 
Principal Accountant interviewed in Liberia, there are sometimes transactions within 
their ministry’s account/business unit that they are unaware of. The rollouts are mostly 
not reflective of the functional improvements in the systems which are necessary to 
achieve the overall objective of the system.  
 
Also, by effectively and actively bypassing (budgeting of corruption) controls, 
accountability and resource allocation and monitoring mechanisms undermine the 
effectiveness of the system. All these dysfunctions negatively affect the overall promise 
of PFM as machinery to improve service delivery and poverty reduction. Furthermore, 
the overstatements of benefits from specific reforms and misconceptions therein, 
means some reforms never get implemented or may lead to partial implementation. 
This often, unnaturally shifts the focus to the next activity or reform, and thus affects 
the application of PFM models such as the sequencing approach and overall 
sustainability of the gains already made.   
 
Apart from the widespread partial implementation of reforms found in the two 
countries, the researcher used the process-tracing analysis to also go beyond the 
quantitative display in figure 5.5 to discuss in the next section, in greater detail, the 
factors that account for the inconsistent and variations in PFM performance in the two 






5.2.2 The Contrast between Upstream, De Jure and Concentrated Reforms vs Downstream, 
De-concentrated and De Facto Dimensions of PFM 
The results shown in Figure 5.5 from the previous section (section 5.2.1) shows a mixed 
picture in terms of PFM performance in the two countries and across dimensions of PFM. 
A prominent feature amid that emerged from the mixed-picture in terms of PFM 
performances is that some PFM dimensions performed, on average fairly-well compared 
with others. Among the six dimensions, comprehensiveness and transparency and 
accounting, recording and reporting rank top and second-best performers respectively. 
In contrast, external scrutiny and oversight and policy-based budgeting are the worst 
performing areas in that order. Also, the remaining two dimensions budget credibility 
and predictability and control often, show slightly below, and sometimes above-average 
performance.  
 
Given the inconsistent performances even within specific dimensions, these 
classifications are less helpful to facilitate an in-depth and analytical discussions about, 
both the specific and broader role and effects of non-technical factors. For these reasons, 
this study adopts in this section a stylised approach to present and discuss the process-
tracing evidence regarding how and why non-technical factors (or country 
characteristics) affect the variation in PFM performance in the following broad 
dimensions: upstream, downstream, de jure, de facto, concentrated and deconcentrated 
dimensions of PFM reforms. These broad categorisation was first adopted by Andrews 
(2010:2) in his analysis of how far PFM reforms have come in Africa in 31 countries. The 





however, noteworthy that even with these broader dimensions, the specific role and 
effects of a non-technical factor on PFM dimensions may not always be clear-cut.  
 
Based on these broader dimensions, the process-tracing evidence and accounts from 
PFM observers in the two case study countries show there is some level of progress 
across each dimension. The findings also reveal that there is generally better 
performance in de jure, upstream and concentrated dimensions compared with de 
factor, downstream and deconcentrated dimensions of PFM. Several reasons and 
insights have been provided for these differences in PFM performance in the 
background information provided in Appendices A and B. Besides, the researcher 
presents in the following sections in-depth and analytical discussions, based on the 
process-tracing evidence about the role and effects of nontechnical factors on the 
variations in performance in the two countries and across these broad dimensions.  
 
5.2.2.1 De Jure and De Facto Dimensions of PFM in Liberia and Sierra Leone  
 Based on the process-tracing evidentiary analysis conducted, the primary difference in 
PFM performance cited by all participants is the increasing gap between PFM laws, 
regulations, and policies and their actual implementation in practice. Investigating this 
implementation-gap in formal laws, regulations and policies and their actual 
implementation was fundamental during the fieldwork and interviews. The was a 
general consensus among interviewees in the two countries about the lack of 
implementation of PFM laws and regulations, which in the words of senior official in the 





nice at policies, good laws but there are lot of issues with implementation. There are 
political issues. Sometimes laws are written but there is no political will to implement 
those laws” (Interview: XL301).  
 
To this end, this study dedicated specific attention to investigate whether PFM 
strengthening efforts were overly ambitious or not, whether there are fundamental 
design issues that affect implementation of PFM legislation, or whether there are 
structural issues such as politics, informal norms and patronage, institutional dynamics 
and economic factors that affects the implementation of PFM laws and policies. The 
evidence reveals several competing explanations for the implementation-gap which the 
researcher examined through the process-tracing analysis and the main findings are 
outlined in the following paragraphs. 
 
First, the evidence reveals the significant gains achieved in de jure reforms are linked 
explicitly to the approach to PFM strengthening efforts in the two countries. These 
efforts focused initially on building the PFM legal architecture in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
The experience of enacting laws in PFM strengthening efforts is not uncommon among 
developing countries. It was part of the more extensive approach by international 
partners in developing countries, with mostly weak institutional environments (de 
Renzio and Dorotinsky, 2007; de Renzio, 2009; de Renzio et al., 2010; Andrews, 2011; 
Fritz et al., 2014a:5). Moreover, the evidence of the initial focus in establishing laws is 
even stronger in the case study countries, where the focus mostly was about protecting 





Chessen and Krech, 2006; Dwan and Bailey, 2006; Lawson, 2007: 19-20; Shah, 2007; 
Schiavo-Campo, 2007; Bank, 2012b, p. 5; Tavakoli, et al., 2015: 340).  
 
In terms of the implementation of the various PFM laws enacted, there is enough 
evidence to support the implementation-gap of formal laws and policies.  As one Local 
Council accountant from Sierra Leone puts it “I believe we have exhausted most of the 
issues relating to the reforms. We have the act, regulations and manuals but if we are 
not sincere it will be very difficult for us to move the reforms. Reform is beyond just 
having these laws, regulations and systems in place it has to do with us and we should 
believe that we can move from where we are now [with the implementation of these 
laws and regulations] (Interview: XX502). However, the existence of mounting evidence, 
from diverse sources, to support the apparent implementation-gap of PFM laws does 
not mean it is at the same time a necessary condition, or responsible for the uneven 
performance in the two countries and across the dimensions of PFM. By examining 
different rival explanations, stakeholders frequently cited inappropriateness of PFM 
laws and regulations, informal institutional norms and patronage systems and lack of 
political support to enforce various PFM laws and policies as factors responsible for the 
implementation-gap.   
 
The evidence in support of technical factors, including the inappropriateness or 
inconsistencies of laws to the country contexts or other legislations (for example, the 
2004 Local Government Act in Sierra Leone) (GoSL, 2004b), could only pass a weaker 





inconsistencies between new PFM laws and existing laws, and in some cases, the new 
PFM legislation was not appropriate to the local contexts in the two countries. For 
example, as a senior official in the Liberia Internal Audit Agency explained “…some of 
these laws are not practical in our settings. For example, the PFM law states that before 
you carry out any transaction for a certain amount you have to advertise in newspapers 
in certain places. Newspapers are only in Mustorado county, and all the other 14 
counties do not have newspapers. So, if you were to implement a project where you 
would face a serious challenge of advertising (Interview: XL401).  
 
The existence and influence of technical factors such as the inappropriateness or 
inconsistencies of PFM laws with other laws and regulations could be hard to justify after 
the first PFM laws and regulations were revised to match the local contexts or 
eliminated the inconsistencies in the two case study countries. The technical 
inconsistencies in the various laws can be corrected, and they have mostly been 
corrected. This means their mere existence is relevant and could affect the 
implementation of the laws. Their absence, however, does not mean stakeholders will 
fully implement all the PFM laws and regulations, as is the case in the two case study 
countries.  
 
On the other hand, there is consistency in the presence of nontechnical factors such as 
the lack of political support and informal institutional norms and patronage systems in 
the two countries. Nontechnical factors such as top-down political directives and 





are “…embedded in society and its culture, they will remain ‘necessary evils’ that the 
donor community can at best contain, not erase altogether” (Hydén, 2005, p. 17). These 
nontechnical factors have the potential to derail the implementation of PFM laws and 
reform efforts. By the same token, the evidence shows political support and 
commitment to PFM reforms, for example, could almost certainly guarantee the 
implementation of PFM laws. The Auditor-General in Sierra Leone in her 2013 report 
said “[various issues giving rise to my qualified opinion] serve to confirm further the 
government’s widely held reputation of being unable to deal with poor public finance 
management decisively. As I have said before, with a stronger commitment and 
willingness to address public financial management reform and strong enforcement of 
existing well-established laws and regulations, the matters could be put right quickly as 
other countries have done”(Audit Service Sierra Leone, 2013, p. Vi).  
 
Also, the absolute authority by executive branch in Sierra Leone to approve extra-
budgetary items and misuse of the contingency fund within the laws and regulations are 
perhaps the most significant factors that continue to undermine budget credibility and 
overall PFM performance (Coffey, 2014; World Bank, 2015; World Bank, 2017a:3). The 
2015 audit report, for example, showed that 80% of all procurement was done through 
non-competitive bidding (sole sourcing) that seriously undermined the effective 
implementation of the procurement regulation (Audit Service Sierra Leone, 2015b).  
 
I draw on four specific examples to illustrate the influence nontechnical factors have on 





specific instances relate to the significant delay in including TSA in PFM legislation in 
Sierra Leone, and the complete failure to even initiate it in Liberia; the 2007 stand-off in 
Sierra Leone between parliament and international partners on SO759 that allowed the 
Auditor General to make her report public; the long delay before the new procurement 
act in Sierra Leone was enacted; and the outright refusal of Sierra Leone Parliament to 
transfer leadership of the PAC to opposition party, after considerable external pressure 
from international partners.  
 
Moreover, several other events or experiences in the two countries could also help 
boost confidence in the influence of nontechnical factors and reduce confidence in 
influence of technical factors such as inconsistencies of new laws with old legislation. 
There is a sense of déjà-vû in both countries, with a long history and reputation for their 
failure to implement laws, policies and reform programs (World Bank, 2010:41; Bank, 
2011c). In Liberia for example, lack of commitment from state authority to enforce 
controls was cited as the main reason for the failure, in less than a year of the USAID 
stabilisation program to boost revenue collection and expenditure control in 1988 set 
up by the projects and other operational arrangements of the project (USAID, 1989; in, 
Chessen and Krech, 2006, p. 3). Secondly, the evidence from the process-tracing analysis 
and other sources on Sierra Leone indicate the lack of implementation of policies, laws 
and programs is ubiquitous across different reform interventions in the country (Jackson, 
                                                          
9 SO75 means Standing Order 75, which is the Parliamentary that was reinterpreter by the Sierra Leone 
Partliament in 2007 to allow the Auditor General to publicly publish her audit report. Before 2007, audit 





2007; ICG, 2008: Robinson, 2009; Fanthorpe & Gabelle, 2013; Jibao & Prichard, 2013; 
Roseth & Srivastava, 2013; Srivastava & Larizza, 2013).   
 
The evidence in support of nontechnical factors is substantial and passes a much 
stronger process-tracing test - the hoop test, given their high relevance in determining 
not only whether a law gets passed, stalled or not passed at all, but they also largely 
explain the lack of implementation of PFM laws and regulations. Based on the above 
analysis, I argue that the deeper the roots a specific PFM law has in non-technical factors, 
such as political economy issues or the more it threatens the political survival of 
politicians, informal norms and patronage systems, the higher the likelihood it will 
encounter stiff resistance or be derailed in its implementation. This premise holds in the 
two case study countries, and it so irrespective of the nature of governance structures 
or extent of complexity of a country’s institutions and wider authorising environment.  
 
5.2.2.2 Concentrated Reforms/Professionalism (Actor-Concentration) vs De-
concentrated Reforms/Professional-deficiency (Actor de-concentration) 
The conventional wisdom is that professionalism or concentration of reforms generally 
presents better opportunities for institutional reforms than professional-deficiency or 
de-concentration. The empirical results from the two case study countries and process-
tracing analysis do provide some support to this proposition, but they also provide some 
nuanced perspectives that challenge this normative thinking about 






This normative thinking was deeply rooted in the international-led approach to PFM in 
the two countries. First, there was a strong belief among donor-partners that building a 
cadre of local experts, who were recruited mostly from overseas or some of whom came 
from Europe and America could facilitate the transfer of ‘best or good practices’ in the 
PFM strengthening efforts by international partners. The placement of foreign experts 
in crucial finance positions is a quintessential example of the ‘best practice’ approach in 
the two countries. Further efforts in this direction could also be seen with the 
recruitment of what is now commonly regarded as LTAs in Sierra Leone (Tavakoli, et al., 
2015; Welham & Hadley, 2016). Also, I also draw on the experience in the 
implementation of the two capacity building programs - Senior Executive Service (SES) 
and Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) in Liberia to illustrate 
the ‘best practice’ approach to PFM in that country (Tripathi, 2017).  
 
Second, the evidence shows there was an even stronger emphasis in PFM strengthening 
efforts in the two case study countries towards having a more centralised and less 
complicated PFM institutional architecture. Again, notable examples include the merger 
of finance and development ministries and the enormous powers given to the Minister 
of Finance in the new PFM laws in the two countries (GoL, 2009; Tavakoli, 2012; GoSL, 
2016).   
 
While the fundamental premise for promoting professionalism in institutional reforms 
in the institutional literature (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 152; Slack and Hinings 1994, 





two case study countries, the evidence from the process-tracing analysis also reveal 
several misconceptions about applying this normative thinking in developing countries. 
First, the evidence shows that the strategy worked well initially in the two countries 
because it aligned well with the interests and motivations of professional elites mostly 
in the ministry of finance and their political masters. Professional elites in the ministry 
of finance in the two countries relied on the successes of the initial reforms to continue 
to survive - in terms of huge salaries they received from those programs but also to 
guarantee their political masters continued development assistance from international 
partners. Political leaders also supported those reforms, as far as they did not threaten 
their legitimacy and survival.  
 
The evidence is further supported by the fact that the apparent declining trend in PFM 
performance in Sierra Leone happened at the same time as GBS started to decline and 
coincided with the transfer of LTAs remunerations to the government payroll. Most of 
the LTAs continue to occupy some of the most strategic positions in the central finance 
ministry, albeit their salaries are no longer tied to the continued progress in reforms. 
The latter was observed to have had significant implications on their level of interest 
and motivations to pursue reforms. This pattern of behaviour of shifting interests is not 
uncommon as shown in section 5.1.2.1 how the boost in domestic revenue, after the 
decline in international assistance provided negative incentives to and affected the level 
of interests and commitment of local leaders to PFM reforms (IMF, 2010; Ecorys and 






Also, the notion that professionalism alone presents better opportunities for 
institutional change is further challenged based on the experience in the two case study 
countries. The fundamental assumption that there will be a transfer of knowledge from 
professional elites or a small group of experts to rank and file civil servants might be 
severely weakened by the interests, motives and behaviours of professional elites. 
Reports from three capability building and knowledge transfer programs (GEMAP, SES 
and TOKTEN) and responses from interviewees have all criticised those programs for 
their limited impact on transferring technical expertise to rank and file civil servants. 
Instead, broad-based efforts through the financial management training school and 
support to the University of Liberia are given much credit (Tripathi, 2017). The evidence 
from the process-tracing analysis further shows how the three programs (GEMAP, SES 
and TOKTEN) in Liberia made little progress on knowledge transfer, which in the view of 
a senior official in the Comptroller General’s Office in the Liberia Ministry of Finance who 
had the first-hand experience of the programs said: 
I firmly believe those programs were not about capacity transfer. It was only 
about bringing Liberians from the diaspora to work in the country for a couple 
of years and then return. The question that always comes to mind when I 
hear donor-partners say the SES and TOKTEN were about the capacity 
transfer. The reality was, whom those experts were supposed to transfer 
capacity to when we had mostly school dropouts and at best new university 
graduates. It was just not practical having some experts from the USA 
transferring knowledge to someone who was a school dropout or someone 
who had very limited technical ability to receive the knowledge that was 





The strength of the evidence of the failure of those programs to transfer knowledge and 
expertise to local civil servants could be ascertained by the admission of some of the 
LTAs interviewed. One of the LTAs who worked in senior positions in the Ministry of 
Finance in Sierra Leone and was leading one of the donor-funded PFM reform projects 
explicitly said: “…the strategy should be if you bring in an adviser [which could be an LTA] 
is to build the capacity of the civil servants. We have more civil servants who are holding 
those positions, and we should concentrate on building their capacity and maybe 
moving out and allow them to take control” (Interview: XX105_303). These remarks 
indicate that LTAs and professional elites recruited under those programs continue to 
occupy the most strategic positions and preside over ongoing PFM reform efforts in the 
two countries. A World Bank study in 2012 shows that there are fewer middle and 
senior-level officials in Sierra Leone than in most counties. Professional and technical 
personnel make up only 11% of all civil servants, and most of them work in the ministry 
of finance, of whom LTAs are in the majority (Roseth and Srivastava, 2013).  
 
Again, the process-tracing analysis reveals the evidence for the failure by professional 
elites to transfer knowledge was rooted in their interests and motives, which is to 
consolidate their power and control and continue to receive salaries that are well above 
the government pay scale in the two countries. This claim is further supported by 
evidence from the fieldwork and from Welham and Hadley (2016: 21-22) that indicates 
the increasing consolidation of informal power within small circles of professional elites, 
who are mostly LTAs in the institutional set-up in the Ministry of Finance in Sierra Leone. 





real authority by LTAs and professional elites, which prevents knowledge transfer and 
hinder long-term capacity-building efforts. This informal power and consolidation of real 
authority even extends to the relationships with development partners, which in the 
words of the same ex-LTA quoted above, “LTAs were convinced they were well qualified 
and represented the best talents in-country. They successfully projected this notion to 
their donor masters who paid their salaries, which further cemented the level of 
marginalisation of local non-technical civil servants” (Interview: XX105_303).  
 
The effect of the three programs in Liberia and the LTAs in Sierra Leone was that they 
created many resentments from ordinary civil servants and tension within the civil 
service. The evidence shows several instances of negative sentiments from ordinary civil 
servants and as well as among senior-level officials interviewed in the two countries. A 
senior official in the Budget Bureau in Sierra Leone summed these negative sentiments 
neatly. He notes, “the LTAs in fact just created tension, in the sense that because of the 
difference in pay with people working in the same institution just differentiated by 
pay scale. Somehow it created a lot of tension, …a lot of many other problems, which 
even now is affecting our payroll aspect, which the government is trying to address now” 
(Interview: XX304). 
 
From the perspective of concentrated (or actor-concentration) and de-concentrated (or 
actor-de-concentration) dimensions of PFM, quantitative data from PEFA scores for 
national and sub-national (in the case of Sierra Leone) and evidence from the process-






The first critical difference is that actor-concentration/concentrated areas of PFM tend 
to perform relatively better than de-concentrated dimensions of PFM. Based on the 
evidence, the most critical implication for future PFM strengthening efforts worth noting 
from the experience of the two countries concerns the trade-off involved in deciding the 
extent to which PFM functions should be concentrated or de-concentrated, when and 
how to do it. Maintaining an appropriate balance is paramount, especially in the two 
case study countries with low infrastructure, low technical capabilities and weak 
institutional environment. However, the absence of any theoretical model to determine 
this balance or trade-off in such contexts, often led to the default approach, which 
centralised PFM functions mostly in the Ministry of Finance in the two countries.  
 
Based on the evidence from the process-tracing analysis, the heavy concentration of 
PFM functions in the Finance Ministries in the two countries was significantly driven by 
the desire of international partners to show results and ensure accountability for their 
taxpayer resources. There are several indications from both the nature and focus of PFM 
reform programs such as the GEMAP in Liberia and the Public Sector Support to PFM in 
the Accountant General’s Department by the World Bank and the EU in Sierra Leone in 
the immediate post-conflict era (World Bank, 2002b; World Bank, 2004d; Chessen and 
Krech, 2006; Dwan and Bailey, 2006).  The approach did create immediate results by 
restoring PFM functions and ensuring transparency and tight control in budget 






In Sierra Leone where initial efforts to deconcentrate PFM functions were taken through 
its decentralisation programme in 2004, the roll-out was done in the form of a 
transactional process. There was little commitment from the ministry of finance later to 
build capacity, and often with no real ownership and commitment from MDAs and local 
councils to finance and sustain those reforms in the future.  All of which had led to 
further weakening of capacity in front-line service delivery areas (MDAs) and continues 
to affect overall service delivery efforts in the two countries (IRCBP, 2008; Tavakoli, 
2012).  
 
As noted earlier, the critical challenge has been for local reformers is to understand the 
trade-offs involved in deciding the extent to which PFM functions should be 
concentrated or de-concentrated and when and how to do it. The study draws on two 
examples from the two countries to illustrate the challenge faced by local reforms and 
development partners. First, the de-concentration of some PFM functions to line 
ministries and sub-national government in Sierra Leone has been associated with the 
massive corruption that took place during the recent Ebola Outbreak in Sierra Leone. 
The Ebola Audit carried out by the Audit Service found serious misappropriate of Ebola 
funds and complete disregard for procurement laws, control mechanisms and reporting 
requirements in the financial management system (Audit Service Sierra Leone, 2014 and 
2015a). Both countries were affected by the Ebola Outbreak, albeit the scale of the 
scandal was greater in Sierra Leone than it was in Liberia. Audit Service Sierra Leone note 
in its Ebola audit that “it is clear from our audit conducted that there continue to be 





resulted in the loss of funds and a reduction in the quality of service delivery in the health 
sector” (Audit Service Sierra Leone, 2014, p. 1). The role of having de-concentrated PFM 
functions in the massive Ebola corruption in Sierra Leone was discussed in a meeting in 
2015, involving officials from the two countries and development partners according a 
NSA officials in Liberia interviewed and who were also present at the said meting 
(Interview: XL701). So perhaps, it is not surprising that it was specifically recommended 
in the evaluation of donor support to PFM to re-concentrate some PFM functions away 
from MDAs or re-establish budget credibility and control over the budget process 
(Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016:129).  
 
Second, the recent de-concentration of some PFM functions in Liberia through piloting 
of treasury centres has been described by some as long overdue, in terms of efforts to 
improve service delivery in that country. However, such as incremental approach seems 
much more realistic considering the insufficient capacity, inadequate infrastructure and 
weak institutional environment. The treasury centres piloted at the time of the fieldwork 
were contributing immensely to service delivery efforts in the four counties according 
to one country treasury financial management officer interviewed (Interview: XL501). 
 
Considering all the pieces of evidence and analysis above, the default preference by local 
reformers and international partners towards professionalism and for having 
concentrated reforms (or actor-concentration) does create opportunities for PFM 
reforms/institutional change. This normative strategy allows for effective influencing 





the prospect to disproportionately and negatively affect long-term capacity-building and 
commitment from front-line service delivery units to sustain these efforts.  
 
Actor-concentration or professionalism alone is not enough to drive change, reformers 
and international partners must seek to understand the local institutional and political 
dynamics and the interests and incentives (which are continually changing) that 
influence the behaviours of professional elites. So, if the right strategy is not employed 
correctly, there will be little or no real transfer of knowledge, and instead, there will be 
informal consolidation of authority, knowledge and institutional memory within small 
circles of professional elites. That has the potential to result in resentments and tension 
within the civil service and could undermine long-term capacity-building efforts. One 
good example which is undoubtedly relevant for future PFM strengthening efforts in 
countries with local capacity is the broad-based capacity development through the 
financial management training school and support to the University of Liberia. These 
highly rated programs further reduce support for the argument about relying on the 
technical expertise of small circles of professional elites.  
 
Finally, the experience from the two case study countries suggests it necessary the local 
reformer and international partners understand the trade-offs involved in de-
concentrating some PFM functions and should always seek to create an appropriate 
balance regarding the extent to which they can de-concentrate PFM functions, when 






5.2.2.3 Upstream and Downstream Dimensions of PFM in Liberia and Sierra Leone  
The evidence from the process-tracing analysis used in this section comes from much 
broader sources (including PEFA reports, government and donor-partner reports and 
reports from independent sources) and analysis of different of the interviews. The 
evidence shows there is more progress made in upstream than in downstream reforms 
processes in the two case study countries. Upstream reforms are mostly those related 
to establishing new institutions, departments, introducing macro-economic planning 
and policy-based budgeting (MTFF, MTEF, investment and public debt management, 
having a budget framework paper), the annual budget process, including the budget 
calendar, legislative scrutiny of the budget ex-ante and the final budget document. 
Whereas downstream reform processes include budget execution and external scrutiny 
and oversight processes - treasury management including managing inflows and 
outflows and TSA, accounting and reporting, payroll, human resources management, 
procurement, internal audit and external scrutiny and oversight (external audit, ex-post 
legislative scrutiny and social audit - participation of NSA).  
 
The above pattern of progress in PFM in the two countries is not surprising given the 
existence of similar results from several studies (Andrews, 2010; Fritz et al., 2012; de Lay 
et al., 2015). However, as stated in the introductory section of this chapter, the emphasis 
in this section is to contribute to the large objective of section 5.2 to answer the second 
research question, which is to examine how and why some developing countries tend to 






As stated by a DFID funded rapid evidence assessment of the extant PFM literature, PFM 
strengthening efforts have been “excessively focused on processes at the front end of 
financial management, especially budgeting and financial planning, but at the expense 
of more downstream processes linked with implementation and oversight” (Mills and 
de Lay, 2016, p.23; see also de Lay et al., 2015). However, as I stated in the introduction 
to this section, the evidence from the two case studies and more extensive quantitative 
studies indicates upstream reforms such as policy-based budgeting is among the 
weakest areas, while downstream budget execution such as accounting, and reporting 
are among better performing areas of PFM. So, while upstream reforms generally 
perform better, the apparent poor performance in the most coveted upstream reforms, 
such as MTEF and the relatively superior performance in some of the most complex 
downstream processes necessitates an in-depth examination of the underlying 
mechanisms that might better explain these dynamics.     
 
The first reason frequently cited for the superior performance of upstream reforms and 
assessed through the process-tracing analysis is the role of project design and other 
technical factors, such as the sequencing of reforms. The role of project design, PFM 
plans and technical models in shaping reform outcomes in the two case study countries 
have been cited in many PFM reports and by independent observers of PFM in the two 
countries (World Bank, 2009b; Fritz et al., 2012; Tavakoli, 2012:17; Tavakoli et al., 2015). 
Their basic argument has been that PFM reform plans focus excessively on upstream 





reports, which do not fully capture and address the underlying issues that undermine 
efforts to strengthen PFM in the two countries.  
 
This fundamental argument seems plausible and backed by significant evidence, which 
is verifiable in the various PFM strategies, plans and diagnostic PFM assessments in the 
two countries. Their argument might not, however, qualify as a necessary factor, or 
significant enough to drive variations in performance between upstream and 
downstream reform processes. I argue differently that those plans and technical models, 
such as the sequencing approach, do not have any causal power to influence PFM reform 
outcomes.  
 
Instead, I focused the process-tracing evidentiary analysis on addressing several 
issues/questions such as what went into the design and implementation of those 
projects, programs and plans, how did reform get to the agenda of country governments, 
did domestic stakeholders set the specific features of the agenda, or were they strongly 
influenced by external ‘scripting’, has there been enthusiasm for particular types of 
reforms, and what explains that enthusiasm, and how long were reforms on the agenda 
before being adopted and implemented.   
 
The above questions speak to the fundamental issues of reform ownership, 
incentives/motives to pursue reforms and leadership to ensure PFM intentions are 





addressing these cross-cutting issues is critical to contributing to our understanding of 
why upstream reforms perform better than downstream reform processes.  
 
Regarding how PFM reforms got onto the agenda of government, the process-tracing 
analysis reveals both countries share several features about how PFM reforms were 
conceptualised or how the PFM agenda emerged. Moreover, the evidence indicates that 
several factors explain those features, which are driven by two mechanisms: reactions 
by both local authorities and international partners to various crises experienced in the 
two countries; and through efforts by local authorities to meet international demands 
under various frameworks and modalities such as HIPC debt relief and general budget 
support. International efforts in PFM reforms in the two countries were at their peak in 
the aftermath of each crisis, except for HIPC debt relief which was part of the broader 
global agenda benefited many developing countries as well.  
 
Based on the above two reasons, international efforts in PFM strengthening in the two 
countries occupied a lead role, and this was irrespective of the nature of the crisis 
experienced. In the view of a donor-partner representative, who is also a Sierra Leone 
national “PFM reforms was mostly thought of by development partners and discussed 
with the government” (Interview: XX106). Even for some local actors who share the view 
that PFM reform was also partly conceived locally, they indirectly admit that any local 
effort towards PFM was also influenced by some form of external incentives from 
development partners. As one local PFM reform leader notes, “yes, we try to champion 





partners because we do not know the angle they will be coming from. Because if they 
come today and say this is what we want to do, [we will have to do it], because as we 
speak now, we have the PFMICP funded by the donor-partners, we have Adam Smith 
funded by DFID, and EU funding the states building project” (Interview: XX305). 
 
The above evidence is vital to explain the second fundamental issue of whether the 
specific features of the PFM agenda were set by domestic stakeholders, or whether they 
were strongly influenced by external ‘scripting’. Regarding the latter, the evidence 
indicates an overwhelming international ‘foot-print’ in the design of PFM reform 
programs in the two case study countries.  Several observations from interviewees and 
from various PFM diagnostic and review reports were not noted in the process-tracing 
evidentiary analysis.  The international ‘foot-print’ in the design of PFM reforms took 
different shapes and forms - ranging from recommendations from donor-partner 
assessment missions/reports, developing adhering to international ‘best practice’ and 
to the placement of international consultants who influence policy directions and take 
the lead in the design of PFM reform strategies and programs (World Bank, 2004b&d; 
Dwan And Bailey, 2006; World bank, 2009b).  
 
The lead-role taken by international partners following every crisis in the two countries 
and their heavy ‘foot-print’ in the design of PFM reform strategies, programs and plans 
are essential to help us understand why countries perform better in upstream than in 






First, they help explain findings elsewhere in this chapter and the next that the nature 
of PFM reforms or reform intentions are explicitly driven by the international desire to 
show results for their development assistance. Upstream and de jure reforms are more 
amenable to current international intervention and result-based models used by donor-
partners to support PFM strengthening efforts in developing countries. This finding is 
supported by earlier results found by Andrews in is his empirical analysis of which 
organisational attributes are amenable to external reforms of African PFM (Andrews, 
2011).    
 
Also, instruments such as PEFA represents the immediate objectives of international 
efforts to support PFM in developing countries (Wescott, 2008:22). Moreover, the 
evidence found also increases support for another key finding of this thesis that argues 
that there is a limit to what could be achieved from PFM reforms that are championed 
externally. As one donor-partner representative from Sierra Leone, who was 
interviewed admittedly notes, “downstream [reform processes] is the problem, a whole 
nightmare” (Interview: XX107). This study, therefore, deduces two implications based 
on the evidence and reform experience in the two countries: that the most critical 
aspects of these reform measures are primarily outside the scope of current policy 
reforms being supported by the development partner; and by extension downstream 
reforms are not always amenable to disbursement triggers mostly relied on by 
international partners to drive PFM reforms in partner countries. Against this backdrop, 
PFM reform efforts supported by internal partners in the two countries have primarily 





peripheral areas of institutions or to ensure legitimacy and standardisation of a set of 
practices (Ashworth, Boyne, and Delbridge 2007, 165; Andrews, 2011).  
 
The fact that some upstream reforms continue to lag, while some downstream reforms 
continue to show relatively stronger performance indicates there is some other factors 
that explains the upstream and downstream divide in PFM performance. However, 
previous studies that assessed the upstream and downstream divide in PFM 
performance de Renzio and Dorotinksy (2007), de Renzio (2009a), Andrews (2010), or 
those that examined the limit to externally driven reforms (Andrews, 2009; Andrews, 
2011; Andrew et al., 2012; Andrews, 2013) did not also seek to explain why some 
upstream reforms continue to lag, while some downstream reforms continue to show 
relatively stronger performance in developing countries.  
 
Based on the evidence, the study argues that success in both upstream and downstream 
reforms is deeply rooted in the local institutional and political dynamics that might 
otherwise be explained by the above criticisms of the international-led approach to PFM 
reforms in developing countries. Understanding the role of the local institutional and 
political dynamics is critical, especially in terms of forward-looking implications for 
future PFM strengthening efforts in developing countries. To this end, I provide through 
specific examples, in the next two sections why and how local institutional dynamics and 
political factors affect not just the upstream and downstream divide, but also why and 






5.2.3 The IFMIS Test Case of PFM Reforms in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
I show in this section how local institutional dynamics and political factors shape 
opportunities for change and fundamentally determine whether progress is made in 
specific reforms, even with the most downstream reform areas. I call this the IFMIS test-
case, which explains the underlying local technical dynamics and political factors that 
enable or derail the progress of IFMIS reforms in the two case study countries. The 
process-tracing evidentiary analysis was undertaken against the backdrop that IFMIS 
reform is widely regarded as the most expensive (Hashim and Piatti, 2016), and one of 
the most complex and challenging reforms to implement (Combaz 2015; Fritz et al., 
2017), in spite of it implementation being largely successful in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
Unlike most PFM reforms, IFMIS reform is very complicated because it involves many 
different facets and different players at different levels of government. Those involved 
have to deal with the technical challenges with IT and ICT infrastructure, procurement, 
project management (Hashim and Piatti-Fünfkirchen, 2018), and also solicit adequate 
political backing to finance it, and to sustain the process in the midst of constant 
challenges from actors, who have the incentives to circumvent the system’s control and 
oversight mechanisms (Fritz et al., 2017:64).  
 
Surprisingly, IFMIS reforms and its associated accounting, recording and reporting, 
comprehensiveness and transparency dimensions of PFM have performed relatively 
better than most PFM dimensions in the two case study countries. Tavakoli et al. (2015: 





more conventional pattern of progress in the general PFM literature (Pretorius and 
Pretorius, 2008; Andrews, 2010; de Renzio et al., 2010). The experience with IFMIS is, 
however, less striking, given that such progress according to findings from Dener, 
Watkins and Dorotinsky (2011) is possible in low-income countries, and even in the most 
challenging environments, such as those in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
However, it is essential to point out that the roll-out of IFMIS in the two case study 
countries is only another step towards improving budget execution. At the time of the 
field work, Liberia had rolled-out IFMIS to 50 MDAs while Sierra Leone has only rolled-
out IFMIS to 36 if of its 50 MDAs. The evidence shows the number of IFMIS rollouts to 
MDAs does not necessarily mean those front-line ministries have a functioning IFMIS in 
place. The experience, especially from Sierra Leone identified severe functional-gaps in 
the IFMIS roll-out process. In one of the largest ministries I visited in Sierra Leone, I found 
the IFMIS had been down for several months before my fieldwork. Even in MDAs where 
the system is ‘up and running’, budget and finance officers have to regularly commute 
to the Ministry of Finance to do budget checks, process vouchers, print out cheques, 
among others.   
 
Perhaps, the biggest surprise based on the research findings in that Liberia’s IMFIS 
capabilities (both in terms of roll-out to MDAs and functionality of the system) had 
surpassed that of Sierra Leone, after coming from behind, with even more challenging 
environment than its neighbour. Considering the above, the process-tracing analysis 





implementation of its IFMIS than Sierra Leone. Interviewees frequently cited several 
factors, such as interests in FMIS from civil servants in the Ministry of Finance in Liberia. 
That, they pined to the fact that IFMIS makes their financial management functions easy. 
One Ministry of Finance official in Liberia, for example, states that “I think IFMIS has 
been very instrumental in Liberia because it has made work a lot easier. It has been able 
to facilitate a lot of payroll and other accounting and payments issues that were not 
possible before.  And I think the Investment in the IFMIS has yielded the necessary 
benefits or the desired results” (Interview: XL306). This evidence seems plausible to 
qualify as a necessary condition to establish causation in the process-tracing approach, 
which means its presence indicates its relevance, but the evidence is not conclusive. 
Thus, the evidence in support of the interest in IFMIS argument is not decisive to explain 
the significant progress made on IFMIS in Liberia.  Several respondents from Sierra 
Leone, in fact, also shared the same reason to explain to level progress made in IFMIS 
reform. The presence of similar reasons in both countries makes such an argument even 
less decisive. This argument is further weakened, given that both countries emerged 
from conflicts and had to do things manually in their day-to-day financial management. 
Therefore, it was more likely that would have embraced any advanced financial 
management systems and move away from the traditional and manual accounting 
systems that existed in the immediate post-conflict environments in the two countries. 
 
Also, several interviewees from the two countries cite the control and accountability 
mechanisms of IFMIS as a prime reason for the challenges encountered from 





accountability mechanisms. However, this widely held view from participants that IFMIS 
faces stiff resistance from some local actors, because of its inherent control in budget 
execution did not prevent both countries from making initial progress in the 
implementation and rollout of IFMIS. Again, while this control argument seems plausible, 
the evidence is not decisive, and its impact is quite benign and hence explained by the 
rapid initial progress achieved in IFMIS in the two countries. As the study explained in 
section 5.2.1 political leaders and top-level bureaucrats, have found ways to override 
the control, transparency and accountability mechanisms of IFMIS through what I 
describe in this thesis as budgeting of corruption in the annual budget process in the two 
countries. 
 
The most compelling explanation for Liberia’s IFMIS success was strong leadership and 
commitment from its government. This study draws on three reasons to support this 
claim. First, the Liberian government, ex-ante showed strong leadership and 
commitment in IFMIS. The authorities had a firm conviction that IFMIS was fundamental 
to PFM reforms in the country, which they manifested through the learning visit to Sierra 
Leone in 2010. The then President Helen Johnson Sirleaf had direct knowledge and 
interest in IFMIS reforms. Her strong leadership and interest were shown in the words 
of IFMIS Consultant who worked in both countries “she was in Washington when the 
vice president was about to launch IFMIS, but she instructed the vice-president to wait 
for her to launch the project herself.  For her, launching the project was important 
because citizens will also appreciate and support the government in their reform efforts” 





the initial progress achieved with IFMIS rollout across national and subnational 
government in Tanzania (Diamond and Khemani, 2005,14--15).  
 
In comparing the two countries, the strong leadership and commitment of the Liberian 
government are also explained by the fact that the authorities financed the IFMIS 
upgrade from domestic resources. Unlike Liberia, Sierra Leone has never financed IFMIS 
from its domestic revenue. Ministry of Finance officials interviewed in Sierra Leone did 
defend the country’s moderate performance compared to Liberia, claiming that the 
latter allocated more funding to IFMIS given their experience with the scenario in Sierra 
Leone. While this argument is supported by Hashim and Piatti-Fünfkirchen (2018) who 
concluded having realistic cost estimates is critical to IFMIS success, the move by 
Liberian authorities to finance the IFMIS upgrade from domestic resources sufficiently 
demonstrates their level of commitment. There is no such commitment from the Sierra 
Leone government. After all, Liberia is not wealthier than Sierra Leone. 
 
Moreover, there is consistency in the leadership and commitment to IFMIS reforms from 
the Liberian authorities. In Liberia, every Finance Minister since the IFMIS launch has 
maintained some level of commitment. While in Sierra Leone, there was much techno-
political disagreement with the new Finance Minister in 2007, which stalled IFMIS 
reforms for a couple of years before it was resolved. The reason was that the new 
finance minister in 2007 thought IFMIS was not desirable and had wanted a completely 
different financial management system. The inconsistency in leadership and 





MDAs in Sierra Leone. Also, it took almost two years under the current PFMICP to recruit 
a procurement consultant to initiate the process for the IFMIS upgrade and to procure 
ITC equipment. The delay led, in 2016 International partners to institute a special IFMIS 
audit.  
 
Finally, there is more broad-based support and commitment to IFMIS reforms in Liberia 
than in Sierra Leone. Most of the civil servants interviewed in Liberia discussed PFM 
reforms exclusively from the lens of IFMIS. One interview participant from the Liberia 
Ministry of Finance described IFMIS as “a grandchild that we need actually to hold and 
pamper” (Interview: XL309). Unlike their counterparts in Sierra Leone, this sentiment 
was widely shared by many respondents and in different quarters within the 
Government of Liberia. IFMIS is like the face of PFM reforms in Liberia, and it was easy 
to read this high level of enthusiasm for IFMIS reforms during fieldwork in that country.   
 
5.2.4 How and Why Certain PFM Reforms are more challenging to implement than others   
As in section 5.2.3, I also show in this section how and why local non-technical factors 
shape opportunities for change and fundamentally determine whether progress in 
specific reforms are achieved, irrespective of whether they are downstream or upstream, 
concentrated or de-concentrated and de jure or de facto dimensions of PFM. To explain 
this, I draw on the experiences in the two countries regarding the successes and 
challenges encountered with specific reforms such as TSA, MTEF, IFMIS, internal audit, 






The basic idea of this section is to warn against the usual upstream and downstream 
divide, which might not always be helpful to our understanding of how and why 
particular reforms fail while others achieve progress. This is because the nature of 
specific reforms underpins the level of resistance which they may face and is not based 
on the usual upstream or downstream, de jure or de facto divide.  
 
De jure reforms are the most successful and regarded as the most straightforward to 
pass but may encounter significant resistance where they conflict with the interest and 
incentives of powerful political elites. Specific examples from the two country 
experiences further illustrate this point. The first example is the resistance by Sierra 
Leone’s parliament to amend Standing Order 75 (SO75), which prevented the Auditor 
General to publish publicly the annual audit report and the outright refusal to change 
the leadership of the PAC. Second, the new procurement law in Sierra Leone stalled for 
three years before it was approved. The third example is the refusal by the authorities 
of both countries, to even include TSA in their PFM laws since the inception of the 
reforms over a decade and half ago. The common theme portrayed by these examples 
is that the above reforms challenge the techno-political state in the two countries, albeit 
some being later passed into law. Even where some are enacted into law, mobilising 
enough political support and commitment may be impossible. However, even the most 
challenging reform to enact into law could still be enacted where it is aligned with the 






Recent experience in Sierra Leone saw the inclusion of TSA into 2016 PFM Act and ex-
ante planning of the initial roll-out, defying resistance from MDAs and autonomous 
agencies. According to many interviewees, the resistance faced in Sierra Leone was also 
driven by some misconceptions from MDAs that TSA will impose restrictions, and they 
might no longer have access to their funds. A senior reformer in the Sierra Leone 
Ministry of Finance states “MDAs are saying government is going to close their accounts 
and utilise their funds. Obviously, they will not be happy. But at times for reforms to be 
successful strict measures need to be put in place” (Interview: XX305). While such a 
resistance from ministries, autonomous agencies, local councils and even commercial 
banks is not surprising (Fritz et al., 2017:60), the process-tracing analysis shows such a 
giant step from the Sierra Leone Government was motivated by fiscal pressures and a 
worsening economic situation in the country following the crash in commodity prices 
and the Ebola Outbreak as shown earlier in section 5.1.2.1 in this chapter.  
 
Fiscal pressures and a worsening economic situation also meant the Ministry of Finance 
needed to exercise tight control, managerial oversight and accountability amidst the 
high borrowing costs and excessive commitments from MDAs. The senior PFM reformer 
in Sierra Leone referenced above emphasised this point during the interview, stating 
that “The Government of Sierra Leone cannot be borrowing, paying high-interest rates 
when you have funds lying with MDAs. The government will utilise those idle funds and 
then refund them later” (Interview: XX305). These benefits of TSA and its control, 
accountability and managerial oversight mechanisms are also detailed in a 2010 IMF 





The extent to which local political factors and institutional dynamics shape opportunities 
for change could also be explained from experience with reforms such as MTEF. The 
implementation of the MTEF is perhaps the most challenging reform in the two 
countries, albeit it being an upstream reform mechanism. After a decade in Liberia and 
a decade and a half in Sierra Leone since was first introduced, the objective of MTEF as 
a mechanism to link policy and planning to the budget, and to support resource 
allocation and contribute to fiscal sustainability has not produced the desired results. 
Despite its initial introduction and considerable support from International Partners, the 
reviews are particularly appalling as a senior official in the PFMRU in Liberia states:  
For MTEF, I honestly do not think we have implemented anything in this 
country. People feel that it is about having the medium-term budget and 
forward estimates. …take, for example, a type of expenditure that spans over 
some years, such as road construction. The problem with this type of 
arrangement is that ministries and agencies do not know whether the next 
chunk of money to undertake specific development programs are going to be 
approved (Interview: XL306). 
 
Considering the above admission of the relatively poor performance of MTEF, I was 
specifically interested in finding out during the fieldwork and interviews whether MTEF 
reforms involve more high-level political process than other reforms such as IFMIS. The 
experience from the fieldwork and process-tracing analysis show MTEF reforms are 
more of a political process that frequently clashes with the interests and incentives of 
the high-level politicians and their political actors. In the words of a senior official in the 
Budget Bureau in the Ministry of Finance official in Sierra Leone, “…the MTEF is just a 





from MTEF implementation. If you are told you have to do it to carry out their activities 
or agenda [whether or not it in line with the MTEF guidelines], you will have to do it 
anyhow” (Interview: XX304). However, the MTEF experience in terms of the high-level 
political process is not unique to the two countries. The role of politics and its 
interactions with institutional rules and dynamics in shaping the final budget and its links 
to policy goals are also discussed by Norton and Elson (2002); Hallerberg et al. (2009); 
and Fritz et al. (2017:56-9).  
 
The most important idea from the MTEF experience in the two countries is that high-
level political interests and incentives frequently changed, which lead to ad-hoc policy 
changes that undercut earlier policy planning and budgeting. The impact of changes in 
the interests and incentives and the ensuing ad-hoc policy changes are substantial even 
where the MTEF process has been in existence for many years. The annual and repetitive 
process means budget support triggers tied to successful MTEF implementation may 
only be temporary. Also, adherence to the MTEF guidelines in one fiscal year to meet 
budget support triggers does virtually nothing to ensure future adherence and 
commitment from political leaders. A similar experience is also reported in Tanzania, 
where earlier progress in MTEF reforms did not guarantee future improvements, and 
the annual budget remained largely unrealistic for several years after its initial roll out 
(Holmes and Evans 2003; Oyugi, 2008).  
 
The MTEF experience from the two countries and from elsewhere offers significant 





time. The unique political interactions of the MTEF with political interests, incentives 
and institutional dynamics, coupled with its repetitive nature, may defy any logical or 
sequence of improvement over time. This claim is supported by the status on 
performance and programme-based budgeting in Africa, which finds that after decades 
of implementing MTEF and programme-based budgeting, most African countries to date 
do not have a fully-fledged system in place that is in line with all the guidelines 
(Worthington 2013: ix).    
 
The process-tracing also reveals changes in the interests and incentives are driven by 
two factors: the desire by political leaders to fulfil their political promises (to fund their 
political roots10) and the frequent changes to cabinet positions in the two countries. 
Government regimes in Sierra Leone are known for frequent cabinet reshuffles - rotating 
politicians between ministries and agencies. Even when MTEF is often claimed to be 
linked with the broader government agenda, there will be “…a Minister whose interest 
is to provide fertilisers. [However] you can have another Minister in the next year, whose 
interest will be to provide attractive subsidies, and now, you begin to see the deviations 
and these are some of the key challenges, in terms of implementing programs like the 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework” (Interview: XL308_XX306). The experience in 
the two countries is that, sometimes, a whole program could be neglected or abandoned 
in favour of a new and politically attractive program.  
 
                                                          
10 Political roots in this thesis means  promises of big infrastructure or investment projects by political 
leaders during political campaigns or in their manifestos. These infrastructure projects are seen as 





The experiences in the two case study countries with reforms such as procurement, 
internal audit and oversight also provide invaluable insight into how and why political 
factors and institutional dynamics shape opportunities for change, irrespective of 
whether a specific reform is downstream or upstream. These reform measures are 
mostly concerned with front-line MDAs engaged in service delivery. They concern 
routine activities that involve many stakeholders, who have different interests and 
incentives that may undermine PFM regulations. Internal audit, for example, despite 
being a relatively new reform (Vani, 2010) faces a much broader challenge because of 
its role in bridging the gap between policy and regulations and practice. Considering the 
breadth and scale of PFM reforms in the two countries, reforms such as internal audit 
encounter stiffer challenges because it “connects people to policy” according to an 
Internal Audit official in the Internal Audit Agency in Liberia (Interview: XL401).  
 
The evidence also indicates some inherent societal problems such as the lack of goodwill 
to follow laws and misconceptions among civil servants, who view internal auditors as 
policemen, are critical drivers of the weak internal audit function in the two countries. 
In the words of the Internal Audit official from Liberia quoted above, “there is a culture 
of impunity in Liberia. Some people may get away with things. So, people who feel that 
they can benefit from that impunity they are not so inclined to do the right things” 
(Interview: XL401).   
 
Procurement reforms, on the other hand, is described by a NSA representative in Sierra 





worst areas in the two countries, absorbing about 70 per cent of all central government 
expenditure.  Because it takes the lion’s share of government expenditure, procurement 
reforms are of particular interest to political leaders and political actors manning MDAs, 
which could be seen in the 2015 audit report in Sierra Leone, which found that 80 per 
cent of all procurement was done through non-competitive bidding or sole-sourcing 
(Audit Service Sierra Leone, 2015b).  
 
Oversight reforms such as external audit, parliamentary oversight, internal audit and 
procurement also involve many actors with interests and incentives that can threaten 
existing political patronage systems. Much of the progress on oversight is in the area of 
ex-post scrutiny from the SAIs in the two countries. The main factors that appear to drive 
the progress made by SAIs are the direct support from international partners and the 
fact that their work is enshrined in the laws of the two countries. The most critical 
challenge concerning oversight is the lack of political accountability and failure to 
enforce audit recommendations, irrespective of the enforcement powers conferred 
upon the Ministry of Justices by the constitutions and PFM laws in the two countries 
(GoSL, 1991; GoL, 2009; GoSL, 2016).  
 
By contrast, IFMIS reforms, unlike the other reforms discussed above, continue to enjoy 
strong support in the two countries. The process-tracing evidence indicates that three 
factors drive the level of support and commitment. First, both countries needed an 
IFMIS system after the conflicts to facilitate the work of the Ministry of Finance, but also 





come with substantial financial implications, through large procurement contracts that 
are attractive to local reformers. However, this high-level interest in IFMIS because of 
the large procurement contracts involved negatively affects other dimensions of PFM, 
which is reflective of the systemic weaknesses in procurement reforms indicated by the 
low PEFA scores shown in section 5.1.2.1. And finally, IFMIS is an accounting system and 
routine processes involving mostly technical personnel. With the latter, IFMIS unlike 
other reforms such as TSA, MTEF, procurement, which present political economy 
dilemmas from the senior Ministry of Finance officials, encounter less resistance from 
high-level political actors because senior officials or reformers in the Finance Ministries 
in both countries can carry it out safely without any confrontations with their political 
masters.  
 
5.2.5 Summary of Findings 
Section 5.2 focused on how progress has been made and why in the two case study 
countries. The evidence presented and discussed relates to the extent to which PFM 
reforms pursed are homogeneous or dissimilar; the pattern of the progress achieved or 
the extent that to which progress achieved varies across the two countries and PFM 
dimensions; and how much of the preceding are influenced by political factors and local 
institutional dynamics. The evidence from the process-tracing analysis reveals that 
reform intentions and programs were homogeneous across the two case study countries. 
Irrespective of the homogeneous reform intentions across the two case study countries, 






First, there are wide variations in the performance of homogeneous reforms across the 
two countries and PFM dimensions. Second, partial implementation of reform packages, 
projects and programs is the common theme in the two countries and across PFM 
dimensions. Whether a reform gets implemented (fully implemented, 
partial/incomplete or not implemented at all) is driven by three factors. The number of 
stakeholders involved in the implementation of specific reform packages or tools; the 
extent of the impact a specific reform package or mechanism on political accountability 
and survival; and the extent of the impact a specific reform package or mechanism on 
the freedom or leverage political actors have over the resource envelope.   
 
Based on the evidence of the level of progress achieved and variations in performance 
between de jure and de facto reforms, between concentrated and de-concentrated 
reforms and between upstream and downstream reforms are mostly the results of non-
technical factors and their intersections, in some instance, with technical reform models. 
This study argued the more profound the roots a specific reform initiate or mechanism 
has in nontechnical factors, such as political economy factors and institutional dynamics, 
or informal norms and patronage systems, the higher the likelihood it will encounter 
stiff resistance, or it will only be partially implemented. 
 
This study demonstrated this through the IFMIS test-case, in which I showed how strong 
and consistent local leadership and broad-based commitment were principally 
responsible for Liberia’s superior IFMIS roll-out and functional capability compared with 





opportunities for change by providing evidence that explains why some reforms, such 
as MTEF, TSA, procurement, internal audit and oversight are more challenging to 
implement than other reform initiatives.  
 
Perhaps, the most significant takeaway and challenge for international partners is that 
political-economy factors and local institutional dynamics are underpinned mostly by 
the interests, incentives and motivations (which are continually evolving) of politicians 
and their proxies. However, the interests and incentives of political leaders and local 
reformers are easily more aligned with upstream, de facto and concentrated reforms 
than with downstream, de facto and de-concentrated reform areas. 
 
5.3 The Key Findings and Conclusion: Current PFM Reform Progress is Not Good 
Enough to Deliver on Its Promise  
This chapter has addressed the twin objectives of providing logical explanations of the 
evidence from the two case studies about how and why progress in PFM reforms vary 
in the case studies and across PFM dimensions. For far too long, there have been few 
efforts in the existing PFM literature to address, in a single study, the how and why 
aspects of PFM reforms in developing countries differ. So, while readers of this chapter 
and this thesis might feel overwhelmed by the details of the process-tracing evidentiary 
analysis, the analytical discussions in this chapter allow the researcher to contribute to 
correcting this deficiency. The analysis I have laid out in this chapter is critical to an 
understanding of the state of PFM, the level of progress achieved, and the underlying 





strengthening efforts in the two countries.  The process-tracing evidentiary analysis has 
also provided a more nuanced contribution to understanding PFM reforms, which is 
different from the prescriptive reform models that dominate PFM reform strengthening 
efforts in developing countries. The evidence has been presented in two-folds and 
tailored to address the first and second sub-questions stated in the introduction of this 
chapter. In this section, I conceptualise and crystalise the evidence from sections 5.1 and 
section 5.2 to address the third sub-research question and to make an overall 
assessment on the state and level of progress achieved in the case study countries. 
 
Figure 5.6: The State and Level of PFM Reform Progress in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
Source: Prepared by the Author based on the evidence from the case studies 
 
In summarising and crystalising the main findings, the critical challenge throughout this 
chapter was maintaining a balance between a retrospective and a prospective view, and 





better inform future PFM strengthen efforts by both development partners and country 
governments. 
 
The presentation in this section provides an overall assessment on the state and level of 
progress achieved in PFM reforms in the two case sties, which is then followed by a 
detailed analytical discussion that explains the extent to which the non-technical causal-
factors contributed to the main findings and overall assessment or conclusion reached. 
Figure 5.6 below presents a framework that conceptualises and crystalises the evidence 
presented and discussed in the previous two sections. It shows the apparent failure of 
current PFM reform models and interventions to deliver on the overall promise/objective 
of PFM reforms in the case study countries.  
 
As depicted in upper half of Figure 5.6, the evidence shows the current PFM reforms 
models championed by development-partners are not good enough to accomplish the 
real thrust of PFM reforms in the two countries. This thrust of PFM reforms is, according 
to Welham et al. (2013), to ensure macroeconomic stability, contribute to state-building 
efforts, improve service delivery and ensure efficient resource allocation in developing 
countries as shown in the extreme right in Figure 5.6 above.  
 
The first critical point based on the evidence is that current PFM reform models and 
interventions are long to upstream and de Jure reforms and short on downstream, de 
facto and deconcentrated dimensions of PFM. The evidence shows the approach has 





in the two countries. While this approach has resulted in substantial progress in 
upstream budget processes and building the legal foundations, its influence on 
downstream budget executions, the actual implementation of the laws and policies, 
programs and reform initiatives at front-line service delivery ministries, agencies and 
department has been minimal. The substantial progress in upstream and de jure reforms 
has been achieved because international partners have mostly relied upon policy-based 
instruments. The approach in the case studies was based on the general belief among 
development partners that progress in upstream budget processes and enacting of laws, 
creation of new institutions and departments or the injection of professionalism in PFM 
could trickle down to other PFM dimensions further down the PFM spectrum (Fritz et al, 
2017:21).     
 
As the evidence and discussions in the previous sections also show, this pattern of 
progress in part, is because of policy-based instruments were overly focused on 
achieving the short-term interests of development partners. That meant PFM 
strengthening efforts kept moving from one short-term objective, without strong 
commitment to deepen reforms, especially in downstream, de facto and de-
concentrated dimensions of PFM. This further meant PFM reforms were treated as ends 
in themselves and not as means to improve service delivery in the two countries. The 
Ebola Outbreak in the two countries is a good example that exposed the limitations of 
the current level of PFM progress achieved. After decades of reforms, current PFM 
systems and institutions in the two countries were incapable of supporting front-line 





through bad procurement process and misappropriations of much-needed funds to 
combat the epidemic.  
 
The weak links or the apparent failure of current policy reform models and interventions 
to trickle down to downstream service delivery units is also explained by three points as 
depicted on the right-hand side in Figure 5.6 above. First, while the evidence in the 
previous two sections (sections 5.1 and 5.2) PFM reforms have been largely 
homogenous, partial implementation of these reforms was, however, widespread in the 
case study countries. The widespread partial implementation of PFM reforms found 
explains the lack of function improvements or functional gaps in PFM institutions and 
the lack of implementation of PFM laws and regulations. The evidence shows the full 
implementation, incomplete implementation or lack of implementation is driven by 
misconceptions about what these terms mean. That further led to partial completion of 
some reform initiatives, overstatement of benefits from specific reforms and generally 
undercut the applicability of practical PFM reform models such as the sequencing 
approach.  
 
With respect to the implementation of PFM reforms, the study found whether a reform 
gets implemented (fully implemented, partial/incomplete or not implemented at all) is 
determined by three factors. 1) The number of stakeholders involved in the 
implementation of specific reform packages or tools. 2) The extent of the impact a 
specific reform package or mechanism on political accountability and survival. 3) The 





or leverage political actors have over the resource envelope. However, there is an 
important caveat to these propositions which could be seen with the success of IFMIS 
reforms in the two countries. The evidence reveals an important element that explains 
the successful implementation of IFMIS reforms is because political actors and civil 
servants have found ways to override its control, transparency and accountability 
mechanisms through what I describe as budgeting of corruption in the annual budget 
process.  
 
Through adopting a broader frame of analysis of PFM performance, I showed how and 
why political factors and local institution dynamics shape opportunities for change 
especially in downstream dimensions of PFM in the two countries. Based on the 
evidence, the limited progress in downstream dimensions of PFM are primarily the 
results of non-technical factors and their interactions, in some instance, with technical 
reform models. The deeper the roots a specific reform initiative or mechanism has in 
nontechnical factors, such as political economy factors and institutional dynamics, or 
informal norms and patronage systems, the higher the likelihood it will encounter stiff 
resistance, or it will only be partially implemented. The research demonstrated this 
through the IFMIS test-case, in which I showed how strong and consistent local 
leadership and broad-based commitment were principally responsible to Liberia’s 
superior IFMIS roll-out and functional capability over Sierra Leone.  
 
I also demonstrated the strength of these nontechnical factors in shaping opportunities 





procurement, internal audit and oversight are more challenging to implement than 
other reforms initiatives. Perhaps, the most significant takeaway and challenge for 
international partners is that political-economy factors and local institutional dynamics 
are underpinned mostly by the interests, incentives ad motivations (which are 
constantly evolving) of politicians and their proxies. The evidence shows the interests 
and incentives of political leaders and local reformers can be easily aligned in upstream, 
de factor and concentrated reforms than in downstream, de facto and de-concentrated 
reform areas. 
 
Several implications and lessons of good practice can be deduced from the evidence that 
might be relevant for future PFM strengthening efforts by development partners, 
country government and independent observations with interest in PFM in 
development countries. First, while debt relief and higher ODA did positively influence 
PFM reform efforts, especially during periods of crisis, their influence, however, declined 
in the development period (post-2009), as country governments mobilised domestic 
revenue - domestic tax revenue and large inflows of mining revenues. The large inflows 
of mining revenue and domestic taxes, however, derailed efforts to strengthen PFM by 
triggering the impulses of local political leaders to increase levels of spending towards 
their ‘political roots’ in disregard of PFM laws and regulations and created opportunities 
for patronage networks.  
 
Also, the evidence suggests it is preferable to have embedded and incremental reforms 





integrated with technical PFM reform models such as the sequencing approach and the 
use of country systems. Large scale PFM reform efforts heightened both the scale and 
pace of isomorphic mimicry and capability traps in the two countries. However, the 
experiences in the two case study countries suggest the impact of isomorphic mimicry 
on capability traps and level of progress achieved is somewhat less evident, where 
similar countries engage in peer learning or sharing experiences and technical 
capabilities. The experiences underscore the benefits of peer learning as a tool to 
promote more realistic solutions or introduce ‘realism’ into the PFM reform process in 
developing countries. It also weakens arguments advanced by critics of having 
homogeneous reforms or standardized institutional development across countries 
(Andrews at al., 2012; Andrews, 2013; Blum, Manning, and Srivastava 2012; Krause 2013; 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2015). There must be room for some form of knowledge 
transfer and sharing of experiences in terms of what works or what does not work 
between countries with similar contexts. 
 
Again, the implications of the short-term focus and treatment of PFM reforms as means 
in themselves are perhaps, not surprising, given the apparent lack of clear evidence of 
the impact of current PFM strengthening efforts in the literature (Fritz et al., 2014; de 
Lay et al., 2015; Mills, 2018:2). For example, the World Bank which has been for decades, 
the dominant player in PFM reforms in developing countries admitted in its ongoing 
evaluation of its support to PFM the lack of adequate evidence of impact on eradicating 






Apart from the methodological challenges such as the attribution problems of studying 
effects of PFM reforms, I have also shown in the previous sections that the lack of 
adequate evidence of impact is also the result of the approach and the tools used by 
international partners to assess progress. In the words of de Lay et al., “The holistic 
nature of PFM systems does not suit a "medical model" investigating links between 
specific "treatments" and specific results” (De Lay et al., 2015, p. 12). For example, the 
theory of change depicted in figure 3.2 in the analytical framework in chapter three, 
which is used widely by international partners to evaluate the impact of their support to 
PFM reforms is not suitable to accurately reflect the state and level of progress achieved. 
It does not address whether outputs and processes in upstream and de jure dimensions 
are, tricking down to downstream, de factor and de-concentrated dimensions, or 
whether those outputs such as new institutions, laws and systems have the adequate 
and appropriate capability to deliver functionality. Based on the evidence, the latter is 
what matters most, and in fact, is what contributes to real progress, or improved service 
delivery and poverty reduction.  One indication of the failure of the progress achieved 
in upstream and de jure reforms to trickle down could be seen in the limited number of 
studies and as well as the limited impact of downstream and de-concentrated reforms 
such as legislative oversight (Mills and de Lay, 2016). Similar evidence of the limited 
focus on downstream and de-concentrated reforms such as oversight, and their limited 
impact on service delivery, improved governance and poverty reduction are available in 






Similarly, current PFM strengthening efforts together with the evaluation framework 
used to measure impact have limited ability to address the underlying political-economy 
factors and institutional dynamics that shape change opportunities, especially in 
downstream, de factor and de-concentrated dimensions of PFM. It is generally easy to 
align the interests of donor-partners and country governments in upstream and de jure 
reforms. Current policy-based reform instruments such as GBS and associated triggers 
do work relatively well because local they provide incentives to local authorities to 
pursue reforms. Those incentives are an essential source of finance to local authorities, 
and sometimes they provide the lifeline to country governments, especially during crisis 
periods in the two countries as shown in section 5.1.2.1.  
 
What is needed is a holistic approach to PFM reforms, that can address both the 
immediate upstream quick-fixes or low-hanging fruits and as well as downstream, de 
facto and de-concentrated functional gaps and service delivery challenges to optimise 
better and lasting outcomes in PFM reforms in developing countries. The critical point 
to note with regards to ongoing efforts to strengthen PFM from experience in the two 
countries is that there is a need for a clear understanding by all stakeholders of the 
essence of PFM reforms. Which means, steps must be taken to re-strike the balance 
between efforts to strengthen PFM and the focus on ensuring improved functionality of 
PFM institutions, including ensuring macroeconomic stability and efficient resource 
allocation, improved service delivery and overall state-building efforts in developing 





outputs and processes in upstream and de jure dimensions trickle down to downstream, 
de factor and de-concentrated dimensions.  
 
The issues raised in the last several paragraphs are an essential starting point for further 
discussions and theorising on the hypothesised role of non-technical factors enabling or 




















UNDERLYING DRIVERS/BLOCKERS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND PRACTICE IN PFM REFORMS 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter has a -focus on constructing logical explanations and theorising on the 
hypothesised role of structural and nontechnical factors that drive or impede efforts to 
strengthen PFM in the two case study countries. In doing so, this chapter explicitly 
addresses the third sub-research question and contribute to our understanding of the 
extent to which political support and country ownership, institutional and management 
arrangement of reforms, donor support and practices and economic factors explain the 
first two sub-research questions or contribute to understanding the state and pattern 
of PFM reform progress in the case studies shown in the Chapter Five.  It does so by 
providing a systematic empirical examination of, and construct logical explanations 
about who and what has led to the initiation and support for PFM reforms, and in what 
ways have structural and non-technical factors have enabled or impeded opportunities 
for change in the two case study countries.  
 
The within-case process-tracing evidentiary analysis adopts a much broader perspective 
for each of the four non-technical factors covered in this chapter. By adopting this more 
general perspective, I demonstrate also demonstrate in this chapter how mechanism-
based explanations are possible at both individual level in analysing the fine-grain pieces 





level. The analysis and theoretical discussions in this chapter generally proceed from the 
analysis of specific pieces of evidence to a ‘big picture’ perspective about the 
hypothesised role of the four factors examined.  
 
Meanwhile, the discussions and theorising in this chapter is underpinned is by two 
important points. First, this chapter has its foundation on the findings and conclusion 
reached in Chapter Five. Specifically, the overarching conclusion reached that current 
PFM reform efforts are not good enough is based on the broader evidence that indicates 
weak links, or implementation gaps/functional gaps between upstream, de jure and 
concentrated reforms and more downstream, de facto and de-concentrated dimensions 
of PFM. Those weak links mean the substantial level of progress achieved in enacting 
new laws, creating new institutions, systems and processes do not address whether 
those outputs such as new institutions, laws and systems have adequate and the 
appropriate capability to deliver functionality. As I show in Chapter Five, the evidence 
indicates the weak links or functional gaps are mostly the results of nontechnical factors. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that the World Bank has also recently emphasis in its 2017 
WDR the importance of ensuring functional improvements in ongoing efforts to 
strengthen PFM and PS institutions more broadly (World Bank, 2017b).  
 
Second, this chapter is based on, and contributes to the broader debate about 
innovative approaches to difficult reforms and institutions strengthening in developing 
countries (Krause 2013). A dominant theme among the most notable approaches, such 





Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2015), power and systems approach in institutional change 
(Green, 2016) and the proposal for doing development differently (Booth, 2015; 
Unsworth, 2015; Wild et al. 2015; Bain, Booth, and Wild 2016) is a discussion about 
understanding the role and impact of non-technical drivers.  
 
While there is considerable agreement about the role of non-technical drivers of PFM 
reforms in development among practitioners, reformers and academics (Andrews, 2010; 
de Renzio et al. 2011; Andrews et al., 2012; Fritz et al. 2012; Lawson, 2012; Fritz et al. 
2017), there is lack of critical mass of empirical evidence, or at best the evidence is 
anecdotal about their specific role in shaping opportunities for change in particular 
contexts (Srivastava & Larizza, 2013:458; De Lay, et al., 2015; Hudson and Marquette, 
2015). According to Fritz et al.  
 there is typically little systematic analysis of the wider political economy 
drivers and dynamics affecting the prospects for PFM reforms. Discussions 
of political economy and related nontechnical drivers are also not 
systematic in project documents. They are most commonly addressed in 
the risk section of program assessment, not always with a clear or 
substantial link to project design (Fritz et al., 2017, p.3).  
 
For example, there is agreement that political support is fundamental to the level of 
progress achieved and the sustainability of PFM reforms. However, there is an apparent 
lack of substantial empirical evidence, with some degree of specificity about how and 
why politics or political-economy factors shape opportunities for change in a challenging 





case studies (Betley et al., 2012; Folscher et al., 2012; Lawson et al., 2012) and a small 
number of multiple case studies (Fritz et al. 2012; Lawson, 2012; Fritz et al. 2017), much 
of the existing literature that attempt to address the role of structural and non-technical 
factors in efforts to strengthening PFM in developing countries are qualitative studies 
(Andrews, 2009; Andrews, 2010; de Renzio et al. 2011; Fritz et al. 2014a).   
 
As in Chapter Five, the critical challenge in the process-tracing analysis has been trying 
to maintain a balance between a retrospective and a forward-looking view. For this 
reason, this chapter charts a specific pathway known as the holistic approach and details 
specific forward-looking implications for both theory development and practice for 
future efforts by development partners and country governments to strengthen PFM in 
developing countries. While the overall objective of the thesis is not about generalising 
the findings from the case studies, the forward-looking implications may provide some 
generalisable insights that might be relevant to development partners, academic 
research and country governments with interests in countries with similar contexts. 
 
The rest of this chapter is divided into two main sections. Section 6.1 presents and 
discusses the hypothesised role each of the four the underlying drivers (political support 
and ownership, institutional dynamics, donor support and practice and economic 
factors) to explain the extent to which each contributes to an understanding of the state 
and level of progress achieved in the PFM reform efforts in the case study countries. 





approach espouse in this thesis and lays out specific forward-looking implications for 
future PFM strengthening efforts in developing countries. 
 
6.1 Understanding the Underlying Drivers of PFM Reform Efforts  
Methodologically and logically it is impossible to claim that only a single political 
economy or institutional dynamics drives or impedes or is the dominant explanatory 
variable across the case studies and dimensions of PFM. This study, therefore, presents 
in this section logical explanations about the hypothesised role of each of the four 
structural and non-technical causal factors widely recognised and covered in the 
literature on PFM reforms in developing countries. The structural and nontechnical 
factors are political support for reforms, international partners’ engagement in PFM 
reforms in developing countries, the role of structural factors and economic dynamics, 
and the role of institutions and management arrangements for PFM reforms.  
 
This section takes a broader perspective for each of the four non-technical factors 
covered in this chapter. By adopting this more general perspective, I demonstrate how 
mechanism-based explanations are possible at both the individual level with analysis of 
fine-grain pieces of evidence and as well as capture the hypothesised role of each 
mechanism/causal factor at the macro level. The analysis and theoretical discussions in 
this section generally proceed from the analysis of specific pieces of evidence to a ‘big 
picture’ perspective about the hypothesised role of the four causal factors examined. 





nontechnical causal factor and determine the extent to which each causal factor 
influence the state and level of PFM reform progress in the case studies and how.   
 
6.1.1 Understanding Politics and Political Support for PFM Reforms 
The process-tracing analysis of the empirical evidence that feeds into the discussions 
and theorising in this section are drawn mostly from the analysis of hypothesis three in 
Appendix C. The process-tracing evidentiary analysis I conducted examined specific set 
of hypotheses/arguments to explain the role of politics and political support for PFM 
reforms in the case study countries. The analysis covered the main argument and three 
sub-arguments, each of which contributes to explaining the main argument. While all 
three sub-arguments help explain the main argument, each brings a different 
perspective, and sometimes alternate explanations of the main argument/hypothesis. 
The process-tracing analysis I conducted examined the arguments listed below as 
follows: 
 The extent of PFM reforms progress in developing countries is influenced by the 
level of ownership and political support for reforms (Hypothesis 3). 
 There is a lack of real political will (commitment) to drive PFM reforms in the 
case study countries (Hypothesis 3a)  
 There is political appetite for reform from politicians and top-level bureaucrats 
(Hypothesis 3b). 
 The lack of real political will/commitment is exacerbated by the narrow 






The process-tracing evidence in support of or lack of it, thereof, and the analysis of the 
above arguments underpin the development of the framework for understanding 
politics and political support for PFM reforms in the case study countries presented in 
the Framework for Understanding Political Support in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: A Framework for Understanding Political Support  
 
Source: prepared by the Author 
Figure 6.1 above presents a framework for understanding political support by 
distinguishing three critical elements found in the process-tracing evidentiary analysis 
from the two case studies. The first element relates to the drivers of political support, 
shown in green and divided into two broad categories (highlighted in light green). The 
first component of the drivers of political support on the left are the incentives, interests, 
power relations and motivations, while the second component on the right relates to 





of political actors. The second layer of analysis deals with what I describe as political 
appetite for reforms represented in orange highlighted and the third layer of analysis or 
element talks about political commitment and the conditions that must be met to 
qualify as such – highlighted in red in Figure 6.1 above.  
 
6.1.1.1 The Drivers of Political Support 
In terms of the drivers of political support, the process-tracing analysis of the evidence 
indicates politics and political leaders are unsurprisingly relevant in driving and 
sustaining PFM reforms in the two case study countries. Based on the evidence politics 
and political leadership is like a double-edged sword – i.e., where reforms have been 
successful, political support was widely cited by participants, and vice versa. For example, 
where a PFM legislation is passed, that is mostly attributed to political support for 
reforms, and where PFM laws and regulations have failed to be enacted or enforced 
participants blame that squarely on lack of political support for reforms (see also 
Tommasi, 2009:11; Bunse and Fritz, 2012:38).  The relevance of high-level political 
support resonates well with a specific branch of the existing literature known as thinking 
and working politically  in  PFM reforms, and institutional reforms more broadly 
(Leftwich, 2011; Carothers and De Gramont, 2013; Booth & Unsworth 2014; Garber, 
2014; Hudson, and Leftwich, 2014; Booth, 2015; Dasandi et al., 2016; Hudson et al. 2016; 







Moreover, the evidence suggests high-level political support is especially essential in 
challenging environments (as in the case studies) where politics permeates every aspect 
of governance and society, and where there are weak institutions to insulate public 
institutions from political interference. Consequently, understanding the political 
dynamics remains fundamental to PFM strengthening efforts in the two case studies. 
This point is emphasized by Allen, Hemming and Porter, who opine that politics is critical 
in the PFM reform process, and they “anticipate that, over the next ten years, the 
importance of political economy analysis as applied to PFM will continue to grow both 
as an area of research and in its practical application.” (Allen, Hemming, and Potter, 
2013, p. 6). This point is also emphasised by several participants from both countries 
that, it is even possible to gauge the prospects of reform progress, based on the level of 
enthusiasm for reforms by champions such as the minister of finance. An NSA 
representative in Sierra Leone, for example, specifically states “can we look at those 
championing reforms probably at the political level. Maybe the Minister of Finance who 
is in charge of reforms to ascertain how enthusiastic he is in term of driving the reforms” 
(Interview: XX702).  
 
Beyond this macro-level empirical finding and theoretical recognition of the relevance 
of high-level political support, the process-tracing evidentiary analysis reveals critical 
pieces of evidence that provide insight into this broader empirical and theoretical 
perspective. The framework in Figure 6.1, therefore, divides the drivers of political 
support into two broad categories. On the right-hand side of the framework are drivers 





Hudson & Marquette, 2014; Dasandi et al., 2016; Fritz et al., 2017). While on the left-
hand side of the framework are drivers that concerns the interests, incentives, 
motivations and power-relations of political leaders and top-level bureaucrats (Kelsall, 
2016; Teskey and Tyrell, 2017; Mills, 2018:2).  These two categories of drivers of political 
support are examined in the next two sub-sections as follows. 
 
The Political Context and Windows of Opportunity 
Regarding drivers relating to the broader political context and windows of opportunity, 
there have been a lot of theorising from practitioners and academics, much of which 
points to factors such as power structures, political systems or regime type, strong 
electoral mandate and the presence of civil society (Geddes, 1994; Dixon, 2005; Grindle, 
2007; Bogaards 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010; Przeworski et al. 2000; Norris 2011; Fritz 
et al., 2014b:10) and programmatic parties (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Cruz and Keefer 
2010; Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini, 2016; Scartascini, et al., 2017). Other practitioners 
and scholars have cited the influence of windows of opportunity such as elections, fiscal 
stress and austerity (Krause 2009; Pretorius and Pretorius 2009; Bunse and Fritz, 
2012:38; de Gramont, 2014).  
 
In light of the above propositions from PFM practitioners and academics, the evidence 
from the process-tracing analysis shows elections are critical to the design and 
implementation of PFM reforms. While elections are considered a crucial window of 
opportunity for reforms, the evidence indicates that elections that involve a change of 





reformers. The transfer of power within the same political party does create uncertainty 
and pose some threats to the sustainability of reforms, but the evidence shows its 
impact is relatively benign compared with elections that result in the transfer of power 
from one political party to another. Power transfers that brought to office former 
President Sirleaf in 2006 and President Weah in 2017 of Liberia and former President 
Koroma in 2007 and President Bio in 2018 of Sierra Leone created both opportunities 
and problems in the reform processes in the two countries.  
 
The opportunities for reforms created by elections in the two countries did lead to the 
creation of new laws and intuitions and formulation of new policy programs. However, 
the momentum of new governments, or what Fritz et al. (2017:88-9) describe as a 
‘honeymoon period’ did not last long and failed to drive efforts to deepen reforms. 
Instead, highly contested elections where there was a prospect of electoral victory from 
the opposition created huge uncertainties even before and immediately after those 
elections. Unlike elections where the incumbent gets re-elected, the transfer, or even 
the prospect of power transfer between political parties undermined the sustainability 
and survival of specific reforms because of the lack of consistency in both policy and 
practice whenever there was a new government in the two countries. New governments 
most often completely overhauled the old system and policies and brought in new 
loyalist bureaucrats in critical public institutions such as the Central Finance Ministry.  
 
The lack of consistency in both policy and practice from new governments in the two 





will have to play the waiting-game, whenever there is a prospect for change of power 
between political parties. The lack of consistency is rooted in the history of governments 
in the two countries which have a reputation of undoing structures, systems and 
programs of their predecessors. In Liberia, for example, every new Minister of Finance 
is required to bring his team of bureaucratic loyalist. As shown in Chapter Five, frequent 
cabinet reshuffles in both countries have also had an impact on specific reforms, such 
as the MTEF, where a new Minister of Agriculture, for example, might abruptly switch 
from providing fertilisers to farmers to a different kind of subsidies that might benefit 
his people or specific interests.  
 
Contrary to suggestions by Fritz et al. (2017:22), there is no evidence from the two case 
studies on whether the availability of ‘a ready-to-go plan or lack of it thereof, by the new 
governments had any effect on the level of political support for reforms and efforts to 
strengthen PFM. In the same vein, it is unsurprising that political parties in the two case 
studies do not identify themselves as having a leftist or right-wing agenda or as 
programmatic parties (Scartascini et al., 2017) because political campaigns are mostly 
along tribal and regional lines. Even when respective governments often adopt PRSPs or 
have a medium-term development agenda, there is little commitment to electoral 
promises, which is further met by weak demand-side factors, such limited civil society 
engagement in PFM and overall low public participation and demand for accountability 






The evidence, however, reveals that power structures and internal party-political 
dynamics are critical factors that shape the actions or inactions of political leaders and 
their bureaucrats. While both countries have a presidential system of government, the 
differences in parliamentary composition and power-relations with the executive 
branch have significant implications for PFM reforms in each country. The balance 
power in Liberia’s Parliament is more diverse and commands stronger influence over 
the executive in its oversight and accountability function, while Sierra Leone’s 
Legislature, with a majority from the ruling government, tend to align themselves with, 
and more supportive of the executive’s decisions and policy directions.  
 
While the process-tracing evidentiary analysis shows there is a marriage between the 
legislative and executive arms in the annual budget process in the two countries, the 
nature and depth of the marriage differs between them. In Liberia, the marriage is much 
stronger between the legislature and top-level bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance 
than between the presidency and the legislature. Critical positions in Liberia’s Ministry 
of Finance are hand-picked by influential legislators. I witnessed this first-hand when a 
senior legislator I interviewed personally accompanied me directly to one of the senior 
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance with no regard for any formal protocol. The 
experience was chilling, and I later learned from one informant that the bureaucrat in 
question was hand-picked by legislators to occupy such a strategic position in the Liberia 
Ministry of Finance. In Sierra Leone, however, the marriage is mostly between the 
presidency and the legislature. The evidence shows the executive in Sierra Leone is 





governments during the period covered by this study have always maintained a majority 
in Parliament.   
 
Unlike Sierra Leone, Liberia has a more diverse Parliament with many independent 
Parliamentarians, and with little control from the executive branch. The Liberian 
president, for example, was reported being on radio defending her position to the 
Liberian people that she did not approve of the significant allowances taken by 
Parliamentarians, after a massive outcry from civil society and donor-partners. Her 
appearance on National radio was backdropped by the Parliamentary approval of huge 
allowances for Members of Parliament as that country was still grappling with the 
aftermath of the Ebola Outbreak in 2015.  
 
The effects of power dynamics could also be seen in the annual budget process in the 
case study countries. The Legislature in Liberia has been blamed for consistent failure to 
approve the annual budget and has mostly usurped the role of the Ministry of Finance 
by making last-minute changes to the budget. While the annual budget process in Sierra 
Leone has always been complete on time, with the Ministry of Finance as the sole driver 
of the process. The de facto executive dominance in Sierra Leone could be traced to its 
post-colonial roots, in which Parliament has mostly been an appendage to the executive 
branch (Thompson, 2007). But more importantly, the evidence suggests the de facto 
executive dominance in both countries is critical to the non-implementation of 
recommendations from the audit report put forward by the PACs in the two countries. 





as found elsewhere by Acosta and de Renzio (2008:1). The executive dominance is also 
manifested in other forms such as the executive protection of state-owned enterprise 
directors in Liberia, who award themselves lucrative contracts and with little or no 
accountability to Parliament or the people of Liberia.  
  
The final contextual causal factor and window of opportunity that the study found 
relevant in the case studies are the effects of fiscal crisis and shocks on political support 
for PFM reforms. Both cases are quintessential examples of how international partners 
can use the presence of fiscal crisis or economic distress to solicit support for PFM 
reforms from political leaders and state bureaucrats. I detailed in section 5.1.2.1 in 
Chapter Five specific instances and periods which triggered PFM reforms in both case 
studies. The promise of debt relief triggered considerable reforms in the immediate 
post-conflict situations, and more recently following the collapse in commodity prices 
and Ebola Outbreak in West Africa. These events were followed by several reforms in 
both countries. The government in Sierra Leone, for example, after it had refused for 
several years to introduce the TSA was finally willing to do so because of the economic 
and fiscal distress in the aftershock of the collapse in commodity prices in 2013 and the 
Ebola Outbreak in 2014-2015.  These findings support the general proposition that fiscal 
distress or austerity can trigger PFM reforms and experienced by several European 
countries in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008 (Krause 2009; Pretorius 







Interests, Incentives and Motivations that Shape Actions of Politicians and Bureaucrats 
This section focuses on the second component of drivers of Political Support for PFM 
reforms in the case study countries. These are the interests, incentives and motivations 
that shape the actions of political leaders and bureaucrats in the PFM reform processes 
in the two case studies. The interests, incentives and motivations are widely supported 
in the literature as critical to understanding the level of political support for reforms 
(Goetz, 2007 Kelsall, 2016; Teskey and Tyrell, 2017 Mills, 2018:2). The process-tracing 
evidentiary analysis tests the strength of political support for PFM reforms by examining 
the extent to which the interests and incentives of decision makers are in line with the 
overall objectives of PFM as a mechanism to enhance service delivery, state-building, 
efficient resource allocation and macroeconomic stability (Welham et al. 2013).  
 
The evidence shows PFM reform efforts were more likely to thrive where they are 
aligned with the interests and incentives of local decisions makers. In the immediate 
post-conflict situations, both President Kabbah of Sierra Leone and President Sirleaf of 
Liberia had keen interests in state-building and in establishing tight control in PFM. 
Thompson (2007) and Tavakoli (2012) explain former President Kabbah’s interests in 
using PFM reforms as part of his government’s state-building efforts and establish tight 
control in PFM to combat existing patronage and corruption in the Public Sector. On the 
other hand, Chessen and Krech (2006:10) also notes that former President Sirleaf had 
interest in exercising control over PFM and used the GEMAP program as a cover to push 






Similar consistencies are found from the process-tracing analysis with the introduction 
of many reforms in return for debt relief because political leaders and bureaucrats relied 
on funds freed-up by debt relief to provide essential government functions. More 
recently, high-level political interests have also aligned well with reform efforts in 
domestic revenue mobilisation in both countries, and in exercising managerial control 
over funds with MDAs through the TSA in Sierra Leone. The high-level political interest 
in revenue mobilisation is evidenced by the three-pronged approach in the last three 
years in Sierra Leone, through the introduction of ITAS and upgrade from ASSYCUDA++ 
to ASSYCUDA World in the national revenue authority. The government has 
simultaneously enacted a new Extractive Industries Revenue Act of 2018 and the 
introduction of the TSA.  
 
The foregoing experiences from both countries suggest even the most challenging 
reform initiative can be implemented or the most binding constraint could be overcome 
where the interests, incentives and motivations of politicians and bureaucrats are 
aligned with efforts from Development Partners to strengthen PFM. Thus, the above 
evidence shows reforms are likely to progress where the interests and incentives of 
decision makers are aligned with the trust of PFM reforms. Recent experiences from 
cross-country studies by Chemouni (2017) and Yanguas (2017) of Ghana, Uganda and 
Rwanda, show how the differing interests and incentives of those governments helped 
shape PFM reform outcomes. In Ghana, reforms were driven by the desire to exercise 
for top-down political control for partisan purposes. In Uganda, reforms were 





government’s power. As a result, PFM outcomes in both countries did yield initial results, 
but progress has been mixed and somewhat declining in Uganda. Meanwhile, Rwanda’s 
reforms, according the authors, have succeeded because they have been used by the 
regime as a mechanism to drive its legitimacy and create an impartial developmental 
state.  
 
However, the challenge for reformers and donor-partners in the two countries is that 
the interests and incentives that drive the behaviours of political leaders and their 
bureaucratic representatives are diverse, fluid and constantly changing. While high-level 
political interests and incentives might influence action on specific reforms, such might 
conflict with other vested political interests, or might not have the broad-based political 
support to thrive or sustain such reforms. Based on the evidence, the basic idea from 
the evidence in the two case studies is that much of the political calculus by reformers 
and donor-partners have mostly focused on the political context and windows of 
opportunity, which have informed much of the design and implementation of PFM 
reforms.   
 
The problem with this calculus is that PFM reforms are not driven by the existing political 
context or windows of opportunity. Thus, programmatic analysis of, and design of PFM 
reforms based on political contexts and windows of opportunity result mostly in the 
initiation of reform programs or enacting news and building new institutions and 
systems. The evidence shows, the extent to which a reform program or initiative or how 





interests, incentives and motivation decision-makers and the extent of board-based 
political for such reforms.  
 
Besides, while the impact of existing political context and interests and incentives on the 
behaviours of political actors might not always be clear, the evidence suggests that 
political interests and incentives are the dominant causal factors in the case study 
countries. In most cases, they fundamentally shape how, and influence the existing 
political context and power structures in the two case studies. This claim is evidenced 
by the deafening silence of opposition politicians in the two countries, most of whom 
tend to align themselves to the ruling party to pursue their interests and those of their 
constituents. Thus, reformers and donor-partners must equally factor the interests and 
incentives the shape political behaviours into their programming calculus. If not, redirect 
their everyday political analysis (Hudson et al. 2016) towards understanding the 
interests, incentives and motivations that drive political behaviours and shape the role 
played by formal political structures and power relations. Unlike the political contexts 
and windows of opportunities, the presence and influence of political interests, 
incentives and motivations are relatively permanent and consistent. This point is also 
emphasised by Rocha Menocal (2014), who argues for greater attention towards 
incentives, interests and power structures because as she claims, they lie at the centre 







6.1.1.2 Political Appetite for PFM Reforms 
The term Political Appetite, as employed in this thesis, must not be confused with the 
ordinary day usage of the word ‘appetite’, which means the desire or liking for 
something. Political Appetite is a catch-phrase that many interview participants from 
the two case studies used to describe the high-level approach to, and behaviours of 
political leaders and bureaucrats towards PFM reforms. This thesis, therefore, employs 
this phrase as a deliberate response to the experiences in the two case studies, and to 
capture how its usage has helped shape reform outcomes. Thus, I define Political 
Appetite, for the purposes of this research, to mean the action(s) of political leaders and 
top-level bureaucrats that meet at least two of three criteria given below: 
 The action(s) is transactional or in exchange for benefits, either directly or 
indirectly; 
 The action(s) Is driven by a third-party, be it locally/externally or 
implicitly/explicitly; and  
 There is no intrinsic desire or a real commitment to pursuing that action(s), 
especially in the long-term. 
For actions by political leaders and top-level bureaucrats to constitute Political Appetite, 
at least two of the three elements in the definition must be present. For example, a one-
off event/action by a politician or top-level bureaucrat in exchange for a benefit, be it 
directly/indirectly, and influenced by a third party may constitute Political Appetite. Such 
a one-off activity need not require any further commitment in the long-term from 






The above definition of Political Appetite is depicted on the right-hand side in Figure 6.1. 
The use of the term action(s) in the above definition could mean the signing of an 
agreement, the launch of a new reform program, or a new reform strategy, enacting a 
PFM law or related regulations, establishing new departments or institutions, having a 
new IFMIS, chart of accounts, etc. While Political Leaders and top-level bureaucrats refer 
to elite politicians (see Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992) and most top-level bureaucrats fall 
into this category. The researcher has refrained from using the word politician because 
in both Sierra Leone and Liberia, most senior civil servants are political appointees, and 
ordinarily referred to as politicians by the general public. Once someone is a political 
appointee in these countries, he/she is automatically classed as a politician. Top-level 
bureaucrats refer to only senior civil servants/political appointees directly involved with 
the strategic decision-making aspects of PFM reforms and Public Expenditure 
Management in these countries. Examples of elite politicians in this context include the 
president, members of parliament, the minister of finance and a small circle of top-level 
bureaucrats within the ministry of finance.  
 
Political Appetite, as employed here, is a concept that contributes to our understanding 
of how donor-country relationship affects the contexts, interests, incentives and 
motivations of political actors in the two case stud countries. The catch-phrase emerges 
as a by-product of the high-level focus on ownership or support for PFM reforms and 
the design and implementation of reform programs mostly in response to the political 
context and windows of opportunities in the two case studies. The process-tracing 





the two cases, and that they reinforce each other. The two elements engulf the PFM 
reform approach in two case studies, both of which carefully move towards the 
treatment of political economy analysis as a one-off exercise. This then fuel 
opportunistic behaviours from political leaders and top-level bureaucrats.  
 
The overly emphasis on high-level political support have relied mostly on so-called 
indicators of willingness from political leaders and their bureaucratic representatives, 
such as enacting new PFM laws, the introduction of new systems and process or having 
PFM on government’s development plan. This so-called willingness is equivalent to de 
jure or window-dressing political support. Moreover, this centrality in PFM and other 
state-building efforts in African has long been affirmed by practitioners and academics 
(Levy and Kpundeh, 2004; Goetz, 2007).  
 
However, the analysis of the evidence in the two case studies shows these countries 
need political support, expressed both in terms of plans and laws (de jure) and as well 
as in practice (de facto). Based on the evidence, without political support in practice, 
these so-called indicators of willingness become mere desires (and hence appetite) from 
political leaders and bureaucrats. They are often not founded on the intrinsic desire of 
political leaders to pursue a political objective, or such Political Will is in exchange for a 
benefit and with no real commitment to pursue such action or objective in the long-
term. The evidence is considered particularly strong in the two cases given the repetitive 
nature with which country governments accepted reform programs or initiatives or 





GBS from Development Partners. Thus, such practice became ‘politics as usual’ in the 
two case studies. Successive governments used external demands for PFM reforms as a 
significant source of revenue in exchange for passing new laws, systems or introduction 
of new policies and programs.  
 
Two immediate implications emerge from the above high-level approach to PFM that is 
also supported by the existing literature on political economy analysis. First, such high-
level approach assumes country governments to be unitary actors and, therefore, 
without having to factor into the political economy calculus the interests and incentives 
often much powerful actors downstream who might oppose specific reform initiatives 
(Brinkerhoff, 2007; Mills, 2018:9). Second, overly focusing on indicators of political 
willingness provide only macro-level perspective into the political economy dynamics in 
the two case studies. The approach is failing mostly to account for the underlying 
complexities that underpin the political contexts, interest and incentives facing decision-
makers (Gibson et al., 2005).  
 
The second element identified above means over-reliance on the political context such 
as party-orientation and windows of opportunity for reforms, tended towards treating 
political economy as a one-off exercise at the start of the programming cycle in the case 
studies (Booth & Unsworth, 2014). Development Partners frequently had to suspend 
vital financial support in periods leading to elections or when they are dissatisfied with 
reform outcomes and wait until the new government comes to power. While 





stakeholders interviewed in the case studies regard this approach as an impediment to 
the reform processes and the sustainability of gains made.  
 
6.1.1.3 Political Commitment to PFM Reforms in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
Political Commitment means broad-based action(s) and support by Political Leaders and 
top-level bureaucrats that is based on their intrinsic desire and long-term pursuit of a 
specific policy objective or their government’s development agenda. For Political 
Support to constitute Political Commitment, the actions of politicians and top-level 
bureaucrats must constitute the four elements of Political Commitment depicted on the 
left-hand of Figure 6.1 in section 6.1.1. Unlike in the definition of Political Appetite, the 
meaning of Political Leaders and top-level bureaucrats in the context of the definition of 
Political Commitment connotes broad-based support from politicians and bureaucrats 
across government. Again, this distinction is crucial in the two countries where there are 
subnational and county authorities with some level of political power that shape the 
level of PFM reform outcomes. The process-tracing evidence and analysis show that 
even the President or Members of Parliament in these countries could encounter 
significant pressures and dilemmas that might affect their interests and motivations 
about which reforms to initiate or how far to pursue specific reform measures. Thus, the 
collective or broad-based support from political leaders and top-level 
bureaucrats/political appointees is indispensable to the survival of specific reforms and 







Meanwhile, the above definition of Political Commitment underscores the complexities 
of Political Support itself. This complexity is what McCourt (2003:10-15) describes as a 
classic ‘black box’, a cloud concept habitually invoked in reform post-mortems when 
reform fails to deliver desired outcomes. Contrary to findings by McCourt (2003:10-22), 
who argued that Political Commitment and lack of it thereof, was predictable in 
Swaziland, the process-tracing analysis of the evidence from the two case studies shows 
commitment or lack of it is not always identifiable ex-ante. The challenges to gauge 
Political Commitment at the inception phases is even higher in the two case studies, 
where reforms mostly coincided with debt relief and government reliance on GBS which 
provided extra incentives to Political Leaders to accept reforms.   
 
However, as the evidence suggests ex-post identification of lack of Political Commitment 
is possible and features prominently in reform post-mortems in the two case studies. 
Most interview participants from the two case studies repeatedly blamed the failure to 
successfully implement reform programs, laws and the lack of functional improvements 
in PFM institutions on the lack of Political Commitment for reforms. The evidence 
further shows the mere passing of laws or setting up new systems or having a PFM 
strategy does not equate to real Political Commitment.  
 
The apparent lack of political commitment takes different shapes and forms. Interview 
participants from both case studies cite numerous instances that indicate the lack of 
Political Commitment for reforms. Notable examples that indicate the lack of political 





among the top three spenders in that country; the Parliamentary takeover in Liberia of 
the annual budget process and consistent failure to approve the budget on time; the 
lack of implementation of audit recommendations and exponential rise in off-budget 
spending in both countries; Political Leaders clearly using systems created by the 
reforms to profit themselves, such as budgetising corruption in the annual budget 
process and bypassing the control and accountability mechanisms by IMFIS are among 
many instances cited by respondents from the two case studies.    
 
Moreover, the variations in PFM reform progress across PFM dimensions and the partial 
implementation noted in Chapter Five are mostly the result of the lack of Political 
Commitment to PFM reforms. The conditions (stated below) discussed in Chapter Five 
which underpin the extent to which a reform initiative gets implemented (partially/fully 
or not implemented at all) are intrinsic elements of the calculus by Political Leaders on 
whether, and to what extent they exercise commitment to specific reform measures. In 
the words of a leading NSA representative from Sierra Leone, “we have a patronage 
government system. When people are appointed their hands are caught in the cooking 
jar, and by trying to disgrace them can bring credibility issues to the entire political party. 
So, sometimes they are just dismissed” (Interview: XL702). Political Leaders often 
support reforms, if such initiatives or the specific PFM reform measure does not affect 
their interests and incentives. The conditions that underpin the extent to which a reform 
measure is generally implemented or not, which are discussed in detail in the previous 





 The number/level of stakeholders involved in the implementation of specific 
reform package or tool.  
 The extent of the impact a specific reform package or tool on political 
accountability and survival; and 
 The scope of the effects a specific reform package or tool on the freedom or 
leverage political actors have over the resource envelope.  
 
The definition of Political Commitment also recognises that Political Support is stronger 
when it is rooted in the intrinsic desire of Political Leaders to pursue specific policy 
objectives or broader national development agenda. A vital element of the fieldwork 
and interviews was to find out how convinced local authorities were about whether PFM 
reforms were a priority to drive government development agenda or whether it was 
conceived as an opportunity to cash-in on international development assistance. The 
evidence shows the latter was mostly the case in the immediate post-conflict 
environment when PFM was part of the decentralisation in Sierra Leone and the GEMAP 
in Liberia. In addition, the evidence shows the former Presidents in the two case studies 
showed great leadership and interest in PFM reforms in the immediate post-conflict era 
(see also Atkinson, 2008, p. 38).   
 
This intrinsic element of Political Commitment is also advocated by McCourt (2003) in 
the sense that it should be voluntary (see also Killick, 1998; Morrissey and Verschoor, 
2003; Brinkerhoff, 2007 and 2010). However, I contend with McCourt’s additional 





(McCourt, 2003). As the process-tracing evidentiary analysis shows, the explicit backing 
or statements by Political Leaders in the case study countries most often amounted to 
Political Appetite, because those statements were often not based on the intrinsic desire 
to pursue the specific objective of the reforms, especially in the long term. The evidence 
also contends with assertions by Brinkerhoff (2007:112), who made an explicit financial 
commitment as a condition of Political Commitment. While this is supported by the 
experience in Liberia with the government expending its resources to support IFMIS 
reforms, this financial requirement might not always hold in developing countries that 
rely mostly on international financial assistance to conduct their essential state 
functions.  
 
The definition of Political Commitment further recognises that political support is not a 
one-off exercise. Instead, it is continuous process over the long-term and the state’s 
capacity to learn and adapt. Based on the evidence the requirement of a long-term 
commitment also means Political Leaders and their bureaucratic actors must ensure 
there are adequate mechanisms to monitor PFM reform programs, which have been 
mostly missing from the political leadership in the two case studies.  
 
This requirement is what Andrews et al. (2012) describe as the need for ‘real-time’ 
feedback loops to solicit adequate information needed to learn and adapt. But also, to 
ensure both upward accountability from International Partners and downward 
accountability for results from Citizens. The long-term requirement is critical to capacity-





actively engage in the process (See also Unsworth, 2015: 60). As Laws and Marquette 
(2018), however, writes such long-term requirement for Political Commitment conflicts 
with the interests of International Partners, who often develop two to five-year 
programmes and still want to claim successful development outcomes.  
 
6.1.1.4 Transitioning from Political Appetite to Political Commitment to PFM Reforms 
Based on the experiences and contexts in the case studies, the study suggests the need 
for some flexibility in the way Political Support have been constructed by PFM 
practitioners and academics (Killick, 1998 and 2004; McCourt, 2003, Brinkerhoff, 2007 
and 2010). The definitions offered by these authors generally presume ownership and 
hence claim Political Support is not possible where reforms are funded by, and in the 
interests of international Partners. This presumption fails to recognise that the case 
study countries (and many developing countries) have been relying and continue to rely 
significantly on international support (financial and technical) to reform their PFM 
systems and laws. Given the evidence and experience in the case studies, the study 
suggests it is, therefore, possible for country authorities to transition from having just 
Political Appetite to demonstrating real Political Commitment if certain conditions are 
met.  
 
Thus, an initial action by Political Leaders and top-level bureaucrats that constitutes 
Political Appetite could translate into a real political commitment if that initial action 
later gains the broad-based support and is further pursued in the long-term by Political 





specific policy objective. That applies even if the initial action did not emanate from the 
intrinsic desire from political leaders/top-level bureaucrats or was driven by a third-
party or the initial action was transactional in nature. In other words, Political 
Commitment does not always need to emanate from the intrinsic desires of Political 
Leaders and top-level bureaucrats, especially developing countries that continue rely on 
international assistance to reform their PFM systems. For example, a Minister of Finance 
may sign an agreement with an International Partner to allow parliament to enact a new 
PFM law as part of a budget support condition. The enactment of that law by Parliament 
may only constitutes Political Appetite, because it was in exchange for budget support 
and was not based on the intrinsic desire from the Minister or Parliament. However, if 
Parliament and the Minister of Finance should enforce that law to the letter in the long-
term, that might then constitute Political Commitment.  
 
The use of the phrase to the letter is critical in the transitioning from Political Appetite 
to Political Commitment. For example, the selective implementation of the PFM law may 
undermine Political Commitment. That is very critical considering the significant deficit 
on both political and administrative accountability dimensions of PFM found in the two 
case study countries. This thesis’s construction of Political Support, therefore, means it 







6.1.2 The Limits to Externally Driven PFM Reforms in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
Like in the previous section (section 6.1.1), this section examines the hypothesised role 
of the second non-technical driver of PFM reforms (Donor Support and Practices) to 
contribute to an understanding in explaining the first two sub-research questions or the 
level and pattern of PFM reform progress in the two case study countries presented in 
Chapter Five. Again, like in section 6.1.1, the process-tracing analysis in examined three 
related arguments (grouped under hypothesis/arguments four in Appendix C) in 
addressing how and why International Support have contributed to the state and level 
of progress made in PFM reforms in the case studies. The three arguments examined in 
this section are interrelated, but each brings a different perspective to understanding 
the role of International Partners in PFM reforms in the case studies. These arguments 
are listed below as follows: 
 Hypothesis 4a: The substantial progress in the design and implementation of 
PFM reforms has been driven largely by Development Partners 
 Hypothesis 4b: The International-led reforms and the associated progress made 
so far does not translate into improved services, macroeconomic stability, 
efficient resource allocation and state-building because there are limits to what 
could be achieved from externally driven reforms, especially in the short-term.  
 Hypothesis 4c: Development Partners’ interests and approaches to PFM reforms 







The process-tracing analysis of the evidence regarding all three propositions reveals 
there is a limit to what could be achieved from externally driven reforms. This overriding 
finding of the role of Development Partners in PFM strengthening efforts is premised on 
several other findings. First, the process-tracing evidence reveals PFM reforms have 
been championed mainly by Development Partners. The International Support to PFM 
in the two cases takes different shape and form. This support includes mainly financial 
inputs and technical assistance (placement of consultants, training programs, 
workshops, sponsoring learning visits, etc.). It further includes the provision of a 
platform/framework for PFM reform support and coordination. Surprisingly, 
International Partners even provide moral support as some of the respondents noted in 
the interviews. Moreover, the International-led effort in PFM cuts across government 
departments and entities, albeit the support being channelled mainly through the 
centre (the Ministry of Finance). International Partners like the World Bank, USAID, EU 
and DFID also directly supported specialised PFM institutions like the external and 
Internal and External Audit institutions, Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, Local 
Councils, etc.  
 
Through the various levels of support they provide, International Partners have been 
and remain influential in efforts to strengthen PFM in the case studies. They   provide 
the strategic guidance, direction and drive policy reforms through various PFM 
assessments, support missions and policy reform instruments. International Partners 





accounts, the below encounter with a member of Sierra Leone’s Supreme Audit 
Institution particularly stood out: 
Back to the issue it is a necessary evil that we have to do certain things 
even though we don’t like them. It is those things that we do that will 
give us money. I was in a meeting with the EU Delegation Leader 
meeting with the Deputy Speaker at the time. And the head of the 
delegation said in the face of the Deputy Speaker if you do make the 
report public the €3511 million was not going to be disbursed to the 
government. This was straight talk and they delegation left. Later 
parliament did a reinterpretation of Standing Order 75. (Interview: 
XX401). 
 
The above encounter speaks to many different aspects of the International-led effort in 
PFM reforms in developing countries. One of them being donor pressure for PFM 
reforms or the use financial assistance to leverage local authorities in partner countries 
(Westcott, 2008; Schiavo-Campo, 2010). It also highlights the supply-driven nature of 
PFM reforms in the case study countries, which overrides any locally-led efforts. 
Moreover, the encounter between the EU Delegation and Political Leaders in Sierra 
Leone highlights an important finding from both case studies. It shows the tension that 
exist between donor-partners and local authorities in the case studies, which emanates 
mostly from the variances between technocratic recommendations and the interests 
and incentives bedevilling Political Leaders. 
 
                                                          
11 This 35 million euros was the General Budget Support that the EU had planned to disburse to Sierra 





The process-tracing analysis of the second hypothesis finds that the interest of donor-
partners, especially their desire to show results for their development assistance has 
shaped the nature of the reforms, programming and the level of progress achieved in 
the two case study countries. Both Sierra Leone and Liberia present typical examples of 
how donor interests evolved as these countries gradually progressed from conflict, post-
conflict and development stages. Donor Partners’ interest immediately after the civil 
wars in both countries was to ‘protect the money’, which significantly influenced the 
type and nature of PFM reform programs. For example, PFM interventions in both 
countries immediately after their civil conflicts have been described as ‘intrusive’ (Dwan 
and Bailey, 2006:17), with tighter controls through programs such as the GEMAP in 
Liberia and the installation of foreign experts as Accountant General in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. The evidence is, however, less striking because of the presence of similar 
evidence of how donor interest in PFM evolved over time in countries such as 
Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc. as these countries developed their PFM systems (Shah, 2007; 
Schiavo-Campo, 2007; Fritz et al., 2012). 
 
The evolution of donor interest and its impact on the approach to and nature of reforms 
could be traced in the two case study countries even after so many years of 
implementing PFM reform programs. After supporting PFM in both cases for nearly two 
decades, donor intervention in PFM has also shifted recently back to ‘the basics’, with 
new programs such as Building Core Systems and The EU State Building Project in Sierra 
Leone by DFID and the EU respectively. These programs are examples of the latest shift 





epidemic in 2014 - 2015 in both countries, which exposed many lapses in the PFM 
systems explained in Chapter Five.  
 
However, the desire to show results often surpassed other broader interests or global 
agenda, such as the Paris Declaration and the HIPC debt relief initiative.  The evidence 
from the process-tracing analysis shows the interest of Development Partners to show 
results and remain visible have always been the central driver irrespective of various 
global agenda and frameworks such the HIPC Initiative or the Paris Declaration. This 
desire to show results from Development Partners underpins the short-term focus of 
PFM interventions, and its treatment as an end, instead of to improve service delivery 
and state-building in the case study countries. The evidence further suggests, the desire 
of Development Partners to show results inspired the design of most of the programs 
and frameworks. It remains critical to Donor Partners and always override any global 
development agenda or context-specific requirement in recipient countries such as 
Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
The desire to show results also affects how Donor Partners perceive how much progress 
has been made. Donor-Partners for instance, had wanted to show that the HIPC 
Initiative was a success, which was reflected in the highly generous HIPC scores 
compared to similar ratings under the PEFA framework. The various pieces of evidence 
from both countries that support this finding are unique and decisive. Take for example, 
how surprising or unique the claim is regarding the desire on the part of the Donor 





emphasised by a prominent civil society activist interviewed in Liberia, who notes the 
follow: 
One of the problems we have in this country is the unwillingness of the 
Donor Community, led by the US and EU to take concrete steps against 
the government simply because if they do, the International 
Community will interpret it that their efforts in Liberia would seem to 
have failed. So, they allow this woman to get away with a lot of 
nonsense with the hope of succeeding in the country. But they are not 
succeeding in reality. The modus operandi is to remain quiet, so their 
efforts are not seen to have gone in vain. The Americans and the 
Europeans have fallen in love with the president, so every government 
is sending a female Ambassador to come to Liberia to promote Women 
Empowerment. They are all lost in the Women Empowerment stuff  
(Interview: XL703). 
 
The evidence from the above statement is even more compelling in present day 
following the departure of former President Sirleaf and the numerous revelations and 
scandals that continue to undercut earlier claims by the International Community of the 
former President having led a successful government in the country.  
 
Another unique and decisive piece of evidence is the DFID withdrawal from the current 
PFM program (PFMICP) under the multi-donor trust fund in Sierra Leone. After two years 
of funding the PFMICP, DFID in 2017 formally pulled-out of the joint PFM program in 
Sierra Leone citing their inability show results or justify any further budget support from 
their HQ.  The evidence regarding the DFID withdrawal includes confidential emails and 
other correspondences obtained from a confidential source in the Ministry of Finance in 
Sierra Leone, detailing communications between the DFID country team, the World 





Perhaps, the best measure of the extent of the desire to show results by International 
Partners is to look at the level of GBS in developing counties. Based on the accounts of 
several interviewees, Donor Partners find it is easier to show results for their 
development assistance when they work outside the country system, and vice versa. 
Thus, high GBS may indicate low interests from donor-parts to show results while low 
GBS may indicate significant desire to show results from donor-partners. However, as 
the evidence suggests, this inverse relationship may also depend on the type of Donor 
Partners funding PFM reforms in a country. While the difference is not always clear-cut, 
traditional partners in PFM such the World Bank and the AfDB are less keen about 
showing results compared to bilateral agencies like the USAID, DFID and the EU.  
 
The significant presence of the USAID in Liberia could be associated to the relative higher 
off-budget support in that country. For example, off-budget support to Liberia in 
2016/2017 fiscal year was estimating to be nearly twice of the country’s annual budget 
for that year (MFDP, 2016). In contrast, the evidence shows Sierra Leone has only 
managed to have four (DFID, AfDB, EU and the WB) general budget support donors, with 
a declining average contribution per year, except during the Ebola Outbreak, which saw 
an upward movement in contributions from donor partners. The USAID was singled out 
by other Donor Partners and state officials interviewed in Liberia for the high-
handedness of their approach in that country.  Moreover, the philosophy and approach 
of the USAID affects even their interpretation and the level of ownership they are willing 
to grant to state authorities. This approach to PFM by the USAID in Liberia is significant, 





That, in turn, according to some interview participants has implications for smaller 
Donor-Partners regarding the nature of their PFM interventions and overall aid modality 
in that country. 
 
The findings from the analysis of the first two arguments, therefore, provide support for 
the overriding finding of the role of International Partners on the state and level of 
progress achieved in PFM reforms in the case studies. In addition to the two conditions 
discussed above, the apparent failure of current PFM reform efforts to deliver on the 
overall promise of PFM (Welham et al. 2013), provides an even more compelling 
explanation about the limit to what could be achieved from externally-driven PFM 
reforms.  The limitation of the role and influence of Donor Partners also help explain the 
weak link or dysfunction in PFM systems and institutions depicted in figure 5. 6 in 
Chapter Five. However, the evidence in support of this argument is not always obvious, 
which must be reviewed in terms of the PFM results and the realities in each country. A 
part of this challenge is the problem of attribution that continues to plague efforts 
toward assessing the impact of PFM reforms. But more so, because of the different 
pieces of evidence that one must assemble to make a determination about the level of 
impact (sufficiency) of specific reform initiatives.  
 
The experience in the two countries also shows the inherent challenges of attempts to 
align the interests of Donor Partners and state authorities for reforms that target 
downstream, de facto and de-concentrated dimensions of PFM. This challenge is also in 





informal institutional dynamics that pervade downstream, de facto and de-
concentrated dimensions of PFM in the two case studies. The international intervention 
in PFM in the two case studies have so far failed to permeate these non-technical causal 
factors. In the words of a Senior Legislator in Sierra Leone “these are the informalities 
that need to be curtailed, and the donor will not be able to do that. So, the donors only 
focus on technical aspects without looking at the broader social fabric of society. You 
will find out that what they are doing has a lot of limitations on the ground” (Interview: 
XX702). This proposition has support in the institutional reform literature. Hydén had 
earlier argued “informal rules rather than formal institutions constitute the principal 
threat to the reform efforts. …because they are embedded in society and its culture, 
they will remain ‘necessary evils’ that the donor community can at best contain, not 
erase altogether” (Hydén, 2005, p. 17).  
 
A good example of the limit to what could be achieved from externally driven reforms is 
the consistent under-performance of even the GBS triggers used to drive reforms in both 
countries. Some interview participants, therefore, raised legitimate issues about the 
effectiveness of GBS triggers use to drive PFM, which they note have not been working 
in some areas in the PS. One example of this is the discontinuance of PET surveys, which 
was a key GSB trigger, and which proved to be ineffective more than a decade since it 
was first launched in the two case studies.  
 
Perhaps the best explanation of this limitation is given by a NSA representative from 





For example, there are cultures and traditions when you visit a village, 
people are not used to using public toilets in city centres. So, if a donor 
comes and say we need to build public toilets in city centres. People 
would prefer to go to the bush traditions because people don’t want 
to be seen going to the toilet. So, building a toilet in the city centre is a 
waste, because that toilet will be there idle. We need to need a 
particular reform program before such a program should be designed 
and implemented. Otherwise, any efforts in implementing such a 
reform program will go in vain (Interview: XL701). 
 
The above scenario explained by the respondent goes to the core of the approach to 
PFM by Development Partners. It speaks to the need for home-grown reforms, and as 
well as the need to approach reform from a problem-driven perspective. If further 
highlights the potential for complete failure of the international-led effort in PFM if the 
right approach is not taken.  
 
Meanwhile, there is a genuine belief among some donor-partners in the two case 
studies that current reforms do not address the most fundamental problems in these 
countries. Some also believe the assessments that trigger these reforms, at least, go a 
long way in diagnosing some of the problems. With time, and with persistent efforts, 
current reform measures will be able to address the most fundamental issues that 
underpin PFM performance in those countries. However, some donor representatives 
still believe current approaches are perhaps the best available, because they are best 
practices - as one of the Donor Partner representative in Sierra Leone notes these reform 
models are what he called the ‘Rolls Royce versions’, or at a minimum, they help trigger 





representative underscores a key finding in this thesis, which posits that the lack of 
Political Commitment discussed in section 6.1.1.3 indicates the inability of DP to 
influence certain politically sensitive decision-making processes in PFM. A finding that 
was also emphasised by the International Crisis Group in their report ‘A New Era of 
Reform’ about reforms Sierra Leone (ICG, 2008). This further underscore the reasons for 
the overarching conclusion reached in Chapter Five section 5.3 that explains how and 
why the international-led effort in PFM in the two case studies is short on downstream, 
de facto and de-concentrated service delivery areas. 
 
6.1.3 The Economic Drivers f PFM Reforms in Developing Countries 
Further to discussions in Chapter Five sections 5.1.2.1 regarding the role of macro-
economic variables on the state and level of PFM performance in the two case study 
countries, this section provides big-picture theoretical discussions on role of the 
economic drivers in explaining PFM reform outcomes in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The 
ensuing theoretical discussions are drawn from the process-tracing analysis of several 
hypotheses/propositions, grouped under Hypothesis Five in Appendix C. The theoretical 
discussions economic variables in this section are grounded in recent PFM reform 
literature about the hypothesised role of economic factors as drivers of PFM 
performance in developing countries (Krause 2009; Pretorius and Pretorius 2009; de 
Renzio et al, 2011; de Gramont 2014; Fritz et al 2014a and 2017). 
 
The fundamental argument advanced in recent PFM literature is that strong economic 





improvements in economic factors positively influence PFM performance in developing 
countries. However, the empirical evidence from the two countries shows there is little 
enthusiasm from state authorities in support of the economic argument as a driver of 
PFM reforms or PFM performance more generally. Several interviewees share the view 
that improved economic performance could still contribute to progress in PFM. For 
example, some note a booming economy could bolster support from the pubic or foster 
innovation in the PFM process and provide greater leverage to state authorities to 
pursue reforms that are home-grown. Irrespective of this assertion by some state 
authorities interviewed in the two countries, there is compelling evidence from the 
interviews and realities on the ground during the period under review that indicates to 
a large extent, that rise in domestic revenue and GDP did not positively influence PFM 
reform progress. Irrespective of the increased revenue from mining exports, local 
support (especially financial support) to PFM reform remained a fraction of the total 
support provided by International partners.  
 
Even if income levels had a strong correlation with PFM systems quality, with higher 
income leading to better PFM quality, does that mean the scope for improvement in 
PFM is limited by income levels as Fritz et al (2014a) seem to suggest? The evidence 
from the case studies indicates this is an, unlikely outcome. In fact, the evidence 
suggests higher income levels come with even greater challenges, including the many 
political economy dynamics and incentives that come with higher levels of revenue 
discussed below. Moreover, the evidence from the case studies indicates a reverse 





quality. This proposition is largely true for improvements in resource-based revenues, 
which tend to undermine PFM reform progress in the two countries. Expanding 
revenues and GDP growth as a result of the mining boom in the two countries 
contributed to the worsening PFM performance.   
 
Based on the evidence, expanding revenues from the mining sector triggered the 
impulses of Political Leaders, who more than proportionately doubled their promises 
through exponential levels of spending towards funding their ‘political roots’. Political 
Leaders had the tendency to plan too large with the expectation that revenue streams 
from mining will continue to flow in the foreseeable future. That led to fiscal indiscipline 
with large extra-budgetary expenditures and declining PEFA scores for budget credibility 
and frequent in-year revisions of budget ceilings during that period under review in the 
two countries. The experience with the boom in mining revenue in the two countries 
fits squarely well with the broader experience of resource-rich countries, where revenue 
from natural resources tend to drive fiscal indiscipline (de Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 
2010; Fritz, et al., 2014a; Fritz et al., 2017). 
 
The process-tracing analysis also found expanding resource-based revenues tend to 
promote rent-seeking behaviours, which undercut specific aspects of PFM, such as 
budget credibility, planning, budgeting and execution, procurement reforms, it led to 
frequent in-year revisions to the budget ceilings and promoted huge extra-budgetary 





First, the governments in both countries have been heavily criticised by many observers 
and concerned citizens for signing bad mining contracts with foreign companies, which 
undermine the taxed-based revenue collections in these countries in the long-term. 
These bad deals, according to critics and civil society organisations are largely the 
products of rent-seeking behaviours by politicians, who in return get kickbacks from 
mining companies and other favours, such as providing employment opportunities to 
their followers and relatives. A 2014 report called ‘Loosing Out’ by the Budget Advocacy 
Network (BAN) - a group of civil society organisations working in PFM, supported by the 
charity Christian Aid UK, Tax Justice Network-Africa (TJN-A), IBIS, and ActionAid, found 
that concessions in the form of low rates of income tax and royalties, important duty 
and Goods and Services Tax (GST) waivers to mining companies are principally 
responsible for the low tax-revenue in Sierra Leone, resulting from huge revenue losses 
to the country (BAN Sierra Leone, 2014). These figures are not surprising, with Sierra 
Leone only ranking 3rd from the bottom, on tax-revenue collection among 23 African 
countries according to an IMF report (IMF, 2012, p, 18). These findings resonate with 
earlier propositions in Chapter Five about the impact of rent-seeking behaviours on 
reform implementation, especially in resource-rich economies (Khan and Jomo 2000; 
Barma, Kaiser, and Le 2012; Okonjo-Iweala 2012; Levy 2014; Fritz et al., 2017).  
 
Second, the surge in resource-based revenue from mining and Foreign Aid have direct 
implications on procurement reform efforts in the two countries. Huge in-year revenue 
collections from mining companies triggered unplanned expenditures, which were often, 





seen from the drop in PEFA score for indicator 19 for competitive procurement from C 
in 2010 to D in 2014 assessment (PEFA website for scores relating to 2010, 2014 and 
2018 assessments). Also, according to the Joint-donor Progress Assessment Framework 
(2013) for PFM reforms in Sierra Leone, 73% (by value) of all government procurement 
between 2012 and 2013 were conducted through non-competitive practices such as 
sole-sourcing or as emergency procurements (PAF 2013, in Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016:63). 
Liberia had similar PEFA scores for indicator 19, with increase in non-competitive 
procurement practices reported in the 2014 assessment, covering the periods during 
the mining boom. The country’s PEFA scores relating to competitive procurement 
methods dropped from C in 2009 to D in the 2014 assessment. 
 
Also, the huge inflows of mining revenues had implications for other PFM dimensions. 
They resulted in increased extra-budgetary expenditures, which were not reported, but 
also poor multi-year perspectives in planning, budgeting and execution. The PEFA scores 
for indicators 7(a) and 12 (a, c & d) for Sierra Leone consistently underperformed 
(averaging D scores) during the mining boom. Liberia’s performance regarding aligning 
policy planning, budgeting and execution (indicator 12) dropped during the mining 
boom, but its scores regarding extra-budgetary and unreported exported expenditures 
improved during the same period (PEFA website for various assessments relating to 
Liberia and Sierra Leone). Based on this evidence, I therefore, conclude that countries 
with significant resource-based revenue (resource-rich countries) or a sudden boom in 





further undermines overall domestic tax-based revenue generation potentials in those 
countries in the short-term and as well as in the long-term.  
 
Regarding tax-based revenues, the two countries experienced on average an increased 
tax-based domestic revenue, both in absolute terms, and as a percentage of GDP even 
at the height of the mining boom. For example, the National Revenue Authority in Sierra 
Leone in the last decade, has consistently met its revenue targets. But Liberia overall 
had higher domestic tax-based revenue as a percentage of GDP compared to Sierra 
Leone. Like the proceeds from mining exports, improvements in tax-based revenue did 
not at all have an equally positive impact on key PFM indicators such as budget 
credibility.  Aggregate expenditure and revenue outturns (PEFA indicators P1 & P3) in 
both countries dropped significantly for most of the recovery and development phase, 
but with some slight improvement in P3 for Liberia in the most recent PEFA assessment 
report. The budget support evaluation in Sierra Leone also noted frequent and 
consistent revisions in budget ceilings and delays in quarterly releases to MDAs (Ecorys 
and Fiscus, 2016:63).  
 
Despite the existence of a strand of literature that countries with increasing tax-based 
revenue tend to have more improved PFM systems than resource-rich countries (Moore 
2004; Prichard and Leonard 2010;  Fritz, et al., 2017), the evidence in the two case study 
countries with increasing tax-based revenue did not equally reflect on their PFM 
performance. The evidence shows the negative effects of improvements in mining 





benefits that might have resulted from improvements in tax-based revenue from the 
two countries. According to some of the interview participants, the experiences in the 
two countries during the mining boom indicate a negative causal relationship between 
improved economic performance and PFM reform progress. Meaning, the sudden 
improvements in key economic indicators such as domestic revenue (both resources-
based and tax-based) and GDP had negative effects on key PFM indicators in the case 
study countries.   
  
The positive effects of improvements in tax-based revenue on PFM according to Moore 
(2004) and Prichard and Leonard (2010) was based on the premise that it would lead to 
stronger citizens’ demand for better services and greater accountability. The evidence 
in the two countries does not support the arguments made by those scholars. Rather, 
citizen’s participation according to the open budget survey remains the weakest link 
among other indicators and across the two countries. The scores for public participation 
in the most recent open budget survey were 6 and 11 out of 100 points for Sierra Leone 
and Liberia respectively (see Open Budget Survey for Sierra Leone and Liberia for 2015 
and 2017).  
 
Also, there are currently no formal mechanisms in either country to facilitate public 
engagement and support external audits and participation in audit investigations. 
Members of public and civil society are not called to testify during budget and public 
account hearings. There are also no mechanisms to facilitate public engagement with 





process. The results from PEFA assessments show that accountability dimensions within 
PFM are among the weakest areas within PFM in the two countries (PEFA reports for 
the two countries from PEFA website).  
 
This study, therefore, argues even if the huge resource-based revenue brought about by 
the mining boom did not negatively affect PFM reform efforts in the two countries, the 
absence or low citizen participation and accountability, meant improvements in tax-
based revenue as well did not have an equally positive effect on PFM reforms. Going by 
the arguments advanced Moore (2004) and Prichard and Leonard (2010), it is plausible 
to claim that, improvements in resource-based revenue in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
given the absence of public participation and low accountability may have contributed 
to the declining PFM performance in the two countries.  
 
Meanwhile, the PFM experience in the case studies indicates a reverse causal 
relationship between Improvements in economic variable and PFM performance – i.e.,   
improvements in economic variables such as domestic revenue and GDP tend to lead to 
declining PFM performance. It presents an important departure from the existing 
literature about the relationship between economic variables such as domestic revenue, 
GDP, and income levels and PFM reform outcomes in developing countries (de Renzio et 
al., 2011; Fritz et al., 2014). Moreover, it also lends credence to earlier warnings by 
scholars about the potential for a reverse correlation about the effect of economic 
variables on PFM performance drawn from quantitative studies (de Renzio et al., 






Unlike earlier quantitative results about the effect of economic variables on PFM 
performance, the process-tracing evidentiary analysis in this thesis reveals 
improvements in PFM systems, instead, had positive effects on economic variables. 
Although each country did experience improved tax-based revenue, both in absolute 
terms and as a percentage of GDP, Liberia on average had higher domestic revenue as a 
percentage of GDP than Sierra Leone (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4 in Chapter Five; Ecorys and 
Fiscus, 2016; IMF, 2010). The superior performance by Liberia, having come from behind 
has been attributed by many respondents to improvements in its domestic revenue 
administration. Interview participants from the two countries recognised the role of 
improvements in revenue reforms could have had on domestic revenue generation and 
overall economic situation. They cite specific reforms such as taxpayer registration, 
introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GT), installation of new systems such as 
ASSYCYDA and the International Tax Administration Systems (ITAS) as major 
contributory factors to improvements in domestic revenue mobilisation. Moreover, 
respondents also seem to agree that the significant advancements in revenue 
administration in Liberia principally accounts for the country’s superior domestic 







6.1.3.1 The Twin-Shocks: The Effects of the Decline in Commodity Prices and the Ebola Outbreak 
on PFM Performance in Liberia and Sierra Leone  
Other factors that appeared to have been relevant in the economic performance and 
PFM reform discussion, are what some respondents described as the twin-shocks 
suffered by both countries. Although some respondents mentioned the 2008 global 
economic crisis, the fall in Iron Ore and other commodity prices in 2013-2014 and the 
Ebola Outbreak in 2014 are considered by many respondents to have had the most 
impact on PFM reform efforts in the two countries. While the Ebola Outbreak did have 
impact on the economies of the two countries, evidenced through the significant decline 
in GDP and domestic revenue, its impact on PFM performance is, however, less obvious 
as some of the respondents suggest. The study draws on two specific reasons to explain 
the lack of clear links between the Ebola Outbreak and PFM performance.  
 
First, results from the 2010 and 2014 PEFA assessments for Sierra Leone show that PFM 
performance was already in decline even before the advent of Ebola virus in 2014. But 
PFM performance in the 2018 PEFA assessment for Sierra Leone also dropped in the 
post Ebola period from 2015-2017. This trend in PFM performance is acknowledged by 
some of the respondents in both countries. It is, therefore, difficult to make the 
argument that the decline in domestic revenue and GDP during the Ebola Outbreak 
directly had a significant impact on PFM, because improved domestic revenue collection 
and rising GDP in the period leading to the Ebola Outbreak in both countries did not lead 






Perhaps, declining PFM performance got worse during the Ebola Outbreak, as one 
Lawmaker suggests, the government had bitten more than it could chew in anticipation 
of rising revenue from mining exports. The argument I make here does not, however, 
rule out the potential impact of the Ebola virus on economic activities. I argue, the direct 
effect of the Ebola Outbreak on PFM reforms in the case study countries may have been 
over-played by state authorities in those countries.  
 
Secondly, while both Liberia and Sierra Leone suffered from the Ebola Outbreak, PFM 
performance (2012 and 2016 assessments) did improve for Liberia during the Outbreak. 
As noted in the previous paragraph, it is, therefore, plausible to argue that the marginal 
improvements in PFM in Liberia before and during Ebola Outbreak are associated with 
its superior domestic tax-based revenue/GDP generation capabilities. However, analysis 
of the fiscal accounts and ODA as a percentage of GDP of both countries during the 
period of the mining boom to post-Ebola (2010-2016) shows that Liberia received, by far 
more ODA/GDP than Sierra Leone did. As evidenced by its superior PEFA scores for 
budget credibility (P1, P2, and P3 - 2009, 2012 & 2016 assessments), Liberia was able to 
effectively manage inflows from mining exports because its development programs 
were financed almost exclusively by Development Partners.  State authorities in Liberia, 
therefore, had greater discretion about how to spend domestic tax-based revenue and 







The above dynamics between state authorities and International Partners in Liberia 
regarding financing public expenditure programs was emphasised by an NSA 
representative interviewed. The representative notes there is a mutual understanding 
between state authorities and International Partners, whereby the government takes 
care of salaries and other recurrent expenditures, while Donors Partners fund all 
development projects in the country (Interview: XL701). Thus, even if the government 
of Liberia also had ambitious plans in anticipation of increasing mining revenue like 
Sierra Leone, its receipts of huge ODA/GDP during the period helped cushion against the 
potential impact of the Ebola Outbreak and the decline in commodity prices in 
2013/2014.  
 
Based on my above analysis of the evidence of the impact of Ebola and the decline in 
commodity prices, I strongly argue that these twin-shocks had greater impact on the 
PFM reform processes in Sierra Leone than in Liberia. My argument is further 
corroborated by the more significant decline in domestic revenue as % of GDP and real 
GDP growth in Sierra Leone than in Liberia (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4 above in Chapter 
Five). While Liberia’s superior domestic tax-based revenue as a percentage of GDP did 
play a role, receipts from ODA were critical to the country’s resilience during the twin-
shocks. The high domestic tax-based revenue in Liberia would have had little or no 
impact with the wage bill absorbing more than 70% of its recurrent budget. Besides, 
ODA to Liberia was consistently higher, representing almost twice the national budget 





2016/2017 and GoL ODA reports for the same period from the ministry of finance 
website). 
 
The relevance of inflows from ODAs was not confined to Liberia alone. Its relevance to 
the PFM reform processes in the two countries and across all phases (post-conflict, 
recovery and development) is apparent in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 presented in Chapter Five. 
PFM performance in the two countries improved in the aftermath of every surge in ODA 
across all phases under review.  In the period immediately after their civil conflicts 
(2002-2005), there was an upsurge in ODA, but so too was there an upsurge is PFM 
performance in the two countries. Even where ODA did not increase, inflows in the form 
of debt relief at the end of 2007 and 2008 led to improved PFM performance in the 2007 
and 2009 PEFA assessments respectively for Sierra Leone. Similar improvements in PFM 
could also been seen in the 2010 and 2012 PEFA assessments in Sierra Leone and Liberia 
respectively, following the slight increase in ODA between 2009 and 2010. This 
relationship could be explained by the high number of budget support triggers that 
related to PFM reforms. That meant, each time there was an upsurge in ODA, of which, 
budget was part of, there were additional disbursement triggers related to PFM. But as 
discussed in section 6.1.2, the extent of external support on overall PFM reform progress 
had been limited to mostly upstream and de jure dimensions of PFM.  
 
A more direct relationship occurred between ODA and domestic revenue as % of GDP, 
especially in Sierra Leone. For most periods, domestic revenue declined immediately 





2007 and the increase in budget support following the 2008 global economic crisis. Two 
implications could be drawn from this relationship between ODA and domestic revenue 
in Sierra Leone. First, ODA surged after every crisis - immediately after the civil conflicts 
and with HIPC debt relief, after the global financial crisis and in 2015 following the 2014 
Ebola Outbreak. This means ODA was used as a countercyclical measure or as a response 
to external shocks that supported government functions. Second, ODA also served as a 
disincentive to domestic revenue mobilisation efforts, especially in Sierra Leone. 
Meaning, for every surge in ODA there was a subsequent decline in domestic revenue. 
Similar results were also found in the evaluation of DFID Sierra Leone country program 
(Poate et. al., 2008); the IFM in 2010 (IMF, 2010) and more recently by the joint-donor 
budget support evaluation in Sierra Leone (Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016:51). 
 
6.1.4 What are the Right Institutional Dynamics for PFM Reforms to Thrive? 
The section, like the last three sections, presents an in-depth theoretical discussion 
about the formal institutional development, legal and management arrangement of 
PFM reforms to provide an understanding of the right institutional dynamics necessary 
for PFM reforms to thrive and survive over the long-term in developing countries. 
Through the process-tracing analysis of several institutional components, their 
structures and interrelationships in the two case studies, the theoretical discussions in 
this section illuminate on understanding of the role of the overall institutional 
environment in driving PFM reforms and improving the quality of PFM systems. These 
components and interrelationships cover the PFM Legal Framework, the Main PFM 





NSAs in PFM. The technical-political interface includes relations between the MoF and 
the legislature, relations within the executive and relations with donor partners. 
Intergovernmental relations cover the PFM institutional set up and governance 
arrangements in sectoral ministries and subnational government, and the nature of 
intergovernmental relations between the MoF and subnational government.  
 
Through observations from primary and secondary sources, I present in this section 
several pieces of evidence for each component within the PFM institutional 
environment that illustrate how the formal institutional environment and management 
arrangements alone, may not have the desired effect on PFM reforms and the quality of 
PFM systems in the two case study countries. The objective of the process-tracing 
analysis was to examine whether there was support for the hypothesis that formal 
institutional development, legal and management arrangements help PFM reform 
progress and overall PFM systems quality in developing countries. I proceed with the 
analysis of the first institutional component, which covers the PFM Legal Provisions that 
set out the rules and regulations that govern the way governments generate, allocate, 









6.1.4.1 The PFM Legal and Regulatory Framework 
The PFM reform experience in the two case studies shows while there has been 
tremendous progress in the legal and regulatory framework, significant gaps still exist 
between PFM laws and regulations and their actual implementation in practice in these 
countries. Based on the evidence, the first learning point from the experience in the case 
studies relates to the fact that much of the initial efforts to strengthen PFM were heavily 
concentrated in building the PFM legal architecture.  
 
The evidence further reveals significant uniformity in the nature and type of laws and 
regulations enacted in the case studies - ranging from the organic budget law and 
associated regulations, procurement law, external oversight, debt management, etc. 
However, the coverage and depth of these laws vary greatly in both countries and even 
between earlier and later versions of the PFM laws and regulations. The divergence in 
coverage and depth are the result of country differences in governance structures and 
systems. Differences between earlier and later versions of the specific laws emanate 
largely from the inappropriateness of earlier versions to the local context in these 
countries, often necessitating revisions or enactment of new laws. For example, the 
latest PFM law in Sierra Leone is much wide in scope and depth than the PFM law in 
Liberia because it captures the PFM operations of the national and subnational 
governments and it has new components such as  TSA that were absent from the earlier 






Irrespective of the gains made in building the PFM legal architecture in both case studies, 
the evidence from the process-tracing analysis indicates a lack of implementation of the 
laws and regulations. The reasons for the significant gap in the implementation of these 
PFM laws and regulations cited in the literature  range from technical to nontechnical 
factors (de Renzio and Dorotinsky, 2007; de Renzio, 2009b; Lawson and de Renzio, 2009; 
de Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 2010; Fritz et al., 2014a).  
 
However, this study argues in this section and elsewhere in this thesis that the apparent 
lack of implementation of PFM laws, regulations and policies is explained mostly by 
nontechnical factors. The existence and influence of technical factors such as the 
inappropriateness or inconsistencies of PFM laws with other laws and regulations could 
be hard to justify after those initial PFM laws and regulations were revised to match the 
local contexts or eliminated the inconsistencies in the two case study countries. The 
technical inconsistencies in the various laws can be corrected, and they have been 
corrected, which means their mere existence is relevant and could affect the 
implementation of the laws. But their absence does not mean all the PFM laws and 
regulations will be fully implemented. These technical factors therefore only pass a weak 
form of process-tracing test of causal inference.  
 
On the other hand, the nontechnical factors such as top-down political directives and 
informal client-patron networks are difficult to eliminate, which Hydén famously noted 
are “…embedded in society and its culture, they will remain ‘necessary evils’ that the 





evidence shows that nontechnical factors pass a much stronger process-tracing test, 
given their high relevance in determining not only whether a law gets passed at all, when 
or if a law fails to pass or stalls, they also largely explain the lack of implementation of 
PFM laws and regulations. This proposition holds true in the two case study countries, 
and it so irrespective of the nature of governance structures or extent of complexity of 
a country’s institutions and wider authorising environment discussed in the next 
subsections.   
 
6.1.4.2 The Main PFM Institution (The Ministry of Finance) 
The fundamental argument I present in this section is that the establishment of new 
institutions or mergers of PFM institutions or both and their institutional set-up have 
limited impact on PFM reform progress and the overall quality of PFM systems. This 
study further shows that although it is generally true that more complex governance 
structures and institutional set-ups may affect reform progress, the evidence from the 
case studies shows that PFM reform efforts and systems in developing countries could 
still be derailed or stifled even with less complex governance structures and institutional 
set-ups. This proposition is justified by the lack of functional improvements in the main 
PFM institutions found in the two case study countries almost two decades 
implementing PFM reforms.  
 
Emerging from civil conflicts, authorities in the two case studies have made significant 
progress in building new institutions, set up new departments, units, built capacity, etc., 





typified by the merger in both countries of the Ministries of Finance and Developing 
Planning.   
 
The PFM architecture in both countries is less complex and financial management 
functions are now highly concentrated in the MoF. It is also worth noting that most top-
level bureaucrats in the MoF, who would normally be considered elsewhere as career 
civil servants are political appointees or are appointed directly by the Presidents in the 
two countries. Irrespective of the highly centralised, simplistic and concentrated 
financial management functions within the MoF in both countries, their MoF still 
struggle to effectively carry out some of their basic functions such as planning, budgeting 
and execution. For example, the performance of the main budget planning, preparation 
and monitoring instrument, the MTEF has been appalling since it was first launched 
almost two decades ago in Sierra Leone and since 2003 in Liberia.  The inability of the 
Central Finance Agency to effectively function is also widely acknowledged in the 
literature of PFM (Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008; Fritz et al., 2012).  
 
The evidence shows structural and techno-political factors are mostly responsible for 
the limited functional improvement in the Central Finance Agencies in the case studies. 
Formal PFM institutions in the case studies have limited impact on the overall PFM 
systems quality, because there is a functional gap created by structural and techno-
political factors in those countries. This functional gap is derived from the difference 





and systems and the actual functionality of those institutions and systems, as shown in 
figure 6.2 below. 
Figure 6.2: Functional Gaps in PFM Institutions, Laws and Systems 
 
Source: Prepared by the Author 
The above diagram depicts the existing scenario in the case studies where the level of 
progress made in building new institutions and systems has failed to deliver functional 
improvements that are critical to achieving the overall promise of PFM reforms. What it 
does not reveal is the serious misconception that exists among state authorities and 
donor partner representatives about what constitute actual functional improvements. 
Most interviewees conflate the meaning of progress with functional improvements of 
PFM institutions. Advancements in PFM in the views of most of the respondents were 
mostly discussed in terms of progress made in building new institutions and systems. 
This misconception needs to be addressed, without which, it may be difficult to even 





clear that both countries now have in place the main PFM institutions and systems. 
What is missing is the lack of functional improvements of those institutions and systems, 
which must be the focus for any future PFM efforts in those countries. The need to 
bridge this functional gap in PFM institutions was also recently noted in the 2017 World 
Development Report (World Bank, 2017b; see also Fritz et al., 2017:90).  
 
Meanwhile, the widespread dysfunctional nature of the main PFM institutions in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone could also be traced to several factors that have their roots in the third 
component the technical-political interface in the two case study countries, which is 
discussed in the next subsection. 
 
6.1.4.3 The Technical-Political Interface  
The technical-political interface in the PFM architecture in Liberia and Sierra Leone has 
three facets - relations between the executive and the legislature, relations within the 
executive and relations with donor partners. These three facets of the technical-political 
interface are jointly discussed, given their inter-relationships, especially between the 
executive and the legislature that make it extremely difficult to examine each separately. 
The World Bank (2011b) and Krause et al. (2013:38) for example, note that the 
relationships within the executive - especially between technical leaders in the Ministry 
of Finance with the political environment is critical to PFM reform progress in developing 
countries. While several parallels exist in the legislative role in exercising oversight and 
accountability over PFM, there are, however, significant differences in the legislative 






These differences affect the power-relations between the executive and the legislature. 
Liberia’s two-tier Parliamentary Structure gives the Legislature greater power and 
leverage in its oversight role in the annual budget process, while the Legislature in Sierra 
Leone seems to be much more aligned and supportive of the executive’s decisions and 
policy directions. Similar differences in power-relations in the legislative budget process 
are found by Wehner (2006); Lienert (2013) and Fritz et al (2017:41), which affect the 
realism of the annual budget in developing countries more generally.  
 
Also, while there is a marriage between the legislative and executive arms in the annual 
budget process in the two countries, the nature and depth of the marriage differ 
between them. In Liberia, the marriage is much stronger between the Legislature and 
top-level bureaucrats in the MoF than between the Presidency and the Legislature. In 
Sierra Leone, however, the marriage is mostly between the Presidency and the 
Legislature. These distinctions are important because, they affect the level of power and 
leverage Parliamentarians have in each country. The executive in Sierra Leone is 
indispensable to the election/re-election of Parliamentarians, and the ruling Political 
Party has always maintained a majority in Parliament.   
 
Unlike Sierra Leone, Liberia has a more diverse parliament with many independent 
parliamentarians and with little control from the executive. The president in Liberia has 
little or no control over the legislature or members from her/his political party. The 





to the Liberian people that she did not approve of the huge allowances taken by 
Parliamentarians. This is complete lack of institutional independence in formal 
accountability institutions, especially in Liberia. This finding mirrors the broader picture 
in developing countries found by Mills and de Lay (2016). In their review, “accountability 
institutions are often too weak to effectively hold Political Leaders accountable (Mills 
and de Lay, 2016: 11). Similar Findings are also reported by Betley et al. (2012) and 
Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2013). This inherent political process in the budget process in 
the case studies has long been emphasised by many scholars and researchers (Norton 
and Elson, 2002; Hallerberg, Scartascini & Stein, 2009; Fritz et al., 2017:86).  
 
The above institutional set-up of the Legislature in the two countries, the power-
relations and marriage between the Executive and Legislature have major implications 
for the annual budget process. The legislature in Liberia has much control over the 
budget preparation and approval which has always resulted in significant delays in 
approving the annual budget. But more so, they have greater leverage over resource 
allocation and can manipulate the process in favour of their personal and political 
interests. There is a much more coherent budget preparation process in Sierra Leone 
with no substantial delays in approving the budget. Much of the institutional problems 
in budget preparations happen during the approval stage, where Parliamentarians from 
the ruling party appear to undermine the process as a way of protecting the executive’s 






Moreover, the institutional set-up, power-relations and marriage between the executive 
and the legislature also affect budget execution and accountability in similar ways in the 
two countries. Many of the reasons shared by the respondents, point to the lack of 
implementation of audit recommendations of the PAC. However, the problem is greater 
than just the failure to implement audit recommendations. The evidence from the 
process-tracing analysis reflects at worse a client-patron network or at best partisan 
politics entrenched in the relations within the executive and between the executive and 
the legislature. The latter presents serious dilemmas for all parties, as an NSA 
representative from Sierra Leone noted “when people are appointed, their hands are 
caught in the cookie jar, and by trying to disgrace them can bring credibility issues to the 
entire political party” (Interview: XL702). These institutional dysfunctions in the set-up 
of PFM institutions, including the legislature and interrelationships between the 
executive and the legislature and relations within the executive branch present far 
greater problems that speaks to power-imbalances, top-down political pressures and 
technical-political dilemmas covered in the next paragraphs.  
 
First, the process-tracing analysis reveals a straightforward top-down relationship within 
the executive branch of government in the two countries. There is a top-down political 
pressure faced by bureaucrats from the highest echelon of state authority in the 
executive branch. However, the relationship in not always top-down, as the analysis 
further reveals technical leaders in the MoF also benefit from their connections with 
political leaders through their appointment to positions and zero bottom-up 





themselves with the political class for their survival and to achieve their personal and 
departmental/program objectives. This so-called marriage has effectively circumvented 
any formal institutional checks and balances, which has resulted in significant extra-
budgetary expenditures, limited discretions from bureaucrats and informality in the 
entire PFM architecture.  
 
Second, the process-tracing analysis reveals far more complex sets of relationships 
among the three facets of technical-political interface. The evidence from these 
observations shows the complexity in the relationships among these facets are rooted 
in the influence, interests, and motivations of bureaucrats and political leaders. That 
means, the mere categorisation of stakeholders as champions or supporters and 
opponents will not contribute to our understanding of these complex stakeholder 
influences, interests and motivations.  
 
The evidence shows that in both countries the debate has been on whether the Minister 
of Finance is supportive or opposed to a reform intervention. The study finds such 
categorisation is misleading because a Finance Minister might express support for a 
reform, but might face a conundrum, or may sometimes be cautious about how far to 
push certain reforms or enforce certain policies or laws. This conundrum applies even 
to other top-level bureaucrats who are also regarded a ‘professionals’ and, therefore, 
would be supportive of any reform efforts. Perhaps, a better approach will be to 
examine whether reform champions or supporters are powerful enough to influence 





encounter similar dilemmas and difficult choices, which reflects the lack of 
implementation of recommendations from the PAC and overall poor performance in 
accountability dimensions of PFM.  
 
Another approach is to examine the interests and motivations of reformers and political 
leaders (instead of grouping them into supporters and opponents), which are critical to 
our understanding of what reform programs are likely to be initiated, pushed and 
sustained. This examination should include ascertaining the bureaucratic incentives and 
inertia that exists within the technical-political interface and the overall public sector 
that might drive or derail PFM reform efforts. Based on the process-tracing analysis, 
these incentives may include both financial and non-financial rewards. There is also 
strong inertia among stakeholders to maintain the status-quo in the two countries and 
to protect their enclaves. 
 
The complex motivations and interests of technical leaders and politicians also have 
implications for the relationships with donor partners. The incentives regarding donor 
support to PFM include both personal benefits as well as at the institutional level.  For 
example, bureaucrats and other technical personnel would relish working on a donor-
funded PFM reform project because of the improved allowances that come with those 
projects. In the words of a Principal accountant in one of the main ministries in Sierra 
Leone, “when you are in government, and you are attached to a donor-funded project, 
people perceive you as 'somebody wea don beteh'… [meaning you are someone who 






However, their ability to engage with donor-partners might also be affected because 
they might not want to appear to challenging donor partners or their interests. It might 
appear perfectly fine to have reform champions with most of their allowances paid by 
donor partners or have budget support triggers attached to a particular activity, but 
there are numerous examples where these arrangements may have created perverse 
incentives for bureaucrats and political leaders. For example, in response to the serious 
budget credibility problems emerging from non-transfers of allocations to Local Councils 
in Sierra Leone and County Authorities in Liberia, the EU tied a significant amount of its 
direct budget support to disbursements to Local Government. This move by the EU did 
help improve the situation in the views of several interviewees, because money was 
attached to this kind of activity, and the authorities directed all the energy towards 
achieving that target. That effectively diverted all the efforts of bureaucrats and political 
leaders away from other critical reform interventions at the time.  
 
The key implication from the above analysis is that in order to understand what reform 
initiatives are likely to be initiated or pushed through in the case of difficult reforms, 
implemented or sustained by bureaucrats and political leaders in the two countries, 
donor-partners and local reformers must refrain from the usual categorisation of 
stakeholders into champions, proponents and opponents, interested and opposed. 
Instead, deliberate effort should be taken to try to understand the level of 
influence/power-relations within the executive and between the executive and the 





reform process. The above distinctions are explained more clearly in the next subsection 
through examining the joint strategy pursued by donor-partners and local authorities in 
institutionalising PFM around key individuals/Champions in the two case study countries. 
 
Institutionalisation of PFM Reforms around key individuals/Champions 
The evidence shows there was a clear strategy by donor partners and local authorities 
in the two case study countries to pursue PFM reforms through core set of individuals 
within the Ministry of Finance. The strategy is part of the broader idea in the reform 
literature that particular individuals are more suitable to engage in politically sensitive 
and development contexts (Rocha Menocal, 2014; Denney and McLaren, 2016: 31), or 
encourage ‘development entrepreneurship’ and build strong networks and relationships 
(Faustino & Booth, 2014; Williamson, 2015) or bring together key stakeholders and 
support them to work collaboratively (Rocha Menocal et al., 2008; Rocha Menocal & 
O’Neil, 2012; Tavakoli et al., 2015).  
 
Much of the emphasis was on the role of the Ministers of Finance in championing PFM 
reforms in the two countries. The approach is widely reflected in the various PFM 
legislations shows in the section on PFM legal and regulatory framework in the two 
countries, which confer greater power and responsibility for overall PFM in the Minister 
and the MoF more generally. The Minister of Finance is highly respected in the two 
countries, with one former Ministry of Finance official in Sierra Leone who was also 
working on a donor-funded PFM project described the Minister of Finance as the 





even regard public statements from the Minister of Finance in support of PFM reforms 
as a powerful tool they can use to drive different programs and activities. Interviewee 
XL306 who is one of the key reformers within the PFM Reform Coordination Unit in 
Liberia responding to my question on whether he considered himself as a champion for 
PFM reforms made the following remark “yes, definitely I do [see myself as a champion 
for PFM reforms] but then, I have my limitations. And those limitations can only be 
removed if I get the blessing of senior management, like in the form of a public 
statement that the Minister has said this, for example, that will empower me to move 
on with different programs” (Interview: XL306). 
 
The strategy to anchor PFM reforms around key individuals did work well in the 
immediate post-conflict contexts in the two countries. The strategy created easy entry 
points for donor-partners and gave donor-partners confidence that they could rely on 
those key individuals to manage the reform process. Publications from independent 
researchers and reports from donor partners also point to the influence of those key 
individuals in driving PFM reforms. The strategy created the highly needed technical 
expertise in the MoF to exercise control and provide leadership in the management of 
PFM reforms in the two countries (Srivastava & Larizza, 2013; Roseth and Srivastava, 
2013; Welham & Hadley, 2016). A World bank study on political economy of reforms in 
Sierra Leone concluded that PFM reforms in Sierra Leone resulted in winners and losers, 
championed mainly by the Local Technical Assistants (LTAs) in MoF who were paid by 
donor partners, and that the reforms never gained momentum beyond the MoF 





A core component of the joint strategy to anchor PFM reforms around key individuals 
was to build capacity locally and knowledge transfer to civil servants. Although there 
were nuances in the approach to capacity building and knowledge transfer in the two 
countries, the evidence shows mixed results for most of the programs, except the 
financial management training school and support to the University of Liberia which are 
widely regarded as largely successful in injecting a lot of capacity in PFM institutions in 
Liberia.  
 
In both countries the focus on strategic technical individuals in key PFM institutions 
created in the view of many interview participants a lot of challenges in the PFM reform 
efforts in the two countries. First, it created significant capacity differences between 
core technical and low-level personnel in the MoF in the two countries. Second, those 
top-level technical personnel were paid augmented salaries financed by donor partners 
that were significantly higher than the average pay or other local civil servants within 
the Ministry of Finance and between the Ministry of Finance, Sector Ministries and Local 
Government. The huge salary gap created a lot of resentment among lower cadre staff 
in key PFM institutions in the two counties. It is nonetheless difficult to establish the 
extent of the impact of the resentment on the overall PFM reform effort in the two 
countries.  
 
Third, and perhaps, the biggest challenge to PFM reform efforts in the two countries 
posed by those programs was the transfer of LTAs and personnel under the SES and 





technical personnel had salaries that were far above the highest pay scale in the 
government payroll in the two countries and contributed to a significant increase in the 
governments’ wage bills. This problem continues to affect ongoing civil service reforms 
through the Pay and Performance project and Public Sector Modernisation Project in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively (Roseth and Srivastava, 2013; Srivastava and 
Larizza, 2013).  
 
A further consequence of the strategy to institutionalise PFM reforms was the fact that 
power and influence became very entrenched within the few officials in the MoF in the 
two countries. This concentration of power and influence among few officials gave them 
a lot of freedom to operate, often with zero accountability for their policies and actions 
regarding PFM and allocation of resources (see also similar findings from different 
countries by Krause et al., 2013:38-9). But more so, the high concentration of power and 
influence among few officials created a lot of informality within the institutional set of 
PFM institutions that meant few individuals had access to the management information 
systems in the MoF. The evidence is particularly strong in Sierra Leone as Welham and 
Hadley argue “the heavy reliance on this cadre of ex LTAs also raises important questions 
about long-term capability of the Ministry if more formalised workforce management 
and succession planning is not introduced” (Welham and Hadley, 2016, p. 33). 
  
The most widely shared and critical concern about efforts to institutionalise PFM 
reforms around key officials in the Ministry of Finance is rooted in its implications for 





meant an existing Minister with little or no interests in specific reforms or a new Minister 
of Finance with different policy background and interests in PFM reforms will certainly 
derail ongoing efforts and undermine the sustainability of the reforms. This concern is 
shared by both local reformers and donor partners. 
 
Finally, the evidence presented from all the above observations shows that the joint 
strategy by local authorities and donor partners to institutionalise PFM reforms around 
key officials in the main PFM institutions in the two countries created a lot of impact in 
the immediate post-conflict environments in the two countries. Part of this success is 
explained largely by the fact that the strategy cultivated strong relationships and built 
trust between bureaucrats in the MoF and donor partners (see also Welham and Hadley, 
2016:22; Krause et al., 2013).  
 
However, whatever the impact that was created by this approach was derailed by the 
tensions and resentment that emerged among low cadre staff in key PFM institutions 
and in the public sector. The approach also created significant challenges in the long-
term and continues to undermine reform efforts in the two countries. In rolling those 
programs, donor partners failed to consider the demand such a strategy places on key 
stakeholders and the incentives structures that confront them in implementing those 
programs. This point is also recently made by Laws and Marquette (2018:26-7) in their 






6.1.4.4 Intergovernmental relations Between Central Finance Agency (MoF), Sectoral Ministries and 
subnational government    
The process-tracing analysis here covers the PFM institutional set-up and governance 
arrangements in sectoral ministries and subnational governments, the nature of 
intergovernmental relations and the challenges and opportunities that exist in linking 
progress in PFM and to downstream or frontline service delivery units. Regarding the 
institutional set-up and governance arrangements, the overall PFM architecture in both 
countries is less complex and financial management functions are highly concentrated 
in the MoF. The highly centralised institutional set-up and management arrangements 
in the PFM architecture in the two countries presents a huge opportunity to improve 
service delivery in these centralized systems - with MoF having direct control during the 
budget planning, preparation, execution and reporting over service delivery units.  
 
Despite initial efforts in Sierra Leone, in particular, to take advantage of the above 
opportunity and improve service delivery through the decentralisation and the 
enactment of the Local Government Act in 2004 (GoSL, 2004: Local Government Act), 
there is limited progress made in downstream service delivery front of PFM (PEFA 
website – PEFA Assessment reports 2010 for five Local Councils – Freetown, Bo, Kenema, 
Kono and Makeni)12. The decentralisation process and devolution of service delivery to 
County Authorities in Liberia had been much slower, but the country has made 
important gains recently in improving services, which have been credited by observers 
and some interviewees to the set-up of county treasuries in four counties (Grand Bassa, 
                                                          





Bong, Margibi and Nimba) as part of its pilot program. (World Bank, 2017c). The highly 
centralised system in Liberia and the recent improvement in service delivery through its 
county treasury pilot program have drawn the spotlight on Sierra Leone in the aftermath 
of the Ebola scandal, which some observers link to the level of deconcentration of PFM 
functions in that country. The Ebola experience and the massive scandal that ensued 
was specifically highlighted in the evaluation of donor support to PFM and some 
interviewees as a product of the deconcentration of some PFM functions away from the 
MoF. For which, they suggest that the government re-concentrate some of those 
functions back under the control of the MoF (Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016).  
 
The generally low level of performance in Sectoral Ministries and Subnational 
Government compared with the more strong performance of the Central Government 
in both countries (See PEFA website for PEFA scores for both Central and Subnational 
Governments), is caused in part by the broader transactional approach to PFM in the 
case studies. Central Government (mainly the MoF) roll out reform programs to MDAs 
and Local Government for implementation, often with no real ownership and 
commitment from MDAs and Local Councils to finance and sustain those reforms in the 
future. The evidence also indicates there were no targeted efforts to build capacity in 
sector ministries apart from the usual roll out of policies and systems such as the chart 
of accounts, MTEF and IFMIS reforms. Moreover, the scale of PFM reform efforts 
(technical and financial support) was lower in MDAs and Subnational Governments 
compared with the level of support directed towards the Central Government. These 





Leaders created tensions in the intergovernmental relations in the two countries 
according to some interviewees. 
 
6.1.4.5 Non-State Actors (NSA) or Civil Society Engagement in PFM Reforms in Developing Countries 
Non-State Actor (NSA) engagement in PFM reform is discussed in this thesis as the fifth 
component, which is part of the broader PFM institutional environment in the two case 
study countries. NSAs in the context of this thesis means any local or Community-Based 
Organisation (CBOs) NGO, Civil Society Organisation (CSO) with interests in PFM issues. 
Based on the evidence, this study argues that irrespective of the low impact of NSA, 
especially on accountability dimensions of PFM, there is a space for improving NSA 
engagement in PFM and its relationship with the wider PFM institutional environment 
or the other four institutional components.  
 
The process-tracing analysis of the primary data and as well as findings from published 
sources shows there has been some level progress made in improving the engagement 
of NSAs in both the supply and demand sides (Fritz et al., 2017:17) in the two countries. 
NSAs have become relevant in the PFM process, but their level of impact could still be 
questioned. For example, greater access to user-friendly information as a direct result 
of NSA engagement has still failed to translate into good governance systems in the case 
study countries.   
 
Meanwhile, NSAs’ impact depends largely on where the focus has been over the years 





on advocacy, transparency and issues around the annual budget formulation process 
than in accountability and public participation dimensions of PFM. There is also, a subtle 
admission by some interviewees that the level of progress made in transparency, 
advocacy and some aspects in the annual budget formulation process denotes the first 
steps in the efforts from NSAs to contribute to improvements in accountability and 
overall service delivery efforts.  
 
Irrespective of the significant gains made in areas such as transparency, advocacy and 
budget formation, the two countries still continue to rank poorly among their peers in 
the sub-region based on the available data from PEFA reports and the Open Budget 
Survey (OBS) from the International Budget Partnership. Among these is the fact that 
local authorities in the two countries were sceptical about any NSA engagement in PFM, 
citing mostly technical concerns, which for them were outside the realm of civil society. 
Others also cite the lack of understanding from government officials about the role of 
NSAs in PFM. Perhaps, a more unlikely explanation for the low progress in the two 
countries with respect to other countries in the sub-region is the fact that NSA 
engagement in PFM only gained attention several years into the reforms. And this, 
understandably, according to some of the respondents was because PFM was not a 
priority for NSAs immediately after the civil conflicts in the two countries. Most NSAs at 
the time were working on issues such as transitional justice, peace building, human 
rights etc. 
However, the evidence described above does not explain the whole story on NSA 





thus far, and the opportunities that exist for better civil society participation in PFM. 
NSA engagement in PFM in the two countries has become a lot more complicated than 
anyone would have thought, which perhaps, is not surprising given the ongoing debate 
about their potential impact, especially on accountability and downstream service 
delivery dimensions of PFM.  NSAs continue to face complex problems, ranging from 
capacity constraints to political and institutional challenges that impede their 
effectiveness. Efforts by donor partners and local authorities to further promote and 
institutionalisation of NSA engagement in PFM have resulted in serious political and 
institutional dilemmas for NSAs in the two countries.  
 
First, the evidence shows that while there has been some level of cooperation and 
strategic alignment between NSA and other components within the broader PFM 
institutional set up in these countries, internal politics remains a challenge and as well 
as an opportunity for active NSA engagement in PFM. Some political actors continue to 
cast doubt on the contribution of NSAs and will go to some lengths to stifle their 
activities by denying them the necessary funding. In recognition of this challenge, NSAs 
have had to make some political manoeuvres within government to push their policy 
objectives. Their work sometimes means they could be considered by government 
officials as allies and sometimes they could be targets.  
 
These situations in which NSAs find themselves have led them to learn and to come up 
effective strategies, such as dialogue and strategic engagement with local authorities, 





The latter, some interviewees note, often has counterproductive effects on NSA and 
government relations in the two countries. However, NSAs have also been blamed by 
some observations for their lack of sincerity and contribution to the political divide in 
these countries. In the words of one prominent NSA representative in Sierra Leone, 
“there are elements of incivility in CSOs. Some are genuine and some are influenced by 
the government to be talking good things about PFM or the country” (Interviewee: 
XX702).  
 
While there has been laudable efforts according to many interviewees in bolstering NSA 
engagement in PFM by the international partners and country governments, those 
efforts have also added another layer of complication for NSAs, who have to now 
balance between satisfying their political masters in the MoF and as well as effectively 
pursuing their mission. NSAs benefit a lot from working from within government, such 
as having greater access to policy makers and aligning their activities with the interests 
(such as PEFA indicators) of both government and donor partners. However, they are 
also being effectively held hostage by state authorities to do their bidding, in terms of 
pushing specific government policies and actions. By having the NSA sitting in the same 
building and under the control of the MoF, it has become easier for state authorities to 
have NSA buy-in to their policies and actions, irrespective of whether those policy 
actions are in line with the interests of NSAs and citizens. At the same time, NSAs are 
now left with little or no leverage to engage strategically with the MoF on PFM issues. 
The NSA experience in these countries poses important questions about whether 





engagement in PFM constitutes state capture or strategic alignment in the relationship 
between NSAs and country government. 
 
The future for NSA engagement in PFM is not as gloomy as the above evidence and 
analysis suggest. As Robinson (2007b) and de Renzio and Krafchik (2007) argue, NSAs 
are another important mechanism for future PFM engagement in developing countries. 
Several opportunities still exist within the current PFM institutional framework in these 
countries to improve NSA engagement in PFM. The evidence shows three specific 
opportunities where involvement of NSAs could create an impact in the PFM reform 
efforts in the two case study countries.  
 
First, NSAs could do better if they focus on shaping governments’ policy directions and 
provide credible alternative policy options through evidenced-based arguments, backed 
by constructive engagement with state authorities. State Authorities in the two 
countries always seek to discredit reports from NSAs by identifying inaccuracies or lack 
of evidence to support assertions in those reports. It is critical that NSAs get their facts 
correct, if they are to engage effectively on specific PFM issues and policies. For NSAs to 
be able to achieve this, donor partner and country governments must be prepared to 
increase their current level of support towards improving the technical competence of 
NSAs working in PFM.  
Second, there is an opportunity for NSA engagement in PFM reforms by improving the 
institutional links between NSAs and the Legislature. There are currently weak 





Legislature. The legislatures in the two countries have little or no capacity to effectively 
perform their oversight role in the annual budget process and provide accountability 
mechanisms within PFM. NSAs could, therefore, support the Legislature by providing 
them with evidence-based research on the annual budget and other PFM matters. There 
is a greater degree of convergence in the interests of NSAs with that of the interests of 
MPs. However, such support must be provided indirectly through dissemination in the 
media and to make copies of their reports available to the general public, to avoid any 
unintended retaliations from the Central Government. Community-Based Organisations 
should also be empowered so that they can support their Members of Parliament with 
policy recommendations based on research conducted in their respective communities 
and as well as support them in conducting oversight over the use of resources allocated 
to their communities.  
 
A final avenue for future NSAs engagement in PFM is in the area of supporting donor 
partners in the determination of appropriate budget support triggers and serving a 
mechanism to monitor performance against those triggers. NSAs can also provide 
support in donor partner review missions and make recommendations about areas 
where donor conditions might be appropriate for specific reform programs. DFID and 
the EU for example, have been cited by some NSA representatives as some of the donor 
partners that have taken the lead in building better collaborations and working directly 
with NSAs in Sierra Leone. However, the idea of NSA supporting donor partners in the 





would have to reconcile between having measurable and short-term objectives with 
often long-term solutions from NSAs. 
 
6.1.4.6 Concluding Remarks about the Role of Institutional Dynamics in PFM Development 
This section has presented a framework for future researchers in trying to understand 
the institutional structures, systems and wider authorising environment for PFM reform 
in developing countries. The five institutional components discussed in this section 
provide a detailed understanding of both formal and informal institutional dynamics, by 
centring the analysis on the interactions and interrelationships between these 
components, power relations, incentives and their coherence with ideas in the 
institutional reform literature.   
 
Based on the evidence this study has demonstrated that formal institutional set-ups, 
systems, policies and governance structures advocate by development partners, PFM 
practitioners and some state authorities (DFID, 2007; see also Shah 2005; Campos and 
Syquia, 2006; Campos and Pradhan, 2007; and de Renzio, 2009b) are only a necessity 
for advancing PFM reforms or improving PFM systems quality. The study has presented 
and discussed compelling evidence that shows these formal institutional arrangements, 
and governance arrangements have a limited impact in driving PFM reforms and in 
sustaining the gains already made in the two case study countries. Significant gaps exist 
between PFM laws and their actual implementation in practice, and between formal 
institutional development and their functionality/functional improvements in the two 





reforms or improving PFM systems is explained by the nature and extent of the local 
political economy and informal institutional dynamics that take place within the five 
institutional components and the structural relationships that exist between them.  
 
The process-tracing evidence and analysis also contradicts the thinking that highly 
centralised and less complex PFM institutional set-ups are the solutions to driving PFM 
reforms in developing countries. While less complex institutional structures and systems 
do facilitate smooth initiation and implementation of specific PFM reform initiatives, the 
effects of such set-up have been overplayed by both state authorities and donor 
partners. The ease of entry for most reforms carried out in the case studies was not 
because these countries now have highly centralised or less complex institutional set-
ups as suggested by Fritz et al.  (2017). 
 
Instead, it had to do with the fact that most of the initial reforms were upstream and de 
jure reforms or low-hanging fruits, which did not threaten the legitimacy of state 
authorities. Among others, there are several PFM reform initiatives such as TSA, 
instituting managerial control over SOEs, allowing the auditor general to publish public 
the audit report or changes to the legislative structure, that did not gain immediate 
traction (or faced stiff resistance) because they threatened state authority and 
legitimacy, even in a now highly centralised and less complex institutional arrangements 






The experience from the case studies has also shown it is possible to initiate even the 
most difficult reforms in a less complex institutional setup. However, the actual 
implementation of most reforms even the less complex institutional set-up is the 
challenge. A less complex and highly centralised institutional set-up could still be 
captured by the more powerful political structures and patronage networks in countries 
like Liberia and Sierra Leone. Allen and Grigoli (2011) and the World Bank (2011b) also 
note how Central Finance Ministries in developing countries are deliberately structured 
and staffed for political gains. In line with  Yanguas and Bukenya (2016:136–152), this 
study, also calls for the need for a new approach that ensures sustained political support 
for both institutional mechanisms and as well as embattled reformers who are 









6.2 Conclusion: Towards a Holistic Approach to PFM Reforms in Developing 
Countries 
In light of the evidence presented and discussed in Chapter Five and the in-depth 





sections in this chapter, I make the case in this section for a strategic nuancing, through 
combining different approaches for better outcomes in efforts to strengthen PFM in 
developing countries. This proposal is what I describe as the Holistic Approach to PFM 
reforms in developing countries. The proposal does not only offer strategic nuancing to 
the international-led approach to PFM reforms, it also takes into consideration what 
policies, measures and systems are likely to be feasible where, when and how wider 
stakeholder engagement can deliver the desired development outcomes.  
The holistic approach in Figure 6.3 is part of the search for thinking out-of-the-box 
options that takes into consideration the problem or developmental challenge and the 
state and the level of progress made in PFM reforms at the outset of PFM reform 
programming. It further takes into consideration a mix of approaches that are aligned 















Source: prepared by the Author 
 
6.2.1 The Foundations of The Holistic Framework: What does the Holistic Approach Take 
into Account?  
The holistic framework is founded on several dynamic configurations that differentiate 
it from several other approaches to PFM reforms in developing countries. These 
configurations or elements are the bolts and nuts upon which the framework is built. 
First, it combines and as well as brings nuancing to several approaches widely recognised 
in the PFM and institutional reform literature. The holistic approach features several 
approaches such as PDIA (Andrews, et al., 2012; Blum, Manning, and Srivastava 2012; 
Andrews, 2013 and 2017; Bridges and Woolcock, 2017), PEA or TWP (Unsworth, 2015; 





institutional change (Green, 2016; Mansoor and Williams, 2018; Wehner, 2018), the 
proposal for ‘doing development differently’ (Booth, 2015) and the Bottom-Up 
approaches to reforms in developing countries (Welham et al., 2017).  
 
Considering the above, the holistic framework does not espouse any specific approaches. 
Instead, it is a dynamic framework to better understand and solve the dynamic PFM 
problems in developing countries. This dynamic nature of PFM problems presents an 
inherent limitation to the applicability of a single approach. In line with the theoretical 
analysis in the literature review chapter, none of the approaches listed above is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for successful development outcome in different 
contexts.  This conclusion was also recently reached by Laws & Marquette (2018:18) in 
their review of the TWP literature.  
 
The PDIA for example, is more long-term oriented in that it might conflict with the desire 
of donor partners to show results for their development assistance discussed in section 
6.1.2 in this chapter. The PDIA approach fails to recognise the interests of donor-
partners and the increasing calls from their citizens for greater accountability for 
development assistance. Such a fundamental difference might make the PDIA 
unattractive, as it effectively takes away all opportunities for donor partners to exercise 
control and justify further funding requests. It calls for a complete transformation from 
logframes to searchframes is untenable. This study, therefore, argues that donor 
instruments such as the logframes will continue to be relevant, as much as the desire of 





critical element in efforts to strengthen PFM in developing countries. The latter is critical 
to future efforts to strengthen PFM, because PFM reforms will continue to take centre 
stage, for which the World Bank is current stepping up its efforts to assess the 
performance of its PFM interventions (World Bank -IEG, 2018a:1).  
 
Secondly, the holistic approach is an innovative and flexible framework that offers 
programmers and state authorities the freedom to combine different reform 
approaches and instruments. This flexibility in the approach is depicted in the triangular 
bars in the extreme left and extreme right in the framework in Figure 6.3. This means 
the choice of approach or a combination of approaches and instruments could range 
between the two extreme ends of the programming continuum. Goetz (2007) made 
similar distinctions are made between policy and governance reforms or first-generation 
and second-generation reforms.  
 
The model, however, does not prescribe an optimum balance or equilibrium in the 
approaches, or instruments or a combination of both to be used, which according to the 
model will depend on several factors. These factors may include the country and 
sectoral realities, the status, pattern and level of progress achieved along the PFM 
dimensions - upstream, downstream, de jure, de factor and de-concentrated reform 
areas. However, the critical challenge posed by the model is for reformers and local 
authorities to ascertain the state of PFM reforms and the level of progress achieved and 






Apart from the above challenge, the flexibility offered by the model means reformers 
can design programs that are capable to achieve short-term gains to satisfy donor 
interests and as well as address the long-term deep-rooted challenges noted elsewhere 
in this thesis. Moreover, adopting such an innovative and flexible approach means there 
is no need to re-invent the wheel in future PFM engagement. The strategic focus for 
most future engagements will, therefore, be on ascertaining the state and level of 
progress made and the critical problems that prevent further deepening of the reforms.  
 
As a key configuration or element of the holistic approach, the framework is 
underpinned by the overriding conclusion reached in chapter seven of the apparent 
failure of the current approach to deliver on the overall promise of PFM reforms. As the 
evidence reveals this failure is in large part, because current approaches are long on 
upstream and de jure reforms and short on downstream, de facto and de-concentrated 
reform areas. Unlike the current approach, the holistic model offers both short and long-
term perspective in reform programming. Moreover, it in line with findings from the 
case studies and the clarion call from local reformers in the case studies to consolidate 
gains already made and deepen reforms to more downstream and de-concentrated 
areas of PFM.  
 
Again, the holistic model recognises several other factors, such as the lack of 
implementation of PFM laws and policies and the severe dysfunction in PFM and wider 
PS institutions that impede PFM development in developing countries. These functional 





and elite interests, incentives and preferences. These are what Srivastava & Larizza 
(2013) labelled as systemic dysfunction and dysfunction by design. This recognition of 
the functional problems in PFM reforms is critical to the relevance of the holistic model, 
given the recent emphasis by the major PFM players on the need to enhance functional 
improvements in PFM institutions (World Bank, 2017b). 
 
6.2.2 Components of The Holistic Framework: What does the Holistic Framework Entail? 
The holistic approach offers programmers and local authorities a model to conduct 
future programming analysis. It provides a specific pathway to conduct future 
programming analysis. These pathways consist of different components which must be 
critically examined to make up the programming analysis. Each of the components that 
make up the programming analysis in the holistic framework is discussed in the following 
subsections. 
 
6.2.2.1 The Specific Problem or Development Challenge 
The analysis takes a bottom-up approach, which starts with a specific problem or 
development challenge shown at the base of the holistic framework. While the 
approach represents a significant departure from the solution-driven programs in the 
case study countries, it is at the same time in line with more recent efforts to push-
through problem-driven approaches by scholars and researchers (Andrews, et al., 2012; 
Andrews, 2013; Bridges and Woolcock, 2017). Unlike all the variant models of the PDIA, 





with the structural and institutional factors and stakeholder interests, incentives and 
power relations.  
 
The study has shown in chapter seven and in the previous sections in this chapter that 
these factors are intrinsic elements to understanding PFM problems in developing 
countries, which are increasingly being recognised in the literature by scholars and 
researchers of PFM and broader PS reforms (Rocha Menocal, 2014; Kelsall, 2016; 
Moshonas, 2018).  
 
Understanding and addressing PFM problems means programmers need to design 
programs, which must be include technical, economic and political economy analysis of 
these factors. A critical problem identified from the experience in the case studies is that 
PFM is not an attractive sector for political leaders to reform, which also means PFM 
institutions or organisations attract high interest from Political Leaders. In line with 
Hudson & Marquette (2014: 74), this is more so the reason why the holistic approach 
advocates different analytical combinations of different factors to understand the 
specific development challenge and the context around it.  Dasandi et al (2016) provide 
in the research a framework for programming analysis across a range of three different 
context - political, sector and organisational contexts. The programs are then 
implemented, and lessons learned are then adapted back into the redesign. 
 
Part of the problem identification and solution advocated by the holistic model is for 





 What are the specific problems preventing improvements in service delivery and 
functional improvements in PFM institutions? 
 Who should identify the problem(s)? 
 Are the problems already identified and part of the country government’s 
development agenda?  
 What are the reforms needed to address the problems identified? 
The default approach to problem identification should be a wider national stakeholder 
engagement, which recognises that the processes of engagement in identifying 
problems, solutions and approaches matters as much as what the solution is. As shown 
in section 6.1.3 with the community toilet scenario, it is critical that reforms are 
designed to solve the real problems in different contexts.  
 
The analysis of the evidence underscored the real danger of potential for complete 
failure if reforms solutions do not address the needs of people. According to Fritz et al. 
(2017:93), it is therefore critical that donor-partners seek to understand what local 
authorities are interested in, what they seek to improve or what problem they seek to 
solve, and their preferred approach to solve the specific problem or development 
challenge. Moreover, this default approach by the holistic model means the problem 
identification and solution must be locally-led. This enable local authorities to champion 
reforms by finding solutions to their problems, avoiding the introduction of pre-






6.2.2.2 Design/programming and Implementation of Reforms  
The proposal of holistic model posits that program design and implementation should 
be iterative processes to respond to the dynamic PFM problems and fluidity of the 
interests, incentives and power relations that shape the behaviours of decision-makers 
in developing countries. The evidence from the case studies presented in chapter seven 
and sections in this chapter has shown the interests and incentives confronting decision-
makers are constantly evolving making it impossible to accurately predict their 
behaviours priori.  
 
The dynamic and complexity in PFM reform processes are now recognised by many 
scholars and research, which they agree need to be constantly reviewed, and the usual 
one-off programming analysis at the design phase is no longer tenable (Booth & 
Unsworth, 2014; Booth et al. 2016; Whitty, 2018). Thus, in line with Cole et al. (2016: 9) 
and Hadley & Tilley (2017), the holistic model proposes a simultaneous programming 
design and implementation. That means there should be constant reviews, learning and 
iteration and adaption in future efforts to strengthen PFM. Political economy analysis 
and engagement for example, at the design and during implementation can lead to 
improving program performance (Bunse & Fritz, 2012).   
 
6.2.2.3 Technical, Economic and Political Economy Analysis 
The third component of the programming analysis proposed by the holistic model 
involves technical and systems analysis (Quist, 2009; Diamond, 2013; Mansoor and 





2014a & 2017) and political economy analysis (Killick 2005; Fritz, Kaiser, and Levy 2009; 
Carothers and De Gramont; 2013; Booth, 2015; Hudson et al., 2016; Kelsall, 2016; Teskey 
and Tyrell, 2017).  
 
Like the problem-driven approach mention above, all three analyses are geared towards 
providing better understanding of the structural factors, institutional dynamics (formal 
and informal) and the stakeholder interests, incentives and power-relations in any given 
context. The evidence from the case studies has shown that political and technical 
leaders react differently to reforms at different spectrum of PFM dimensions. Part of the 
political economy analysis will be to seek to understand how and why political and 
technical leaders react different to upstream and de jure reforms than downstream, de 
facto and de-concentrated reform areas.   
 
The PEA may also include seeking to explore ways how to ensure there is a sustained 
political commitment to PFM reforms, moving beyond promises in exchange for 
financial assistance, beyond transactional reforms or moving beyond demonstrating 
only political appetite for reforms. 
 
6.2.2.4 Innovation and Flexibility Along two Extreme Ends of The Continuum of The Holistic Approach 
As stated earlier in this section, the holistic approach offers strategic nuancing to the 
approach to PFM programming, through combining different approaches for better 
outcomes in efforts to strengthen PFM in developing countries. It contributes to ongoing 





flexibility to PFM programming. By allowing for innovation and flexibility, programmers 
can adopt best-fit approaches, depending on the country and sector realities, the state 
and level progress made in PFM to address the specific problem or development 
challenge in each context. The best-fit model unlike other idiosyncratic approaches such 
as PEA or technical reform models is a configuration of different approaches that are 
aligned with the state of PFM, the country and sector realities along the two extreme 
ends of the holistic continuum. 
 
On the one hand of the holistic continuum (the left-hand side of the framework), 
programmers and local authorities can employ several different approaches, techniques 
and policy reform instruments. The choice of approaches and instruments should be 
mostly those suitable to achieve the short-term development outcomes of PFM. They 
can be adapted to the existing reform space or windows of opportunities that might 
arise in specific contexts. Given the experience from the two case studies, these short-
term policy reform instruments and approaches could deliver better outcomes if they 
target upstream and de jure reform programs. They have limited applicability in practice 
in certain context and in downstream, de facto and de-concentrated reform areas of 
PFM. The research has shown the increasing focus on these policy reform instruments 
and short-term approaches in the case studies is among the leading the factors limited 
and uneven progress made.  
 
Techniques such as engaging modest stakeholders or developing entrepreneurship 





working with strategic set of individuals in the ministry of finance in the case studies 
(see also Rocha Menocal, 2014), or relying on windows of opportunities (Fritz et al., 2017) 
have failed to deepen reforms, and are not capable to deal with the long-term 
challenges posed in those countries. For example, the reliance on elections as a window 
of opportunity for reforms with incoming governments is a high-stake gamble by donor-
partners. The evidence from the case studies has shown there are often, far more 
negative implications on PFM when there is change in government, which might off-set 
any potential benefits. New regimes in those countries are more like to have a complete 
U-turn on existing development programs, or they can completely overhaul the existing 
bureaucracy, which may affect existing relationships and collaborations. They are 
effectively not good enough to deepen reforms to more downstream service delivery 
areas and to lead to functional improvements in PFM and wider PS institutions. 
 
On the extreme right of the holistic continuum are reform approaches and measures 
that are far-reaching and focus on achieving long-term development outcomes of PFM 
interventions. This long-term focus as this study shows is vital to ensure sustained 
commitment from political leaders beyond mere expressions of appetite for reforms.  
According to Unsworth (2015: 60) it gives local authorities the opportunity to be 
invested in the process and learn over time.   
 
Part of the long-term commitment from local leaders and donor-partners should also be 
about ensuring monitoring of PFM reform programs. As Hudson & Marquette (2015) 





programming.  Similar calls have been made by Andrews et al. (2012) to develop ‘real-
time’ feedback loops to provide the required data for iterative programming adjustment, 
but at the same time meeting the desire of donor-partners to show results for their 
development assistance. This study further argues, monitoring of reform 
implementation is fundamental to ongoing efforts and to ensure existing reform 
programs contribute to functional improvements and improved service delivery.                
                   
The extreme right of the holistic approach also offers opportunities for reformers to 
design and implement reforms that are far-reaching, engage wider stakeholders and 
expand the existing reform space in any given context. These approaches and 
techniques would be vital to attempts at deepening reforms to front-line or downstream 
and de-concentrated service delivery areas and as well as bring about functional 
improvements in PFM institutions. Moreover, in line with many scholars and PFM 
practitioners (Andrews et al., 2012, Fritz et al., 2012; Blum et al., 2012; Copestake and 
Williams, 2014:33-154), wider stakeholder engagement for example, may facilitate 
ownership and legitimacy and the collective identification and solutions to problems. It 
may also facilitate broader-based ownership, through demand-side approaches that 
could transform political appetite to the lasting commitment from politicians and 
technical leaders.  
 
6.2.3 How much Innovation and flexibility can the current approach accommodate? 
This final section discusses the unresolved above question that confront international 





out-of-the-box approaches, including the holistic proposal set out in this thesis. Several 
scholars have advocated for greater flexibility and innovation, by learning from 
experience, but to also met the constantly evolving nature of the interests, incentives 
and power relations that shape the behaviours of decision-makers (Carothers and de 
Gramont,  2013; Booth & Unsworth, 2014; Booth & Faustino 2014: 3; Booth et al 2016: 
13; Teskey & Tyrell 2017; Wild et al., 2017).  
 
However, there is potential for clash between the strategic interests of donor partners 
projected in current models with some of the proposal suggested in the thinking out-of-
the-box approaches, albeit the holistic approach offering the unique opportunity to 
combine the different approaches. While proposals in the holistic approach seem 
intuitive and well-evidenced from the experience in the case studies and as well as in 
the literature (Hogg and Leftwich 2008; Bunse and Fritz, 2012; Whitty, 2018) that shows 
that deepening reforms to front-line service delivery units tend to happen over the long-
term, such an approach cannot deliver successful PFM outcomes within the current 
three to five-year development programming time frames.  
Also, technical reforms models such as sequencing of reforms currently being employed 
by the International Partners may have limited applicability in practice in developing 
countries (Allen et al., 2013:6; Fritz et al, 2017:22) and as well as in the thinking out-of-
the-box approaches, albeit the fact that innovative and flexible nature of the holistic 






The development challenge going forward is for development partners to acknowledge 
and take full responsibility that their interest and actions also have consequences 
(Lassou and Hopper, 2016). They can demonstrate their commitment to PFM reforms 
by ensuring flexibility and innovation in their approach. They can also demonstrate this 
commitment by absorbing into their existing approaches the demands of out-of-the-box 
approaches, include proposals made in the holistic model in this thesis. In line with the 
thinking of Rocha Menocal (2014), the holistic model requires donor partners to also 
exercise flexibility in funding. They must be willing and prepared to adjust their funding 
mechanisms to respond to strategic needs and new programming opportunities.  
 
Finally, flexibility does not mean ad hoc programming changes based only the supply 
driven interests exemplified by the recent DFID withdrawal from the ongoing PFM 
reform project in Sierra Leone, which seriously affected implementation of the project. 
There should be mechanisms in such scenarios to re-calibrate the program and direct 
funding to other components without affecting the overall program deliverables. Again, 
innovation and flexibility in the approach to PFM reforms should not lead to 
fragmentation and uncoordinated approaches, given the high transactional costs 
experienced in initial stages of the reforms in the case studies. Thus, any innovation or 
flexibility must be done within existing coordinated frameworks, such as the MDTF in 
the case study countries. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has addressed the third sub-research question by providing 





evidence to providing a ‘big picture’ perspective about the extent to which political 
support and country ownership; the role of international partners, economic factors and 
the institutional and management arrangement of reforms have contributed to the main 
findings and conclusion arrived at in this thesis. It has demonstrated to readers that it is 
not only enough to claim, for example, that politics or political support is important for 
PFM reform success, rather it has also shown how political support matters and why. It 
has demonstrated, with some degree of specificity, how and why politics or political-
economy factors shape opportunities for change in a challenging environment, 
especially in the context of the case study countries. This chapter has shown how 
mechanism-based explanations are possible at both the individual level, through the 
analysis for fine-grain pieces of evidence and as well as capture the hypothesised role of 
each non-technical drivers of PFM reforms at the macro level.  Through analysis of the 
empirical evidence, this chapter has further established that is it methodologically 
impossible to claim that only a single political economy or institutional dynamics was 
the driver or the dominant explanatory causal factor for how and why PFM reform 
performance vary in the case study countries and across the dimensions of their PFM. 
To address this challenge, this chapter has maintained a balance between a 
retrospective and a forward-looking view in the analysis. By maintaining a forward-
looking perspective, this chapter has advocated for a holistic approach to PFM reforms 
and detailed specific implications for both theory development and practice that might 
be relevant to country governments, international partners and researcher with interest 
in PFM reforms in similar contexts. This holistic approach proposes strategic nuancing 





more far-reaching reforms by expanding the reform space, engaging wider stakeholders 




















SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTIONS & IMPLICATIONS FOR 







7.1 Summary of the Thesis: Revisiting the Research Questions, the Research 
Approach and the Main Findings  
After almost two decades of implementing New Public Financial Management (NPFM) 
reforms, progress in reforming Public Financial Management (PFM) systems, processes and 
institutions in developing countries has been limited and uneven (de Renzio & Dorotinsky, 
2007: 12-21; Pretorius & Pretorius, 2008: 17-18; Wescott, 2008:39-50; Fritz et al., 2014a; 
De Lay et al., 2015: 7-12). This has been despite substantial financial and technical 
support from the international partners (Allen & Last, 2007: 170-1).  
 
The approaches to PFM reform in the literature, such the result-based management 
systems, the three levels of budgetary outcomes (fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency 
and operational efficiency), the sequencing model and the PEFA approach to PFM 
reforms have been mostly technical and prescriptive reform models rather than derived 
from formal analysis of empirical evidence. These different technical reform models are 
the results of the range of International Partners supporting PFM reforms in developing 
and the diverse backgrounds of PFM practitioners working for them. Thus, these reform 
models have fallen short of creating an appropriate balance in addressing issues such 
as how and why certain reform initiatives or countries became successful in their PFM 
reform efforts when compared with others. 
 
The apparent failure of the various approaches to address the how and why aspects of 
PFM reform outcomes is in part, because of the idiosyncratic nature of each of the 





countries. Meaning, each model is only trying to address some aspects of PFM, often 
leaving many critical aspects unaddressed in the reform programming calculus. 
Moreover, the apparent failure of these technical models to address the how and why 
aspects of PFM reform outcomes is also because PFM reform is itself a complex process, 
involving many interactive processes and with diverse stakeholders with different 
interests and incentives. The diverse interests, incentives and power-relations among 
PFM stakeholders and the iterative processes involved in PFM reforms imply the need 
for a holistic examination of the cumulative contributions of various causal factors that 
underpin PFM development in developing and post-conflict countries.  
 
This evidence-based research, therefore, combined within-case and cross-case analyses 
to investigate the underlying causal mechanisms associated with the limited and 
uneven progress in the Implementation of Public Financial Management reforms in 
post-conflict Anglophone Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
                                                                                                    
7.1.1 The Research Questions and Related Findings 
This research has attempted to answer the overarching research question why progress 
in Public Financial Management reforms is limited and uneven in post-conflict 
Anglophone countries and across the dimensions of their PFM.  In order to answer this 
question, this study drew mainly on empirical evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
and as well similar single and multiple case studies and the broader literature of PFM 





1) How and why do some post-conflict Anglophone countries perform better than 
others in the implementation of PFM reforms over time?   
2) How and why do some post-conflict Anglophone countries perform better in 
upstream and de jure dimensions than in downstream, de facto and de-concentrated 
dimensions PFM?   
3) To what extent have political support and country ownership; institutional and 
management arrangement of reforms; donor support and practices; and economic 
factors contributed to these issues?   
4) Which lessons of good practice may, therefore, be drawn regarding the future PFM 
programming and implementation in post-conflict Anglophone countries?    
To answer the above research questions, I conducted a detailed process-tracing analysis 
of the empirical evidence collected from doing field work in the case study countries. 
The process-tracing analysis of the empirical evidence are grouped into different 
hypothesis/arguments and tailored to address the first three sub-research questions 
presented and discussed in Chapters Five and Six respectively.  In terms of the 
contribution of each group of hypothesis/argument in answering a specific research 
question, the presentations and discussions of the empirical evidence were broadly 
tailored as follows:  
 Hypotheses 1 & 2 addressed sub-research questions 1 and 2, which are 
presented and discussed in Chapter Five 
 Hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6 addressed sub-research question 3, which are 





 Hypothesis 7 addresses aspects of all three (1 to 3) sub-research questions in 
Chapters Five and Six.  
 The fourth research question stated above in this section is addressed in the 
section 7.3 of this chapter.  
 
While there exist a small number of single case studies and  evaluations (Betley et al., 
2012; Folscher et al., 2012; Lawson et al., 2012) and a few multiple case studies (de 
Renzio et al., 2011; Fritz et al., 2012; Lawson, 2012; Fritz et al., 2017), this study provides 
a nuanced approach to understanding PFM reforms in post-conflict Anglophone 
countries by addressing the twin objectives of how and why progress in PFM reforms 
vary in the case studies and across the dimensions of their PFM.   
 
Based on the analysis of the empirical findings from the case study countries, this thesis 
makes an overarching conclusion that current PFM reform efforts in the case studies 
are not good enough to deliver on the overall promise of PFM reforms in ensuring 
macro-economic stability, contributing to state-building efforts, improving service 
delivery and ensuring efficient resource allocation in developing countries (Welham et 
al. 2013). This conclusion is based on several key findings derived from the process-
tracing analysis of the empirical evidence collected from doing field work in the case 
studies. These findings are group under two strands of evidence in Chapter Five 
(sections 5.1 and 5.2) from the process-tracing analysis of hypotheses 1 & 2 to address 






On the one hand, the progress-tracing analysis examined evidence relating to the first 
sub-research question how and why some post-conflict Anglophone countries perform 
better than others in the implementation of PFM reforms over time. This strand of 
evidence focused on addressing the state and level of progress in PFM reforms in the 
case studies. It is noteworthy that the study was not about which of the two countries 
had more successful PFM. Rather, the objective was to investigate how and why they 
vary in their PFM reform performance. The study found both countries made rapid 
initial progress in their immediate post-conflict environment, but with a declining trend 
in Sierra Leone and marginal levels of advancements in Liberia. The rapid initial 
development achieved and with the somewhat declining trend is also experienced by 
many developing countries, especially HIPC countries (see Fritz et al., 2014a; Fritz et al., 
2017:9). However, the lack of clarity in both countries about the state and what 
progress means have and continue to undercut the real thrust of PFM reforms. The 
high-level of subjectivity involved in PFM assessments meant those assessments did not 
always reflect the actual status and level of progress achieved. Which also meant those 
assessments were incapable of capturing the real reasons why. For example, PEFA 
scores have changed, and by extension, accurately reflect the underlying dynamics in 
the two countries.   
 
I presented and discussed the evidence to explain the above state and level pf PFM 
reform progress in the case studies under three headings:  structural factors and 
country characteristics; the nature PFM reform interventions; and the effects of 





Regarding the structural and economic variables, the evidence shows aid and debt relief 
did contribute to the initial successes in the two countries. Their impact was especially, 
high during periods of crisis, which is further evidenced by higher PFM scores, following 
huge receipts of ODA and debt reliefs. The twin-shocks - fall in commodity prices and 
the Ebola Outbreak affected PFM development, but their impact was less visible in 
Liberia because its higher receipt of ODA helped cushion against the negative effects of 
fall in commodity prices and the Ebola Outbreak.  Their influence, however, declined in 
the development period (post-2009), as country governments mobilised domestic 
revenue - domestic tax revenue and large inflows of mining revenues. The large inflows 
of mining revenue and domestic taxes, however, derailed efforts to strengthen PFM by 
triggering the impulses of local political leaders to increase levels of spending towards 
their political roots. 
The conditions such as increased public pressure for better services and demand for 
greater accountability, under which improvements in domestic tax-based revenue 
could lead to gains in PFM performance were almost non-existent in the two countries 
(Moore, 2004; and Prichard & Leonard, 2010).  Instead, the evidence indicates 
advancements in revenue administration in Liberia were expressly noted to have 
contributed to its superior domestic tax-based revenue as % of GDP when compared 
with Sierra Leone.    
 
With respect to the nature of PFM reforms in the case study countries, the evidence 
indicates it is preferable to have embedded and incremental reforms than large-scale 





technical PFM reform models such as the sequencing approach. While efforts to 
strengthening PFM reforms did lead to isomorphic mimicry and created capability traps, 
large-scale stand-alone PFM reform projects heightened both the scale and the pace of 
isomorphic mimicry and capability traps in the two countries.  
 
However, experiences in the two case studies suggest the impact of isomorphic mimicry 
on capability traps and level of progress achieved is somewhat less evident, where 
similar countries engage in peer learning or sharing experiences and technical 
capabilities. The experiences underscore the benefits of peer learning as a tool to 
promote more realistic solutions or introduce realism into PFM reform programming in 
post-conflict countries. PFM reformers in Liberia were able to learn from the challenges 
and bottlenecks encountered in Sierra Leone to design a system that focused on 
delivering results, instead of processes and addressing the specific issues before and 
after launching IFMIS.   
 
The second strand of evidence presented and discussed in Chapter Five addresses the 
second sub-research question how and why do some post-conflict Anglophone countries 
perform better in upstream and de jure dimensions than in downstream, de facto and 
de-concentrated dimensions PFM. The evidence from the process-tracing analysis 
reveals PFM reform intentions and programs were homogeneous across the two case 
study countries. This homogeneity of reforms is widely recognised in the extant PFM 





et al., 2017). The extent of the homogeneity in the case studies was unique and striking, 
and one that was driven mostly by their post-conflict context.  
 
The relevance of this homogeneity across the two case studies has a long history in the 
institutional reform literature (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; North, 1990; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 2004). While homogeneous reforms may not always yield the desired results, 
the evidence from the experience seems to weaken arguments advanced by critics of 
having standardised institutional development across countries (Andrews at al., 2012; 
Andrews, 2013; Blum, Manning, and Srivastava 2012; Krause 2013; Brinkerhoff and 
Brinkerhoff, 2015). This study  makes the case for some form of knowledge transfer and 
sharing of experiences in terms of what works or what does not work between countries 
with similar contexts.   
 
Irrespective of the homogeneous reform intentions across the two case study countries, 
two clear pictures emerged from their implementation. First, there are wide variations 
in the performance of homogeneous reforms across the two countries and PFM 
dimensions. Second, partial implementation of reform packages, projects and programs 
is the common theme in the two countries and across PFM dimensions.  The incomplete 
or lack of implementation is driven by some misconceptions about what these terms 
mean, which further leads to partial completion of some reform initiatives, 
overstatement of benefits from specific reforms and generally undercut the 






The evidence from the case studies shows whether a reform gets implemented (fully 
implemented, partial/incomplete or not implemented at all) is determined by three 
factors. 1) The number of stakeholders involved in the implementation of specific 
reform packages or tools. 2) The extent of the impact a specific reform package or 
mechanism on political accountability and survival. 3) The scope of the effects a specific 
reform package or mechanism might have on the freedom or leverage political actors 
have over the resource envelope.  
 
A notable caveat to these propositions could be seen with the success of IFMIS reforms 
in the two countries, which the process-tracing evidence reveals is because political 
actors and civil servants have found ways to override its control and accountability 
mechanisms through what the researcher describe as budgeting of corruption in the 
annual budget process.  
 
The partial implementation of PFM reforms also explains the weak links or 
implementation/functional gaps in the design and implementation of PFM reforms in 
the two case studies. These weak links or functional deficits in the state and level of 
progress achieved in PFM strengthening efforts undercut the main thrust of PFM 
reforms. This thrust of PFM is to provide the mechanisms to facilitate efficient service 
delivery, state-building, efficient resource allocation and macroeconomic stability 






Limited progress achieved, the declining trend and wide variations in PFM performance, 
the partial implementation of PFM reforms and the apparent failure to deliver on the 
overall promise of PFM explain the above overarching conclusion arrived at in this study. 
I explained this failure of PFM reforms to delivery better development outcome in terms 
of the weak links or functional gaps between upstream, de jure and concentrated 
reforms and more downstream, de facto and de-concentrated dimensions of PFM. 
Those weak links mean the substantial level of progress achieved in enacting new laws, 
created new institutions, systems and process do not address whether those outputs 
such as new institutions, laws and systems have adequate ability to deliver functional 
improvements in PFM institutions or trickle down to downstream and de-concentrated 
service delivery MDAs.  
 
The substantial progress in upstream and de jure reforms has been achieved because 
international partners have mostly relied upon policy-based instruments. The approach 
in the case studies was based on the general belief among development partners that 
progress in upstream budget processes and enacting of laws, creation of new 
institutions and departments or the injection of professionalism in PFM could trickle 
down to other PFM dimensions further down the PFM spectrum (Fritz et al, 2017:21). 
This expectation has largely not been met, and the Ebola Outbreak in the case study 
countries is a good example that exposed the limitations of the current level of progress 
achieved in PFM reforms.  After almost decades of reforms, current PFM systems and 
institutions in the two countries were incapable of supporting front-line service delivery 





corruption through bad procurement process and misappropriations of much-needed 
funds to combat the epidemic by public officials.  
 
I provided in Chapter Six a more detailed theoretical discussion of the extent to which 
each of the four drivers (political support, institutional dynamics, economic factors and 
the role of international partners) contributed to the overall PFM reform outcome and 
pattern of progress in the case study countries stated above.  Chapter Six, therefore, 
specially addressed the third sub-research question, which is the extent to which the 
four drivers of PFM reforms contributed to the issues in the first two sub-research 
questions addressed in Chapter Five. The main findings and implications for future PFM 
reform efforts in similar contexts from the theoretical discussions of the four drivers are 
covered in section 7.1 and 7.3 in this chapter.  
 
7.1.2 The Research Approach and Methodology 
This research study adopted a two-pronged approach to the research design. The 
design included a theoretical perspective and as well as a methodological perspective, 
which is set out in Chapters Two to Four. For far too long, there have been fair efforts 
in the existing PFM literature to address, in a single study, the how and why aspects of 
PFM reforms performance in developing and post-conflict countries. Thus, combining 
the two perspectives was critical to an understanding of the state of PFM reforms, the 
level of progress achieved, how progress was achieved, and the underlying political 
economy factors and institutional dynamics enabling or impeding PFM strengthening 





more nuanced contribution to understanding PFM reforms, which is different from 
prescriptive reform models that dominate PFM reform strengthening efforts in 
developing countries.  
 
This study justified the rationale behind the theoretical approach by making the case 
for the need for a holistic approach in understanding the drivers and challenges of PFM 
reforms in developing and post-conflict countries in the literature review and analytical 
framework chapters. These chapters further addressed the research questions by 
examining differences in PFM performance or what success or failure in PFM reform 
looks like in different countries and the reasons for these differences. Chapter Three 
specifically made the case for the need for a case study approach in understanding the 
drivers and challenges of PFM reforms, especially in developing and post-conflict 
countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
In moving towards the holistic approach in investigating the drivers and challenges of 
PFM reform progress, the literature and theoretical framework chapters covered what 
success or failure looks and as well as what factors/drivers determine PFM reform 
success or failure over time. de Renzio for example, note "beyond broad generalisations, 
there is little knowledge of what precisely makes some PFM reform efforts more 
successful than others and how financial and technical support to PFM reform can most 
effectively be provided" (2009, p. 5). Also, Chapters Two and Three together, facilitated 
the development of a much broader and inclusive analytical framework, rather than 





countries (Wescott, 2008: 20-29; de Renzio, 2009a; de Renzio et al., 2011; Lawson, 
2012).  
 
The holistic approach represents an important step in filling the emerging gap in much 
of the existing literature on PFM and broader PS and institutional reforms to address 
questions of how and why progress in PFM reforms has been limited and uneven in 
developing countries and across the dimensions of PFM.  
  
The theoretical approach stated above, and the research questions needed to be 
aligned with an appropriate research approach. Thus, the research project adopted an 
intensive research design (Lewis, 2003: 51-52), grounded in the ontological assumption 
that PFM reforms in developing countries have been or may have been driven by a 
myriad of factors; in light of which, political support and local ownership; economic 
factors; donor support and practices; and institutional and management arrangements 
were specifically investigated to understand the limited and uneven performance in the 
case study countries. The four factors emerged in both the literature review and 
analytical framework chapters as the dominant drivers widely acclaimed in the existing 
PFM reforms literature. In order to tailor this theoretical perspective with the research 
question and approach, this thesis examined two developing post-conflict Anglophone 
countries that have implemented PFM reforms, both of which were pursued in “the 
epistemology of causal mechanisms and the methodology of process-tracing” (George 






The study combined the case study approach and the process-tracing method, which 
facilitated within-case and cross-case analyses to investigate the drivers or underlying 
causal mechanisms associated with the limited and uneven progress in the 
Implementation of PFM reforms in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This combination of 
approach and method was mainly because of their ability to address the how and why 
research questions pursued in this thesis, address a contemporary phenomenon within 
a real-life context, their ability to achieving high conceptual validity and address 
complex causal relationships (George and Bennett, 2005:17-19; Yin, 2003:1 and 2014:4-
24). This strategy fits well with the highly recognised contextual nature of PFM reforms 
(Schiavo-Campo & Tommasi, 1999:2; De Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 2010, p. 59). 
Peterson specifically writes that “PFM [reform] is contextual, it begins with context and 
ends with context” (2010, p.8).     
 
7.1.3 Generalisability of the Research Findings and Approach  
Given that the bulk of the causal aspects of the research findings were derived from the 
within-case analysis, the challenge posed by the combined research strategy was to 
maintain a balance between a retrospective and a forward-looking view. However, the 
forward-looking approach through the holistic model, its related proposals and detailed 
specific implications for both theory development and practice set out in sections 7.3.1 
and 7.3.3 may provide some generalisable insights that may be relevant for countries 
with similar contexts.  The study notes that any attempts to generalise the findings to 





be relevant where there are little differences in their PFM institutions, systems and 
processes and wider authorising environment.  
 
Moreover, apart from the holistic model, the study proposes two additional 
frameworks that might be relevant to PFM Practitioners, International Partners, 
country governments and researchers with interests in PFM reforms in many 
developing countries. These include the framework for understanding Political 
Commitment and the five-point model to understanding PFM institutional dynamics in 
post-conflict Anglophone countries set out in Chapter Six.  
 
7.2 Understanding the Drivers of PFM Reform Efforts in Post-Conflict Anglophone 
Countries 
As I mentioned in the final paragraph in section 7.1.1 above, this section draws out the 
key findings and implications for future PFM reforms efforts in post-conflict Anglophone 
countries discussed in Chapter Six. It summarises the main findings relating to the 
extent to which the four driver or causal factors covered in Chapter Six contributed to 
explaining the findings from the first two sub-research questions in Chapter Five. 
However, it was methodologically impossible to claim that only a single political 
economy or institutional dynamics was the driver or the dominant explanatory causal 
factor for how and why PFM reform performance vary in post-conflict Anglophone 
countries and across the dimensions of PFM. In line with the research approach, this 
study adopted a broader perspective to investigate the hypothesised role of four non-





reforms in developing countries (De Renzio et al., 2010; De Renzio et al., 2011; Fritz et 
al., 2014a; Fritz et al., 2017). The non-technical causal factors include political support 
for reforms, international partners’ engagement in PFM reforms in developing 
countries, the role of structural and economic dynamics, and the role of institutions and 
management arrangements for PFM reforms. By adopting this broad perspective, the 
study has demonstrated how mechanism-based explanations are possible at both the 
individual level, through the analysis for fine-grain pieces of evidence and as well as 
capture the hypothesised role of each non-technical causal factor at the macro level 
(Waldner, 2015; Pouliot, 2015).  
 
This research study has shown that the overriding conclusion reached in Chapter Five 
was because there are weak links between upstream, de jure and downstream and de-
concentrated reforms. These weak links in the continuum of PFM reform programming 
in developing countries (see Figure 6.3 in Chapter Six) are mostly the results of non-
technical drivers and their intersections, in some instances, with technical PFM reform 
models. Based on the detailed process-tracing analysis of evidence from the case 
studies, this study further posits that the more profound the roots a specific reform 
initiative or mechanism has in non-technical drivers, such as political economy factors 
and institutional dynamics, or informal norms and patronage systems, the higher the 
likelihood it will encounter stiff resistance, or it will only be partially implemented. I 
showcased this through the three conditions set in section 7.1.1 above, that shape the 
extent to which reform initiatives get fully implemented, partially implemented, get 





non-technical drivers of PFM reforms, through what I described in Chapter Five section 
5.2.3 as The IFMIS Test Case of PFM Reforms in Liberia and Sierra Leone and in section 
5.2.4 How and Why Certain PFM Reforms are more Challenging to Implement Compared 
with Others. For example, I demonstrated through The IFMIS Test Case how strong and 
consistent leadership and broad-based commitment were principally responsible for 
Liberia’s superior IFMIS rollout and functional capability when compared with Sierra 
Leone.  
The strength of these non-technical factors in shaping opportunities for change was also 
demonstrated by providing evidence that explains why some reforms, such as MTEF, 
TSA, procurement, internal audit and oversight are more challenging to implement than 
other reforms initiatives. The programming calculus in the case studies was mostly 
based on broader political context and windows of opportunities, which have failed to 
deliver effective development outcomes in PFM. The study found the most effective 
drivers that shaped the behaviours of Political Leaders and their bureaucratic 
representatives were their interests, incentives and power-relations discussed 
extensively in Chapter Six section 6.1.1.  
 
Unlike the political contexts and windows of opportunities also discussed extensively in 
Chapter Six section 6.1.1, the presence and influence of political interests, incentives 
and motivations are relatively permanent and consistent. This point is also emphasised 
by Rocha Menocal (2014), who argues for greater attention towards incentives, 
interests and power structures because, as she claims, these lie at the centre of most 





most significant finding and challenge for international partners is that these interests, 
incentives, motivations and power-relations are constantly evolving, which means they 
cannot be accurately determined at the outset of PFM reform programming. However, 
this study found International Partners can easily align their interests with the interests 
and incentives of Political Leaders and local reformers regarding upstream, de Jure and 
concentrated reform areas, but not so, for reforms targeting downstream, de facto and 
de-concentrated dimensions of PFM.  
 
The evidence also suggests the fundamental arguments advanced in the recent PFM 
reform literature (Krause 2009; Pretorius and Pretorius 2009; de Renzio et al, 2011; de 
Gramont 2014; Fritz et al 2014A and 2017) about the hypothesised role of economic 
factors as drivers of PFM performance in developing countries is untenable in the case 
study countries. There is little support from state authorities to support the economic 
argument as a driver of PFM reforms progress in Liberia and Sierra Leone. I presented 
evidence from both quantitative and qualitative data sources in Chapters Five and Six, 
sections 5.1.2.1 and 6.1.3 respectively to explain how and why expanding revenues and 
GDP growth, especially as a result of the mining boom in the case studies contributed 
to the deteriorating PFM performance. Improvements in these economic variables led 
to exponential increase in the levels of spending by state authorities towards funding 
their political roots, fiscal indiscipline with large extra-budgetary expenditures and 
declining PEFA scores for budget credibility, frequent in-year revisions of budget ceilings 
and promoted rent-seeking behaviours. Instead, the evidence from the case studies 





interviewees in contributing to its superior domestic tax-based revenue/GDP when 
compared with Sierra Leone.   
 
Also, this study has demonstrated that the formal institutional setups, systems, policies 
and governance structures as suggested by many development partners and PFM 
observers (DFID, 2007; see also Shah 2005; Campos and Syquia, 2006; Campos and 
Pradhan, 2007; and de Renzio, 2009b) are relevant (only a necessity, but not a sufficient 
condition) for advancing PFM reforms or improving PFM systems quality in the case 
study countries. The evidence indicates these formal institutional setups, governance 
arrangements have limited impact in driving PFM reforms, sustaining the gains already 
achieved and deepening reforms in downstream, de facto and deconcentrated service 
delivery units of PFM in post-conflict Anglophone countries. Significant gaps exist 
between PFM laws and their actual implementation in practice, and between formal 
institutional development and their functionality/functional improvements in the two 
case study countries. How far PFM laws and formal institutions go in influencing PFM 
reforms or improving PFM systems is explained by the nature and extent of the local 
political economy and informal institutional dynamics that take place within the five 
institutional components and the structural relationships that exist between them. 
 
Finally, based on the above summary this study concludes that PFM reforms are only a 
necessity, but not a sufficient condition for improving PFM institutions and achieving 
better development outcomes in post-conflict Anglophone countries. Instead, a long 





technical PFM reform models must be considered and addressed accordingly. To this 
end, better analytical tools, such as the model for understanding Political Support, the 
five points for understanding institutional dynamics and the Holistic Model presented 
in Chapter Six, sections 6.1.1, 6.1.4 and 6.2 respectively. It is my hope that these 
frameworks or analytical tools will help contribute to an understanding of the complex 
causal mechanisms underpinning the local political economy, formal and informal 
institutional dynamics, the role of development partners, the effect of economic factors 
and the structural relationships that exist between them. The specific contribution and 
implications of the above frameworks or analytical tools and the main findings of this 
thesis for future PFM reform interventions in post-conflict countries are detailed in the 
next section.  
 
7.3 Research Contributions and Implications for Theory and Practice  
The contribution of this research study to our understanding of main research question 
why progress in Public Financial Management reforms is limited and uneven in post-
conflict Anglophone countries and across the dimensions of PFM is three-fold. These 
three-dimensional contributions, which are discussed below include theoretical, 
methodological and practical contributions to future efforts by International Partners, 
country governments and PFM Practitioners and researchers with interest in PFM 






7.3.1 Theoretical Contributions and Implications for Future PFM Interventions in Post-
Conflict Countries 
From a theoretical standpoint, the study makes a contribution to the PFM literature by 
providing a comprehensive synthesis and critical analysis of various approaches and 
theoretical debates about the drivers of PFM reforms in developing countries in one 
place. To this end, it examines both the drivers or non-technical causal factors of PFM 
reform efforts (literature review chapter) and what success or failure looks like in 
developing countries (analytical framework chapter). This is significant, in that, it is my 
hope that it will open new ways of thinking and aide future analytical studies about the 
drivers of PFM reforms in post-conflict Anglophone countries and developing countries 
generally.     
 
Apart from a few single case studies (Betley et al., 2012; Folscher et al., 2012; Lawson 
et al., 2012) and a small number of multiple case studies (Fritz et al. 2012; Lawson, 2012; 
Fritz et al. 2017), much of the existing literature that attempts to address the role of 
structural and non-technical causal factors in efforts to strengthening PFM in 
developing countries are quantitative studies (Andrews, 2009; Andrews, 2010; de 
Renzio et al. 2011; Fritz et al. 2014a). This evidence-based research, therefore, 
contributes explicitly to the existing PFM reform literature, by providing a more 
nuanced and systematic empirical examination of, and construct logical explanations 
about who and what has led to the initiation and support for PFM reforms, and in what 
ways have structural and non-technical factors have enabled or impeded opportunities 






In addition to the above theoretical contribution, this study also makes an empirical 
contribution by providing new empirical cross-country data that can be useful for future 
research in explaining how and why some post-conflict Anglophone countries perform 
better compared with others in the implementation of PFM reforms. It is also expected 
that this empirical research will contribute to filling the gap in the growing need for 
cross-country and evidence-based case studies to understanding the drivers and 
challenges of PFM reforms in developing countries (de Renzio, 2009a; de Renzio et al., 
2011; Fritz et al., 2014a).  
 
Perhaps the study’s most critical and unique theoretical contribution is to the broader 
debate on “innovative” or “thinking out-of-the-box” approaches to difficult reforms and 
institutions strengthening in developing countries (Andrews, et al., 2012; Andrews, 
2013 and 2017 Krause 2013; Unsworth, 2015; Wild et al. 2015; Bain, Booth, and Wild 
2016; Green, 2016; Bridges and Woolcock, 2017; Welham et al., 2017; Mansoor and 
Williams, 2018; Wehner, 2018).  
 
The dynamic nature of PFM problems presents an inherent limitation that no single 
approach listed above provides a necessity and as well as a sufficient condition for 
successful development outcomes in PFM reform interventions in different contexts. 
What is, therefore, needed is a dynamic framework to better understand and solve the 
dynamic PFM problems in post-conflict countries. This study, therefore, makes the case 





better development outcomes in efforts to strengthen PFM in post-conflict countries 
and developing countries more generally.  
 
This proposal is what I describe as the Holistic Approach to PFM reforms in post-conflict 
countries. The implication of the holistic approach is that it does not only offer strategic 
nuancing to the international approach to PFM reforms, it also takes into consideration 
what policies, measures and systems are likely to be feasible where, when and how 
broader stakeholder engagement can deliver the desired development outcomes. It 
brings innovation and flexibility to PFM reform programming that allows for the 
combination of different approaches along the two extreme ends of the holistic 
continuum shown in Figure 6.3 in Chapter Six.   
 
The study makes two further important contributions, which might have implications 
for future efforts to strengthen PFM in developing countries. First, it provides a 
framework for understanding Political Support (see Chapter Six, section 6.1.1 and Figure 
6.1), which is different from earlier frameworks or theories on the concept (Killick, 1998 
and 2004; McCourt, 2003, Brinkerhoff, 2007 and 2010). The model underscores the 
serious misconceptions that exist in the programming calculus about what constitutes 
political commitment and charts a clear path-way that shifts the focus from short-term 
political support (described in this thesis as political appetite) to long-term real and 






Second, the study provides a five-point model that might be useful to International 
partners, researchers and reformers in understanding the institutional dynamics for 
future PFM interventions in post-conflict countries. The five-point model is based on 
the analysis of five institutional components (the PFM Legal Framework, the main PFM 
institutions, technical-political interface, intergovernmental relations and the role of 
NSAs in PFM) and the interactions between them. Based on the evidence from the five-
point model in understanding the PFM institutional dynamics, the study calls for the 
need for a new approach that ensures sustained political commitment for both 
institutional mechanisms and as well as embattled reformers who are confronted with 
powerful interests, incentives and power-relations in the process of institutional change 
in post-conflict countries.   
 
7.3.2 Practical Contributions Implications for International Partners and Country 
authorities 
The study makes several practical contributions and suggests implications that might 
be relevant to International Partners and state authorities in partner countries. First, 
International Partners and state authorities must accept the fact that the substantial 
progress achieved in upstream and de jure reforms through current policy reform 
models for PFM intervention are incapable to deliver on the overall promise of the 
reforms. The weak links established in Chapter Five between upstream and 
downstream reforms mean, the substantial level of progress achieved in enacting new 
laws, created new institutions, systems and process do not address whether those 





functional improvements in PFM institutions or trickle down to downstream and de-
concentrated service delivery MDAs. What is, therefore, needed is a holistic approach 
to PFM reforms, that can address both the immediate upstream quick-fixes or low-
hanging fruits and as well as downstream, de facto and de-concentrated functional gaps 
and service delivery challenges to optimise better and lasting outcomes in PFM reforms 
interventions in post-conflict countries.  
 
There is a need for a very clear understanding by all stakeholders of the essence of PFM 
reforms. That means steps must be taken to re-strike the balance between efforts to 
strengthen PFM and the focus on ensuring improved functionality of PFM institutions, 
service delivery and overall state-building efforts in post-conflict countries. Thus, both 
International Partners and state authorities must ensure future efforts include both 
short and long-term plans to ensure outputs and processes in upstream and de jure 
dimensions trickle down to downstream, de factor and de-concentrated dimensions of 
PFM.   
 
Consequently, the short-term quick-fixes by International Partner and state authorities 
may include in policy reforms, measures such as adapting models to the existing reform 
space and windows of opportunities and modest stakeholder engagement. However, 
these short-term measures must be instituted concurrently with long-term policy 
instruments that could include measures such as expanding the reform space through 
wider stakeholder engagement and implementing far-reaching reform programs to 






A vital aspect of these far-reaching reforms should be a shift to actual monitoring of 
reforms and demanding accountability within the reform itself. That means, part of the 
wider-stakeholder engagement should be efforts to enhance NSA engagement in PFM 
reforms in post-conflict countries. The study has identified specific ways in which NSA 
involvement in PFM could deliver the desired results.          
 
First, NSAs could do better if they focus on shaping governments’ policy directions and 
providing credible alternative policy options through evidence-based research and 
backed by constructive engagement with state authorities. Second, there is an 
opportunity for NSA engagement in PFM reforms is by improving the institutional links 
between NSAs and the legislature. NSAs could, therefore, support the legislature by 
providing them with evidence-based research on the annual budget and other PFM 
matters. A final avenue for future NSAs engagement in PFM is in the area of supporting 
donor-partners determine appropriate budget support triggers and provide a 
mechanism to monitor performance against those triggers. NSAs can also provide 
support to donor-partner review missions and make recommendations about areas 
where donor conditions might be most appropriate for specific reform programs.           
 
International partners and local reformers must recognise the deep-rooted political 
economy and institutional dynamics, such as the interests, incentives and power-
relations of local political leaders that stymie efforts to deepen reforms and sustain the 





that these interests, incentives, motivations and power-relations that shape the 
behaviours of decision makers in post-conflict countries are continuously evolving. That 
means, the usual ex-ante programming calculus used to determine political 
commitment to reforms may be inappropriate. Thus, international partners and local 
reformers can ensure better development outcomes in PFM reforms if they engage in 
simultaneous programming design and implementation. That means, they must ensure 
constant reviews, learning and iteration and adaption in future efforts to strengthen 
PFM. An explicit political economy analysis and engagement, for example, at the design 
and during implementation can lead to improving program performance.         
 
International partners should face the fact that their current framework for evaluating 
PFM reform programs (see de Renzio, 2009b; Lawson, 2012; World Bank, 2018a) will 
continue to encounter the same old challenges such the problem of attribution or 
traceability of the specific impact of PFM reform interventions. The longer the time lag 
between the implementation of specific reforms and the actual evaluation, the higher 
the challenge will be to attribute progress made to specific interventions. The lack of 
evidence of impact (see Fritz et al., 2014a; de Lay et al., 2015; Mills, 2018:2; World Bank, 
2018a) goes beyond methodological challenges, such as problems with attribution. The 
problem is also associated with the tools used such as PEFA used by international 
partners to measure both progress and impact. For example, the theory of change 
depicted in Figure 3.2 in the analytical framework chapter, which is used widely by 
international partners to evaluate the impact of their support to PFM reforms is not 





address whether outputs and processes in upstream and de jure dimensions are, 
trickling down to downstream, de facto and de-concentrated dimensions, or whether 
those outputs such as the new institutions, laws and systems created by the reforms 
have the ability to deliver functionality.       
 
Local reformers and international partners should also take note of the wide-spread 
partial implementation of PFM reforms in developing countries. There must be a clear 
understanding of the state and the difference between the level of progress made in 
establishing new laws, building new institutions and systems and the functional 
improvements of these institutions and systems. Part of the understanding of partial 
implementation of reforms is also a requirement for reformers and international 
partners to recognise that some reforms, such as the MTEF, TSA, Internal Audit and 
procurement are more difficult to implement when compared with others.  
 
The deeper the roots a specific reform has in non-technical factors, the more likely it is 
that it will encounter stiff resistance or at least be partially implemented. The strength 
of the influence of political-economy factors and institutional dynamics and the fluidity 
in the interests and motivations of state authorities could be seen from the stiff 
resistance even to upstream reforms such as MTEF or in downstream reform areas such 
as TSA, internal audit and procurement reforms. However, progress is more likely in the 
future for certain reforms such as the IFMIS, which in part, is because they involve 
mostly technical personnel, but in most part because Political Leaders and some 





control and accountability mechanisms by IFMIS through what I describe in the study 
as budgeting of corruption.  
 
Finally, a key implication for future reform efforts is that in order to understand what 
reform initiatives are likely to be initiated, implemented or sustained, bureaucrats and 
their political leaders, international partners and local reformers must refrain from the 
usual categorisation of stakeholders into champions, proponents and opponents, 
professionals, interested and opposed. Instead, deliberate efforts must be taken to try 
to understand the level of influence/power-relations within the executive and between 
the executive and the legislature, and the specific interests and motivations of all 
stakeholders involved in the reform process. A Finance Minister might express support 
for a reform, but might face conflict of interest, or may sometimes be cautious about 
how far to push certain reforms or enforce certain policies or laws. Political Leaders also 
encounter similar dilemmas and difficult choices, which reflect the lack of 
implementation of recommendations from the PAC and the overall poor performance 
in accountability dimensions of PFM. Perhaps, a better approach will be to examine 
whether the so-called reform champions or supporters are powerful enough to 
influence change more broadly or push through difficult reform programs.   
 
7.3.3 Methodological Contributions and Implications for Future Research 
One of the most important contributions of this study is from a methodological 
perspective. This study combined the case study approach and the process-tracing 





underlying causal factors that drive and sustain PFM progress over time in developing 
countries. This combined research strategy is consistent with the thesis’s overall 
objective, which is to inductively build theory and as well as explore the observable 
implications of the hypothesised role of four non-technical drivers widely covered in 
the PFM reform literature. 
 
The process-tracing analysis I conducted represents the most transparent evidentiary 
analysis of the hypothesised role of four non-technical drivers of PFM reforms. In line 
with Fairfield (2013), the presentation of the process-tracing tests of causal inferences 
represents a significant departure from many users of the process-tracing method and 
PFM practitioners who have attempted the procedures of this method (Fritz et al., 
2017). These scholars and practitioners often leave these analyses implicit and informal, 
which may not be helpful to future researchers, who might want to use this method.   
 
By applying the process-tracing analysis in understanding the drivers and challenges of 
PFM reforms in post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone, I have demonstrated that it is 
possible to provide mechanism-based explanations of fine-grain detail or individual 
level of analysis of evidence, and as well as analysis of the hypothesised role of each 
non-technical factor at the macro level in each case study country. 
 
The study has also shown that this model is suited to understanding the complex 
interactions among non-technical causal factors and the constantly evolving nature of 





makers in post-conflict and developing countries more generally. It is, therefore, my 
hope that especially in the new age of social science research, applying process-tracing 
to both within-case and cross-case analyses will also encourage other researchers to try 
new ideas, theories and methods from other disciplines in understanding the 
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APPENDIX A: BACKGROUND NOTES ON PFM REFORMS 
IN SIERRA LEONE 
A.0 Introduction and Background  
This background note is designed to provide readers who may be interested in gaining further 
insights into the context of PFM reforms and broader reform agenda in Serra Leone and Liberia, 
through building clear descriptive accounts of the various reform interventions from pre-design 
to implementation and reform re-think. The main points from these notes have been 
incorporated into the main texts of this thesis and this appendix and the next two are only for 
those readers who might be interested in additional detailed descriptive information about the 
reform processes in the case study countries. The background note is based on available data 
from fiscal accounts and reports, various PFM assessments reports and policy documents. This 
appendix therefore proceeds as follows.  
 
First, section A.1 presents the historicity of PFM reform interventions in Sierra Leone in the years 
leading to the end of the 11-year civil conflict and immediately after the war was officially 
declared over in early 2002. This is followed by a stylised presentation of the baseline and 
context of PFM systems, laws, institutions and policies in the early 2000s. Together, this 
appendix also presents a highlight and analyses about the build-up to PFM reforms - how PFM 
reforms got to the agenda of the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL)?, what inputs were 





Sections A.2 presents a holistic description of the reform process, including the design, reform 
policies and strategies, and an analytical overview of PFM structures and technicalities - 
including sequencing of reform interventions. Section A.3 catalogues the implementation of the 
various PFM reforms interventions, ascertaining what reform outputs were produced over time, 
and an analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness of reform outputs and associated 
implementation experience and challenges.  
 
A.1 Origin of PFM Reforms in Sierra Leone 
PFM Reforms in Sierra Leone dates to the 1980s, through IMF structural adjustment programs. 
The country continued with the reforms even after the war broke out in the early 1990s by both 
the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) Junta regime and later by the Kabbah led SLPP 
government up to the official end of the war in February 2002 (Bank, 2002:1-3; Bank, 2004). 
Among Others, some of the reforms included those implemented by the IDA through the 
Reconstruction Import Credit (RIC) and by both the IDA and IMF through the Structural 
adjustment credit (SAC) in 1993 and the SAF/ESAF arrangement to enhance reform efforts in 
1994 (IDA & IMF, 2001).  However, PFM reforms discussed here are limited to reform activities 
and programs leading to the end of the civil war and afterward. The next section therefore 
presents background, context and baseline to PFM reforms in Sierra Leone.     
 
A.1.1 The PFM Reform Context and Baseline Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone is still a low-income country and continue to sit at the bottom on the Human 
Development Index (UNDP, 2017), with high inequality, corruption, etc. The country has 
however made significant improvement in reforming it financial and budgetary institutions, 






First, it is widely believed that bad governance, exclusion, corruption in the public service, lack 
of accountability and weak institutional capacity to provide public services and maintain the rule 
of law fuelled the 11-year civil conflict (Thomson, 2007).  The war ravaged most of the country’s 
infrastructure and human resources base, leading to massive killings of at least 50,000 ordinary 
civilians, including civil servants, while others fled the country for greener pastures in Europe, 
America and elsewhere.  Even with the massive improvements in the workforce, pay and 
performance in the civil service, there remain still significant gaps, with  87% of civil servants in 
the lower cadre (grade1-5) while top management grades represent about 1% of the civil service 
(Roseth & Srivastava, 2013:9-10) In addition to the loss of skilled personnel, PFM was also 
particularly affected when the physical infrastructure that housed the finance ministry was 
completely burnt down by the rebels in 1997 (PEFA Secretariat, 2007).  
 
Public debt stood at US$1.19, equivalent to 110 percent of GDP in 2000 (IDA& IMF, 2001:8), but 
declined considerably to in 2007 after the country reached completion point under the 
Enhanced HIPC and MDRI initiatives. However, the country’s total debt has risen considerably in 
the last decade, and it’s projected to increase to 59.9 percent of GDP in 2017 with 40.05 percent 
relating to external debt. This is projected to even increase further to 62.1% and 61.6% in 2018 
and 2020 respectively (World Bank, 2017b, P.8-12).  
 
During the period 1998 to 2015 the economy has recorded an average annual growth rate of 
4.4% between 1998 and 2015, exceeding most Sub Saharan African countries (World Bank, 
2018). This was achieved amidst a very unstable macroeconomic climate, with high inflation, 
financial shocks and withholding of donor support in 2007. Basic infrastructure and institutions 






The GoSL together with its development partners have initiated substantive policy and 
governance reforms, including PFM reform  programs among others, to provide critical balance 
of payment and budgetary support through the Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery Credit - 
ERRC (IDA& IMF, 2001:6), introduction of a new budgeting system in 1994/95 that provided a 
framework for a unified budget, introduction of a new Vote Controller’s Ledger in the Office of 
the Accountant General (OAG) in 1999 that allowed for commitment control, pre-audit, cash 
management, etc.,  and the introduction of MTEF and MTEF/TC and IFMIS  in 2002. Other reform 
programs before and immediately after the war included a census of civil servants in 1997, the 
launching of the financial sector reform, with the new Banking Act and Bank of Sierra Leone Act 
in 2000 and the Other Financial Institutions Act in 2001, etc.  
 
By March 2002 two months after the end of the war when the first PFM assessment was 
conducted, Sierra Leone had enacted various PFM regulations, set up institutions, initiated 
numerous PFM and PFM related policies, systems and processes. These laws, institutions, 
systems and policies are summarised in table A.1 below. 
Table A.1: A Stock-take of PFM laws, institutions, systems and policies in Sierra Leone by March 
2002 
Regulatory Framework Institutions PFM Policies, Systems and Processes 
● The Public Budgeting and Accounting 
Act, 1992, (Budget Act) 
● The Public Budgeting and Accounting 
Act (Amendment) Decree, 1996. 
Issued by National Provisional Ruling 
Council (NPRC), No. 7, (96 Decree) 
● The Audit Services Act, 1997, (Audit 
Act) 
● Financial Administration Regulations 
(1998) 
● The Appropriation Bill for 1998 covers 
only 11 months (February - 
December) and was passed in June 
                       The National 
Revenue Authority (NRA) 
■     Merged the Ministries 
of Finance and 
Development Planning  
 
■ Audit Service Act 
passed, and set up of 
Audit Service Board 
1997: The Government developed a 
National Strategy for Good Governance 
and Public Service Reform. 
1999: Original budget for 1999 
abandoned, new budget passed in June 
with special dispensation by Parliament. 
2000: 
■  Introduction of Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
2001-2003 - including 






with special dispensation from 
Parliament. 
● Audit Service Act passed and set up 
of Audit Service Board. 
● The Bank of Sierra Leone Act, 2000 
(Bank Act) 
● Income Tax Act, 2000, (Tax Act) 
 
■  Introduction of the Budget 
Framework Paper for Cabinet 
Review. 
■  Integrated Financial 
Management Information 
System (IFMIS)- including payroll 
and control modules. 
■ Issue of Public Accounts for 
1998 (the first for over 25 
years). 
2001: 
■ First PETS study (published May 
2002)   
■ FMAS pensions module 
implemented 
■ Completed the HIPC Preliminary 
Assessment and reach the 
Decision in 2002. 
■ Country Financial Accountability 
Assessment (CFAA) was 
launched. 
2002:  
■ CFAA completed in March. 
Source: Compiled by the Author from various sources 
The priority at the time was clearly around maintaining tight control in budget execution and 
having a centralised public expenditure management, predominantly in the Office of the 
Accountant General (OAG). It was therefore concluded that basic functions of financial 
management in the country performed “surprisingly well” (World Bank, 2002, p.13) by the end 
of the civil war in 2002. Many factors have been attributed to how well PFM functioned at the 
time, sighting the existing legal and regulatory environment, both financial and technical 
support provided by Development Partners (DP) and the high degree of control maintained 
through the computerised accounting system at the Accountant General’s Department (AGD). 





PFM literature on Sierra Leone and constitutes the main element in the main texts in Chapters 
Five and Six.   
 
Apparently, there have been back-sliding in the various reform programs and gains achieved 
over the years. But the country’s economy has been resilient, bouncing back several times during 
its troubled past - ranging from civil war to series of financial shocks -  starting with the global 
economic crisis of 2008 (World Bank, 2010), and then with the crash of Iron Ore prices in 
2013/2014, the Ebola Outbreak and more recently with the Mudslide in July 2017. The 
cumulative effects of all these instabilities and shocks have significantly weakened the country’s 
finances, financial accountability processes, systems and procedures, fiscal institutions and 
public infrastructure. In particular, the combined economic shocks suffered by the country have 
been devastating to the reform efforts, which left the country in financial ruins and exposure to 
significant fiscal risks during these crises and shocks, which in turn eroded both public and donor 
trust (Bank, 2017a).  
 
The relatively weak state of Sierra Leone’s public expenditure management and PFM institutions 
after the civil war, coupled with the experience from financial and economic shocks meant that 
the GoSL had to continually develop policies and initiate new reform programs to address the 
challenges and gaps in public expenditure management. However, it is important to understand 
how PFM reforms got to the agenda of the GoSL in the first instance. There have been various 
accounts explaining what factors influenced the emergence of PFM reform as a centre piece in 
the drive to rebuild the country, promote accountability and probity in the use of resources and 






A.1.2  Analysis  and Build Up to The Reforms: How PFM Reform got to the 
Agenda of Government  
The extent to which PFM reforms came to the forefront of government agenda is still unclear. 
What is however clear from the literature is that the donor community singled out PFM as the 
cornerstone in the efforts to rebuild the country and promote development. Like in other post-
conflict countries, the reasons for prioritising PFM reforms remain debatable; be it because the 
donors recognised that PFM was fundamental to the state building efforts or whether this was 
borne primarily to protect the huge influx of development assistance also remain unclear and 
an area for further study (Shah, 2007; Schiavo-Campo, 2007; Tavakoli, 2012). However, what we 
do know about Sierra Leone is that PFM reform have been and continue to form the basis for 
budget support, especially the Multi-Donor Budget Support to the country (World Bank, 2006).  
 
On the part of the GoSL, strengthening and modernising the public sector was notably part of 
the large state building efforts by the SLPP Government (GoSL, 2001; GoSL, 2002; GoSL, 2005). 
Meanwhile, the extent to which this was extended to PFM remains blurred. This dilemma is 
largely the result of many conflicting, and often competing explanations put forward by experts, 
researchers and staffers of DP. Some argue that the GoSL only pushed through PFM reforms 
because of their dependence on financial and technical support from DPs to pursue the 
government’ agenda. Those who hold this view believe the later presided over policy options, 
programmers and activities by the GoSL (World Bank, 2008: Tavakoli, 2012).  
 
Such claims must be interpreted with extreme caution given the repeated inclusion of PFM 
components into various government development agenda after 2002, starting with the interim 
poverty reduction paper in 2001 to the Agenda for Prosperity in 2012 (GoSL, 2001; GoSL, 2005; 
GoSL, 2008; GoSL, 2012). But more so, in designing the Institutional Reform and Capacity 





local resources and development assistance and to further build and strengthen capacity in 
public expenditure management as part of its decentralisation efforts (World Bank, 2004b:2). 
Invariably, the mere inclusion of PFM reform components into various government agenda and 
policy programs should also be interpreted with caution, especially when examined together 
with the initial setbacks and resistance encountered by DPs and reformers. According to a World 
Bank Political Economy analyses of Sierra Leone, such setbacks and resistance are not 
uncommon, given that planned reforms were meant to building institutions and processes that 
counteracted patrimonialism and clientelism within state authorities. The study therefore 
concluded that PFM reforms in Sierra Leone resulted in winners and losers, championed mainly 
by Local Technical Assistants (LTAs) in MoFED who were paid by DPs and the reforms never 
gained momentum at the highest echelon of state-authority (World Bank, 2008).  
 
The evidence on whether PFM reforms were driven by the donors, the GoSL or both and whether 
government commitments to reforming its budgetary institutions were limited to certain level 
within state-authority remain unclear.  Thus, chapters 5 and 6 in the main text will seek to find 
answers to critical questions around the dimensions of ownership, depth of ownership and 
breadth of ownership of the reform efforts. These questions will revolve around the 
conceptualisation of PFM reform ideas - by whom, how and why? What were the main policy 
documents that initiated PFM reforms? How convinced were stakeholders about whether 
reform was a priority or an alternative course of action? Who were the champions within 
government and where? was decision-making process politics-as-usual or was there any specific 
or isolated and extraordinary intervention in the decision-making process by top politicians and 
other state actors? Were reforms the results of donor pressure or were they genuine desires by 








A.1.3 What Inputs were Provided –  By Whom and Wow and The Relevance of 
the inputs?  
This section focuses on the extent of the financial and non-financial inputs provided by both 
donors and the GoSL during the design and implementation of PFM reforms in the country. 
These inputs are considered both in terms of their nature, scale, who provided what and how 
and the types of structures used in the design, management and implementation of the reforms. 
Meanwhile a critical component of this thesis regards ascertaining the relevance of these inputs 
to the PFM reform institutional, economic and governance contexts in Sierra Leone. But this is 
considered in detail in chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Regarding financial inputs, attention is directed at the funds committed and disbursed towards 
PFM reform interventions by both government and donors over time. First, table A.2 below 
show the nature (direct and indirect) of financial support to PFM reforms by source and program 
since 2002 to 2015. 
Table A.2 Financial Support to PFM Reform in Sierra Leone by Nature, source and program 
PROGRAM Source 
Direct Budget Support to 
PFM Reforms 














Local 0.06 0.00         
DPs 6.2 8.68         
IPFMRP 
Local 1 1         
DPs 20.49 
19.6
6         
PFMICP13 Local 0 0         
                                                          
13 Disbursements from all sources under the PFMICP stood at $18.69M as of March 2017. That followed a 
restructuring of the project after DFID and EU polled out and further extension of the project beyond 







7         
BS under the MDTF 
(2006-2015) DPs       0 
235.3
7   
             
                
TOTAL 
Local 1.06 1.00   0.00 0.00   
DPs 26.69 
43.1
1   0 
235.3
7   
Source: compiled by the Author from different sources 
It is evident from the above table that DPs financed almost 100 per cent of all PFM reform 
programs and initiate in the country. This is although the indirect financing could have been 
double counted, given that some DPs, especially AfDB used their Budget Support (BS) program 
under the MDTF to fund the IPFMRP. Primarily because indirect BS to PFM were calculated based 
on the number of PAF indicators in the MDTF agreement (Tavakoli, 2012:12). The indicators were 
divided between PFM and nor PFM indicators (Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016). The rationale being 
disbursements were directly linked to government meeting those indicators/conditions, which by 
inference could be attributed indirectly to PFM reform initiatives*. What is also significant from 
the above table is the direct funding to PFM increased exponentially since 2002, irrespective of 
been significantly lower when compared to the indirect funding.  
The data must be made with caution and not taken out of context. Comparing for example, the 
sources of funding should certainly be made given the local context and government revenue base 
after the civil war. But more so, with the larger context of international development assistance 
and PFM reform interventions by DPs globally. This must also be interpreted in line with the level 
of financial support provided to certain PFM reform initiative and components, and not others as 
shown from table A.3 below.  
                                                          
budget from $28.47M to $31.71M, with the IDA increasing its contribution by another $10M following 
the loss of $6.76M after DFID and EU withdrawals ($4.95M and $1.81M respectively). The World Bank/IDA 








Table A.3 Financial Support to PFM Reform in Sierra Leone by PFM Components 
PFM COMPONENTS 
SOURCE 






IRCBP** IPFMRP PFMICP Others MDTF Others 
Strengthening Macro 
fiscal Coordination and 
Budget Management   2.604 3.63           
Reinforcing the Control 
System for Improved 
Service Delivery  2.604 3.188***         
Strengthening Central 
Finance Functions   9.32         
Assisting Non-State 
Actors’ Oversight   1.21         
Parliamentary Oversight   1.212***         
Local Government 
financial management  2.604 0         
Project Management  0.868 2.11         
Others   0         
* 
**IRCBP - shared between strengthening macro fiscal framework (30%), control systems (30%), local 
government (30%) and project management and monitoring (10%) 
*** support to parliamentary oversight deducted from reinforcing control and improve service 
delivery component. 
Disbursement under the PFMICP as March 2017 stood at 
$18.69 from all sources.            
Source: compiled by the author 
For these reasons, the process tracing evidence and analyses undertaking in chapter 5 will 
examine the underlying mechanisms that were at interplay in explaining the significant variations 
in the nature and sources of funding and the level of efforts directs at certain PFM reform 
                                                          
14 Of the 158 PAF indicators under the MDTF from 2006 to 2014, 90 were PFM related while only 68 





interventions and components. Why significant efforts were directed at certain areas, functions 
and levels within government and not others. The relevance of the financial support from DPs in 
the context of post-conflict Sierra Leone, government’s willingness and capability to have 
provided more financial support and even beyond after the withdrawal of all DPs will also be 
examined and constituted part of the questions asked in the interviews during my fieldwork in 
Sierra Leone.   
But support to PFM reform in Sierra Leone was not only limited to financial contributions from 
DPs. It also involves wide-ranging activities, mechanisms and structures, including but not limited 
to technical assistance (TA), institutional arrangements and management of the reform process, 
coordinating mechanisms, etc. For example, an evaluation of donor support in Sierra Leone 
highlighted the substantial TA provided by DPs, amounting to some $6m - $7m per year - 
approximately 10% of direct budget support between 2002 to 2014 (Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016a:18). 
The extent to which these non-financial assistances were necessary or sufficient conditions for 
driving the reforms as against financial assistance need critical analyses. Even when analysed in 
terms of the balance between government-controlled versus donor-controlled or shared 
controlled, project versus traditional management arrangement, the nature, coherence and 
consistency of these non-financial support remain the subject for analyses in the chapters 5 and 
6. 
A.2 The PFM Reform Process  
The PFM reform process described in this section broadly mirrors a kind of reciprocal process, 
starting with pre-design and conceptualisation of PFM reform ideas, design of PFM reform policies 
and programs, implementation of the reforms and rethinking or re-design of new policies and 
programs based on experience and emerging lessons from elsewhere.  Given the context in Sierra 





gradually from one stage to another. With each stage involving different actors, processes and 
posing its own uniquely challenges and opportunities. These issues, and many more are discussed 
in the following subsections. Section A.3.1 examines the various processes, the role and influence 
of different actors and the context during conceptualisation and design phases of PFM reforms. 
Section A.3.2 describes the Policy programs, strategies and structures to the design and 
management of the reforms. And section A.3.3 provides a cursory examination of the various 
technical approaches and mechanisms using in the design in PFM reform programs. 
 
A.2.1 The Reform Design: Conceptualisation and Design of  PFM Reforms 
There have been contradictory claims from independent experts, policy makers and reformers 
about how PFM reform came to fore front of government agenda in Sierra Leone (Thompson, 
2007:28; Tavakoli, 2012; Tavakoli at al., 2015). Whether conception of the idea for reform came 
from donors or local government or whether this was part of the larger effort by DPs and 
developing countries alike is a matter for investigation in the process-tracing and analytical 
chapters later in this thesis. Here I examine concepts, processes, who initiated what, when and 
how, what other inputs (financial and non-financial) that went into the conceptualisation and 
design of PFM reforms? 
What is evident from the literature is that PFM reform is part of the broader shift in development 
paradigm in the late 1990s and early 2000 - the clarion call for debt relief by many including the 
Pope, Pop Star Bono, other independent think-tanks, among others. PFM reform in Sierra Leone 
was also clearly part of President Kabbah and the UK government’s effort to maintaining tight 
control in Public Expenditure Management (PEM) and delivery of basic services in the late 1990s 





central control in PEM was unique to Sierra Leone or part of broader efforts by DPs will also be 
explored further in the Liberian context and later in the analytical chapters.    
 
PFM reform in Sierra Leone thus started with gradual steps primarily to maintain central control 
in PEM supported initially by DFID and later jointly with the EU. PFM reform thus started as a small 
component of large efforts by local authorities and the UK government to restore peace and 
security through DFID’s governance reform program - decentralisation and strengthening local 
government (Thompson, 2007:10). PFM reforms started in bits and pieces, mostly with small 
groups of foreign and local experts funded entirely by DPs. Notable instances included: DPs funded 
Governance Reform Secretariat in the office of the President and the Economic Policy Unit (EPU) 
that oversaw macroeconomic planning and managing donor relations in the country (Thompson, 
2007:7; Tavakoli, 2012). This further extended to other small efforts in PEM cantered mainly in 
the Accountant General’s Department (AGD). During which period key PFM functions were the 
responsibility of a foreign expert who was made Accountant General (AG) and whose services 
were paid for by the EU. The AG supervised at least eight other local technical experts within the 
AGDs. And a new Budget Director was also appointed on contract at the same (World Bank, 2002). 
Some have argued that the distinction local experts (including Local Technical Assistants - LTAs) 
and foreign expatriate nationals was not clear-cut, except they were all financed by DPs during 
the initial phases of the reform (Thompson, 2007; Ingram, 2010:22). 
Key as aspects of the reform prior to 2002 included: expenditure control (designing and 
implementing the computerised Financial Management Accounting System - FMAS) in the AGD; 
the introduction of MTEF and as stated inter-earlier the establishment of the EPU charged with 
macroeconomic management (Tavakoli, 2012; Tavakoli et al., 2015:). What is still unresolved by 





country coming from such a low base priory to the official declaration of the end of the civil war 
in 2002 (World Bank, 2010; Tavakoli, 2012:15).  
Despite the small and disjointed reform interventions noted above, PFM reform as a central 
government agenda, it is argued, only became a primary concern when local authorities and DP 
began discussions to pave the way for debt relief in Sierra Leone (Thompson, 2007:20). Thus, 
ensued the first CFAA study by the World Bank with support from the IMF completed in March 
2002 that detailed a snapshot of PEM in the country. Whether the CFAA provided a complete 
assessment of PEM given the context at the time, it was solely financed and driven by donors are 
matters for further consideration. But what was clear was that the CFAA’s recommendations 
provided a set of guidelines and areas of intervention for both DP and the GoSL (World Bank, 2002). 
Meanwhile, the development paradox in the late 1990s and early 2000 was centred on PRSPs 
pushed by the World Bank and IMF, with developing countries designing medium-term policy 
agenda that also served as a platform to channel development support by the international 
community. With no exception, Sierra Leone prepared the Interim Poverty Recover Strategy Paper 
(I-PRSP) in 2001 that had some PFM related component (GoSL, 2001; IMF & World Bank, 2001). 
Although the CFAA constituted by bedrock for all reform initiatives at the time, other policy 
programs and development interventions such PRSPs and HIPC Debt Relief Initiative soon open 
the floodgate for PEM assessments and PFM reforms. By 2004 several PFM assessments, reviews 
and action plans and policy programs with PFM components had been completed, including but 
not limited to CFAA, I-PRSP, HIPC-Assessment and Action Plan (AAP), the European Union’s Audit 
that has action points to be carried out by the GoSL and the World Bank Public Expenditure Review 
(PER) (GoSL, 2001; World Bank, 2002; IMF & World Bank, 2004a; 2004b; World Bank, 2010; 





Even at that early stage what remained clear was PFM reform programs in Sierra Leone, in this 
case the CFAA were primarily based on series of diagnostics studies and expenditure review - 
financed entirely by DPs. While donors continue to applaud the soundness of the reform design 
in strengthening areas of major PFM weaknesses identified during implementation of previous 
projects and project preparation, what is apparent is that these reforms were heavily directed and 
influenced donor policies harmonised into a single PAF, and large driven by results from the 
various PEFA assessments, which remained fundamentally flawed if PFM reforms are to actually 
address the underlying mechanisms associated with successes or failures of these programs. 
 
A.2.2 Description of the Various PFM Reform Programs and Interventions in 
Sierra Leone 
The matrix below presents a summary of sequences of the various PFM reforms programs and 
interventions between 1998 and 2018. Detailed PFM Reform Interventions and Activities in Sierra 
Leone 1998 to 2018 are set out in table A.4 below.  
Table A. 4 PFM Reform Interventions and Activities in Sierra Leone 1998 to 2018. 
PFM or PFM Related Reform 
Program/Intervention 
Period Description of Components and Activities 
 




The establishment of the Governance Reform 
Secretariat in the President’s Office with a small staff 
working on civil service and local government reform 
 Establishment of the Economic Policy Unit that took 
responsibility for macroeconomic management and 
safeguarded the relationship with the IMF and donors.  
Introduction of a new Vote Controller’s Ledger in the 
Office of the Accountant General (OAG) in 1999 that 
allowed for commitment control, pre-audit, cash 
management, etc. 
An Anti-Corruption Act was drafted and passed in 
February 2000 
 
Financial Sector & Tax Reforms 
 
2000-2001 
Financial sector reform, with the new Banking Act and 
Bank of Sierra Leone Act in 2000 and the Other Financial 
Institutions Act in 2001. 





MTEF & Budget Framework Paper 2000 Introduction of the Budget Framework Paper for 
Cabinet Review 
Expenditure Control and Oversight  
2000 
Financial Management Accounting System (FMAS) main 
accounts, expenditure control and payroll module 
implemented 
Issue of Public Accounts for 1998 (the first for over 25 
years) 
2001 FMAS pensions module implemented 
2001 First PETS study (published May 2002)   
 Introduction of direct payment of teachers' salaries 
through a private firm 
 
 
2002 The introduction of MTEF and MTEF/TC and IFMIS in 
2002. 
Studies and Assessments  
2002 
CFAA completed in March 
Completed the HIPC Preliminary Assessment and reach 
the Decision in 2002 




Hearings were held by sector groups (security, social, 
economic and general administration), involving officers 
from the line ministries, MOF, MODEP, Members of 
Parliament (MPs) and civil society NGOs. Some 
Ministers also attended. 
Budget Oversight Committees 2003 Established District Budget Oversight Committees and 
began functioning. MDAs have also been encouraged to 
set up internal Budget Committees. 
MTBF & MTEF 2003 The new MTEF Guidelines (August 2003) envisage more, 
but perhaps not enough, involvement by the Cabinet.  
Procurement Reform 2003 Cabinet dissolved the CTB and established a Public 
Procurement Reforms Steering Committee (PPRSC) and 
instructed all Ministries to cease forthwith from 
awarding contracts either by themselves or through CTB 
and to hand over all pending procurement contracts to 
the PPRSC.  
Accounting & Control 2003 Design of a new chart of accounts 
IRCBP   
2004 - 
2009/2011 
Subcomponent 2.1 Improve the legal and regulatory 
framework for publicBnancia1 management 
Subcomponent 2.2 IFMIS 
Subcomponent 2.3 Design and support implementation 
of interim financial management systems for newly 
elected local governments. 
Subcomponent 2.4 Strengthen the Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
Subcomponent 2.5 Procurement reform 
Subcomponent 2.6 Monitoring & Evaluation (including 
PFM assessments) 
 











The CAP established the PFM steering committee 
headed by the financial secretary. 
The CAP established the PFMRU and LGFD 
The CAP later developed into the NAP based on further 
diagnostic studies.  
NAP:  
The NAP in 2006 then consolidated targets and 
indicators from the PRSP and the MDBS PAF in to one 
single program.  
The NAP led to the establishment of the PFMRU 
charged with oversight of all PFM reforms 
 
 





The pact committed the donors to provide more and 
better-quality assistance, and the government to act on 
key areas of governance reform – notably corruption, 
transparency and financial management, civil service 
reform, service delivery and elections. 
Overall, the donors (World Bank, EU, African 
Development Bank and DFID) have negotiated with the 
government a common action plan on Public Financial 
Management which will become part of the framework 
for multi-donor budget support. 
Public Financial Management Reform Unit 
(PFMRU)  
2008 Appointment of Director of PFMRU 
 
 





Component 1 – Strengthening Macro Fiscal 
Coordination and Budget Management 
Component 2 – Reinforcing Key Aspects of the Control 
System to Support Improved Service Delivery 
Component 3 – Establishing and Maintaining 
Sustainable and Capable Central Finance Functions 
Component 4 – Assisting Non-State Actors’ Scrutiny 
Component 5: Project Management 
 
 
PFM Reform Strategy  
 
 
2014 - 2017 
Theme 1: Budget Planning, Comprehensiveness, and 
Credibility 
Theme 2: Financial Control and Accountability, Service 
Delivery and Oversight 
Theme 3: Revenue Mobilization 
Theme 4: Strengthening Local Governance Financial 




Public Financial Management Improvement 




Component 1: Enhancing Budget Planning and 
Credibility 
Component 2: Procurement, Financial Control, 
Accountability and Oversight 
Component 3: Supporting the Strengthening of Revenue 
Mobilization and Administrative Systems 
Component 4: Strengthening Local Governance, 
Financial Management and Accountability Systems 





EU State Building Contract 2014-2017 Support and engage in political dialogue where 
pertinent to ensure the implementation of PFM reforms 
as set in the PFM Reform Strategy 2014-2017. 
Provide support to improve systems for PFM, budget 
formulation, execution and external oversight. 
Analyse information on macroeconomic, fiscal and 
budgetary developments within the technical working 
group of the MDBS. 
DFID Building Core Systems: Strengthened 
core systems and improved practice. 
2014-2017 Output Area 1:  Well-developed and well-executed 
national budget 
Output Area 2:  Improved domestic revenue 
mobilisation 
Output Area 3: Improved transparency and enhanced 
value for money in national procurement 
Output Area 4:  An efficient public sector wage bill 
 
A.2.3 The Technical it ies in PFM Reform Design: Sequencing and other 
Technical  Factors   
What we do know from the last two sections is that PFM reform interventions started gradually 
with some uncoordinated activities and programs. But eventually transformed into more 
systematic and coordinated reform programs in the late 2000s, especially with the endorsement 
of the CAP/NAP and MTBS trust fund and associated PAF by both donors and the GoSL in 2006. 
What is less clear though is the emergence of the recent fragmentation and largely uncoordinated 
efforts by the BS donors and the subsequent withdrawal by DFID and the EU from the current 
reform program - the PFMICP supported jointly under the MDTF. Again, what we have learned 
also is that some areas or dimensions clearly received more attention and support proportionately 
to others. The same explanation could also be said for the level of efforts, nature and type of 
support directed at certain reforms/activities and at different phases of the reform process and 
during the country’s developmental stages.  
Meanwhile, were PFM reform activities, interventions and programs rooted on some fundamental 
principles, concepts and technicalities, especially during the design and implementation phases? 





And what does this tell us, if any, about the progress made in the design and implementation of 
PFM reforms in the country to date?  
The suspect might be because early assessments (CFAA and HPIC-AAP) of PEM in the country on 
which interventions and action plans were based on were limited in scope - both in terms of their 
objectives and comprehensiveness and were underpinned by static analysis of specific parts of the 
country’s PEM system (World Bank, 2002; Tavakoli, 2012:17). This is true especially in a post-
conflict environment like Sierra Leone and elsewhere, where the initial focus for DPs was to 
maintain tight control in PEM (Shah, 2007; Schiavo-Campo, 2007). This initial approach also holds 
true even for well-coordinated subsequent PFM reform strategies and programs - which seem to 
have been based on diagnostic studies and PFM assessments, largely initiated and financed by DPs 
(World Bank, 2002, 2004 & 2010; PEFA 2007, 2010 & 2014; GoSL, 20115:11; World Bank, 2017c:6). 
Could this be part of the reason PFM performance varied significantly for example, between 
budget execution and control compared to planning, oversight and accountability during the first 
half of the reform process? (PEFA, 2007 & 2010.) The analysis of this dilemma falls within the 
ambit of the analysis of the process-tracing evidence in chapters 5 and 6. 
Back to the question posed at the beginning of this section - were PFM reform activities, 
interventions and programs rooted on some fundamental principles, concepts and technicalities, 
especially during the design and implementation phases? Concepts and technical models such as 
sequencing of reforms - through the platform approach and getting the basics first only surfaced 
in the PFM reform arena in Sierra Leone in the late 2000s (World Bank, 2009a). Perhaps because 
of the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of earlier interventions and other political and 
structural dynamics. However, ideational concepts such as the Paris Declaration, HIPC and MDR 
Initiatives, PEFA, Improved Governance and Accountability Pact (IGAP) together with technical 





align their support. Which could reasonably be linked to MDBS agreement between DPs and the 
GoSL in 2006, and its subsequent PAF.  Together, they paved the way for the design of the first 
comprehensive reform program - the IPFMRP, based on the solid foundations of donor 
harmonisation, alignment, and coordination and technical models such as sequencing and getting 
the basis first (Tavakoli, 2012:17).  
 
A.3 Analyses of Implementation of PFM Reforms in Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone has long been criticised by many for often what is described as a country with good 
laws and policies but perform poorly in their implementation (xxx; Tavakoli et al., 2015). While the 
GoSL has made ‘substantial’ progress in the implementation of PFM reforms since the official 
declaration of the end of the civil war in 2002, overall PFM performance over time has been slow, 
inconsistent and uneven across the dimensions of the budget cycle (PEFA 2007, 2010 &2014; 
Tavakoli et al., 2015). The current implementation gap in the status of PFM reforms in the country 
therefore warrants a closer consideration into many questions: whether efforts, plans and 
programs were overly ambitious, were there fundamental design issues that continue to plague 
implementation of those plans, laws and policies? Are there structural, institutional and societal 
features that undermine implementation of laws, plans and programs in general? These questions 
are addressed in chapters 5 and 6.   
A.3.1 What Outputs were Produced? 
PFM reform outputs and performance could be explained in several ways, either by function, 
nature and type of outputs produced or from a much broader perspective in terms of the 
dimensions of reform outputs across the budget cycle. While detailed list of PFM reform outputs 
by type and nature and overall performance (PEFA scores) are presented in appendix E, the 





The latter being a deliberate choice by the researcher given the distinctions between PFM reform 
dimensions in the analytical framework presented in chapter three. The following paragraphs 
present PFM reform outputs/results/achievements and associated challenges by dimensions 
across the budget cycle, dating back from 2002.  
De Jure Versus De-Factor Dimensions of the budget cycle:  here I examine the PFM regulatory 
framework and its actual implementation in practice. As demonstrated in section A.2.1, PFM in 
the country has always been based on solid legal and regulatory framework. It was however the 
subject of several amendments and challenges during the civil war following for example, the 1996 
Decree by the NPRC that suspended the 1992 Government Budgeting and Accounting Act. The 
Decree completely diminished the oversight role of Parliament and the Auditor General and the 
control function of the Accountant General. There was much more improvement in the years 
leading to the end of the war. Which saw the enactment of several PFM legislations restoring 
confidence and oversight function to both parliament and the Audit Service (World Bank, 2010).  
Between 2002 and 2007 the GoSL had enacted several PFM regulations and procedures. Among 
others, the Local Government Act (LGA) 2004; Public Procurement Act of 2004; Government 
Budgeting and Accountability Act (GBAA) 2005 and its associated Financial Management 
Regulations (FMR) in 2007. Together they further reinforced and restored parliamentary control 
over PEM and reinstated the oversight role to both Parliament and the Audit Service, which were 
significantly curtailed by previous legislations and associated amendments. A 2010 World Bank 
Public Expenditure Review (PER) revealed that the country’s PFM legal framework was generally 
sound, appropriate and compares favourably well with other developing countries (World Bank, 
2010: 41). The progress made on the regulatory front did not come as a surprise, given the massive 





control and public confidence in PEM in the country after the civil war (Lawson, 2007: 19-20; 
Tavakoli, et al., 2015: 340).  
Considering the above inappropriateness and inconsistencies in the legal framework, there has 
been a joint and coordinated response by both donors and GoSL to existing PFM legislation. 
Resulting in a second of reforming the PFM legal framework - with revision or upgrade to most of 
the earlier PFM Acts and regulations such as the enactment of the new Anti-Corruption Act in 
2008; Public Debt Management Act, 2011; Audit Service Act in 2014; Public Private Partnership 
Act, 2014; Public Financial Management Act, 2016; Public Procurement Act, 2016; Local 
Government (Amendment) Act, 2017; Fiscal Management and Control Act in 2017; etc. Even with 
the enactments of many PFM legislations, their implementation will arguably continue to be the 
most important challenge, especially for local authorities amid political dynamics and largely 
informal nature of public administration in the country. But more so, whether the newly enacted 
laws are appropriate to the local context and consistent across all PFM legislation remain to be 
verified. And therefore, constitute a key element in the process-tracing investigations conducted 
in later chapters 5 and 6.  
Upstream Dimensions Versus  Downstream  Dimensions: Here a line is drawn between reform 
initiatives directed towards more strategic aspects of the budget cycle (upstream dimensions) - 
including but not limited to macroeconomic planning and policy-based budgeting (MTFF & MTEF, 
investment and debt management, and the budget framework paper); legislative scrutiny of the 
annual budget; and the final budget documents. Downstream dimensions of the budget cycle on 
the other hand, include aspects such as treasury managements - inflows and outflows and the TSA, 
internal audit and control, payroll, procurement, accounting and reporting, oversight and 





I established in section A.3.3 that PFM reform interventions started gradually with some 
uncoordinated activities and programs. But eventually transformed into more systematic and 
coordinated reform programs in the late 2000s, especially with the endorsement of the CAP/NAP 
and MTBS trust fund and associated PAF by both donors and the GoSL in 2006. We also learned 
from the same section that there was a clear prioritisation of PFM reform interventions in Sierra 
Leone like in many developing and post-conflict countries (World Bank, 2002; Shah, 2007; Schiavo-
Campo, 2007; Tavakoli, 2012:17). Some areas or dimensions of the budget cycle receiving greater 
attention and support proportionately to others. In Sierra Leone, the same could also be said for 
the level of efforts, nature and type of support directed at certain reforms/activities and at 
different phases of the reform process and during the country’s developmental stages.  
A.3.2 Big Ticket vs Small  Reforms? The share Effort Towards MTEF and IFMIS 
and Regulatory Framework Compared to Efforts Directed Towards Core PFM 
Systems and Processes  
It seems plausible to infer that the progress made in downstream dimensions in recent years may 
have been the results of the increasing focus on downstream and other basic PFM systems and 
process. Could one therefore argue that PFM performance is more likely to be greater for areas 
that received more support and vice versa? By extension, could one also reasonably argue that 
PFM performance is associated with the longevity of the reform effort? (Andrews, 2007; Andrews, 
2010; Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008). Therefore, activities and measures that received the greatest 
support over time should show improved performance or record high PEFA scores for example 
(Tavakoli, et al., 2015: 347).  The case of Sierra Leone is not however that straightforward. For 
example, the analogy holds true for reform initiatives such budget execution in the AGD, 
macroeconomic planning and some aspects of budget formulation have improved consistently 
over time (Tavakoli, et al., 2015:347). Other areas such as MTEF and local government financial 
management that gained much attention at the early stages of the reform process continue to 





contextual problem with its implementation in developing countries (Pretorius and Pretorius, 
2008; World Bank, 2012), or is part of the ongoing political Economy debate in reforming 
budgetary institutions in developing country? I therefore asked interviews specifically whether 
MTEF is more political than aspects of budget execution such as IFMIS and the findings presented 
in Chapter 5.  
Concentrated Versus De-Concentrated Reform Areas: And here I make a cursory comparison 
regarding concentration of reform efforts between the central agency (usually the ministry of 
finance/MoFED) and Ministries, Agencies and Departments (MDA). PFM reform in Sierra Leone 
like in many other countries have been heavily concentrated at the ministry of finance. But why 
has there been the greatest attention directed towards building the capacity of ministry of finance 
compared to other line ministries and agencies? This question was specifically investigated during 
the data collection and findings covered in chapters 5 and 6.  
Certainly, PFM performance has been uneven and inconsistent over the years between central 
government and local council and even between PFM functions carried out at the centre and those 
performed at line ministries (PEFA, 2007, 2010, 2014; Welham & Hadley, 2016). One key factor 
sighted by experts and reformers is the disproportionate level of capacity between staffers at the 
MoFED and those at line ministries and local councils. The increased technical in MoFED has largely 
been attributed to the recruitment of donor funded LTAs, with augmented salaries far above the 
national pay scale. Also, with strong technical expertise and who have been able to exercise 
control and leadership in the management of reform process. Irrespective of the increased 
capacity of MoFED staffers over the years, the proportion of annual budget for MoFED have also 
increased significantly15. Welham & Hadley (2016:17-18) for example, highlighted a significant 
increase in MoFED budget in the five years to 2015.  
                                                          









APPENDIX B: BACKGROUND NOTES ON PUBLIC 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORMS IN LIBERIA 
 
B.0 Introduction and Background  
Like Appendix A, this background note introduces the reader to the context of PFM reforms in 
Liberia, through building clear descriptive narratives of the various reform interventions from 
pre-design to implementation, and ongoing restructuring and re-design of reform efforts, based 
on experience from previous reforms. The descriptive analyses are based on data from financial 
reports, various PFM assessment reports, studies and policy documents from the Government 
of Liberia (GoL) and its donor partners.  This appendix mirrors mostly the structure, style and 
analyses of PFM reform efforts presented in Appendix A. Drawing primarily on the descriptive 
information given in each section in the case of Sierra Leone, as a basis for describing and 
analysing the reform efforts in the case of Liberia. These descriptive  presentations include 
aspects of the reforms that are unique to Liberia and those reforms that are ubiquitous to both 
countries.  
 
The next section (section B.1) presents the history of PFM reform interventions in Liberia in the 
years leading to the end of the 14-year civil conflict and immediately after the war was officially 
declared over in early 2003. The section is followed by a stylised presentation of the baseline 





appendix also analyses about the build-up to PFM reforms - how PFM reforms got to the agenda 
of the GoL? What inputs were provided by whom, where, and their degree of relevance in the 
design and reform process.  
 
Sections B.2 presents a holistic description of the reform process, broadly mirroring a kind of 
cyclical process, starting with pre-design and conceptualisation of PFM reform ideas, the design 
of PFM reform policies and programs, implementation of the reforms, restructuring and re-
design. Section B.3 outlines the implementation of the various PFM reforms interventions, 
ascertaining what reform outputs were produced over time, and analysing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of reform outputs and associated implementation experience and challenges.  
 
B.1 Origin of PFM Reforms in Liberia 
Like Sierra Leone, PFM reforms in Liberia dates to the 1980s during the IMF structural 
adjustment programs until the outbreak of the civil war in 1989. The USAID was the most critical 
player in Liberia in the years leading to the civil war. The USAID was motivated according to 
Chessen and Krech (2006, p. 3) by a sense of 'déjà-vû' leading it to finance in 1988 a stabilisation 
program to boost revenue collection and expenditure control. The programme deployed 17 
experts with control over government accounts within the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The 
project however failed in less than a year. Which the USAID in its final report the failure as in 
part, because of lack of commitment from state authority to enforce controls set up by the 
projects and other operational arrangements of the project (USAID, 1989) in, (Chessen and 
Krech, 2006, p. 3).  
 
Unlike neighbouring Sierra Leone, the outbreak of the civil war in 1989 degenerated the country 





Radical neopatrimonial politics (Bøås, 2001) and economic warlordism continued up the special 
election that brought former warlord Charles Taylor to power in 1997 (World Bank Bank, 2004; 
Chessen and Krech, 2006). While the election of Charles Taylor brought calm, much was not 
achieved regarding economic governance because of the resumption of hostilities immediately 
after the election until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra in 2003.  The only 
meaningful reform during the Taylor regime was the enactment of the Revenue Code in 2000 
(GoL, 2000). The country was, however, the subject of prolonged sanctions by the UN preventing 
the export of minerals - diamond, timber and gold (World Bank, 2004; Atkinson, 2008).  
 
Considering the preceding, there was a complete absence of any meaning PFM reform 
interventions by both local authorities and the international community in Liberia since the 
outbreak of the war in 1989 to the cessation of hostilities in 2003. With this brief background, 
the PFM reforms discussed in this chapter are limited to activities and programs immediately 
after the war ended in 2003 and beyond. The next section, therefore, presents background, 
context and baseline to PFM reforms in Liberia.     
 
B.1.1 The PFM Reform Context Baseline in L iberia  
Liberia started its PFM reform process from a low base compared to most post-conflict countries 
such as Sierra Leone. By the end of the 14-year civil war, the state had collapsed entirely, seating 
at the bottom of the HDI and GDP only about 30% compared to the 1980 level16. This low base 
is typical for post-conflict countries characterised by acute corruption and poverty, weak and 
dysfunctional institutions, dilapidated socioeconomic infrastructure and a political culture in 
which impunity reigns (Chessen and Krech, 2006; Hope Sr, 2010, p. 244; Tripathi, 2017). The 
                                                          





conflict also led to human and capital flight, leaving the country with a net outflow of $ 65m by 
2002, according to estimates by the World Bank, IMF and UNDP (World Bank, 2004, p. 9). The 
country's problems were even exacerbated by the pervasive lack of technical skills in every 
sector of the economy (Ackerman, 2009, pp. 90-1). The situation after the war was even made 
worse by the continued absence of any formal education during the war period, culminating in 
a generation of the uneducated youthful population, with no formal training and technical skills 
to spearhead the country's recovery and champion its PFM reform agenda.  
 
Regarding PFM, a joint UN/World Bank needs assessment in 2003-2004 concluded that PFM 
process and systems in the country were outdated, mostly because of weaknesses in the 
institutional framework (World Bank, 2004). The destruction of vital financial institutions during 
the war meant there were widespread self-seeking behaviours, especially by top officials in 
revenue-generating institutions, which ultimately saw the country's national budget contracting 
from $300 million in 1980 to $48 million in 2003 (World Bank, 2012b, p. 4). It is unsurprising, 
therefore that initial effort by the National Transitional Government (NTG), President Sirleaf and 
the international community were directed towards restoring the status quo ante before the 
war. They established tight controls and discipline across essential PFM functions and 
institutions (World Bank, 2012b:5; Tripathi, 2017).  
 
Recognising the challenge at the time, the NGT with support from donor partners took 
immediate steps such as streaming revenue through Executive Order #3 in 2003, established a 
Cash Management Committee (CMC) in 2004 and enacted the Public Procurement and 
Concessions Act 2005. Despite showing commitment to reforms by the NTG, the initial gains 
made had weakened. Some of the reasons include, among other things, corruptions and uneven 





institutions and slow disbursement of development assistance. Lack of implementation of 
established controls and oversight especially over a customs and concessions and dysfunction 
of the cash management committee have also been cited to had contributed to weakening 
reforms (Chessen and Krech, 2006, p. 6; Dwan and Bailey, 2006).   
 
The above concerns and the unique context in Liberia precipitated to what has been described 
by experts as a more 'intrusive' PFM reform intervention by the international community 
through the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) (Dwan and 
Bailey, 2006). The design and processes through which GEMAP came into being will be discussed 
in the next section (Atkinson, 2008). Meanwhile, the launching of GEMAP in 2005 and other 
associated programs with support from donors yielded immediate benefits such as the lifting of 
sanctions and meeting the targets to reach the HIPC decision point in 2007 and became eligible 
for interim reliefs under the enhanced HIPC framework (IDA&IMF, 2008). By the time the 
country reaches a decision point, its nominal debt stock of public-guaranteed external debts had 
reached US$4.9 billion as of 2007 (equivalent to US$3.3 billion net present value terms). With 
full debt relief under the enhanced HIPC and MDRI, Liberia's external debt stock had fallen to 
US$78 million (approximately 10.7 per cent of GDP) at the end of 2010 (IDA&IMF, 2008; 
IMF&IDA, 2010). The country's key economic indicators had also improved after the end of the 
war. GDP growth rate averaged 6.31 per cent between 2013 and 2014 (see World Bank WDI 
2017). 
 
Although there have been several PFM reform initiatives in the country since the end of the war, 
progress has generally been limited (Europe, 2016; IMF, 2017a: 25; MFDP, 2017e). The country 
continued to face fundamental challenges in deepening the reforms and consolidated the gains 





had been compounded. This is especially true during the last decade by the impact of the global 
economic crisis in 2008, the crash in commodity prices in 2013-2014 and the Ebola Outbreak in 
the sub-region in 2014 (World Bank, 2009a: 4; World Bank, 2011c: 2; World Bank, 2013b: 6; 
Europe, 2016: 7).  
B.1.2 Analysis  and Bui ld Up to the Reforms: How PFM Reform got to the 
Agenda of Government  
Given the baseline and context set out in the previous section from which Liberia emerged after 
the war, the country at least, in the eyes of the international community presented an 
extraordinary situation and therefore required extraordinary intervention. Unlike many other 
post-conflict interventions by the UN and other donors, PFM reform became the central 
platform for fostering the peace efforts and overall state building in Liberia (Dwan and Bailey, 
2006, p. 25; Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008; Zounmenou, 2008, pp. 3-5; Farrall, 2010, pp. 338-9; 
Hope Sr, 2010). International intervention in PFM and the overall peace process in Liberia, as 
argued by (Atkinson, 2008), was fundamentally flawed although it paid off in so many respects. 
PFM intervention is Liberia was used for multiple purposes, ranging from sanctions on 
commodities and on those involved in the war to strengthening economic governance (Dwan 
and Bailey, 2006:21). This broader focus on PFM (Atkinson, 2008:15) again argued, ignored other 
fundamental and contextual structural features such democratic governance, which needed 
immediate attention after the war. The preceding perhaps, as she further added could have 
emanated from the lack of strategic interest by the international community in Liberia. But 
maybe also, of the difficulty in maintaining an appropriate balance with such a massive global 
footprint.   
 
One could also argue that such a massive footprint in Liberia was warranted given the low 





Leone, where the 2002 World Bank CFAA concluded that PFM functioned 'surprising well' after 
the civil war (World Bank, 2002), PFM institutions, systems and processes had collapsed entirely 
in the case of Liberia by the end of the 14-year civil war in 2003 (World Bank, 2004; Chessen and 
Krech, 2006; Dwan and Bailey, 2006). Among the many reasons cited by experts, researchers 
and donor representatives, corruption and economic mismanagement by the NTG ranked highly 
in the pecking order. These came to the limelight following the EU audit of the central finance 
agency and five state-owned Enterprises (SoEs). The EC audit according to experts was initiated 
entirely because of-of the alarming corruption and mismanagement by the NTG and highlighted 
the composite picture fundamental, procedural and capacity constraints in Liberia after the war 
(Chessen and Krech, 2006:5).   
 
Findings from the EC audit was pivotal in galvanising support and consensus among 
development partners. They agreed that unless something was done, considering the evidence 
the NTG would enrich themselves and jeopardies the already fragile peace at the time (Chessen 
and Krech, 2006:7-9; World Bank, 2012b:10). The status quo, therefore, led to the development 
of GEMAP, pushed mainly by the international community (Dwan and Bailey, 2006:6). The 
central idea of the GEMAP program was to restore control and accountability in key financial 
management institutions and functions. GEMAP embedded international consultants to 
takeover co-signatory powers, the actual process that led to GEMAP and its features are detailed 
in (Chessen and Krech, 2006; Dwan and Bailey, 2006; Hope Sr, 2010; Tripathi, 2017). 
 
Irrespective of the overall agreement by the development partners on the nature and scope of 
GEMAP (Chessen and Krech, 2006:7), there was a lot of scepticism among donors. Their concerns 
were not only because of potential political fallout as a result of the highly intrusive nature of 





of implementing such a sophisticated program (Dwan and Bailey, 2006, p. 9). Experts have cited 
the tension among development partners as the primary motivation for the first revolt against 
GEMAP by the NTG and even president Sirleaf before her election in 2006 (Dwan and Bailey, 
2006:11). Overall international intervention in Liberia, via GEMAP, has been described by many 
as most successful regarding meeting the original peacebuilding goals and the short terms 
economic governance objectives envisaged under the program (Dwan and Bailey, 2006; Farrall, 
2010).  
 
Credits for at least, these short terms gains under GEMAP must be equally attributed to efforts 
and leadership shown by local authorities - the NTG and former president Sirleaf's regime for 
their courage and support to the programs, especially after their initial opposition to it (Hope Sr, 
2010:243). Although the chairman of the NTG and president Sirleaf face the same dilemma, 
regarding balancing pro-reform agenda while keeping their constituents happy, president Sirleaf 
was in a much better position to maintain this balance. In part, because GEMAP as experts 
argued, provided her government with a political cover for pushing more stringent reforms even 
if they alienated her support base, and pleasing the international community (Chessen and 
Krech, 2006:10).  
 
In fact, those critical of the international community's role in Liberia - via GEMAP, believe former 
president Sirleaf was the most significant contributor to the restoration of PFM reform agenda 
in Liberia. Perhaps because of her apparent preference for economic governance as a platform 
to pursue other development agenda of her government, at least in short to medium term. 
Others have argued that it was her experience and background and her drive for strong local 
leadership (Johnson-Sirleaf, 2007) of the development process of Liberia that propelled her to 






Considering all the preceding paragraphs, it, therefore, becomes pertinent to attempt at 
understanding who or what factors were responsible for driving the PFM reform agenda in 
Liberia immediately after the war.  There is considerable consensus among experts, donors and 
local authorities on the original rationale and nature of the intervention in PFM in Liberia 
(Chessen and Krech, 2006; Dwan and Bailey, 2006:25; Zounmenou, 2008, pp. 3-5; Farrall, 
2010:338-9; Hope Sr, 2010). However, the extent to which the PFM reform agenda gained 
traction remains the central focus for analysis in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. The analysis will 
focus exclusively towards the conceptualisation of the various arguments while providing 
detailed analytical explanations of our understanding about how and why PFM reform gained 
traction in Liberia? What was the depth and breadth of ownership of the reforms among donors 
and local authorities? How convinced were stakeholders about whether reform was a priority 
or an alternative course of action? Who were the champions for the reforms within government 
and where? Was the decision-making process politics-as-usual or whether the decision-making 
was left with reformers acting on-behalf of politicians? Were improvements in PFM the results 
of donor pressure or were they genuine desires by local government to institute change in PFM 
and the public sector as a whole?     
 
B.1.3 What Inputs were provided –  by whom and how and Relevance of the 
inputs? 
Like in many developing and post-conflict countries inputs to PFM reforms come in different 
shape and form - ranging from financial, technical support and a platform for coordination and 
harmonisation of the interests of donors and with the local PFM development agenda. This 
section examines these inputs regarding their nature, scale, who provided what and when and 





researcher presents here must not be taken in isolation. Instead, these inputs must be 
considered regarding the global dynamics shaping PFM reform interventions and the local 
institutional, governance and other contextual factors prevailing in Liberia. The relevance of 
these inputs is perhaps, in the opinion of the researcher, the most critical consideration to our 
understanding of effects of these inputs to overall PFM reform agenda in Liberia. The researcher 
will, however, examine the latter in detail in chapter seven and eight.  
 
Regarding financial inputs to PFM reform in Liberia, the researcher examines the financial 
contributions by both the GoL and its donor partners to various PFM programs and interventions. 
Emerging from a brutal 14-year civil war, the GoL even if it was willing to finance its PFM reform 
agenda, it apparently did not have the financial muscle to do. So, what is the cost to donors for 
financing various PFM reform interventions in Liberia from the cessation of hostilities in 2003 to 
the post-Ebola in 2017? First, table B.1 below shows the nature (direct and indirect) of financial 
support to PFM reforms by source and program from 2003 to 2017. 
Table B.1 Financial Support to PFM Reform in Liberia by Nature, source and program 
 






From the above table, funding to PFM reform in Liberia have primarily come from donors, 
representing 98 per cent of the total financing to various PFM reforms programs and 
interventions. The financing mechanism from donors has mainly been direct support for specific 
programs and interventions, except EU's state-building project of US$24 through DBS. The one-
off DBS, however, makes the EU the most significant contributor to PFM, followed by USAID, 
World Bank and Sida. What is not visible from the table is that much of the funding especially, 
for IPFMRP I & II have been made through the MDTF (MFDP, 2017i). The low financing from the 
GoL is not surprising given the very low domestic revenue base and the mounting development 
challenges that the country faced and continue to meet especially, in the post-financial crisis 
(global financial crisis in 2008 and the crash in commodity prices in 2013-2014) and the Ebola 
outbreak.  
 
More meaning could also be added to the financial contributions by donors if they are 
interpreted regarding the level of financial support provided to specific PFM reform initiative 
and components, and not others as shown from table B.2 below. 
Table B.2 Financial Support to PFM Reform in Liberia by PFM Dimension or area: 
 






Unsurprisingly strengthening the legal framework, controls, accounting, accountability and 
transparency received the highest financial support. These variations in funding among donors 
and various PFM dimensions present a valuable opportunity for our process tracing analysis in 
the analytical chapters. Specifically, chapters seven and eight will examine the underlying 
mechanisms that were at interplay in explaining the significant variations in nature and sources 
of funding and the level of efforts directed at specific PFM reform interventions and components. 
The level efforts were directed at areas, functions and levels within government and not others.  
The GoL's willingness and capability to have provided more significant financial support to PFM 
and even beyond the withdrawal of all DPs will also be examined and constituted part of the 
questions asked in the interviews during my fieldwork in Liberia. 
 
As alluded to by researcher noted in the introductory paragraph of this section, support to PFM 
goes beyond financial aid from DPs. It involves other wide-ranging activities such as TA. It has 
also evolved to include more recently, institutional and management arrangement of the 
reforms, coordinating mechanisms and structures geared towards harmonising the interests of 
donors and aligning same with those of local authorities relating to PFM. The nature and scope 
of TA in Liberia have come under a lot scrutiny among experts (Atkinson, 2008; Tripathi, 2017:16). 
Despite the many criticisms, TA remains a crucial component of donor support to developing 
and post-conflict countries. Often, critics focus on the extent and institutional arrangement the 
TA provided, rather than the relevance of the TA itself. The later has been argued by many was 
invaluable in capacity building efforts especially, after the war by placing international experts 
with co-signatory power in important PFM institutions and functions (Dwan and Bailey, 2006; 






B.2 The PFM Reform Process in the Republic of Liberia  
The PFM reform process described in this section broadly mirrors a kind of cyclical process, 
starting with pre-design and conceptualisation of PFM reform ideas, the design of PFM reform 
policies and programs, implementation of the reforms and re-design of new policies and 
programs based on experience and emerging lessons from within and elsewhere.  Given the 
context in Liberia unlike in many post-conflict countries, PFM reform process started with a 
more robust and intrusive approach but progressed gradually into the structure and well-
coordinated reform agenda. Generally, the PFM reform process in Liberia has been categorised 
according to the World Bank into three phases. Phase one (2003-2005) was mostly about 
restoring the status quo ante before the war broke out in 1989. Phase two (2005-2008) was 
about consolidating gains under phase one, while also enforcing tight control and accountability 
in PEM notably through GEMAP. And finally, phase three (2009 and beyond) is characterised by 
a more structured, coherent PFM reform agenda and long-term institutional development 
capacity building efforts (World Bank, 2012b, pp. 1-2).  
 
What is apparent from all three phases above is the fact each phase presents its unique 
challenges and opportunities, involves a different set of players, processes and objectives. These 
issues, and many more are discussed in the following subsections. Section B.3.1 examines the 
various methods, the role and influence of different actors and the context during 
conceptualisation and design phases of PFM reforms. Section B.3.2 describes the Policy 
programs, strategies and structures to the design and management of the reforms. And section 
B.3.3 provides a cursory examination of the various technical approaches and mechanisms used 






B.2.1 The Reform Design: Conceptualisation and Design of  PFM Reforms  
Unlike many post-conflict countries (Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Palestine) ( see Fritz et al., 2012), 
PFM reform in Liberia gained prominence even during the peace negotiations in Accra in early 
2003 (World Bank, 2004). PEM immediately became the bedrock for the peace process and 
overall state-building efforts (Chessen and Krech, 2006; Dwan and Bailey, 2006; MoF, 2009).  
Whether conception of the idea for reform came from donors or local government or whether 
this was part of the broader effort by DPs and developing countries alike is a matter for 
investigation in the process-tracing and analytical chapters (chapters 5 and 6). In this these 
chapters, the researcher examines who initiated what, when and how, and what concepts, 
processes and what other considerations informed the conceptualisation and design of PFM 
reform interventions in Liberia? 
 
B.2.2 Description of the Polic ies,  Strategies  and Structures to the Design & 
Management of the Reforms  
While this section presents brief descriptions of the various reform programs, it does not 
address pertinent questions and concerns relating to whether those reform programs provided 
a common currency for both local authorities and DPs, the appropriateness of the design 
elements and instruments, given the context at the various stages.  Whether the GoL could have 
done more to champion and take ownership of the reforms or whether they were taking 
directives from their donor masters! These so many other questions are examined in the 
process-tracing and analytical chapters (chapters 5 and 5) in the main text. However, table B.3 
below presents a summary of sequences of the various PFM reforms programs and interventions 
from 2003 to 2016. The step-by-step matrix in table B.3 provides detail list and description of 





intended to provide the reader with a complete understanding of the types of reforms 






Table B.3 PFM Reform Interventions and Activities in Sierra Leone from 2003 to 2016 
DFID Funded Governance Reform (1999):  
 The establishment of the Governance Reform Secretariat in the President’s 
Office with a small staff working on civil service and local government reform 
 Establishment of the Economic Policy Unit that took responsibility for 
macroeconomic management and safeguarded the relationship with the IMF 
and donors. 
 Introduction of a new Vote Controller’s Ledger in the Office of the 
Accountant General (OAG) in 1999 that allowed for commitment control, 
pre-audit, cash management, etc. 
 An Anti-Corruption Act was drafted and passed in February 2000 
 
Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) 2006-
2009: 
 international experts with binding co-signature authority in selected 
institutions, agencies and ministries 
 international Chief Administrator of the Central Bank of Liberia 
 international-led Resource Management Unit to manage payment processes 
and an Integrated Financial Management Information Systems, or IFMIS 
 international-led Technical Secretariat for the existing Cash Management 
Committee 
 executive authority to the CPA-established Contract and Monopolies 
Commission to review concessions, contracts and licenses 
 international management contracts for state-owned enterprises (SOEs 
Budget Preparation (FY2006-2007): 
 These included integration of recurrent and development budgets, issuance 
of budget preparation forms and instructions on budget preparation and 
presentation.18 A Budget Transfer Act was also passed to restrict transfers to 





 2008 - A Budget Transfer Act was passed in early 2008, amending section 
2212 of the Revenue Code, to allow transfers of up to 20 percent between 
agencies. 
 ODI is supporting the development of an enhanced budget framework 
through its Budget Strengthening Initiative 
Integrated Financial Management Information Systems (IFMIS) Project - restructured 
in 2012 to extend its implementation to March 2012 from Feb 2010 by 2 months 
(2009-2012): 
 Implementation of the complementary activities being funded by Sida will 
also be completed before the proposed extended closing date. FreeBalance 
IFMIS system 
 Introduction of the Budget Framework Paper for Cabinet Review 
The Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support Project (2006-2012): 
 The SES program offered a total of 100 positions 
 The Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support Project has brought highly 
qualified expatriate Liberians to key positions in the public sector, bringing 
new ideas, experiences, and professionalism to the reform process. The 
project (2006-08) consisted of two major components. 
 The beneficiaries (expatriate nationals and local professionals) are 
contributing to capacity building by bridging the gaps in critical areas of 
service. The TOKTEN project is being implemented under special 
arrangement, through the UNDP Direct Execution (DEX) Service Centre 
 The 2008 Civil Service Reform Strategy (supported by a LICUS trust fund 
grant), is a very ambitious program that aims to build foundations for (Civil 
Service Agency 2008). 
Financial Management Training Program (FMTP) 28 as a collaborative effort of the 
MOF, Civil Service Agency (CSA), University of Liberia (UL) and the Liberia Institute of 
Public Administration (LIPA) 2006: 
 (i) recruitment of two batches (30 each) of graduates as trainee civil servants 
for a two-year Masters Program; (ii) short-term training for serving civil 
servants. 
PFM Act in August 2009 
Intensive Procurement Training Program (IPTP) was established in 2011 to 
strengthen Public Financial Management (PFM) and to enhance the capacity of the 
civil service. Since then the school has graduated one hundred and eleven (111) 
students with masters of business administration (MBA) and eighty three (83) with 
post graduate diplomas in procurement 





 The new PFM Strategy and Action Plan (2017-2020) has been developed in 
line with the goals and objectives of AfT and Vision 2030 
Internal Audit Agency Act 2013 In 2013, the Legislature enacted the Internal Audit 
Agency (IAA) Act to create an independent agency for purposes of strengthening 
internal controls and audit in all public institutions 
General Auditing Commission Act 2014 Article 89 of the 1984 Constitution 
establishes the General Auditing Commission (GAC) as an autonomous government 
agency 
The  2015/2016 Citizen's Guide to the Approved National Budget for FY2015 - 2016 
Liberia PFM Reform Strategy and Action Plan 2017-2020 
 
Source: Compiled by author from different sources. 
 
Given the long list of PFM reform programs and intervention from the above matrix, the 
researcher is compelled to highlight critical reforms during the period under review. Those 
reforms, among others, include, GEMAP, EU support to the General Auditing Commission (GAC), 
IFMIS Project 2009-2012, Financial Management Training Program (FMTP), PFM Act of 2009, 
financial and technical support to Liberia's Revenue Authority, and IPFMRP - phase I&II. 
 
B.2.4 The PFM Reform Platform –  Coordination and Harmonisation  
PFM reforms in Liberia have generally evolved through different stages. A more intrusive and 
massive international footprint between 2003 - 2009, with greater emphasis on expenditure 
control, accountability and revenue mobilisation. PFM reform interventions in the post-2009, 
on the other hand, has been more systematic, well-coordinated programs and grounded in some 
fundamental and technical principles. For the most part in the years immediately after the war, 
approach to PFM reform in Liberia was a priori mostly disjointed and uncoordinated. At the time, 
individual donors mostly supported reform programs that aligned with their institutional 






The PFMU was established in 2009 and became the hub for the day-to-day accounting and 
management of donor-funded programs (World Bank, 2011c:68; World Bank, 2012b:2). 
Although the PFMU was considered to solve the immediate fiduciary concerns and pave the way 
for direct donor support through the budget (World Bank, 2009a), it was criticised by observers 
as creating a parallel system that undermining the government capacity and confidence (World 
Bank, 2012b, p. 15; Tripathi, 2017, p. 15).  
 
Meanwhile, 2009 and beyond marked the era where PFM reform interventions became more 
systematic and coordinated among donors and with local authorities. The new trajectory was 
manifested by the creation of the PFM Reform Coordination Unit in 2008 in the MoF and the 
following PFM reform strategy (World Bank, 2011c). The action plan in the 2008 PEMFAR for 
example, highlighted explicitly about the need to have the plan as a platform to further 
government-donor dialogue and a framework to which to align donor interests about the 
country's PFM reform agenda (World Bank, 2009a, p. xxiii). Various coordinating and 
management mechanisms, such as the joint donor and government Steering Committee (SC) - 
chaired by the MoF, technical committees (TC), etc., were set up to provide overall leadership 
and management of the PFM reforms (MoF, 2009; Bank, 2011c, pp. 67-8). The PFM platform has 
also been used to coordinate with non-state actors (NSA) on matters, not just those related to 
PFM (NCSCL, 2016). 
 
Irrespective of the preceding paragraphs, the researcher is confronted with a more pertinent 
question as to whether this apparent coordination among donors and with local authorities have 
yielded the desired results. Measuring the potential impact of this coordination is, however, the 
challenge. For example, could improvements in coordination had led to fewer restructuring, 





mechanisms meant improved harmonisation and alignment of donor policies and interests with 
local government agenda and better use of country systems? These and many other questions 





APPENDIX C: THE PROCESS-TRACING EVIDENTIARY 
ANALYSIS 
   BACKGROUND NOTES 
This appendix reviews the underlying logic of tests of causal inferences through process 
tracing that discussed in section 4.4.2.3 in Chapter Four. It presents the main 
assumptions/hypotheses about PFM performance and non-technical drivers and illustrates 
how process tracing is applied here as a basis for analysing differences in country PFM 
performance and the dimensions of their PFM and the causal effects of the hypothesised 
non-technical drivers or macro-level country characteristics. This appendix is provided for 
readers who may want to double-check the main arguments and findings presented in 
Chapters Five and Six and for those who might be interested in using the process-tracing 
method for similar research.  
The following paragraphs present the various assumptions/hypothesis or group of 
hypotheses and the main arguments/observations about variations of PFM reform progress 
and the hypothesised role of non-technical drivers in the two case study countries. 
 
  GROUP ONE & TWO HYPOTHESIS (General/Cross -cutting Assumptions)  
The discussions and analyses of this group of hypotheses present a summary of the main 
components of the arguments regarding how and why PFM performance varies across the 
two countries and the PFM dimensions. It is noteworthy that the two arguments are not 





or improve service delivery in both cases is directly associated with the variation of 
performance across the PFM dimensions.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Progress in the implementation of PFM reforms in developing countries has 
been generally substantial but limited in the delivery of real change or improved service 
delivery. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Countries generally perform better in upstream and de jure PFM 
reforms/systems than in downstream, de-facto and de-concentrated reforms or dimensions 
PFM  
The researcher discusses in the following paragraphs key observations, drawn from various 
sources, to provide direct, and circumstantial evidence regarding whether to increase or 
decrease confidence in the hypotheses stated above. Words in bold for each observation 
and inferential analyses represent emphasis from the researcher.  
HYPOTHESIS ONE:  
Observation 1a: While some will argue that much has been achieved given 
the low base from which the country started (Bank, 2009a, p. 37); (Bank, 
2011a, p. 1); (Europe, 2016); (MFDP, 2017); critics believe progress has 
been slow and limited compared to the level of investments made by donor 
partners and the GoL (Hope Sr, 2010); (Hove and Wynne, 2010, p. 1); xxx}.  
Although both schools of thoughts do have somewhat valid arguments, 
overall performance has been slow and uneven across the budget cycle 
(PEFA, 2012, p. 233); (GoL, 2014); (Europe, 2016); (MFDP, 2017). See 
chapter 6, section 6.3.2. 
Observation 1b: While the GoSL has made ‘substantial’ progress in the 
implementation of PFM reforms since the official declaration of the end of 
the civil war in 2002, overall PFM performance over time has been slow, 
inconsistent and uneven across the dimensions of the budget cycle (PEFA 
2007, 2010 &2014; Tavakoli et al., 2015).  
Observation 1c: Much of the process made (reform outputs and outcomes) 
relate to upstream and de jure dimensions of PFM (see Appendices A & B).  
Observation 1d: Now salaries are paid, but there is not much more funding 
in the budget, the ministry of education, for example, is not able to deliver 
public schooling in Liberia. There are many mismatches in the systems, and 
then the existing resources are not used effectively. The budget comes late, 
and sometimes after one or two months before the budgets are approved. 
The procurement then becomes delayed, how many months then a 
ministry have time to implement effectively (Donor representatives in 





Observation 1e: They have a budget capacity because they have a budget 
office to analyse the budget, but still this year in the budget process I think 
the legislature added almost 50,000USD to the budget. And the forecast 
did not predict that those revenues will be available. So, one could ask how 
political the process is. Or is it that you take salary expenditure and a little 
bit more and that because of your request. There are not really enough 
efforts in the sector ministries to even try to budget real costs because they 
know already there is a budget ceiling and the funds are not available. So, 
it kind of because of a pretty tricky situation if you are supposed to deliver 
quality services because you already know that you will not (Donor 
representatives in Liberia: XL103).  
Observation 1f: If you look at government budgeting in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia or most of the countries in the region 50 to 70% of their budget is 
made up of wages and salaries, pensions and social benefit.  The remaining 
is spread out between development projects and other investment 
Projects.  I think people will always have interests in areas with big 
contracts or in areas of operations that is within their control (Consultant 
who worked in both Liberia and Sierra Leone: XL308_XX306).   
Observation 1g: There's also a lot of competing objectives and political 
interests that happens within the implementation of the budget. It means 
for example; a minister will make certain decisions based on his ministry's 
power or preferences and another minister in make a completely different 
demands in the midst of scarce resources of government.  This kind of 
competition also presents significant challenges for the implementation of 
the MTEF (Consultant who worked in both Liberia and Sierra Leone: 
XL308_XX306).  
Observation 1h: If you look at the number of interventions as against the 
impact, I can say it is still low in terms of the reforms (Interview: XX701). 
Observation 1i: An evaluation of budget support, which have been used 
mainly by donor partner to drive PFM reforms in Sierra Leone found 
insufficient evidence show any causal link between budget support 
programs and poverty reduction or improvement in service delivery 
(Evaluation of GBS 2002 to 2015 - ( Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016, p.2)). See also 
page 19 of the same report for the proportion of BS triggers relating to PFM.  
Observation 1j: The same report noted on page 4 that, the balance 
between the poverty reduction and governance improvement objectives 
of the DPs needs to be re-struck to focus on service delivery for poverty 
reduction as the primary objective (Evaluation of GBD 2002 to 2015 - 
(Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016, p.4)). 
Observation 1k: We present a detailed analysis of PAF indicators in Chapter 
3. Comparing the PAF performance between PFM and non-PFM related 
issues, it is interesting to note that performance against non-PFM issues is 
better, with 55 % of indicators met whereas only 34 % of PFM indicators 
were met. Amongst the PFM issues, performance was poor with regard to 





rather stronger with regard to external oversight and budget credibility.  
(Evaluation of GBD 2002 to 2015 - ( Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016, p.66). 
Observation 1l: Although there have been several PFM reform initiatives in 
the country since the end of the war, progress has generally been limited 
(Europe, 2016); (IMF, 2017a, p. 25); (MFDP, 2017e). The country continued 
to face fundamental challenges in deepening the reforms and consolidated 
the gains made so far (MFDP, 2017f); (MFDP, 2017i).  
Observation 1m: But was the slow pace and backsliding of the progress 
made associated with the economic problems and external shocks 
experienced by both countries as claimed in various reports: Like in 
neighbouring Sierra Leone, Liberia's problems had been compounded. This 
is especially true during the last decade by the impact of the global 
economic crisis in 2008, the crash in commodity prices in 2013-2014 and 
the Ebola Outbreak in the sub-region in 2014 (See chapter  5 ad 6, sections 
5.2.1 and 6,2,1 respectively), (Bank, 2009a, p. 4);(Bank, 2011c, p. 2); (Bank, 
2013b, p. 6); (Europe, 2016, p. 7).  
 
INFERENCE: While both countries have made limited or even substantial progress over the 
years, the observations presented also point to the fact that such progress did not reflect all 
the efforts from DPs and local authorities, both in terms of achieving the specific deliverables 
in various PFM reform programs and delivering on the overall promise of PFM reforms (to 
deliver real change or improve service delivery). These observations come from various 
corroborating sources, and present empirical facts and some are based on insights of 
stakeholders at the centre of the reforms in both cases. There has however been a lot of 
debate in the literature on PFM reforms about what, for example, success looks like? The 
latter is critical for both the empirical facts and insights of stakeholders involved with the 
reforms in the case study countries. These are even more relevant in the light of the analysis 
of the cases, for which, the following considerations must be taken into account: 
The entry point for each country is relevant as a recent World Bank study: Strengthening 
Public Financial Management found, “initial level of PFM quality is the only other statistically 
significant variable, with a negative sign. That indicates that countries with worse initial PFM 
systems have tended to achieve a greater degree of reforms” (Fritz, Sweet, Verhoeven, 2014, 
p. 5).  That is important for both cases in this dissertation as they emerged from a war 







However, was it just a natural coincidence that most countries that started from a low base 
were able to make significant reform progress? I found this not to be a natural sequence, but 
rather a combination of many factors, which I discussed in chapters five and six sections xxx 
respectively.  
 
These factors relate to nature of initial reforms pursued in the case study countries, which is 
reinforced by DPs approach to PFM and the type of PFM assessments frameworks used ( like 
the World Bank’s AAP - used for HIPCs for example) which provide the basis for further 
reform programs. These reasons and several other factors will constitute the basis for the 
process-tracing analysis regarding Hypothesis 2, discussed below.  
 
The evidence regarding the nature of reforms pursued together with DPs approach to PFM 
reforms provide more plausible explanation than the World Bank study (Fritz, Sweet, 
Verhoeven, 2014, p. 5), as to why countries with low starting base progressed rapidly in their 
PFM reform implementation.  The study argues here that, countries that started their PFM 
reforms from a low-based progressed rapidly because of DPs approach and nature of the 
PFM reforms, which were mostly de jure and upstream reforms. De jure and upstream 
reforms unlike other PFM dimensions, are mostly ‘quick fixes’ or ‘low-hanging fruits’ and 
could be easily tied to donor conditions/disbursement triggers or specific programs like the 
HIPC. The implications for countries starting from a low-based (including the two case studies) 
is that the pace of the reforms begin to slow down as they transition from upstream and de 
jure reforms into more downstream ad actual implementation of the PFM laws, regulations 
and policy programs. In addition to findings from the World Bank (Fritz, Sweet, Verhoeven, 
2014, p. 5), the researcher shows from the evidence in observations 1a, b, c, l and m above 
(including the most recent PEFA scores for both cases), and 1n below that PFM reform 
progress in PFM reforms is much slower,, and worse, declining performance in later stages 
in the reform process in some countries, including the two cases examined in this thesis.  
Observation 1n: we judge that overall the quality of PFM systems and 
processes has improved since the early post-conflict years and that Sierra 
Leone has been successful in re-establishing functional PFM and 
accountability institutions. Nevertheless, it is clear that the early gains 
recorded in the period up to 2010 have proven difficult to consolidate 
subsequently; indeed, there is evidence from more than one source of a 
decline in the performance of PFM systems since 2010 (Evaluation of GBD 





As stated earlier, the initial paragraph hypotheses one and two are not mutually exclusive, 
and instead to be analysed concurrently, for reasons given in observation 1n. The study now 
proceeds to discuss the process tracing application for hypothesis two. 
 
HYPOTHESIS TWO: Countries generally perform better in upstream and de jure PFM 
reforms/systems than in downstream, de-facto and de-concentrated reforms or dimensions 
PFM  
In analysing the evidence regarding the second hypothesis, the researcher first examine how 
pervasive is the variation of PFM performance across the two case study countries and the 
PFM dimensions?  
Observation 2a: I start with all standard performance measurement 
frameworks such as the World Bank’s AAP and PEFA scores for both cases.  
These are provided as appendices (to be appropriately labelled in the final 
draft) in the thesis. The scores from PEFA for example, constitute an 
important part of the evidence as it provides comprehensive and historical 
observations relating PFM performance in the two case study countries.  
Observation 2b: We have seen significant progress in Parliament. The PAC 
for instance, if you look at the activities of the PAC in 2014/2015 we see a 
lot of publication by the PAC, also of the public hearings that happened at 
the time and as well as the enthusiasm by the PAC members that was very 
significant. And, there is part of the champions of PFM reforms in Liberia. 
We have also seen significant improvement by the GAC. About 80 audit 
backlogs have been cleared within a short period and submitted those 
reports to parliament. The minister of finance for instance, if you look at 
the kind of reforms that have taken place in the PPCC as well you could see 
that yes there have been a lot to bring transparency into the procurement 
process in Liberia (Donor representative in Liberia: XL101). 
Observation 2c: The GAC has been producing other reports since 2008. We 
have delivered more 125 audit reports, and they could be found on our 
website (Official from GAC in Liberia: XL402). 
Observation 2d: Audit backlogs were there but as we speak today those 
backlogs have been cleared and the GAC has analysed almost all of those 
reports and some have had public hearings (Donor representative in Liberia: 
XL101).  
Observation 2e: These are some of the work that we do, and we believe 
that if we do our work diligently and people take our recommendations 
seriously and act upon them this is how PFM reform will progress in this 
country (Official from ASSL: XX401).  
Observation 2f: I believe we have exhausted most of the issues relating to 
the reforms. We have the Act, regulations and manuals but if we are not 





just having these laws, regulations and systems in place it has to do with us 
and we should believe that we can move from where we are now (Local 
council official in Sierra Leone: XX502). 
Observation 2g:  Downstream is the problem, a whole nightmare! (Donor 
Representative in SL: XX107).  
Observation 2h: …the most critical reason according to the World Bank has 
been the apparent "gap between formal laws, rules and systems and their 
actual implementation in practice" (Bank, 2011c).  
Observation 2i: There is evidence to suggest however that lack of 
implementation of policies, laws and programs is ubiquitous across 
different reform interventions in the country (Jackson, 2006; ICG, 2008: 
Robinson, 2008; Fanthorpe & Gabelle, 2013; Jibao & Prichard, 2013; Roseth 
& Srivastava, 2013; Srivastava & Larizza, 2013).   
Observation 2j:  XX701: One key thing that is lacking is implementation of 
the laws and policies. This is really lacking in terms of our PFM issues. We 
see the report by the auditor general on special procurement you will see 
a number of institutions flouting procurement rules- doing over-pricing of 
goods and services. So, it’s about ensuring that those laws and 
recommendations are implemented (Donor representative in SL: XX701).  
Observation 2k: Major efforts have been expended to design and 
implement reforms and yet significant weaknesses remain in budget 
planning and execution, in procurement, payroll management and treasury 
management (Evaluation of GBS 2002 to 2015 - ( Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016, 
p. 64).  
 
INFERENCE: The evidence presented above shows a widespread and significant difference in 
performance between upstream and de jure reforms compared to downstream, de facto and 
deconcentrated dimensions of PFM. That is further corroborated by detailed analysis of nature, 
types of reforms and the various outputs as laid out in chapters 5 & 6, sections 5.4.1 and 6.3.2.1 
respectively. See also findings from the most extensive quantitative PFM assessment by the 
World Bank (Fritz Stephanie, Sweet, Verhoeven, 2014).  
Why did countries perform better in upstream and de jure dimensions, but continue to perform 
poorly in downstream, de facto and deconcentrated dimensions of PFM? I first address the 
issues raised in observations 2f, 2h to 2j about the significant gap between laws and policies and 
their actual implementation in practice.  I must first of all state that the inferential analysis and 
the ensuing discussions address only some of the how and why PFM performance varies across 
the two cases and the PFM dimensions. These inferential analyses and discussions in this section 
do not address the PEA and motivations/incentives behind why some of reform measures 





stakeholders acted the way they did. These are discussed under the section on PEA, Leadership 
and Local Ownership Incentives/Motivations, and opportunities (section 7 of in this appendix).  
Observation 2l: Experts and observers have attributed this slow, uneven 
and limited progress to reasons such as, the complex project design and 
inappropriate use of PEFA to measure overall progress (Bank IEG Review 
Team, 2018, p. 12), limited political support for specific reforms (GoL, 2014, 
p. 11), funding gaps during implementation (Bank, 2011a, p. 1) and 
organisational and management arrangement constraints (Leechor, 2012, 
p. xxvi).  Meanwhile, the most critical reason according to the World Bank 
has been the apparent "gap between formal laws, rules and systems and 
their actual implementation in practice" (Bank, 2011c). See chapter 6, 
section 6.3.2.  
Observation 2m: Experts and observers have already provided some 
insights into the reasons for the limited and uneven PFM performance in 
Liberia. These reasons range from structural and societal issues, design 
issues including such as diagnostic instruments and technical sequencing 
of reform measures, among others (GoL, 2014, p. 11); (World Bank, 2011a, 
p. 1); (World Bank, 2011c).  
Observation 2n: Let me just explain very well what I mean about the lack 
of performance. Take for example the last PFM strategic plan from 2013 to 
2017. The assessments continue to show a significant shortfall in 
performance against the planned deliverables. Nearly half of the 
deliverables have not been met. So, there are areas within the 
performance framework for which a lot of bottlenecks exist. Some are 
caused by political will, some by the legal and regulatory and some because 
of lack of capacity (Donor representative in SL: XX107).  
Observation 2o: The first thing this is a general thing for most African 
countries - we are nice at policies, good laws but there are lot of issues with 
implementation. There are political issues. Sometimes laws are written but 
there is no political will to implement those laws (MoF Official in Liberia: 
XL301). 
Observation 2p: While the volatility of iron ore prices has complicated the 
budget management process, there is evidence of politically motivated, 
‘last-minute’ changes to the budget during the process of execution, 
although these were better controlled in 2014 and 2015 (Evaluation of GBD 
2002 to 2015 - ( Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016, p.3)). 
Observation 2q: The Auditor General and other stakeholders have 
questioned the commitment of the political leadership to the PFM reform 
process, especially during the period since 2010 onward. In the latest 
annual audit report (2013), the Auditor General commented as follows: 
“[The various issues giving rise to my qualified opinion] serve to further 
confirm the government’s widely held reputation of being unable to 
decisively deal with poor public finance management. As I have said before, 
with a stronger commitment and willingness to address public financial 





laws and regulations, the matters could be put right quickly as other 
countries have done” (Auditor General’s Annual Report for 2013, p. Vi47; 
Evaluation of GBD 2002 to 2015 - ( Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016, p.67)).  
Observation 2r: Unfortunately, while the laws have been impressively 
written to please international actors, politicians have converted the 
application of these laws to their own benefits.  Despite the fact that there 
are PFM laws and regulations, politicians are abusing the system by 
‘budgetising corruption’. What I call budgeting corruption is instead of... 
out-rightly taking money that does not belong to a particular politician, 
he/she has to do it in collaboration with other higher-profile politicians and 
top government bureaucrats and ... insert that into the budget (NSA 
representative in Liberia: XL703). 
Observation 2s: Because some of these laws are not practical in our 
settings. For example, the PFM law states that before you carry out any 
transaction for a certain amount you have to advertise in newspapers in 
certain places. Newspapers are only in Mustorado counties and all the 
other 14 countries do not have newspapers. So, if you were to implement 
a project where you would face a serious challenge of advertising. If you 
don’t advertise you cannot go forward (Internal Audit official in Liberia: 
XL401). 
Observation 2t: To some extent but it is new, and I believe as time goes on 
people will begin to adhere to it. The law says for example, that there 
should be no third party in payment, and this presents a lot of challenges. 
Some business, for example, does not have accounts under a registered 
business name. That complicates the process of raising vouchers and 
making check payments to vendors (County official in Liberia: XL501).  
 
INFERENCE: First, these observations suggest overwhelmingly variations in PFM 
performance across PFM dimensions in both countries is explained by the gap between laws, 
regulars, policies and their actual implementation.  
This claim passes a smoking gun test: The evidence is overwhelming and sufficient to support 
such a claim. The observations reflect the same claims in both countries and from different 
actors - both local and external. More so, these observations are corroborated with actual 
data from various PFM assessments such as PEFA. These PEFA scores not only reflect these 
variations in performance across the reform cycle for the two cases, but similar results are 
shown for most countries where PEFA assessments have conducted in other studies (Fritz 
Stephanie, Sweet, Verhoeven, 2014). (See also Pretorius and Pretorius, 2008; Wescott, 2008; 
De Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 2010 and De Lay, et al., 2015 on the section of ‘the need for 






Although the claim passes the smoking gun test, the evidence presented does not mean the 
implementation gap in laws, regulations and policies is necessarily responsible for the 
variations in PFM performance across all the PFM dimensions. In part because of 
observations - 2l to t. I used a simple analogy that is commonly used, which is the mere 
possession of a murder weapon by a suspect does not mean she/he committed the murder 
act, although it does cast suspicion on the person. However, there might be some other 
factor (s) or mechanism responsible for the vast variations in performance across PFM 
dimensions.   
 
Among others, observations 2l, 2n to r present mounting evidence of the role of lack of 
political will and leadership. These observations are rich in detail and come from multiple 
sources in both countries, and from other studies. This political dimension does certainly 
pass the hoop test, but it is not sufficient to confirm it. To determine sufficiency, one must 
be able to examine the motivations and incentives behind the apparent lack of political will 
and leadership for the vast difference in PFM performance across PFM dimensions. As the 
researcher alluded to earlier, this will be focus of the process tracing analysis in subsequent 
sections.  
 
Observations 2l and m also provide evidence about the role of project design and sequencing 
of reforms. This design and sequencing argument have also been put forward by other 
independent researchers and DPs (World Bank, 2002; Tavakoli, 2012:17). Does this 
argument pass any tests? Indeed, it does pass a smoking gun test, at least for the two case 
study countries. Which I show in chapters five and six, that reforms programs have been 
heavily donor-driven and based on PFM assessments such PEFA, which does not capture the 
underlying issues and underpin PFM performance. In addition to these observations, and 
other evidence from published studies there are also tangible proofs, in the form of the 
numerous PFM projects plans, associated reports that often short term in nature (See 
various PFM projects plans for both cases – sources to be added). But these were just plans 
and programs that were both designed and implemented by different actors. These plans 
alone, I argue, do not have any causal power to have influenced reform outcomes.  What I 
am interested in are what went into the design and implementation of those projects, 
programs and plans? How did reform get to the agenda of local governments? Who decided 






Answering the above questions would require analysis of the Political Will and Leadership of 
reform programs in the two cases. Understanding the dynamics of political will and 
leadership, I argue, will present a more decisive argument that to simply assess PFM based 
on reform instruments and plans. It would, therefore, be extremely surprising if the null 
hypothesis that political will and leadership were not relevant for the limited and uneven 
performance across PFM dimensions were correct. In fact, this political dimension has been 
argued is fundamental to the level of progress and sustenance of PFM reforms in developing 
countries. However, to determine how decisive this argument is, one must be able to 
examine the motivations and incentives that drive the apparent lack of political will and 
leadership for the vast difference in PFM performance across PFM dimensions. As I alluded 
to earlier, this will be the focus of the process-tracing analysis in the section on PEA, 
Leadership and Local Ownership Incentives/Motivations, and Opportunities (section 7 of this 
appendix). 
 
Meanwhile, there is evidence that the extent of progress even in downstream dimensions 
or specific reforms vary among countries. It, therefore, becomes even tricky to attempt to 
explain the causes behind the vast difference in PFM performance between upstream and 
downstream PFM dimensions, given this extra layer of differences in PFM performance. The 
researcher, therefore, attempts to explore this by the exploration of the level and extent of 
progress made in IFMIS and MTEF, which are two of the most prominent reforms 
implemented in the two case study countries, which are discussed in observations 2v to 2ad 
below. 
Observations 1b, c and 1e and Observation 2a to k all show mixed 
performance across PFM dimensions in the implementation of PFM 
reforms in the two cases.  
 
You mentioned in your opening statement that government has excelled in certain areas and 
not so for others. How will you explain this? I got the following observations when I asked one 
of the PFM reform coordinators in one of the case study countries: 
Observation 2u: “The performance is a mixed picture. We have areas 
where the government has excelled, and we have areas where the 
government is still trying to excel. And we have other areas where there 





the budget or PFM cycle varies. Each of the five areas has mix performance. 
In terms of budgeting, there has been an overall improvement. First with 
the new PFM act, and the recreation we did recently we noted that the 
new act was put into use during the 2017 budget process. They were using 
the budget framework paper (BFP), but now they are no longer using it. 
Now, they are using the strategic financial statement (SFS), which looks at 
a broader framework than what is expected in the BFP. Those are all gains. 
Now the budget calendar for a period now and you will notice that the 
budget is tabled to parliament in time. We even now have a wider 
discussion of the budget. We have the citizens budget many more 
stakeholders are taking part. What is the core problem in the budgeting 
system is the MTEF? The MTEF is supposed to be a medium-term but, in 
actual fact, the budget is on a yearly basis. [And then I asked this - someone 
said to me the annual budget process only involves adding 10 per cent to 
the previous year budget!]. That is the issue, they are not really following 
the MTEF principles. And there are also weak costed sector strategies. Now 
they are trying to get more budget officers to help with costing sector 
strategies to augment the MTEF process itself”. (Donor Representative in 
SL: XX107).  
 
INFERENCE: First, there is overall progress in all the four areas selected - both upstream, de 
jure and downstream and de factor reform aspects. In the case of Sierra Leone, there is 
additional evidence to support the significant progress made in downstream reforms for 
example, in budget execution (IFMIS), as noted by Tavakoli et al., (2015: 347). According to 
Tavakoli, et al., (2015: 347), this finding was initially surprising and contrary to more 
conventional pattern of reform progress, given the evidence from broader studies (Pretorius 
and Pretorius, 2008; Andrews, 2010; de Renzio et al, 2010). This conventional pattern of PFM 
reform progress is less so in both case study countries with improved performance in budget 
executing and control (mostly limited to IFMIS). It is even less evidence from the most recent 
global study by the World Bank (Fritz Stephanie, Sweet, Verhoeven, 2014).  
 
However, much of the progress in progress recorded in both countries are skewed towards 
upstream and less so towards downstream dimensions. Take, for example, observation 2u 
above, most of the gains highlighted on budgeting relate to upstream activities such as 
having a budget calendar, BFP or SFS, establishing a budget unit and recruitment of new 
budget officer and the introduction of MTEF. There is less progress in ensuring budgets are 
implemented as planned, lack of adherence to the MTEF principles - instead, the budget is 





ceilings and budget hearings, but the actual budgets and strategic plans from sector 
ministries do not reflect those ceilings and overall government agenda.   
 
Second, the extent of progress made differs even for specific reform initiatives between the 
two case studies. Although there is some level of progress made on IFMIS in both countries, 
Liberia is widely regarded as more successful in its implementation or roll-out of IFMIS than 
Sierra Leone (see references xxx; xxx). So, how and why has Liberia made more progress in 
the implementation and roll-out of IFMIS than Sierra Leone? 
Observation 2v: Interestingly, Liberia that started late had made significant 
progress in terms of the public financial management system.  As I speak 
to you now Liberia has 50 IFMIS roll-out sites while Sierra Leone has only 
36. Unlike Sierra Leone, Liberia has commissioned IFMIS with the internet 
and you can access IFMIS anywhere now in Liberia. They have made 
progress that is beyond Sierra Leone (Consultant who worked in both LBR 
and SL: XL308_XX306).  
Observation 2w: Another gain Liberia has made is the introduction of the 
new component through the current IFMIS project. So far, they have 
piloted the project and hopefully, between 1 to 3 months from now they 
will be using IFMIS live for the Financial Management operations.  In the 
next year and it will mean that there will be one system that will support 
the core PFM operations of government. It will support all central 
government operations and the operations of selected counties. It will also 
support the donor management operations of government.  So, this system 
will support all fiscal operations in an integrated system.  While Sierra 
Leone has only one system that is not integrated (Consultant who worked 
in both LBR and SL: XL308_XX306).  
Observation 2x: Exactly so. I fully agree with you. Again, I said it depends 
on harmonisation of the donors. Some donors they have a particular 
reform that they pay attention to. If Liberia came to Sierra Leone to do a 
study tour, and now they are far ahead of Sierra Leone, you know why? 
(Senior reformer in MoF in SL: XX305). 
Observation 2y: FMIS that is where the major problem for SL PFM has been 
(Donor  representative in SL: XX107).  
Observation 2z: Because it is not their interest, and this is the same point 
we keep making because IFMIS brings in some control measures that can 
actually stop some leakages (Donor representative in SL: XX106).  
Observation 22aa: So, the IFMIS is like a grandchild that we need actually 
to hold and pamper (Official in the Comptroller and Accountant General’s 
office in LBR MoF: XL309).  
Observation 2ab: IFMIS is receiving attention from MoF because it makes 






Observation 2ac: I think IFMIS has been very instrumental in Liberia 
because it has made work a lot easier. It has been able to facilitate a lot of 
payroll and other accounting and payments issues that were not possible 
before.  And I think the Investment in IFMIS has yielded the necessary 
benefits or the desired result (Senior reformer in the LBR Reform 
Coordination Unit: XL306). 
Observation 2ad: For us, as accounting personnel, it makes the work very 
easy. We used to do manual vouchers, and in every stage, we had to take 
them to the Accountant Generals Department, where they also had to do 
it manually (Sector Ministry official in SL: 402). 
 
INFERENCE: Liberia has made more progress than Sierra Leone - both in terms of roll-out 
and functionality of the system itself - observations 2v and 2x. Given the latter, observation 
2y and 2z highlight the functionality problems faced particularly by sector ministries in Sierra 
Leone. I also had a first-hand experience during my interview with officials of two of the 
largest ministries in Sierra Leone, where I found the IFMIS system had been down for several 
months prior to my fieldwork. These instances provide a clear window to our understanding 
of the fact that the roll-out of IFMIS is only one aspect towards improvements in budget 
execution. And there has been significant gaps between these roll-out and the actual 
functionality of IFMIS particularly in Sierra Leone Observations 2v and 2w have more 
probative value because they come from someone with direct involvement with IFMIS 
implementation in both countries. And these observations are more believable as one would 
expect the respondent to have given a biased view in favour of his country Sierra Leone 
whereas these are rather critical. That is further supported by Observation 2x, which was an 
open admission from the top PFM reformer in Sierra Leone.  
Several factors, such as interest in IFMIS from civil servant because it makes their work easy, 
were cited in observations 2aa to 2ac to account for improvement in IFMIS in Liberia. This 
evidence seems plausible to pass a jump a hoop test, but it is not that decisive to explain the 
significant progress made on IFMIS in Liberia.   These reasons are also shared by participants 
from Sierra Leone in observations 2ad. The presence of similar reasons in both countries 
makes such an argument even less decisive. This argument is further weakened given that 
both countries emerged from war situations and had to do things manually in their day-to-
day financial management. Therefore, they had every incentive to embrace new financial 
management systems and move away from the traditional and manual accounting systems 






Again, there is an implicit control argument (IFMIS as a tool to exercise control in PEM) in 
observations 2z, which speaks to the idea of potential resistance to IFMIS implementation 
because of its ability to introduce checks and balances in public expenditure. While this is 
widely held the view that IFMIS faces stiff resistance from some local actors because of its 
inherent control in budget execution, this did not prevent both countries from making initial 
progress in the implementation and roll-out of IFMIS. This control argument thus passes the 
hoop test, but the evidence is not decisive, given its prevalence in both countries irrespective 
of the rapid initial progress recorded. 
So, what else might account for the success of IFMIS in Liberia? 
Observation 2ae: Overall both countries PFM programs following the end 
of their civil wars to date have been almost entirely funded by DPs - 
averaging over 95%. (See Appendices A & B respectively).  
Observations 2af: Irrespective of the increased level of recurrent spending 
in major PFM institutions in Sierra Leone, Budget support according to the 
evaluation noted “has also not resulted in increased GoSL financial support 
to PFM projects, as counterpart funding for such projects has remained 
modest over the years” (Evaluation of GBS 2002 to 2015 - ( Ecorys and 
Fiscus, 2016, pp.64-65).  
Observation 2ag: The government could invest in ICT solution to enhance 
IFMIS operations, for example, the decision to migrate for the old version 
with the web version of IFMIS was fully financed by the government and 
not the donor partners.  Unlike other countries will wait for the donors to 
do this kind of investment which is typically the case Sierra Leone. But here 
the government took the bold decision to invest in the migration and it has 
started yielding benefits (Consultant who worked in both LBR and SL: 
XL308_XX306).  
Observation 2ah: Not 100 per cent but I think we are above average with 
the reforms. The structures that are there we should build on them. Trust 
me we are above average. We implemented the IFMIS system with less 
than $6 million. Other countries spent far more than what we spent. Is it 
unfortunate that we are lagging in going forward, but we implemented it 
within a very short time and very effectively (Donor representative but also 
worked as LTA in the MoF in SL: XX3105_303). 
Observation 2ai: Let me give you the reason. When IRCPB was formed, the 
kind of funds that were allocated to IFMIS was so small. So, Liberia had to 
learn from that, and you do not micromanage for projects like IFMIS. What 
did we do? We wanted to implement at the AG’s department, but what did 
they do? WAN, LAN, you buy all the equipment - servers, computers, UPS, 
etc., you then implement the project. Now we want to roll out to the four 
big MDAs, so we had to come back and start everything all over. You see 
we are micro-managing and it’s so scattered. Liberia came and studied and 





WAN. So, it’s a matter of just connecting the WAN. So, it is easier for them 
(Senior reformer in SL MoF: XX305). 
Observation 2aj: It was really significant but then it was not that politics 
because the president believed in the reform.  In fact, she was in 
Washington when the vice president was about to launch IFMIS, but she 
instructed the vice-president to wait for her to launch the project herself.  
For her launching the project was important because citizens will also 
appreciate and support the government in their reform efforts (Consultant 
who worked in both LBR and SL: XL308_XX306). 
Observation 2ak: In my view I think Liberia was fortunate because of two 
reasons. One there was a minister of finance that had interest in reforms 
and technological advancements (Consultant who worked in both LBR and 
SL: XL308_XX306). 
Observation 2al: Sierra Leone has a lot of problems.  First and foremost, we 
had a minister of finance that wanted to discontinue the IFMIS and bring 
another system and that took a couple of years with several back and forth 
while other countries were making progress. People come into 
government with their own agenda even not knowing that they are 
hampering their own operations.  The minister of finance came in Liberia 
and he invested into the solution.  For Sierra Leone, the new minister came, 
and he said no and wanted to discontinue the IFMIS and bring his own 
system (Consultant who worked in both LBR and SL: XL308_XX306). 
Observation 2am: That is what I am saying we started well but going 
forward maybe we need the government to take ownership because world 
bank was sponsoring the program it was working very well and then 
government took over. So, what happened I cannot say? [Is this not an 
indication of lack of commitment from government?] Yes, maybe [lack of 
political] commitment is the problem because, if the infrastructure is there, 
they should build on it and we should have improved more than our 
current status (Donor representative but also worked as LTA in the MoF in 
SL: XX105_303).  
 
INFERENCE:  Political support and strong leadership and commitment seem to the most 
plausible evidence for Liberia leapfrogging Sierra Leone in its implementation and roll-out of 
IFMIS. Both countries’ PFM reforms, including IFMIS, were financed mainly by international 
partners (observations 2ae and 2af), but Liberia went an extra mile to finance the IFMIS 
upgrade from its domestic resources (Observation 2ag). Unlike Liberia, Sierra Leone at the 
time of my fieldwork was still waiting for the donor-sponsored procurement expert to lead 
to sourcing of the IFMIS upgrade. There was also a lot of dissatisfaction with IFMIS in Sierra 
Leone that led international partners and reformers to institute an IFMIS audit in 2016 (see 






Although there is some validity in the low-funding argument by local stakeholders in Sierra 
Leone for IFMIS implementation (Observations 2ah and 2ai), their claim is weakened by the 
fact that the Liberian authorities were willing to finance the IFMIS upgrade from domestic 
resources. After all, Liberia is not wealthier than Sierra Leone. In fact, Observations 2aj and 
k show that Liberian authorities were more committed, which could be evidenced by the 
desire of the president launch IFMIS herself, and the minister of finance who was seen as a 
champion for IFMIS. Their backgrounds were cited as critical in driving their level of interest 
and commitment to IFMIS, and PFM reforms generally.  Sierra Leone, however, had a lot of 
political bickering about IFMIS involving the new finance minister in 2007, which took a 
couple of years to resolve (observation 2al). This lack of leadership and commitment in Sierra 
Leone was also confirmed from an interviewee who worked on IFMIS under different 
leadership at the ministry of finance (Observation 2am).  
The learning visit (Observations 2ai) by the Liberia IFMIS team to Sierra Leone might have 
had an impact on the design of IFMIS. For this reason, the evidence of the impact of the 
learning visit is sufficient and passes a smoking-gun test, but might not have been a necessity 
Also, the learning visit could however, not have been the only reason for the commitment 
shown by the Liberia authorities to drive the IFMIS rollout and implementation.  
 
Leadership and political will, or lack of both thereof, could also be explained in terms of their 
contribution to the uneven performance in the selected reform measures (IFMIS, 
Budgeting/MTEF, procurement, interval audit and oversight) in the two case study countries.  
Observation 2an: In particular, in the areas where the political support for 
reforms was insufficient to generate real progress - notably with regard to 
procurement, revenue mobilisation and payroll, policy dialogue was unable 
to overcome the resistance to reform. In those areas, the regular inclusion 
of PFM indicators in the PAF did little to contribute to functional changes 
or corrective actions. (For example, the new procurement act has been 
stalled for the last three years, despite its submission to Parliament being 
included as a PAF indicator since 2012.) By contrast with reforms to 
External Oversight for example, these are also areas where reforms involve 
a wide number of stakeholders and can threaten the scope for political 
patronage within the public administration system (Evaluation of GBS 2002 
to 2015 - ( Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016, p.65). 
Observation 2ao: Well this is an obvious something but the politicians form 
the government and so they drive government. They come up with the 
agenda. The MTEF is just a tool to drive the agenda. There is no way you 





are told you have to do it to carry out their activities or agenda, you will 
have to do it any how (Senior Budget official in SL MoF: XX304).   
Observation 2ap:  For the MTEF, I honestly don't think we have 
implemented anything in this country.  People feel that I am just about 
having the medium-term budget and the forward estimates.  But if you do 
an empty plan for three years.... take for example, a type of expenditure 
that spans over some years such as road construction Contracts. The 
problem with this kind of arrangement is that the ministries, agencies and 
departments do not know whether the next chunk of money to undertake 
certain development programs are going to be approved (Senior reformer 
in LBR reform coordination unit: XL306).  
Observation 2aq: The MTEF again has to be linked with the programme 
budgeting. If the government has a national project programme like 
agenda for transformation agenda for prosperity, they should be target 
they should be target with clear output and his target should be tracked in 
terms of government resources and disbursements against these outputs.  
But like I said for example, you can have a minister whose interest is to 
provide fertilisers, but you can have another minister in the next year 
whose interest will be to provide attractive subsidies, and now, you begin 
to see the deviation and these are some of the key challenges in terms of 
implementing programs like the medium term expenditure framework 
(Consultant who worked in both LBR and SL: XL308_XX306). 
Observation 2ar: Let me start with the MTEF, it is not working, and I think 
is because of some of the political influence that is making MTEF not 
working. You can set a sector budget, but they will influence the decision 
at the highest level, so you ended having an individual ministry budget. And 
also, another thing is the resource envelope could be another reason why 
the MTEF is not effective (MoF official in LBR: XL405_XL307) . 
Observation 2as: This lack of implementation has in part been blamed 
according the World Bank PER, on the blatant disregard for the procedures 
set out in the FMR. For example, miscellaneous budget head 501 was 
consistently overspent for the period covered by the PER (World Bank, 
2010:41 - Appendix A).  
Observation 2at: I think some programs are just too complicated to 
progress rapidly. For example, the TSA is a bit tricky, and has a lot of 
implications and challenges to implement in Africa (MoF official in LBR: 
XL405_307).  
Observation 2au: As you rightly say there would be individual resistance 
because it is difficult for people to understand — the perception that our 
funds are going to be restricted and we would no longer have access. It is 
good for the govt as a whole because if idle cash is sitting at the commercial 
bank while govt is borrowing elsewhere (MoF official in LBR: XX309). 
Observation 2av: It happens even here in Sierra Leone wherein the MDAs 
and autonomous agencies ganged against the principal itself (Donor 





Observation 2aw: Government can’t be borrowing, paying high interest 
rates when you have funds lying with MDAs. Government will utilise those 
idle funds and then refund them later (Senior reformer in SL MoF: XX305). 
Observation 2ax: The 2015 audit report for example showed that 80% of 
all procurement were done through non-competitive bidding (sole 
sourcing) that seriously undermined the effective implementation of the 
procurement regulation (Audit Service, 2015).    
Observation 2ay: It is undoubtedly among the worse area, and the reason 
is that the procurement people are being manipulated from the very top. 
They do not have a free hand to operate. For me, I have the free hand to 
operate because I deal with what has been approved. For them they switch 
the process on, from the start there are people are sitting on top of their 
necks… “da man na me yon posin na e you dae gee no matter what!” 
[Meaning in Krio there is a particular business owned by my friend/relative 
and you must award the contract to that business] These are societal issues. 
That is where the money, so everybody’s attention is there. It is a good 
thing to have procurement officers in big officers, but again they are 
manipulated by senior people. That is the problem. The society is too 
small…people say ‘na me cousin dan dae or na me sister dan day gee am d 
contract’ [that businessman or businesswoman is my cousin you should 
award the contract to him/her] (Sector Ministry Official in SL: XX402).  
Observation 2az:  To me, the most important lesson is that they (donors) 
should put more pressure on building a good procurement system. 
Because, the procurement system takes 70 per cent of government 
expenditure. It is in the procurement system you have all the death traps. 
It is the procurement system you have ministers who have their private 
companies being award government contracts, and the society or public 
doesn’t even pick that up. (Donor representative in SL: XX702)  
Observation 2ba: Some see us as outsiders. Even though we try to tell that 
we are part of the entity, we rotate internal auditors every year to maintain 
to integrity and professionalism of our auditors (Internal Audit official in 
LBR: XL401). 
Observation 2bb: Yes, for example, internal audit has been very weak 
because people don’t want actors to be capable of policing them. In effect, 
internal auditors are seen as the ‘policeman’. This has resulted in a weak 
internal audit in the country (Donor representative in SL: XX103). 
Observation 2bc: XL401: Considering the vast amount of changes that were 
taking place at the same time, they needed to have a group like a bridge 
[meaning internal audit] to connect the people to policy (Internal Audit 
official in LBR: XL401).  
Observation 2bd: The first internal audit was established in the 1960s at 
the national port authority and it spread across government. As I said 
earlier, our people lacked the goodwill to follow the laws and this has made 





Observation 2be: Well it is apolitically driven sort of because the minister 
is a politician right whilst the IFMIS is more operated by the technical 
people that's the difference (Donor representative and who also worked as 
LTA in SL MoF: XX105_303).  
Observation2bf: Yes, I think it has a political undertone and IFMIS is not 
and people like IFMIS (Senior reformer in LBR MoF RCU: XL306).  
Observation 2bg: We don’t have a no-go area. I audit the president and 
parliament and there is no limit in what we can do (Interview: XX401). 
Observation 2bh: I am a professional and if the AG ask me to do the thing I 
will resign from this organisation and go because those are the principles, 
we both signed up to fulfil (Audit Service SL official: XX401). 
 
INFERENCE: The nature of certain reforms exposes them to resistance which make 
implementation particularly difficult. Observation 2an lays out two important points that 
better explain why certain reforms measures face stiff resistance and the general lack of 
progress in downstream, de facto and deconcentrated dimensions of PFM. 
First, these reforms are at the centre of the governance processes (decision making and 
allocation of resources) in these two cases. Observations 2ao- 2aw detail various evidence 
to illustrate how MTEF and TSA for example, are entrenched in the day-to-day politics and 
governance processes (decision-making, resource allocation and redistribution of wealth) in 
both cases. Second, these reform measures are mostly concerned with front-line service 
delivery MDAs, and are routine activities involving many stakeholders. This point is further 
illustrated and supported from the evidence presented in observations 2ax to 2bd. It is 
noteworthy that there is often no clear-cut distinction between the various reform measures, 
with regards to the extent to which they interact with multiple stakeholders, governance 
and service delivery efforts. What is however clear is that they inter-phase, to a varying 
degree with politics, governance processes and connect stakeholders to policy, programs 
and laws.  
Perhaps, it is no longer surprising given the level of progress made on IFMIS compared to 
other reform measures such as MTEF, TSA, Internal audit and procurement in both cases. 
The former (IFMIS) as the evidence from observations 2be and 2bf suggest, is operated 
mainly by technical people.  
  
Two implications can be deduced from the evidence presented in the last paragraphs: 1) the 
most critical aspects of these reform measures are largely outside the scope of current policy 





not always amenable to disbursement triggers set by development partners. These points 
trigger a couple of important questions such as: what the implications for international 
intervention are if PFM reforms go forward, how institutional development in these 
countries can improve PFM performance, and how can PFM reforms be designed to ensure 
local ownership, leadership and commitment.  The apparent lack of leadership, ‘political 
will/commitment’ (which is different from the ‘political appetite’ discussed in the next 
section) can only exacerbate the uneven performance across the PFM dimensions and in the 
two case study countries.  
So, what explains this ongoing lack of leadership and political will that has accounted for the 
limited and uneven performance in PFM reforms? See next section on political drivers. 
 
 
  GROUP THREE HYPOTHESIS (Political Drivers)  
Hypothesis 3: The extent of PFM reforms progress in developing countries is influenced by 
the level of ownership and political support for reforms. 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a lack of real political will (commitment) to drive PFM reforms in the 
case study countries  
Hypothesis 3b: There is ‘political appetite17 ’ for reform from politicians and top-level 
bureaucrats. 
Hypothesis 3c: The lack of real political will/commitment is exacerbated by the narrow 
application of the concept of political will by donor partners and local authorities alike.   
Hypothesis 3a – 3c are ancillary to the main hypothesis (hypothesis 3) – and they provide 
addition support and contribute to our understanding of the main hypothesis. While all 
three ancillary hypotheses help explain the main hypothesis, each bring different 
perspective, and sometimes alternate (as in the case of hypothesis 3a & 3b) explanations of 
the main hypothesis. In essence, all four hypotheses must be considered jointly to form a 
clear analytical narrative about the extent to which politics and political leaders, and their 
                                                          
17  Political appetite for the purposes of this research is defined as, any action(s) from politicians and top-level 
bureaucrats for which they expect a certain benefit (directly or indirectly), that action(s) is driven by some third part 
(locally or externally, implicitly/explicitly), and for which there is no real commitment to further that action(s) in the 
long-term.  To constitute political appetite, at least two of the three elements in the definition must be present. For 
example, a one-off event/ action by a politician or top-level bureaucrat in exchange for a benefit (directly/indirectly) 
and influenced by a third party may constitutes political appetite. Such a one-off activity need not require any further 





interactions with other factors have impacted the level and pattern of PFM reform progress 
in the two case study countries.  
 
I discuss in the following paragraphs key observations, drawn from various sources, to 
provide direct, and circumstantial evidences regarding whether to increase or decrease 
confidence in the hypotheses stated above.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The extent of PFM reforms progress in developing countries is influenced by 






Observation 3a: “Reform of any sort you need a leadership that will drive the 
reform process. The leadership has the resources and can make decisions 
regarding the movement of personnel and the hiring of personnel for 
example. If you do not have that kind of leadership, it is almost impossible 
to bring reforms. It is the leader that has the power to change things. If the 
leadership that is not prepared to do all those changes or movements, they 
will not happen” (Audit Service SL official: XX401). 
Observation 3b: “Of course, it is very significant. In every society there are 
socio-political challenges. Yes, you have policies, policies and let us say you 
have the capacity, but do you have the political will to drive the reforms? You 
have to look at how the political decisions impact the various instruments. 
You will have to look at the composition of the social-political economy” 
(Donor representative in LBR: XL101). 
Observation 3c: “Leadership is government and PFM is a governance issue. 
It is the entire government that should take responsibility” (Audit Service SL 
official: XX401). 
Observation 3d: “Can we look at those championing reforms probably at the 
political level. Maybe the minister who is in charge of reforms to ascertain 
how enthusiastic he is in term of driving the reforms” (Donor representative 
in SL: XX702). 
Observation 3e: “When there is that political leadership, we saw those 
institutions functioning effectively. So, we also want that political leadership 
to ensure that they implement those policies, those laws geared towards 
improving PFM in Sierra Leone. We have seen the political leadership in 
revising the GBAA to now the new PFM Act of 2016 to make it stronger. We 





acts. But the structure to operate those institutions is also key. But if we also 
have the political leadership to ensure that it is not about setting up those 
institutions and have laws but ensuring that they actually work” (Donor 
representative in SL: XX701). 
Observation 3f: The political economy section in the literature review 
chapter (Chapter 2) also detail various accounts of the role of politics and 
high-level ownership and leadership of PFM reforms. 
Observation 3g: The importance of nontechnical factors, including politics or 
political will is also discussed extensively in the PFM and governance 
literature dating back to 1880s (Wildavsky 1986; Von Hagen and Harden 
1994; Killick 2005 on Ghana and Rakner et al. 2004 on Malawi; Diamond 2012; 
Wehner and de Renzio 2013). 
 
INFERENCE: The above observations (3a to 3g) clearly indicate the relevance of politics, 
politicians and leadership in driving and sustaining PFM reforms. The evidence from the two 
case study countries does conform to the global recognition of the crucial role of politics, 
and the increasing shift towards of ‘thinking politically’ or political economy analysis in 
understanding PFM and overall governance reform dynamics. This high-level political 
commitment or leadership is also emphasised by Allen, Hemming and Porter who opine that 
politics is critical in the PFM reform process, and “anticipate that, over the next ten years, 
the importance of political economy analysis as applied to PFM will continue to grow both 
as an area of research and in its practical application.” (Allen, Hemming, and Potter (2013, 
p. 6). One can even gauge the prospects of reform progress, based on the level of enthusiasm 
of reform champions such as the minister of finance (Observations 3d).   
 
Hypothesis 3 therefore passes a hoop test - the evidence is significant and widespread to 
affirm the relevance of the hypothesis. The relevance of politics and high-level leadership is 
shared by nearly every stakeholder involved with PFM reforms - ranging from international 
partners, local authorities including NSAs, researchers to practitioners of PFM. This political 
narrative is even more crucial in the two case study countries, and in many developing 
countries where politics permeates nearly every aspect of governance and society, and 
where there are weak institutions to insulate public institutions from political interference.  
The observations set out below highlight a number of issues, such as, the impact of elections 
on the design and implementation of PFM reforms, widespread political interference on the 
day-to-day PFM process, etc, that lend credence to the critical role politics play in PFM 





on PFM is even greater, as noted in observation 3i, where it involves a transfer of power 
from one political party to another.  
Observation 3h: According to a participant who has worked in different 
capacities in different agencies, there is political interference in every level 
of government that negatively affects PFM reform progress (Senior MoF 
official in LBR: XL405_307). 
Observation 3i: “Yes, especially if there is change of power, this will be the 
first real democratic transition we would have experience in more than 2 
decades. Transfer of power from political party to another. If there is a 
change this time and this depends on how we are going to manage the 
change and reduce tensions, which there will be whenever there is a 
change. Which has the potential to impact the reform process. The new 
government could come with its own priorities” (Senior MoF official in LBR: 
XL302).  
Observations 3j: “Yes, because it bothers me in the sense that it poses a 
threat to sustainability. For example, this government is retiring in 2018. 
There is a likelihood that we will have a new government. This is why when 
a new government comes, they always try to undo what their predecessors 
have already done. But it should be a continuation. This is why our elections 
are very critical. Because if we do not elect someone who will see the gains 
that we have made and continue with them, then it will bring us back to 
everything” (Donor representative in LBR: XL702).   
 
However, the high-level leadership and political commitment is only a necessity (and not a 
sufficient condition) in driving PFM reforms and sustaining the gains already made. The 
conventional wisdom is most government will seek to pursue PFM reforms to fulfil the overall 
promise of PFM - for example, the PFM objective of the GoSL is “to formulate and implement 
sound economic policies and public financial management, ensure efficient allocation of 
public resources to promote stable economic growth and development in the context of a 
stable macroeconomic environment” (Ministry of Finance Website). But, delivering on this 
overall goal has not always being the primary focus of political leaders. There are numerous 
other considerations (as detailed in chapter 2 and the above observations) that drive the 
behaviour of politicians and top-level bureaucrats alike. In fact, the level and extent of 
leadership and ownership of PFM reforms in the two cases have been unsatisfactory as 





Observation 3k: A World Bank political economy analysis of PFM reforms In 
Sierra Leone for example, found that there was little enthusiasm for reforms 
at the highest level of state authority (Robinson, 2008 – Appendix A).  
Observation 3l: There was even a somewhat surprising admission of the lack 
of leadership from the political class by a member of PAC I interviewed, who 
said “political ownership of this whole exercise is not as effective as one 
would actually want it to be” (Member of Parliament in SL: XX602).   
Observation 3m: “But, as you know it is difficult to restrain politicians from 
achieving their goals. They always try to achieve things at all cost even if they 
are not in the budget” (Local council official in SL: XX501).  
Observation 3n: “I think one of the objectives in this phase of the support is 
comprehensive and predictable budget, which was not achieved. There have 
been efforts towards that, and there have been lots of discussions with the 
Ways and Means Committee. They have a budget capacity because they 
have a budget office to analyse the budget, but still this year in the budget 
process I think the legislature added almost $50,000,000 to the budget. And 
the forecast did not predict that those revenues will be available. So, one 
could ask how political the process is?” (Donor representative in LBR: XL103).      
Observation 3o: We are doing well in terms of producing reports it about 
implementing what is in those reports and this what we have not been doing 
well. To me I can allude that to so many reasons the leadership for that 
particular institution to ensure that things work. The other one has to do 
with aspect that should do with the genuineness of the leadership itself and 
to what extent our laws are ensuing the MDAs follow the laws and 
regulations (Donor representative in SL: XX701).    
Observation 3p: “Yes, there are several factors responsible for this uneven 
progress. They range from political to institutional. And maybe historical 
factors and they impinge on PFM performance or the anticipated 
performance of PFM reform programs” (MoF official in LBR: XL302).    
Observation 3q: “It has to do with the political cost that comes with 
implementing some of these programs. Like tightening in fiscal and 
monetary policies and consolidating public expenditure. As you have already 
seen some of the provisions in the budget are excessive and more recurrent. 
And so, the political will to take decisions to re-calibrate the budget and 
make it more capital driven is the challenge” (MoF official in LBR: XL302).    
 
A salient issue that runs through observations 3k to 3q has to do with the level and extent 
of political commitment to the PFM reform process in the two cases, which I test in 
hypothesis 3a below. 
HYPOTHESIS 3a: There is lack of real political will (commitment) to drive PFM reforms in the 





Observation 3r: Notwithstanding the various high-level political statements 
made in support of PFM reforms, there are doubts about the adequacy of the 
political support for PFM reform (Evaluation of GBS 2002 to 2015 - ( Ecorys 
and Fiscus, 2016, p. 67). 
Observation 3s: “Ask for instance how many government officials have 
declared their assets even though this is prescribed by law? Why is the 
president who they say is a reformer is not taking action against people who 
she has the right to appoint or dismiss and refuse to comply with the asset 
declaration? What is the reason for her failure to enforce this?” (Donor 
representative in LBR: XL702). 
Observation 3t: “Well they perceive our work as good as it does not involve 
them!  For example, we made several attempts to audit the legislature, but 
their cooperation has been very poor, irrespective of the fact that they are big 
spenders and were part of our selection for audit” (Senior GAC official in LBR: 
XL402). 
Observation 3u: Responding to my question on the level of political 
commitment to reforms by politicians, a parliamentary staff said the following 
“...this is right an electioneering period for example - trust me this off the 
records. The manner in which they will conduct themselves will be different 
because this is politics. They will say this is election period and we should not 
be too hard on our colleagues during this period” (Parliamentary Clerk in SL: 
XX601). This respondent was referring to the inaction from members of the 
PAC in holding public officials in the same political party accountable during 
election years.  
Observation 3v: “The legislature makes the decisions to pass laws and decides 
what kind of budget to pass.  And it also decides what kind of projects should 
be implemented based on their priorities.  For example, in the last five years 
the budget has never been approved before the scheduled date, and it has 
always been approved 3 or 4 months after the due date, which is on 30th June 
every year” (Senior reformer in LBR RCU: XL306). 
Observation 3w: Referencing the significant off-budget spending by the 
government of Sierra Leone, a donor representative I interviewed noted that 
“government needs to showcase that they are really committed to their 
objectives, and not just paying lip-service. They need to demonstrate their 
commitment, not only to say we will do XYZ” (Donor representative in SL: 
XX107). 
Observation 3x: A prominent civil society activist noted the following 
“Unfortunately, while the laws have been impressively written to please 
international actors, politicians have converted the application of these laws 
to their own benefits.  Despite the fact that there are PFM laws and regulations, 
politicians are abusing the system by ‘budgetising corruption’. What I call 
budgeting corruption is instead of... out-rightly taking of money that does not 
belong to a particular politician, he/she has to do it in collaboration with other 
higher profile politicians and top government bureaucrats and ... insert that 





Observation 3y: A donor representative, and who is also a Sierra Leonean 
made the following remarks on the extent of political commitment. He 
reiterated to me that “… if you ask me [about the level of political commitment] 
the bottom-line government has not been very serious about the reforms” 
(Donor representative in SL: XX106). 
Observation 3z: “Well, publicly they will not come and say they are not 
genuine but from their actions you can see it’s really low - in terms of having 
genuine desire to drive PFM reforms. We can see it, just look at the auditor 
general’s report the same issues for the same ministries over and over again” 
(NSA representative in LBR: XX701). 
Observation 3aa: A former top ministry of finance official and now a donor 
representative in expressing his frustrations about the lack of progress or even 
deterioration of the gains made noted the following “there should be some 
form of ownership by the government officials. Is like each time the donors 
come and go and things get worse and the experts have to come in again. Take 
for example, I implemented the HCA under my days at the PFMRU. This it 
broken down to a large extent, so we are coming back to help build the system 
again. We continue to go back and forth. We should have move to strengthen 
the HCA. We should be building structures instead of breaking them down” 
(Donor representative and who also worked as LTA in SL: XX105_303). 
 
INFERENCE: Having laid out the evidence in support of the relevance of high-level political 
support for the initiation and survival of PFM reforms (hypothesis 3 above), there is also 
substantial evidence to show the apparent lack of real high-level political commitment to 
drive the reform process and sustain current gains. This lack of real political commitment is 
detailed in the evidence shown in observations 3r-3aa above. Hypothesis 3a therefore passes 
a smoking-gun test - the evidence is substantial and from diverse sources, such as donor 
representatives, PFM reformers and top-level bureaucrats, civil servants, NSAs and even 
from politicians themselves. The evidence from politicians and top-level reforms and 
bureaucrats is perhaps more decisive. For example, a parliamentary staff-member with 
knowledge about the inner workings of politicians I interviewed (observation 3u) was quite 
blunt that he wanted his remarks about the lack of political commitment to be of the records. 
The respondent made the request knowing fully that the interview will be anonymised. So, 
my read into his thinking was that his assertion was a damming indictment of members of 
the PAC, and indirectly wanted to covey this information to me. My reading into his thinking 
is also predicated on my experience in interviewing other public officials, who often make 
similar request when they convey the most critical evidence or talk about issues that touch 






I provide three other forms of evidence to explain how decisive the evidence is in support of 
hypothesis 3a. First, I ask how important is success of political goals such as political survival 
or re-elections, political legitimacy, etc., as against PFM reform efforts? Observations 3ab to 
3af below explain the lack of real political commitment in terms of the primacy of political 
goals and political survival over efforts to drive and sustain PFM reform progress. The desire 
to put political goals and survival above anything else is manifested in different ways. This is 
better explained in observation 3ab, that portray politicians as rational actors, who tend to 
support reforms that mostly make political sense to them. In other instances, politicians use 
the PFM process to further their political agenda or seek re-election. For example, one civil 
society activist (NSA representative in LBR: XL703) described the marriage in the budget 
process between the top-level bureaucrats and politicians as ‘budgeting corruption’. This 
involves using legal loopholes in the annual budget process to inflate the annual budget of 
the legislature, which is then used to further the political interests of legislators. Also, 
politicians normally will prefer financing mega infrastructure projects such as roads, 
electricity instead of investing in less tangible areas such as PFM and corruption. These mega 
projects are what a Local council official: XX502 described as political roots. In fact, corruption 
and PFM are less attractive given their tendency to expose patronage systems within 
government, thereby making their political parties unpopular. Clearly, there is no real 
commitment from political leaders to commit political capital to PFM reforms and explicitly 
back efforts to sustain reforms gains in the two case study countries. 
Observation 3ab:  Politicians look at things from the political point of view 
and we look at things from the financial and economic point of view. There 
are several reforms that have political implications. For us they make 
economic sense, and politicians will not support some of these reforms if 
they do not make political sense irrespective of any economic benefits 
associated with some of the reforms. We have several examples of those 
(MoF official in SL: XX308). 
Observation 3ac: Ongoing budget credibility challenges have mostly been 
attributed to overspending as one of the respondents noted is “because at 
times the priority of the government may be different from what is in the 
budget. Maybe government want to construct roads for example, and the 
amount for other programs are mostly used to augment these kinds of 
projects because these are the ‘political roots’. The government would say 
for instance why they should spend money on reforms when they need to 
make roads. They want to do tangible things that the layman would see, 
because when you talk to people about reforms and even when you look 





still visible in all institutions with all the ongoing reforms” (Local Council 
official in SL: XX502). 
Observation 3ad: The legislative sees itself as the people. And so, when the 
budget is presented to them, they see it as the government budget, and 
they as the people could play with it for their people – but not necessarily 
not for the people but to score some political point. The legislature also 
uses the budget as a, means of getting re-elected (NSA representative in 
LBR: XL701). 
Observation 3ae: It has to do with the political cost that comes with 
implementing some of these programs. Like tightening in fiscal and 
monetary policies and consolidating public expenditure. As you have 
already seen some of the provisions in the budget are excessive and more 
recurrent. And so, the political will to take decisions to re-calibrate the 
budget and make it more capital driven is the challenge. Because it means 
that you will have less now on social programs. You will have to cut on 
social programs and subsidies and these are things that the political will 
has been lacking to implement and consolidate in the budget. Because of 
these there are lots of compromises when it comes to executing the budget 
(MoF official in LBR: XL302). 
Observation 3af: We have a patronage government system. When people 
are appointed, and their hands are caught in the cooking jar, and by trying 
to disgrace them can bring credibility issues to the entire political party. So, 
sometimes they are just dismissed (NSA representative in LBR: XL702). 
 
Second, the evidence presented in observations 3ag to 3a show that political support is short 
on downstream and accountability and long on upstream and de jure aspects of PFM. These 
evidences should be considered together with evidence and discussions of hypothesis 2 
through observations 2an to 2bh.   
Observation 3ag: I don't think Liberia needs any more laws. We have lots 
of laws in term of PFM reforms. What is lacking is implementation. Holding 
people accountable for their failure to comply is what is required in this 
country (NSA representative in LBR: XL703).  
Observation 3ah: They [referring to the parliamentary PAC] were very 
important in promoting PFM but to what extent they are doing their work 
to ensure that they bring about real improvement in PFM reforms is what 
is lacking. For example, the PAC is supposed to produce a report on the 
auditor general’s report every year. And we have seen them produce one 
or two reports, but a number of actions are yet to be taken, and parliament 
approves the budget and parliament also has an oversight role to monitor 
the implementation of the government budget. So, in a nutshell those 
committees are there, they are doing their work yet little changes have 
happened – meaning they still have to do more and be sincere in terms of 





Observation 3ai: A key official at the GAC in Liberia cited some examples 
where members of parliament were negatively impacting the work of the 
GAC, especially that which relate to audit recommendations. Which he 
noted “sometimes they [members of the PAC] water down the 
recommendations from the GAC, and we can't do anything about that” 
(Senior  GAC official in LBR: XL402).  
Observation 3aj: Accountability and transparency is the talk of the world. 
Without accountability and transparency, there will be no development. 
They enhance development and are the cornerstone. The enhanced value 
for money in the delivery of public services (Member of Parliament in LBR: 
XL601). 
Observation 3k: The lack of accountability in the PFM sector has in fact 
created tension within intergovernmental entities (NSA representative in 
LBR: XL702).  
Observation 3al: The intergovernmental tension mentioned in observation 
3ak was experienced during the stand-off between parliament and the 
Anti-corruption Commission in Sierra Leone on the Ebola Audit report from 
ASSL. According to a donor representative interviewed “there was a big 
fight between Parliament and the ACCA, for which Parliament said once 
they are looking at those recommendations/documents the ACCA should 
not at the same time look at the audit report. When they have finished, 
they will ask ACC to act based on their recommendations. That is how they 
want it to be, quoting the standing orders” (Donor representative in SL: 
XX107). Some view this standoff as a deliberate move by parliamentary 
leadership to protect any member from the same political party that might 
be involved in the scandal, and to take the spotlight and gain political for 
themselves. 
Observation 3am: “I think the problem is abuse of power. We have a 
system of government wherein the legislature approves the budget 
submitted by the executive head of government the president. There has 
been a marriage between actors in the legislature and actors in 
government to enrich themselves at the expense of the population. All they 
have to do is to appease the judiciary with lucrative allowances which are 
not commensurate with the status of the judiciary. These are judges who 
have no power to declare anything that in unconstitutional in this country 
“(NSA representative in LBR: XL703).  
Observation 3an: the political will and the leadership to make sure that 




The third, and perhaps a more decisive explanation of the lack of real political 
will/commitment is by distinguishing between commitment that is driven externally as 





ownership of government policy direction. Based on the evidence shown in observations 
3ao to 3as, I show in this section how the most notable PFM reform programs and measures 
have been largely driven by external partners or by the incentives provided by development 
partners. Perhaps the most notable example of the pressure for reforms from development 
partners in Sierra Leone is set out in observations 3ao-3ap. The stand-off in 2007 between 
donors and the GoSL is widely believed to be responsible for the lowest ODA per annual the 
country has received over the last decade and half. There are similar notable experiences in 
Liberia. For example, the merger of the ministries of finance and development planning was 
clearly against the interest of key local actors (observation 3aq).  Other notable actions taken 
by local authorities in Liberia, for example the sacking of the PFM Reform director and his 
deputy for embezzling funds for PFM reforms and the Global Witness case were actioned 
because of their international flavour – they related to programs supported by DPs, for 
which, any failure on the part of local authorities to take action will damaging implications 
from DP.  
Observation 3ao: “Back to the issue it is a necessary evil that we have to do 
certain things even though we don’t like them. It is those things that we do 
that will give us money. I was in a meeting with the EU delegation leader 
meeting with the deputy speaker at the time. And the head of the 
delegation said in the face of the deputy speaker if you do make the report 
public the $35 was not going to be disbursed to the government. This was 
straight talk and they delegation left. Later parliament did a 
reinterpretation of Standing Order 75 — the standing order that prevented 
the so-called premature publication of report being looked at by 
parliament” (Audit Service SL official: XX401). 
Observation 3ap: “Yes, but who can change this now. If really you can go 
back - you do some comparing with some commonwealth countries (Like 
UK, Ghana, Nigeria, etc.) you will see the PAC chair is voted for, but here in 
Sierra Leone the PAC chair is from the ruling party - the deputy speaker of 
parliament. Elsewhere the PAC chair is from the opposition - are you seeing 
things. This DFID tried but still they cannot change it. There was immense 
pressure then before 2007 on the then government. Someone raised a 
motion in parliament then to change the position of the chairman from 
ruling party to the opposition but the then government refused as well. 
DFID came then and said this is the wrong practice, but nothing happened. 
They did change the SO75 and started holding public meetings in public” 
(Parliamentary Clerk in SL: XX601).  
Observation 3aq: “Let us take for example, we were asked by the IMF to 
merge the ministry of finance and the ministry of planning. Initially we had 
both ministries different. Our thinking was to let the minister of planning 
focus only on planning - everything that has to do with economic planning. 





revenue and expenditure. But there was a need to merge both ministries, 
so we had to abide to them in order to meet their triggers. These triggers 
are conditions you have to meet in order to access funds. In those cases, 
those reforms are championed internationally” (MoF officla in LBR: XL301). 
Observation 3ar: “Some international consideration drives most of the 
government policies and things that we do here. Those affect how we do 
certain things here. Some of the things we where we think that it will affect 
our international standing or it will cause donors not to give us money, we 
will take action immediately. In some case, they will only act on such a 
matter when they have some international flavour. For example, the global 
witness case and because of the nature of the case and how it was brought 
from the international organisation the global witness. These kinds of cases 
attract attention because of the enormous consequences for the 
government” (Senior GAC official in LBR: XL402). 
Observation 3as: “We see the trickle-down effects on the larger society. 
Some of these reforms are just a charade because they want to satisfy the 
international donors” (NSA representative in LBR: XL702). 
Observation 3as: “I can tell you it sometimes depends on the government 
as well regarding government policy and government procedures.  I had a 
similar conversation with one of the donors and that person said to me you 
guys sign all those agreements and all those provisions are in that 
agreement and you never complain.  But we do not have the political will 
to tell donors that some of these things are wrong” (Senior reformer in RCU 
LBR: XL306). 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3b: There is often political appetite from politicians and top-level authorities. 
Here I distinguish between real political will (political commitment driven by internal desire 
for change) and political will influenced by external pressure and incentives (known as 
political appetite). In light of the lack of real political will/commitment in driving and 
sustaining PFM reform gains shown in hypothesis 3a above, observations 3at to 3bc below 
show the presence of what I refer to ‘political appetite’ for PFM reforms in the respective 
case study countries.  
Observation 3at: “Another issue has been the lack of political will and local 
ownership - donor agreements are like peace agreements. The often make 
huge publicity in signing these agreements without real commitment to 
implement these deals. This scenario even exists between political actors 
and various agencies within government”. (Sector Ministry official in LBR: 
XL403). 
Observation 3au: “But there is no law in this country that does not go to 
parliament. There are no reforms that culminate into law that does not go 





ratification. And that does not have the presidential assent” (Donor 
representative in SL: XX106).  
Observation 3av: “The appetite is there but they are just paying lip-service. 
If they want to achieve good PEFA scores, if they want to see donors relying 
on the system we want to see them taking actions to fix these problems. 
And they should not be asking for a waiver, while they have not fixed the 
problems and should stop given so many protracted excuses” (Donor 
representative in SL: XX107).  
Observation 3aw: “… but if you ask me and this is to me the crux of the 
issue, most of these PFM reforms that have been going on was not home-
grown. It was donor driven. And therefore, I am not surprised that despite 
all these reforms the results are pointing in the opposite direction” (Donor 
representative in SL: XX106). 
Observation 3ax: “So, capacity has grown there so what we need to do now 
is to make them effective. Now this is where the problems come in with 
the political commitment. If you have a good internal audit unit, and you 
do not have an effective audit committee at MDAs. So, each ministry is 
doing its own bit. The government now needs to establish audit 
committees in all of these MDAs to augment the work of the internal 
auditors” (Donor representative in SL: XX107). 
Observation 3ay: “However, when you come to the detail of how this 
reform should happen [is the problem] … but I think there is an appetite 
for reforms, and everybody recognises that. If you do not have a good PEFA 
score it will tell on you, especially when you are a donor-driven country. 
People see that this is a necessary evil. They may not like it, but they need 
it”.  I personally cannot say, but I think there is an appetite for PFM reforms 
because of the price that it comes with. It is attractive that people should 
do it. Whether people genuinely like or they feel that they should do it is 
another matter for discussion (Audit Service SL official: XX401). 
Observation 3az: I think if they were not committed, we wouldn’t have set 
up the directorate of Public Financial Management Reform. Because the 
minister is representing the government (Donor representative and who 
also worked as LTA in SL: XX105_303).  
Observation 3ba: “Also, in the new PFM Act there are sanctions. It is not 
common to have sanctions in any act”. A top government official making 
reference to the existence of actions in the new PFM Act of 2016 to 
demonstrate political commitment to PFM reforms (MoF official in SL: 
XX304).  
Observation 3bb: “But let me tell you we have the internal audit which 
years ago was just a department within ministry of finance. Bud given 
government’s commitment it was transformed into what is now a 
directorate with an internal audit cadre of professional developed and 
when you look at this, we also have other cadre of professionals like 
procurement cadre and so on”. (Donor representative and who also 





Observation 3bc: “When the government was seriously empowering the 
auditor general’s office, we saw a number of strides that were made. We 
also saw the setting up of the anti-corruption commission to prosecute 
corruption. Of course, most of those cases have to do with public financial 
management issues. When there is that political leadership, we saw those 
institutions functioning effectively. So, we also want that political 
leadership to ensure that they implement those policies, those laws geared 
towards improving PFM in Sierra Leone. We have seen the political 
leadership in revising the GBAA to now the new PFM Act of 2016 to make 
it stronger. We have seen the political leadership with even the anti-
corruption and procurement acts. But the structure to operate those 
institutions is also key. But if we also have the political leadership to ensure 
that it is not about setting up those institutions and have laws but ensuring 
that they actually work” (Donor representative in SL: XX107). 
 
INFERENCE: There is substantial evidence in observations 3at to 3bc above to support this 
claim. Therefore, hypothesis 3b passes a smoking-gun test.  The political appetite shown in 
observations 3at to 3bc is manifested mainly in the form of acceptance of donor-funded 
reform programs by local governments, public statements in support of certain reforms, 
having a PFM reform strategy/plan or as part of central government agenda, enacting laws, 
establishing new institutions and setting up new departments/units, all of which come in 
exchange for financial incentives from donor partners. This construct of political will is a clear 
departure from the widely held proposition by scholars and practitioners of PFM. Scholars 
and PFM practitioners measure political will through for example, whether the President 
made public statements in support of PFM reforms; and the existence of a PFM reform 
program/strategy or whether PFM is set out in the national development strategy of a 
particular country. I argue in chapter seven, section xx that the mere existence of PFM 
reform strategy/plan or appearance of PFM in a country’s national development programme 
does not equate to real political will/commitment. I go a step further to determine whether 
those political statements or PFM strategies were influenced by the need to satisfy 
development partners? More so, I also explore the extent to which political will translates 
to not only having PFM plans/strategies and policies, enacting laws; and establishing new 
institutions and departments but to their actual implementation in practice in the long-term.  
The evidence shown in observations 3at to 3bc is a form of a gun-ownership test, which is 
not always obvious and for which I presume there at least some aspects of PFM reform 






HYPOTHESIS 3c: The lack of real political will/commitment is exacerbated by the narrow 
application of the concept of political will by donor partners and local authorities alike.  
Observation 3bd: “Can we look at those championing reforms probably at 
the political level. Maybe the minister who is in charge of reforms to 
ascertain how enthusiastic he is in term of driving the reforms” (NSA 
representative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 3be: “I think what we needed was the political will.  We had 
one or two ministers that were willing to move the reforms, but we didn't 
take advantage of that. Take for example, the issue of cash management 
the previous minister understood the importance the role state-owned 
Enterprises (SoEs) will play in this area. But guess what, we didn't take 
advantage of this at the end of the day everything became a lot more 
political.  The minister wanted to know exactly what those state-owned 
Enterprises were doing with their money and why where they not 
contributing to the National budget.  And because of that that the state-
owned Enterprises unit was set up in the ministry of finance.  But as we 
speak most of these state-owned Enterprises that do generate a lot of 
revenue still do not contribute to the National budget or service delivery.” 
(Senior reformer in the RCU in LBR: XL306). 
Observation 3bf: “Whatever happens the incentives might be coming from 
the top. For example, under the then minister Marah around 2012 we had 
a lot of action on PFM than now. I do not think the present minister sees 
PFM as central to his work. To me, if you want to ascertain the appetite for 
reforms, you should focus on those at the top”. (NSA representative in SL: 
XX702). 
Observation 3bg: “I think it is the way the political landscape is everything 
is channelled through politics. But where you have different arms 
participating in doing things, it will be better. But when you have one or 
two people, they operate by their mood.” (Sector Ministry official in SL: 
XX402).  
Observation 3bh: “But to me it is not about leadership at the technical level, 
rather it is about leadership at the political level”. (Interview: XX106). 
Observation 3bi: “Honestly, I think the various institutions should take PFM 
serious. Maybe we should have more champions in the various sectors 
instead of us coming and driving the process again they should take 
ownership and drive the process” (Donor representative and who also 
worked as LTA in SL: XX105_303). 
 
INFERENCE: Most of the references made to political will from interview participants and 
from other sources apply the concept to include only support from the president, 
parliamentarians or the minister of finance. In Sierra Leone for example, political will mostly 
meant support from the minister of finance, the financial secretary, the president or 





stakeholder groups - donors and local authorities alike. At the same time, there have been 
a lot of calls for broader and inclusive leadership and ownership for PFM reforms. Hypothesis 
3c passes a hoop test - there is evidence from observations 3bd to 3bi above to suggest the 
negative impact on PFM reforms because of lack of broad-based political support and 
ownership. The lack of broad-based political support has negatively impacted on the 
sustainability of certain reforms, which tend to crumble with the departure of a finance 
minister for example. There has been no broad-based approach to PFM reforms from both 
local authorities and development partners. For example, there is no evidence, whatsoever, 
of PFM reforms being part of the agenda of political parties or discussions of PFM on party 
platforms (including opposition parties). PFM reform programs are mostly discussed in 
government circles or between top-level bureaucrats and development partners in the two 
case study countries.  
 
The foregoing analysis in the above paragraph present significant implications for both PFM 
reform progress and the sustainable of the gains already made in the case study countries. 
Support from even the most reform advocates, such as the minister of finance, as in 
observations 3bf - g, does not guarantee success and continuity in PFM reform efforts. 
Enthusiasm for reforms and the general progress made are often gauged by the support 
from the minister of finance. This means a new finance minister with less 
appetite/commitment for PFM reforms or with remote technical background from PFM 
meant a shift in interests and enthusiasm away from PFM reforms. More so, the mere 
expression of support for PFM reforms or certain reform program by the president or 
minister of finance does not guarantee successful implementation of a certain PFM reform 
initiatives or sustainability of reform progress. Especially, in the presence of weak 
institutions and the enormous informal networks and arm-twisting that go on in the two 
case study countries. I draw on a number of examples from both cases in observations 3bj 
to 3bl below to further explain these dynamics. 
Observation 3bj: Failure of the Attitudinal and Behavioural Change (ABC) 
Commission in Sierra Leone, which was President Koroma’s biggest 
campaign promises in the overall fight against corruption in the country. 
Although it is unclear how ABC got prominence in the 2007 manifesto of 
the then opposition, what is clear was that it was championed by president 
himself. Who, in fact, established the ABC secretariat at State House, few 
offices away from his. The ABC campaign came to its knees just two years 





anti-corruption commission for practically looting the 2 billion Leones 
meant for the commission (personal experience from the researcher).  
Observation 3bk: One of the interview participants recounted during our 
off-the-record discussion about a stunning denial by President Hellen 
Johnson Sirleaf on national radio that she never approved the lucrative 
salary increment for members of parliament. Her denial could also be 
viewed as admitting to the political reality in Liberia, which depicts the 
increasing influence of parliament on the budget process in that country 
(NSA representative in SL: XL702). 
Observation 3bl: If you take the president, for example, I think he is trying. 
If you look deep down, he is trying, and I am privy to some of the strategic 
meetings at the state house. The president has the heart to help this 
country, but he is surrounded by people who would just pay lip service. 
They have been doing it all along — most of them, and when you actually 
find out what they are doing, you will shed tears. It is not a one-day job to 
clean up this country. It has to start from right at the top. Take it from me 
(Sector Ministry official in SL: XX402). 
The lack of broad-based leadership and ownership of PFM reforms could 
also be seen in the performance gap between the reforms concentrated at 
the centre and those at MDAs and councils (see discussions on hypothesis 
2). The gap is also evident in the level of ownership and lack of enthusiasm 
shown by MDAs and the general approach to governance in the case study 
countries, as shown in observations 3bm - o.  
Observation 3bm: “For us in the ministry of finance the minister and the 
financial secretary are very much committed as far as the internal audit is 
concerned. However, for the other MDAs and also local councils you would 
realise most of the internal audit units do not even have a budget line so 
to access funds to do their jobs is a big challenge” (MoF official in SL: XX307).  
Observation 3bn: “The commitment from vote controllers is not too great 
and for councils their situations are bad. We do provide coaching and 
mentoring for internal auditors in the local councils. They will complain 
about stationaries and cartridges, basic things that they need to do their 
work is a big challenge” (MoF official in SL: XX307). 
Observation 3bo: “We may even have the best of goods but because the 
structure and attitude when it comes to governmental activities are 
characterised by elite and power is perceived on a set of people within 







GROUP FOUR HYPOTHESIS (Drivers relating Donor support and 
practices)  
Hypothesis 4a: The substantial progress in the design and implementation of PFM reforms 
has been driven largely by donor partners 
Hypothesis 4b: The donor-driven reforms and the associated progress made so far does not 
translate into improved services for the people because there are limits to what could be 
achieved from externally driven reforms, especially in the short-term.  
Hypothesis 4c: Donor interests and approaches to PFM reforms in developing countries 
underpin the nature of the reforms, patters, and the extent of progress made. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: The substantial progress in the design and implementation of PFM reforms 
has been driven largely by donor partners. 
 
OBSERVATIONS 
Observation 4a: “Back to the issue it is a necessary evil that we have to do 
certain things even though we don’t like them. It is those things that we do 
that will give us money. I was in a meeting with the EU delegation leader 
meeting with the deputy speaker at the time. And the head of the 
delegation said in the face of the deputy speaker if you do make the report 
public the $35 was not going to be disbursed to the government. This was 
straight talk and they delegation left. Later parliament did a 
reinterpretation of Standing Order 75” (Senior Audit Service officla in SL: 
XX401).  
Observation 4b: “I am throwing that at you, you are the researcher. Go and 
pinpoint to each and every reform and try to see which donor was behind 
this.  I can guarantee you are going to correlate 100% to donors. If you 
correlate below that then eh em…” (Donor representative in SL: XX101) 
Observation 4c: “So, the government needs to show more interest in 
moving PFM reforms forward.  But currently PFM is influenced basically by 
the donors” (Senior reformer in RCU in LBR: XL306).  
Observation 4d: “They have been quite influential, and they have helped 
us a lot. They drive most of the reforms and as I told you they had driven 
most of the projects and we appreciate their commitment. They have 
assisted both in consultancy services, expertise and funds” (Senior officla 





Observation 4e: Yes, we get a lot of support from the donors. The donors 
give logistical, moral support we get a lot of that… The govt with the usual 
budgetary constraint could not do anything. And the donors stepped in and 
through donor support we were able to train almost 75 of senior-level staff 
of the IAA.  In this area [internal audit] donors have been very supportive, 
in term logistics, training and the government takes care of salaries, and 
the salaries are competitive (Internal Audit official in LBR: XL401).  
Observation 4f: Donors have been supporting PFM it has been donor driven. 
Even when we had the IPFMR project is was donor-funded and at the time 
we had a lot of training, and other capacity building activities (Local Council 
official in SL: XX502). 
Observation 4g: I do think donors are probably the primary parties actually 
pushing structural reforms if we are talking about institutional change and 
the introduction of a completely new system different from what we had 
– normally that comes from external technical support from the donors’ 
side. Again, there is a huge inertia in the civil service (Donor representative 
attached to the MoF in SL: XX102_301). 
Observation 4h: There a significant work in Liberia and there is a lot of 
achievement. Let me say, after the war, the PFM system was generally 
donor managed. So, the Bank [The World Bank] came in to start building 
the capacity and also to support the government and engaging them in 
PFM reforms. The Bank since 2005 to now have been engaging to be able 
to support the government establish itself and its PFM activities. For 
example, the government was supported to adopt the IPSAS cash basis of 
Accounting and IFRS. Audit backlogs were there but as we speak today 
those backlogs have been cleared and the GAC has analysed almost all of 
those reports and some have had public hearings. The Public hearing was 
not there and through the support of the Bank, the national legislature has 
now been able to conduct public hearings (Donor representative in LBR: 
XL101).    
Observation 4i: The govt per se did not play any central role in encouraging 
or fostering civic participation in the budget process. I could say this with 
confidence. Because all these processes where being driven by external 
actors and from within civil society itself (NSA representative in SL: XX702).  
Observation 4j: The other issue I will bring out to you is that most of the 
acts [PFM and related Acts] that were passed maybe I can link them to 
donor pressure (Donor representative and who also worked as LTA in SL: 
XX105_303). 
Observation 4k: If you ask me and this is to me the crocks of the issue, most 
of these PFM reforms that have been going on was not home-grown. It was 
donor driven. And therefore, I am not surprised that despite all these 
reforms the results are pointing in the opposite direction (Donor 
representative in LBR: XL106).  
Observation 4l: There is substantial evidence in chapters five and six that 
PFM reforms in the years leading to and after the end of the civil wars in 





seen with introduction of the cash management committee and the 
GEMAP programme following the joint UN/World Bank PFM assessment 
2004. For Sierra Leone donor intervention in prominent even before the 
civil war ended in 2002. The AG department for example, was led by a 
British national with support from other foreign experts and some local 
personnel. And the 2002 World Bank CFAA was principal assessment report 
that informed all PFM reforms at the time (Appendices A & B).  
Observation 4m: There is also evidence laid out in chapters five and six that 
show the influence of donors through the HIPC/MDRI debt relief initiatives. 
The HIPC decision and completion point triggers like the GBS conditions 
have been heavily linked to PFM reform reforms over the last decade and 
half in both countries. Appendices A & B respectively also laid out the 
evidence that show donors were able do exact their influence in the reform 
process through assessment report and PEFA reports, which have mainly 
been the basis for subsequent reform programs. (Appendices A & B).  
Observation 5n: The evidence in sections 5.2.3 and 6.2.3 - what Inputs were 
provided – by whom and how and Relevance of the inputs? In chapters five 
and six respectively show that PFM reforms in both countries were 
financed almost entirely (over 95 per cent) by international partners 
(Appendices A & B).  
 
INFERENCE: The evidence presented in observations 4a to 4n is clear and overwhelming on 
the nature and relevance of international intervention in PFM in the two countries. Donor 
support to PFM in the two cases takes different shapes and forms: financial inputs, provided 
platform/framework for PFM reform support and coordination, technical assistance 
(placement of consultants, training programs, workshops, sponsoring learning visits, etc.) 
and even moral support as one respondent noted in observation 4d.  Also, international 
intervention in PFM cuts across government departments and entities - although much of 
the support has been channelled through the centre (the ministry of finance). Partners like 
the World Bank, USAID, EU and DFID however directly supported specialised PFM 
institutions like the external and internal audit institutions, parliamentary public accounts 
committee, local councils, etc.  
Hypothesis 4a therefore passes a smoking-gun test - the evidence in observations 4a to 4n 
is sufficient to make the claim. Apart from financing almost every aspect of PFM reform in 
the two cases since the end of the civil wars, the evidence shown above points to the 
relevance and influence of development partners in the reform process. Donor partners 
have been able to exert their influence through many fronts - be it in terms of shaping the 
reform agenda, via various projects and programs and sometimes through global PFM and 





Agenda. Their influence has also been manifested through donor assessment missions and 
associated reports, and other global PFM assessment frameworks such as PEFA, World Bank 
CFAA and AAP, which have been the primary documents that have informed PFM reform 
programs in those countries.  
 
Perhaps the most decisive and smoking-gun evidence for sceptics who still question the 
influence of development partners on the conception, design and implementation of PFM 
reforms in developing countries, is the long stand-off between donors and local authorities 
in Sierra Leone in 2007. The donor partners had requested parliament to allow the Auditor 
General to make public her audit report and had threatened to withhold budget support if 
parliament did not comply. Parliament initially refused to comply, which many 
commentators point to as the main contributory factor for the lowest level of budget 
support in 2007 in recent history in Sierra Leone. The climax of the stand-off was in the view 
of respondent XX401 (Observation 4a) the direct confrontation between the EU 
representative and the Chairman of the PAC, in which the EU representative had threatened 
to withhold a proposed $35 million budget support for that year. DFID on the other hand, 
had already suspended disbursement of the ‘fixed tranche’ of its budget support, which 
created significant treasury management problems in the first six months of 2007. These 
two developments in the view of many local authorities interviewed and in the view of other 
commentators were the last straw that broke the camel’s back, eventually leading the new 
parliament later in 2007 to reinterpret Standing Order 75 thus clearing the way for the 
Auditor General to make her audit report. The reinterpretation of Standing Order 75 
represents a milestone in PFM reforms in Sierra Leone, which paved the way for a host of 
the other reforms, especially in the areas oversight and accountability.  
 
The relevance and influence of development partners have been questioned by some 
respondents, often for reasons such as ‘donors only provide funding, approve activities and 
nothing else’ among many other reasons (see observations 4o & 4q below). The researcher, 
however, finds evidence to the contrary, especially as it relates to both countries emerging 
from destructive civil wars with their economies in severe difficulties. International 
development assistance was indispensable to not just PFM reforms, but to their economies 
as a whole (observations 4h, 4l-4m; xxx). Some of the reasons provided for example, in 





oversight and determination of the overall PFM reform agenda by approving every project, 
program and activities before they got implemented. Most of the international development 
programs and aid modalities such as debt relief and GBS had most of their disbursement 
conditions/triggers tied to PFM reform initiatives (see observation 4o).  
 
Perhaps, a better way to explain the relevance and influence of donors would be to examine 
what role have the domestic governments played in initiating and driving the PFM reform 
process? The evidence presented under this hypothesis and in the previous ones show less 
and less direct role of domestic governments, especially in initiating at least certain PFM 
reforms. For example, there is evidence to justify, at least, unwillingness on the part of local 
governments to push reforms relating to oversight and accountability, as one of the key 
respondents noted in observation 4i.  
Observation 4o: “As we have noted above, the primary focus of the Budget 
Support TA was on strengthening PFM and governance. There was very 
limited attention given to sectoral policies and strategies and to service 
delivery processes. The PAF targets, on which policy dialogue was 
concentrated, also had a primary focus on PFM issues (54 % of the PAF 
targets)” (Evaluation of GBS 2002 to 2015 - ( Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016, p. 
21)). 
Observation 4p: They have been influential in a way, but not too much. 
They provide funding and approve the activities. Whatever activity is 
designed by the ministry via the component management has to go 
through the World Bank (NSA representative in SL: XX702).   
Observation 4q: Donors have nothing. All they do is to give money. Donors 
should tie their aid to politicians or to the scrupulous management by 
politicians. We are taking about 8m dollars that has been taken by the 
president of the legislature. What did donors do about this for example? 
(NSA representative in LBR: XL703). This respondent was reacting to the 
failure in his view by the international partners to hold local authorities 
accountable and questioning their continuing willingness to fund various 
reforms without seriously holding politicians in particular to account for 
these funds.  
There is a genuine recognition and appreciation of the lead role donors have been played 
and continue to play in the PFM reform process in these countries, but there is also 
consensus on the need for local ownership and leadership for PFM reforms going forward. 
Interview participants frequently rephrased the researcher’s question and asked two 
contrasting questions - what is driving the PFM reforms and what should driver PFM reforms? 





relevance and influence of development partners in initiating and driving previous and 
current reforms, but at the same time participants also agree on the need for greater local 
ownership and political support and on the use of country systems going forward. 
Observations  
Observation 4r:  I think right now what is driving reforms is donor support 
and institutional development, but ideally you would want local ownership 
and political support to be at the top (Donor representative attached to the 
MOF in SL: XX102_301). 
Observation 4s: Approach of the donors has been one of the problems – 
the projects and programs were often to donor-driven. But a lot has 
changed recently with a lot more emphasis on using country systems. But 
the downside has been having civil servants in strategic positions that do 
not have any clue or experience in implementing development projects 
before. This definitely has had negative impact on the implementation of 
donor funded development projects in some cases (Sector Ministry official 
in LBR: XL403). 
 
The researcher also finds evidence from the accounts of interview participants and from 
other published sources and government documents that show international development 
intervention in PFM to have been more influential during periods of crisis in both countries, 
and as a means to stabilise their economies by using budget support to finance budget 
deficits. Observations 4s to 4w lay out some of the evidence to support the role of budget 
support in PFM and the economies of the two cases as a whole.    
Observation 4t: GBS which was mostly tied to PFM reform activities, was 
particularly relevant in the context of a post-conflict Fragile State in both 
countries and during the external shocks such as the decline in commodity 
prices (for example, decline in Iron Ore prices between 2012 to 2014) and 
the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa in 2014 (Evaluation of GBS 2002 to 2015 
- ( Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016, pp. 18-20). 
Observation 4u: “Three significant assessments undertaken in 2007 and 
2008, all concluded that Budget Support made an important contribution 
to kick-starting economic growth and stabilising the security situation – 
Thomson (2007), Lawson (2007) and Poate et al (2008)” (in ( Ecorys and 
Fiscus, 2016, p. 19). 
Observation 4v: Our [meaning the IMF] fourth role is in periods of crisis to 
provide exceptional financing. So recently eh… during the Ebola we gave 
what is called the catastrophic containment relief trust, which is a new 
program that we have just added. Also, during the global financial crisis, 





Observation 4w: As a matter fact, donor [are so influential] so much so far 
because of the shocks we envisaged apart from that global depreciation, 
and we also had the Ebola, etc. So, if you talk about local ownership it is a 
challenge as a country to grasp with all those things. We are still struggling 
to keep up with all these economic activities, it hadn't been for help of the 
donors. So, the donors somehow play a vital role leading us to where we 
are (Senior MoF official in SL: XX304).  
Observation 4x:  And that there is no spirit associated behind the 
implementation of these reform measures. They [PFM reform programs 
and activities] are influenced more or less by the need for authorities to be 
able to finance the budget deficit. Most of these programs come with 
additional financing and budget support. The authorities push on most of 
these programs for... in the case of the IMF they provide a major source of 
balance of payment support and balance of payment deficit financing. So, 
the authorities are most interested in closing the gap in the deficit for 
balance of payment in obtaining additional budget support. Their failure in 
not having such supports will lead to widening of the deficits. These are 
some of the reasons I think donor partners will have to take into 
considerations (Senior MoF official in SL: XL302). 
 
The relevance and impact of development partners’ involvement have often been 
questioned, and this include concerns about the appropriateness of donor instruments such 
as PEFA used in measuring reform progress. In short, questions have been raised about the 
level of progress made on paper as against realities in those countries and the mechanisms 
used to assess these countries. Given the latter, the retrospective nature of PEFA 
assessments (covering the last three years) provide a defence for domestic authorities in 
their criticism of PEFA. But more so, they are critical about PEFA because the benefits of 
certain reform programs are only realised in the future, which may underscore why PEFA 
focuses mostly of progress gains (such as whether the is budget is prepared and on time, the 
kind of reports prepared, etc.).  
Observation 4y: If you look at the kind of progress, PEFA is good at look at 
process gains. It is not really about the impact in major changes regarding 
service delivery. For example, we are training auditors, we are recruiting, 
and those are the things really impact the positive ratings of PEFA (NSA 
representative in SL: XX 702). 
Observation 4z: And PEFA will not be graded based on the building blocks. 
What the grading will look at is that you have not been able to reach the 
top, irrespective of the significant movement upwards.  I think there should 
be a room where improvements like these should be captured within the 
PEFA framework.  PEFA doesn't look at the details. If you take for example, 





you set a target that you get agency A [certain number of agencies]. If you 
get there fine, and if you don’t get there is the problem. For example, 
getting to the top is about building blocks until you get finally get there 
(Senior reformer in the RCU in LBR: XL306). 
Observation 4aa: I would say inconsistency in PEFA ratings for us if you look 
at it there appear some misgivings about the ratings regarding progress 
and challenges. You will see that in meetings where these PEFA scores are 
presented to the component managers and they tend to argue that certain 
scores do not reflect the reality. If you look at the kind of progress, PEFA is 
good at looking at process gains. It is not really about the impact in major 
changes regarding service delivery. For example, we are training auditors, 
we are recruiting, and those are the things really impact the positive ratings 
of PEFA. For me, I do not tend to agree with the ratings because from the 
NSA point of view my interest is how system changes or the institutional 
support – from the provision of equipment, payment of salary and 
recruitment of experts. Are these leading to improved service delivery on 
the ground? Are people feeling the impact of the reforms? (NSA 
representative in SL: XX702). 
 
Hypothesis 4b: The donor-driven reforms and the associated progress made so far does not 
translate into improved services for the people because of there are limits to what could be 
achieved from externally driven reforms, especially in the short-term. 
Observation 4ab: I do agree with XL406 (Sector Ministry official in LBR), but 
we should be able to determine what we want to do. For example, there 
are cultures and traditions when you visit a village people are not used to 
using public toilets in city centres. So, if a donor comes are say we need to 
build public toilets in city centres. People would prefer to go to the bush 
traditions because people don’t want to be seen going to the toilet. So, 
building a toilet in the city centre is a waste, because that toilet will be 
there idle. We need to need a particular reform program before such a 
program should be designed and implemented. Otherwise, any efforts in 
implementing such a reform program will go in vain.  
Observation 4ac: So, the triggers are working to some extent, but then we 
still need more triggers for pro-poor spending and accountable use of 
public resources. And to me, the failures of government to even undertake 
the PET survey is an indication that some of these triggers are not working 
because the PET survey has been one of the conditions that donors have 
been putting. So, this opens the question of whether the triggers are 
working in all sectors. So, you say some are working, but the one that 
should create real impact is not working (NSA representative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 4ad: We must note that consultants do not solve problems, 
they hear from you and put that into their own perspectives which are 
driven by their interests and background for the most part. Consultants are 
mostly interested in the continuation of their work and this is key to what 





Observation 4ae: These are the informalities that need to be curtailed, and 
the donor will not be able to do that. So, the donors only focus on technical 
aspect without looking at the broader social fabric of society. You will find 
out that what they are doing has a lot of limitations on the ground (NSA 
representative in SL: XX702).  
Observation 4af: “Informal rules rather than formal institutions constitute 
the principal threat to the reform effort. …because they are embedded in 
society and its culture, they will remain ‘necessary evils’ that the donor 
community can at best contain, not erase altogether” (Hydén, 2005, p. 17). 
See also chapter two - section xx, the role of informal structures and from 
section on PEA.  
 
INFERENCE: hypothesis 4b passes the gun ownership tests18 (‘weaker’ smoking-gun tests) - 
there is decisive evidence to support the arguments in observations 4ab to 4af, but the 
evidence is less obvious at first glance. Perhaps, as a result of the inherent attribution 
challenges that continue to plague efforts toward assessing the impact of PFM reforms. But 
more so, because of the different pieces of evidence that one must assemble to make a 
determination about sufficiency. The best explanation in support of hypothesis 4b is in 
observation 4ab. The scenario explained by the respondent goes to the heart of the 
approach to PFM by development partners. The scenario speaks to the need for home-
grown reforms, and as well as the need to approach reform from a problem-driven 
perspective. But more so, the scenario in observation 4ab also highlights the real danger or 
the potential for complete failure of these development programs if the right approach is 
not taken by donor partners. Even if we presume for example, that international 
development support to PFM is designed based on the local context which alone, is not an 
assurance that the desired results of those programs will be achieved. And even more 
compelling evidence of the limit of international intervention in PFM, in terms of what could 
be achieve is presented in observations 4ad & e.   
 
While there is a genuine belief among some donors that current reforms do not actually 
address the most fundamental problems in these countries, they also believe the 
                                                          
18 This form of evidence is decisive but is not always obvious at first glance. Which means the researcher 
has to piece together different pieces of evidence and combine that with context to make a determination 
on sufficiency. For example, this is a form of smoking-gun evidence that does not only look for the 
possession of a murder weapon at a crime scene, it also looks for other evidence such as fingerprints and 
other details that indicate ownership of the murder weapon. In the context of PFM reforms, possible clues 
could be whether reforms are home-grown or the extent of international footprint on these reforms, 





assessments that trigger these reforms, at least, go a long way in diagnosing some of the 
problems. And with time, and with persistent efforts they will be able to address the most 
fundamental truths that underpin PFM performance in those countries (see observations 
4ag & h below). However, some donor representatives still believe current approaches are 
perhaps the best available, at best because, they are best practices - as one of the 
respondents noted these reform models are what he called the ‘Rolls Royce versions’, or at 
worse, they help trigger action from local authorities (see observations 4ah & I below).  
Observation 4ag: “Well this is what we are interested in. I wouldn’t tell you 
that the laws alone will bring enormous changes. But one thing I know is 
that with this new act it empowers those at the technical and policy level 
to help to drive the PFM reforms” (NSA representative in SL: XX107). 
Observation 4ah: What I will say is that donor support influenced policy 
change at that time and only few people will tell you this because…. I did it 
personally that’s why I said I am doing this in my personal capacity and not 
the view of the IMF (Donor representative in SL: XX101). 
Observation 4ai: “Of course! Those experiences we bring to bear which to 
me they are like Rose Royce versions among cars... ehh! You can think 
about it they are like top-notch experience” (Donor representative in SL: 
XX101). 
Observation 4aj: “The budget support is only inviting those instruments to 
come into the reform process. We believe that if the instruments are in 
place, and then, local governments have the capacity to interpret those 
instruments and make them effective within government, then donors will 
claim to have made some progress” (Donor representative in LBR: XL101). 
 
Hypothesis 4c: Donor interests determine the approach to and nature of the reforms, and 
by extension the pattern and the extent of progress made in PFM reform in developing 
countries. 
Observation 4ak: GEMAP embedded international consultants to takeover 
co-signatory powers, with the overall aim to exact control and 
accountability in public expenditure in Liberia (Chessen and Krech, 2006; 
Dwan and Bailey, 2006; Hope Sr, 2010; Tripathi, 2017 - see also Appendix 
B). 
Observation 4al: Generally, the PFM reform process in Liberia has been 
categorised according to the World Bank into three phases. Phase one 
(2003-2005) was mostly about restoring the status quo ante before the war 
broke out in 1989. Phase two (2005-2008) was about consolidating gains 
under phase one, while also enforcing tight control and accountability in 
PEM notably through GEMAP. And finally, phase three (2009 and beyond) 





long-term institutional development capacity building efforts (Bank, 2012b, 
pp. 1-2 - Appendix B). 
Observation 4am: “So, donors came in the EU and the World Bank came in 
with what they called the Public-Sector Management Support. The EU and 
the World Bank came with some support in the accountant general’s 
department and the budget bureau. In fact, at that time the accountant 
was a British National. I don’t know whether you have been informed about 
the”! (Donor representative in SL: XX101). 
Observation 4an: “Look we had a broken-down system and was like 
somebody coming and saying I want to help you fix your system. We 
needed to get a platform where we can move from and we needed a base. 
I think it was very complementary especially at that time. Imagine we had 
the inspector general of police a foreigner from the UK and all those 
structures were filled by foreigners. Even the accountant general at that 
time was a British. We appreciated that a lot to help us build our structures. 
They were just using us as locals or LTAs because we know the system, 
although there were few other foreign consultants” (Donor representative 
and who also worked as LTA in SL: XX105_303). 
Observation 4ao: “Yes, because especially regarding dealing with the IMF 
then, we needed that technical skills. Before me, it was an expatriate who 
was brought in here who was compiling these tables to deal with the IMF. 
It was more or less thought of to bring in some local expertise, someone 
with that local flavour into the whole process and ensure that capacity is 
being built from within” (Donor representative and who also worked as LTA 
in SL: XX104_302).  
Observation 4ap: Reform experiences mostly guided PFM interventions 
and models in developing countries. For instance, experience with some 
post-conflict countries meant that some countries had to go through more 
robust reform efforts than others. One such case is Liberia which went 
through a more robust, radical and controversial reform in PFM through its 
governance and economic management programme (Shah, 2007). Also, 
Schiavo-Campo (2007) in his review of budgetary institutions in post-
conflict countries suggests that a first entry point for these countries was 
to protect the money – ensuring that public resources both external and 
domestic resources are properly accounted for. More so, post-conflict 
countries often accepted much tougher conditions such as “no aid without 
a program, no program without a budget” (Schiavo-Campo, 2007, p. 436), 
in return for much needed resources for post war reconstruction and 
recovery efforts (Literature review chapter - theory vs PFM reform 
experience in developing countries).  
 
INFERENCE: The interests of donor partners have always remained sacrosanct, often taking 
different shapes and forms, and mostly in line with the global development agenda and 





progress through various stages of its development. Observations 4ak to 4ap above provide 
evidence from multiple sources that is consistent with the hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 4c passes a Hoop test, as it relates to influence of donor interests on the 
approach to and nature of PFM reforms, based on the context in recipient countries. Both 
Sierra Leone and Liberia present typical examples of how donor interests evolved over time 
as these countries gradually progressed from conflict, post-conflict and development stages. 
Donor partner interest immediately after the civil wars in both countries was to ‘protect the 
money’, which significantly influenced the type and nature of PFM reform programs. For 
example, PFM interventions in both countries immediately after their civil wars have been 
described as ‘intrusive’, with tighter controls through programs such as GEMAP and the 
installation of foreign expert as Accountant General in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively. 
The evidence is however, less striking because of the presence of similar evidence of how 
donor interest in PFM evolved over time in countries such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc. as 
these countries developed their PFM systems (Shah, 2007; Schiavo-Campo, 2007; World 
Bank, 2012). 
 
In essence, the approach to and nature of PFM reforms evolved as donor interest changed 
over time. The evolution of donor interest and its impact on the approach to and nature of 
reforms could be traced in the two case study countries even after so many years of 
implementing PFM reform programs. After supporting PFM in both cases for nearly two 
decades, donor intervention in PFM has also shifted recently back to ‘the basics’, with new 
programs such as ‘Building Core Systems’ and ‘The EU State Building Project’ in Sierra Leone 
by DFID and the EU respectively. These programs are examples of the latest shift in interest 
of donor partners in PFM following the devastating impact of the Ebola epidemic in 2014 - 
2015 in both countries.  
 
Hypothesis 4c however, fails to jump the Hoop test, as it relates to influence of donor 
interests on the approach and nature of PFM reforms, based on the global agenda such as 
debt HIPC debt relief and the Paris Declaration. Its failure to jump the hoop test is because 
the interests of DPs to show results have always been central driver irrespective of various 





results that inspire most of the program and frameworks. Failure to jump the Hoop Test 
means this aspect of the hypothesis is therefore ruled out from the process analysis.  
 
Apparently, the overriding interests of donor partners have been the need to show result 
for their development assistance and to remain visible. This desire to show results remain 
critical to donor partners and always override any global development agenda or context-
specific requirement in recipient countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. The need to 
show results does not only influence the approach to or nature of the reforms, but it also 
bears on how donor partners perceive how much progress has been made. The evidence 
presented in observations 4aq to 4at is more decisive and surprising compared to that set 
out in observations 4ak to 4ap above.  Hypothesis 4c therefore passes a smoking-gun test 
based on the evidence in observations 4aq to 4at. Take for example, how surprising or 
unique the claim is regarding the fair on the part of the donor partners, that their efforts [in 
PFM reforms] in Liberia are not seen as fruitless (observation 4aq), or the DFID withdrawal 
from the current PFM program (PFMICP) under the multi-donor trust fund because of their 
inability show results or justify any further budget support from their HQ (observations 4ar). 
Another example is the frequent and ad hoc revisions to the PAF under the multi-donor trust 
fund in Sierra Leone because of the continuous shifts in the interests of donor partners 
(observation 4as).  
 
Observation 4at below provides even more compelling evidence showing how the interest 
of donor partners continue to supersede the global PFM reform agenda such as the Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Agenda, both of which emphasis the use of recipient country 
systems. The desire to show results by donor partner have had and continue to have direct 
implications for the approach to and ongoing implementation of PFM reform programs in 
both countries. These implications on PFM are very visible, viz-a-viz the significant off-
budget support programs in these countries. For example, off-budget support to Liberia in 
2016/2017 fiscal year was estimating to be nearly twice of the country’s annual budget for 
that year. In contrast, Sierra Leone has only managed to have four (DFID, AfDB, EU and the 
WB) general budget support donors, with a declining average contribution per year, except 






Observation 4aq: “One of the problems we have in this country is the 
unwillingness of the donor community, led by the US and EU to take 
concrete steps against the government simply because if they do, the 
international community will interpret it that their efforts in Liberia would 
seem to have failed. So, they allow this woman to get away with a lot of 
nonsense with the hope of succeeding in the country. But they are not 
succeeding in reality. The modus operandi is to remain quiet, so their 
efforts are not seen to have gone in vein. The Americans and Europeans 
have fallen in love with the president, so every government is sending a 
female ambassador to come to Liberia to promote women empowerment. 
They are all lost in the women empowerment stuff”! (NSA representative 
in SL: XL703). 
Observation 4ar: “That is not good, and I must say that even headquarters 
are a little bit worried about PFM reforms in Sierra Leone. If you look at the 
past, especially the multi-donor budget support conditions by budget 
support partners were mostly based on PFM reform measures to the 
extent that even headquarters are now fed up of seeing PFM in our 
programs. Of course, and DIFD is finding it extremely difficult to even make 
a justification for a case for budget support to their headquarters” (Donor 
representative in SL: XX106). 
Observation 4as: XX105_303: The divergence in donor interests even 
within the multi-donor trust fund, led to frequent, and often ad hoc 
revisions of the joint donor Progress Assessment Framework (PAF) This 
experience was noted by one of the interview participants, who was an LTA 
and key player for the government in the early stages of the reforms and 
working for one of the donor partners during the time of the interview. He 
made the following remarks: “… for now to me the donors, even though 
the coming of the donors sometimes is that they have areas of interest 
which are very dear to them sometimes.  Definitely they have to revise the 
approach [viz-a-viz the multi-donor trust fund and PAF] because some of 
them are much interested in certain areas” (Donor representative and who 
also worked as LTA in SL: XX105_303).  
Observation 4at: XL302: “I think it is a combination of other factors. It is not 
just trust issues. I think also most of the donors are interested in showing 
their presence. Visibility. They want to show results. I think they feel that it 
is easier to show results when the work outside country systems. And if 
you do direct budget support what you have done is you have you put 
resources through the budget which is more difficult to show results than 
through their programs. It is about visibility which to some extent political. 
Some of the bilateral agencies they want to show that they are making 
impact. They can easily show this if they run off-budget programs” (MoF 
official in LBR: XL302). 
 
Further implications of the desire of donor partners to show results/impact is also reflected 
in the approach by individual donors. The extent of the preference to show results differs 





domestic authorities interviewed in Liberia for the high-handedness of their approach in that 
country.  But more so, the philosophy and approach of USAID affects even their 
interpretation and the level of ownership they are willing to grant to domestic authorities 
(see observation 4au below). This approach to PFM by USAID in Liberia is significant, 
especially in light of its position as the biggest development partner. This, in turn, according 
to some interview participants has implications for smaller donor partners with regard to 
the nature of their PFM interventions and overall aid modality- see observation 4av below.  
Observation 4au: “For the African Development Bank knowing that this is 
an African institution with more or less right we want to build the capacity 
of government, so they can take ownership and there is some level of 
responsibility. But when you ask USAID that question, they will tell you this 
is the usual way of doing things we don't channel directly funds to 
government. What they do is to pass it to other entities because of lack of 
trust.  Sometimes I will say it is the management system sometimes they 
have problems with.  So, they usually channel finances to other institutions 
not directly to the government budget. For us, what we have done 
overtime is to be able to use the country's system.  For example, we have 
helped to build the capacity of the public procurement concession 
commission so that the system or our own procurement rules to that of 
Liberia transcend. Where we give responsibility to the procurement 
authority to be able to champion some of these procurement issues.  We 
are able to give government that support to take some level of ownership. 
The definition of ownership and the confidence that goes with it varies 
based upon who you talk to. If you talk to USAID that will be there problem, 
but with the African Development Bank we recognised these problems but 
also, we try to help the government to build capacity.  We have the aid 
management platform at the ministry of finance so that we can ask all 
those donors and not just the African Development Bank to submit their 
budget to that unit so we submit the disbursement projections to so you 
can populate that into the system, so that they can be able to holistically 
capture everything that comes from the donors (Donor representative in 
LBR: XL102). 
Observations 4av: “Their actions also have implications for other donors 
who mostly look up the bigger development partners like the USAID. I 
believe if the USAID should give more direct budget support this will help 
influence other donors to do the same” (MoF official in LBR: XL309). 
The following additional implications are deduced by the researcher regarding the desire by 
donor partners to show results for their development assistance. First, donor partners’ 
interest in showing results has led to the design of PFM reform programs as ends, and not 
as means to deliver real change or enhance service delivery. I present in observations 4aw 






Observation 4aw: Reform programs have been limited to changing the face 
of institutions (merger of the finance and development ministries; setting 
up institutions, enacting laws, hire new employees, install automated 
systems, transform business processes, etc.) and fails to actively create the 
platform to improve the functionality of those institutions, systems and 
processes in the long term, and improved accountability for results. In 
another word, it is not enough to design programs, build institutions, install 
new systems, change business processes, create new departments, recruit 
new personnel and expect to achieve the desired results. I presented under 
hypothesis two in the process tracing analysis various forms of evidence 
(observations 2l & m) that show how donor interest helped shaped the 
nature, pattern and extent of progress made in the PFM reform efforts in 
the two case studies and elsewhere (see also Appendices A & B respectively: 
PFM Reform Outputs and Analysis of Their Efficiency and Effectiveness). 
Observation 4ax: “The Swedish message has all the time be to slow down 
and be realistic is what has to be done. They should not roll out IFMIS to 
107 entities before the 50 [to which IFMIS has already been rolled out to] 
starts functioning properly. They should take steps and build on what is 
there and take a closer look at sector ministries. The whole PFM system is 
not an end in itself, but it is more like supporting service delivery. We need 
to look from the angle of the ministries in term of what do they need in 
terms of PFM tools, competence and capacity to deliver services more 
effectively. One is to have more focus on sector ministries and of course, 
continue with the systemic reforms – improving the budgeting and 
procurement processes and having all the documents in place, good assets 
and inventory management. So, the budget comes on time, the salaries 
come on time, and so there is a monitoring system in place. We have been 
trying to influence the World Bank in slowing down the reform process” 
(remarks from a representative from one of the donor partners actively 
involved in PFM in Liberia: XL103). 
Observation 4ay: The following studies from Matt Andrews also present 
similar findings consistent with the findings in this thesis: Andrews, M. 
(2009) Isomorphism and the limits to African public financial management 
reform; Andrews, M. (2011) Which Organizational Attributes Are 
Amenable to External Reform?;Andrews, M. (2013) The Limits of 
Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions; 
Andrews, Matt (2013) Explaining positive deviance in public sector reforms 
in development. See also Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett & Michael 
Woolcock (2013) Escaping Capability Traps Through Problem Driven 
Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). 
 
The evidence laid out in observations 4aw -y above clearly support the idea that PFM 
reforms in developing countries have been a kind of a transactional process, not just 
between donor partners and national governments, but also between the core of central 





agencies and departments and local councils). On the one hand, donor partners propose 
series of reforms programs (mostly through assessment reports and recommendations as 
the basis for new PFM reform programs) in exchange for developing countries promise to 
implement those programs. These reform programs often come with conditions/triggers 
which recipient countries are expected to fulfil in return for GBS from donor partners (see 
observation 4a).  
While on the other hand, central government (mainly the ministry of finance) roll out reform 
programs to MDAs and local government for implementation, often with no real ownership 
and commitment from MDAs and local councils to finance and sustain those reforms in the 
future (see observations 4az - 4ab below). The ultimate result from such a transactional 
nature of these reforms is the fact that the focus keeps changing from one reform program 
to the next pressing reform activity, with local authorities spending considerable time and 
resources on activities that are less germane to the survival and sustainability of the reforms 
(see observations 4ac - 4ad). This creates perverse incentives for local authorities to direct 
all efforts to meet donor conditions, especially reform programs attached to budget support 
triggers. This, in turn, has direct implications for both PFM performance (fluctuations in PEFA 
scores, variations in performance across the budget cycle) and the sustainability of the gains 
that have been achieved. The evidence presented in this section will be triangulated and 
compared with PEFA scores over time for both case studies and PEFA scores from large-N 
studies in the main text.  
Observation 4az: The council cannot fund IFMIS, and even the PETRA now 
the ministry of finance is paying, and the council is not paying for the 
license. If you take into consideration revenue generation and council’s 
expenditures, it will be difficult to support the IFMIS with council funding 
(Local council official in SL: XX501). 
Observation 4aa: Yes, tensions will come normally when a ministry [agency, 
department of local council] refuses to take ownership for example, with 
the IFMIS. When there were operational difficulties. They had damaged 
equipment and they had to requisite the LAN and the ministry didn’t want 
to take ownership for that and instead wanted the reform unit to use funds 
from the project. Even after agreeing to a MOU stating that line ministries 
should take such responsibility (MoF official in LBR: XL302).  
Observation 4ab: “There was no internal audit because it was a two-man 
show. Now there is directorate of internal audit in the ministry of finance, 
and now a section has been created for internal audit in the new PFM act. 





know for the current ministry, but he was supporting the idea for internal 
audit to become an agency, but that will have to take time” (Donor 
representative in SL: XX107). 
Observation 4ac: I present here examples of how PFM reform has 
progressed over time within a number of PFM dimensions, with little or no 
focus in improving the functionality of the unit/department or system 
concerned. I present two examples with internal audit and IFMIS reforms 
to demonstrate the kind of progression I am talking about. 
 
Internal Audit reforms: Coupled with already available evidence on internal audit reforms in 
Sierra Leone, I also draw on information from a senior internal auditor in the ministry of 
finance to explain the continuing shift in focus within internal audit without proffering 
concrete solution to the underlying problem of internal audit. A number of reforms have 
happened within internal audit such as the creation of an internal audit unit in the ministry 
of finance, transformation of the unit to a directorate, creation of the internal audit manual, 
recruitment of internal auditors and placement of internal auditors in various MDAs. 
Irrespective of all these developments, internal audit remains the least performing 
dimension in every PFM assessment including PEFA. Clearly, all these developments within 
internal audit do not address the fundamental problem of internal audit. So, what are the 
problems with internal audit? I identify two fundamental problems from my conversion with 
this informant: the lack of pre-auditing of transactions and the absence of a mechanism to 
hold internal auditors accountable for their actions or inaction. These problems are however 
not mutually inclusive, rather they reinforce each other.  
 
In Sierra Leone for example, it is both by law and common practice that public officials can 
only be held liable for wrongdoings if they approve or countersign financial transactions. The 
lack of any pre-auditing of transactions means completely exoneration of internal auditors 
because an auditor might say he/she did not sign on any documents, and therefore is not 
liable for any wrongdoing. Another excuse for internal auditors could be they were not 
aware about certain transactions, irrespective of the fact that they have a duty of due 
diligence or to raise the red flag of any potential wrongdoings. According the informant, 
“because of the weakness in [their] structure that is why [they] are more of Pathologists 
than Doctors. There is not much difference between external auditors and [them - internal 
auditors], and hence the same issues keep coming up every year because there are no 





accountable exposes them to all the informal networking and arm-twisting that go on within 
MDAs. Which further undermine their integrity, professionalism and even diminishes any 
value addition that they might contribute as internal auditors to the PEM in the country.  
 
Even under the current pilot program (execution of pre-audit of transactions by internal 
auditors) with the ministry of defence, who are the only institution being pre-audited, 
officials in the defence ministry will deliberately refuse to send certain transactions to the 
internal auditors for pre-auditing before making payment to vendors. This practice seriously 
undermines the very essence of pre-auditing if most of the transactions or the biggest 
procurements contracts are being hidden from the auditors. What this also tell us is that 
merely allowing pre-auditing by internal auditors will not solve all the problems, there is no 
enforcement mechanism for non-compliance from Vote Controllers and some form of 
accountability mechanism for internal auditors. For example, the latest reform within 
internal audit being pushed by donor partners in the current PFMICP is to have internal audit 
committees in every MDA and a national audit committee in the ministry of finance.  
 
According the informant this is also another effort that does not address the fundamental 
problem of internal audit in the country. He argued “the issue will still not be solved because, 
as of now, there is no internal audit act/clause in the [new] PFM Act that penalises MDAs for 
failing to implement internal audit recommendations, and also enforce pre-auditing of 
transactions before payments are made”. It is therefore almost certain that the same old 
problems within internal audit will continue to come up.  
Observation 4ad: I think there is always that kind of conflict of interest… 
how do donors measure progress in-country and what do countries really 
need. And countries in general do spend a lot of time trying to achieve 
things that do not really mean all that much (Donor representative 
attached to MoF in SL: XX102_301 - the experience of an ODI fellow during 
her placement in the Ministry of Finance in Sierra Leone).  
 
IFMIS Reforms: The statements (Observations 4ae - f) in the following paragraphs also 
demonstrate the thinking of some of the donor partners and the apparent failure to address 
the fundamental problems affecting IFMIS even with the proposed upgrade. From reading 
the below statements, it is clear that the proposed IFMIS upgrade will still face challenges 





ongoing financing of licensing and technical support from the IFMIS vendor, poor ICT 
infrastructure and electricity problems in the country. And more importantly the 
unwillingness of local authorities to finance and take ownership of IFMIS going forward 
(please refer to my previous process-tracing analysis and arguments of IFMIS in hypothesis 
two, observations 2ae - 2am).  
Observation 4ae: “You see the IFMIS that is where the major problem of 
Sierra Leone PFM has been. Yes, the current IFMIS is working, yet it is not 
technically fit to support most of the reforms. Presently the budget module 
and the financial management module aren't integrated, and the interface 
problems with the national revenue authority is a problem. So, I think 
during the last review we have discussed under the PFMICP that we need 
a robust reimplementation of the reforms. So, we are going to have a more 
advanced version of the IFMIS FreeBalance and that will take care of most 
of these issues (Donor representative in SL:XX107). 
Observation 4af: “Yes, we have a lot of connectivity problem here. I agree 
with you entirely on IFMIS - there are lots of problems with the 
implementation here, but with this new upgrade that is coming on board, 
it will fall in line and a lot of these issues will be resolved.  The roll-out does 
not depend on the technical functions of the IFMIS. The roll-out to other 
MDAs should have done, but licensing, connectivity are the problems. Even 
in Liberia the technical issue is also a problem. But capacity in Liberia is the 
real problem, and the legal framework to support the implementation is 
another problem. Strengthening the Accountant Generals department is 
another big problem there” (Consultant who worked in both SL and LBR: 
XL308-XX306). 
GROUP FIVE HYPOTHESIS: ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF PFM REFORMS  
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PFM performance as shown in the figures above for Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively 
improved immediately after their civil wars, which also culminated with significant 
improvements in fiscal dynamics such as ODA, GDP growth rate, Domestic revenue, and 
government debt in the same period.  Apart from this initial pattern, there is no clear 
relationship between PFM performance and the four economic variables considered in the 
above figures for the two countries. PFM performance in the two countries remained on 
average, relatively low and did not change significant over the period 2002 - 2017. Beyond 
these broad patterns, it seems almost impossible to be able to draw any meaningful 
inferences regarding the nature of any possible causal relationships between PFM 
performance and the fiscal dynamics covered in the above figures.  
 
However, the two countries experienced similar events over the period under review that 
might provide more context into how fiscal dynamics might have directly or indirectly 
influenced PFM performance, the level of appetite or commitment to PFM reforms, or vice 
versa. Specifically, the two countries had gone through post-conflict, recovery and 
development, external shocks (global economic crisis in 2008 and the fall in commodity 
prices around 2013-2014) and natural disasters (the Ebola Outbreak 2014-2015). I discuss 
these events under two broad categories - Post-conflict and recovery; and development.  
 
Post-conflict and Recovery Phase (2002 - 2008): 
First, the period immediately after the conflicts was characterised by improvements in all 
the fiscal dynamics and increased efforts in PFM. Emerging from civil conflicts, both 
countries started from a low base, and suddenly recording significant improvements in fiscal 
dynamics. But the immediately post-conflict period also witnessed increased PFM reform 
activities brought about by the PRSP agenda and the HIPC debt relief initiative. As part of 
the HIPC debt relief initiative, these countries had to implement several PFM reforms in 
return for debt cancellations. At the HIPC completion points, aid flows to the two countries 
had reached its highest level, with declining government debt, reaching its lowest levels in 
the history of the two countries in 2006-2007 and 2008 in Sierra Leone and Liberia 
respectively.  
 
As with many post-conflict countries, there was also improved economic activities with rising 





in the reform process reported in these countries in the immediate post-conflict and 
recovery era. Interviews and information from published sources and my previous analysis 
under hypothesis four provide compelling and detailed evidence about how budget support 
under the Multi-Donor Trust Fund in the two countries have been the main instrument used 
by donor-partners to drive PFM reforms. More than half of all budget support triggers in 
Sierra Leone for example, were related to PFM reforms. Local authorities in turn saw PFM 
reforms as an important aspect to attract foreign aid. In the words of one interview 
participants “government needed the structures for decentralisation and PFM reforms, 
because the only way to have more money [from donor-partners] is when you have 
structures and PFM reforms and getting various financial management acts” (Interview: 
XX105_303). But it is also extremely constraining, in the light of other evidences to entirely 
attribute the initial progress in PFM to aid and debt cancellations. In part, because there is 
no clear relationship between the economic variables and PFM performance as shown in the 
figures above. But also, the evidences presented in the discussions of other hypothesis 
suggest Liberia and Sierra Leone, like many countries that started from a low-base with the 
current wave of PFM reforms had gone to record significant gains in the early stages of their 
reforms. Although, findings from the World Bank (Fritz et al. 2014) note that these group of 
countries mostly benefited from debt relief, but the authors also note that the result is the 
same for other low-income countries that started their PFM reforms from a low-base.  
 
Development Phase (2009 - 2017): Unlike the immediate post-conflict and recovery phase, 
development phase in the two countries experienced an average decline in the economic 
variables under review. But PFM performance on average remain the same in Sierra Leone 
and with some minor improvements in the case of Liberia. Again, unlike the post-conflict 
phase the recovery and development witnessed different set of economic dynamics that 
elucidate on our understanding of the relationships between PFM reforms and the economic 
variables under consideration.  
 
First, the two countries experienced significant boom in economic activities brought about 
by revenue from iron and other commodity exports. As a result, domestic revenue and real 
GDP (including mining revenue) grew significantly during the recovery and development 
phase. The central argument has been when economies grow, they provide a strong 





evidence from the two countries however show little enthusiasm in support of the economic 
argument as a driver of PFM reforms or PFM performance, among other hypothesised 
factors such as politics, donor support and institutional factors. But some interviewees still 
share the view that improved economic performance could contribute to progress in PFM. 
For example, a booming economy could bolster support from the pubic or foster innovation 
in the PFM process and provide greater leverage to local authorities to pursue reforms that 
are home-grown (observations 5a-d).  
 
Meanwhile, there is compelling evidence from the interviews and realities on the ground 
during the period under review that show to a large extent, the rise in domestic revenue and 
GDP did not positively influence PFM reform progress. Irrespective of the increased revenue 
from mining exports, local support (especially financial support) to PFM reform as shown in 
chapters five and six remained a fraction of the total support provided (chapters five and six, 
sections xxx and xx). Rather, the evidence suggests increased revenue and GDP as a result 
of mining revenues in the two countries contributed to worsening PFM performance 
(observations 5e-g). Expanding revenues in these countries seem to have triggered the 
impulses of political leaders to more than proportionately double their promises or build 
their political clouts through exponential levels of spending towards their ‘political roots’. 
There was a natural tendency by politicians to plan too large with the expectation that 
revenue streams from mining will continue to flow.  This led to fiscal indiscipline with large 
extra budgetary expenditures and declining PEFA scores for budget credibility and frequent 
in-year revisions of budget ceilings during that period for the two countries.  
Observation 5a: In the status quo, I think the first one is donor support, the 
second is institutional development, and then politics and local ownership 
and the last one is economic factors. I think there is a possibility of PFM 
reforms regardless of the economic situation as you know it’s an ongoing 
process. Just because we have a cash constraint doesn’t mean we cannot 
continue with PFM reforms. Obviously, we with booming economy we will 
have more leverage and it will be easy to carry out reforms, but I don’t 
think that’s a very strong factor (Donor representative attached to MoF in 
SL: XX102_301). 
Observation 5b: Ok! The penultimate which is donor support and practice 
that is the set up that has support PFM reform because during the time of 
economic boom, you know it was the donors that supported the economy 
and helped in PFM reforms (Donor representative in SL: XX101). 
Observation 5c: Stronger economic performance for example, gives a lot of 





if you implement these measures you will have better economic 
performance...better growth and you will have the economy becomes 
attractive to both foreign and local private sector investment. If you have 
strong institutions and robust laws and regulations in the banking and 
financial sectors these will create the optimum conditions for bringing 
about better growth (MoF official in LBR: XL302). 
Observation 5d: Yes, it helps reforms so much, in fact, it brings in 
innovation. If you do not have the resources you could hardly proffer better 
decision, but if the country has the resources, we will be more innovative 
and a lot more proactive in deciding what gets done (MoF official in LBR 
Interview: XL309). 
 
Observation 5e: Exactly, so it is that when economies grows they support 
PFM.I can tell you this is not necessarily yes, because we saw the economy 
grew around 20% in 2012 and 2013 that was around the time when 
government was most reckless because expectations grew and they 
thought that the mining was going to be forever. The increased the salaries 
of parliamentarians by 100% in this country. And if you look at the PEFA 
scores it was very horrible (Donor representative in SL: XX101). 
Observation 5f: : But I have seen during the boost in the extractive industry 
(iron ore exports) between 2012 to 2014 in Sierra Leone, the country had 
a serious issue with fiscal discipline and weak PEFA scores because of the 
increased domestic revenue brought about as a result of iron ore exports. 
It is still too early to make any conclusive claims, but this could undermine 
the economic argument you are making! (MoF official in LBR: XL309). 
Observation 5g: Like you mentioned during the peak of the iron ore 
industry, we did receive a lot of resources. Here use to be a hot spot of 
would be investors coming in and going out. But again, our ownership as a 
government of those resources did not go well in terms of management. 
We did not plan properly. We planned so large with few resources, and so 
we wanted to implement those plans we did not have resources. And come 
with the outbreak of Ebola all other excuses came down to the Ebola thing. 
True EBOLA did bring about some pushbacks in our development process. 
But if we had managed and planned it well! (Member of Parliament in SL: 
XX602). 
 
The experience with the boom in mining revenue in the two countries fits squarely well with 
the broader experience of resource-rich countries, where revenue from natural resources 
tend to drive fiscal indiscipline (see de Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 2010; Fritz, et al., 2014 
and 2017). In light of the empirical evidence from the two countries, it is reasonable to 
therefore, think that countries with higher share of non-tax-based revenue tend to have 
poor PFM performance. Apart from triggering the impulses of political leaders to more than 





expanding resource-based revenues tend to promote rent-seeking behaviours that 
undermine specific aspects of PFM.  
 
First, the governments in both countries have been heavily criticised by many observations 
and concerned citizens for signing bad mining contracts with foreign companies, which 
undermine the taxed-based revenue collections of these countries in the long-term. Albeit 
the huge contributions to GDP from the mining boom in the two countries, with Liberia 
signing six concessions amounting to some $13 billion by 2014, these mining contracts were 
filled with huge concessions to foreign companies. Liberia for example, had royalties on goal 
and diamond and on all other minerals as low as 3% and 5% respectively. For Sierra Leone, 
the royalties were set at 3% in the contracts with African Minerals and London Mining, with 
income tax rates set as low as 6% for London Mining. The income tax rate for Sierra Rutile 
had been 0% since the company started operations in the 1980s until 2013 when the rate 
was revised to 30%.  These are well below the statutory rate of 30% on corporation tax in 
Sierra Leone. Both the London Mining and African Mineral contracts had concessions that 
allowed the companies to mine and export all other associated minerals or mineral 
concentrates apart from Iron Ore.  
 
These bad deals according to critics and civil society organisations, are largely the products 
of rent-seeking behaviours by politicians, who in return get kickbacks from mining 
companies and other favours, such as providing employment opportunities to their 
followers and relatives. A 2014 report called ‘Loosing Out’ by the Budget Advocacy Network 
(BAN) - a group of civil society organisations working in PFM, supported by the charity 
Christian Aid UK, Tax Justice Network-Africa (TJN-A), IBIS, and ActionAid, found that 
concessions in the form of low rates of income tax and royalties, important duty waivers and 
GST to mining companies are principally responsible for the low tax-revenue in Sierra Leone, 
resulting from huge revenue losses to the country. The report estimated that revenue losses 
from tax incentives in 2011 and 2012 amounted to 13.7% and 8.3% of GDP respectively, with 
an annual average loss of $ 199 million between 2010 and 2012. They report further 
projected that revenue losses were estimated to rise to $131 million in 2012-2014, fuelled 
almost entirely as a result of revenue losses from the five mining companies (BAN Sierra 





bottom, on tax-revenue collection among 23 African countries according to an IMF report 
(IMF, 2012, p, 18).  
 
Second, the surge in resource-based revenue from mining has direct implications on 
procurement reform efforts in the two countries. Huge in-year revenue collections from 
mining companies triggered unplanned expenditures, which were often, treated as 
emergency procurements. This could be seen from the drop in PEFA score for indicator 19 
for competitive procurement from C in 2010 to D in 2014 assessment (see PEFA website for 
scores relating to 2010, 2014 and 2018 assessments). Also, according to the Joint-donor 
Progress Assessment Framework (2013) for PFM reforms in Sierra Leone 73% (by value) of 
all government procurement 2012-2013 were conducted through non-competitive practices 
such as sole-sourcing or as emergency procurements (PAF 2013, in Ecorys and Fiscus, 
2016:63). Liberia had similar PEFA scores for indicator 19, with increase in non-competitive 
procurement practices reported in the 2014 assessment, covering the periods during the 
mining boom. Its PEFA scores relating to competitive procurement methods dropped from 
C in 2009 to D in 2014 assessment. 
 
Also, the huge inflows of mining revenues had implications on other PFM dimensions. They 
resulted in increased extra-budgetary expenditures, which were not reported, but also poor 
multi-years perspectives in planning, budgeting and execution. The PEFA scores for 
indicators 7(a) and 12 (a, c & d) for Sierra Leone consistently underperformed (averaging D 
scores) during the mining boom. Liberia’s performance regarding lining policy planning, 
budgeting and execution (indicator 12) dropped during the mining boom, but its scores 
regarding extra-budgetary and unreported exported expenditures improved during the 
same period (PEFA website). Based on these evidences, I therefore, conclude that countries 
with resource-based revenue or a sudden boom in resource-based revenue has directly 
implications on specific PFM dimensions, which further undermines overall domestic tax-
based revenue generation potentials in those countries in the short-term and as well as in 
the future.  
 
As shown in the figures above the two countries continued to experience on average 
increase tax-based domestic revenues, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP 





Sierra Leone in the last decade, has consistently achieved its revenue targets. But Liberia 
overall had higher domestic tax-based revenue than Sierra Leone. Like proceeds from mining 
exports, improvements in tax-based revenues did not as we all have an equally positive 
impact on key PFM indicators such as budget credibility.  Aggregate expenditure and 
revenue outturns (PEFA indicators P1 & P3) both countries dropped significant for most of 
the recovery and development phase, but with some slight improvement in P3 for Liberia in 
the most recent PEFA assessment report. The budget support evaluation in Sierra Leone also 
noted frequent and consistent revisions in budget ceilings and delays in quarterly releases 
to MDAs (Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016:63).  
 
Although, the existence of a strand of literature that countries with increasing tax-based 
revenue tend to have improved PFM systems than rich or resource-based countries (Moore 
2004; Prichard and Leonard 2010;  Fritz, et al., 2017), the evidences in the two countries with 
the increasing tax-based revenues did not equally reflect on their PFM performance. The 
negative effects of improvements in resource-based revenues on PFM systems and overall 
PFM performance surpassed by far, any potential benefits that might have resulted from 
improvements in tax-based revenues from the two countries. According to some of the 
interview participants, the experiences in the two countries during the mining boom, with 
increased resource-based and tax-based revenues, with declining PFM performance during 
the development phase could indicate reverse causal relationships between improved 
economic performance and PFM reform progress (see observations 5h below). 
Observation 5h: Then, the next I would say institutional and management 
arrangement of reforms, and then I will put economic factors… they are 
not associated. Econometrically, they can be a kind of reverse correlation 
(Interview: XX101). 
Observation 5i: The PFM was very important in some ways. Through PFM 
now the government does business only with taxpayers. Before the PFM, 
you could do business with anyone who had a little bit, but the PFM 
required that only registered taxpayers conduct business with the 
government as vendors. There are other important things we are doing 
thanks to the PFM (Internal Audit official in LBR: XL401). 
Observation 5j:  Let us go back to the global PFM architecture or global PFM 
methodology. If IFMIS is just one component of PFM.  Then this another 
thing altogether, but Liberia is way ahead of Sierra Leone in terms of tax 
administration. Liberia has commissioned and is presently using an 
integrated tax administration system.  When you implement automation 
in tax management you will see a lot of revenue inflow in terms of cash and 





integrated tax system. I think it's at the evaluation stage. It will take time 
for Sierra Leone to even commence the implementation (Consultant who 
worked in both LBR and SL: XL308_XX306). 
Observation 5k: For me, revenue is an issue. We need fundamental change 
in revenue. There is a lot going on. We are not looking at the introduction 
of ITAS for domestic and the upgrade from ASSYCYDA++ to ASSYCUDA 
World to be implemented at the NRA. Again, I do not want to come back 
to the extractive industry revenue and the TSA… if we have these, it is the 
lifeblood for any reforms. Revenue management will help improve budget 
credibility (Senior reformer in SL MoF: XX305). 
Observation 5l: These are issues that have a lot relationships with the 
economy and these are the issues that also foster, consolidate, limit or 
undermine formal structures. For example, take tax waivers is where you a 
lot of informality.   The ministry of finance has guidelines and policy 
regarding tax waivers. But then because of the executive and legislature 
mostly subvert those rules have a lot of waivers that they cannot account. 
You will find we have lost billions of tax waivers that are given through the 
back door. There is a study on the tax waiver, and I will look for it (NSA 
represenatative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 5m: All these things have to do with how well the PFM reforms 
have helped in managing the country’s economy. If you have resources and 
your PFM system is strong, with innovative personalities they will vision 
what should be done, regarding the country’s development priorities, with 
the increased domestic resources (Senior official in LBR MoF: XL309).  
 
The positive effects of improvements in tax-based revenue on PFM according to Moore 
(2004) and Prichard and Leonard (2010) was based on the premise that it would lead to 
stronger citizens’ demand for better services and greater accountability. The evidence in the 
two countries do not support the arguments made by those scholars. Rather, citizen’s 
participation according to the open budget survey remain the weakest link among other 
indicators and across the two countries. The scores for participation in the most recent open 
budget survey were 6 and 11 out of 100 points for Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively (see 
Open Budget Survey for Sierra Leone and Liberia for 2015 and 2017). There are currently no 
formal mechanisms in both countries to facilitate public engagement and support external 
audits and participant in audit investigations. Member of public and civil society are not 
called to testify during budget and public account hearings. And there are no mechanisms 
to facilitate public engagement with the executive branch to foster knowledge exchange and 






Also, results from PEFA assessments show that accountability dimensions within PFM are 
among the weakest areas within PFM in the two countries (PEFA reports for the two 
countries from PEFA website). I therefore, argue even if the huge resource-based revenues 
brought about by the mining boom did not negatively affect PFM reform efforts in the two 
countries, the absence or low citizens participation and accountability meant improvements 
in tax-based revenues as well did not have an equal positive effect on PFM reforms. Going 
by the arguments of Moore (2004) and Prichard and Leonard (2010), it is plausible to claim 
that, improvements in resource-based revenues in Liberia and Sierra Leone, in the absence 
of public participation and low accountability must have contributed to the declining PFM 
performance in the two countries.  
 
Meanwhile, the evidence from both countries rather, suggest, improved economic 
performance is associated with improved PFM systems. Although both countries have 
improved tax-based revenues, in absolute terms and as well as a percentage of GDP, Liberia 
on average had higher domestic revenue as a percentage of GDP than Sierra Leone (see the 
figures above; Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016; IMF, 2010). The superior performance from Liberia, 
having come from behind has been attributed by many respondents to improvements in its 
domestic revenue administration (observations 5i-m). Interview participants from the two 
countries recognised the role of improvements in revenue reforms could have had on 
domestic revenue generation and overall economic situation. They cite specific reforms such 
as taxpayer registration, introduction of GST, installation of new systems such as ASSYCYDA 
and International Tax Administration Systems (ITAS). But they also agree that the significant 
advancements in revenue administration in Liberia principally accounts for its superior 
domestic revenue/GDP performance over Sierra Leone.   
 
Other factors that appeared to have been relevant in the economic performance and PFM 
reform discuss, are what some respondents described as the twin-shocks suffered by both 
countries. Although some respondents mentioned the 2008 global economic crisis, the fall 
in Iron Ore and other commodity prices in 2013-2014 and the Ebola Outbreak in 2014 are 
considered by respondent to have had the most impact on PFM reform efforts in the two 
countries (observations 5n-s below). While the Ebola Outbreak did have impact on 
economies of the two countries, evidenced through the significant decline in GDP and 





I draw on two specific reasons to explain the lack of clear links between Ebola Outbreak and 
PFM performance. First, results from the 2010 and 2014 PEFA assessment for Sierra Leone 
show that PFM performance was already in decline even before the advent of Ebola in 2014. 
But PFM performance in the 2018 PEFA assessment for Sierra Leone also dropped in the post 
Ebola period from 2015-2017. This trend is PFM performance is acknowledged by some of 
the respondents from both countries (see observations 5q-r). It is difficult to make the 
argument that the decline in domestic revenue and GDP during the Ebola Outbreak directly 
had a significant impact on PFM, because improved domestic revenue collection and rising 
GDP in the period leading to the Outbreak (mining boom: 2010-2014) did not lead to better 
PFM performance in the first instance. Perhaps, declining PFM performance got worse 
during the Ebola Outbreak, as one Lawmaker suggest the government had bitten more than 
it could chew in anticipation of rising revenue from mining exports (see observation 5r). The 
arguments I make here does not however rule out potential impact of Ebola on economic 
activities, but its direct effects on PFM reforms seem to have been over-played by local 
authorities.  
Observation 5n: Yes, we have the best policies we are using PEFA but if you 
are having twin-shocks right, because again that is why we are trying to 
diversify. Not to just rely on iron ore, it failed, and it is now a lesson learned 
(Senior reformer in SL MoF: XX305).  
Observation 5o: We need to improve. Take the entire budget how much is 
funded by domestic revenue or our own efforts. Before it was 20/80 but 
then we developed during the mining boost from 2012 to 2014 and then 
the twin-shocks. I think we have gone down an again, and as we speak now, 
we are struggling to meet our budget (Audit Service SL official: XX401).  
Observation 5p: Yes, you have to look at the revenue aspect which 
definitely affects that PEFA. I am not surprised about the current trend in 
PEFA (Senior reformer in SL MoF: XX305).  
Observation 5q: XL301: We start off well!  And yes, we were having a better 
growth rate, the economy was growing to a 2-digit growth rate. That was 
very important for us then. So, these reforms now started sinking to the 
low, but people were appreciating it. Now we have to downsize a bit. We 
actually started dropping [on our PFM performance] even before the Ebola 
came. The Ebola worsened the situation. The prices of principal 
commodities on the world market dropped drastically. To maintain these 
reforms there are also costs associated with them.... This whole politics 
about the storeman, once you don’t have the finance to take care of them, 
no reform is absolutely better to them. That’s why people say hungry men 
are angry men'. There is absolutely nothing you are going to tell the people 





Observation 5r:…and come with the outbreak of Ebola all other excuses 
came down to the Ebola thing. True EBOLA did bring about some pushbacks 
in our development process. But we also did not plan well when we had 
the boom in mining revenues (Member of Parliament in SL: XX602).  
Observation 5s: They are influenced more or less by the need for 
authorities to be able to finance the budget deficit. Most of these programs 
come with additional financing and budget support. The authorities push 
on most of these programs for... in the case of the IMF they provide a major 
source of balance of payment support and balance of payment deficit 
financing. So, the authorities are most interested in closing the gap in the 
deficit for balance of payment in obtaining additional budget support. Their 
failure in not having such supports will lead to widening of the deficits. 
These are some of the reasons I think donor partners will have to take into 
considerations (Senior official in LBR MoF: XL302).  
 
Secondly, while both Liberia and Sierra Leone suffered from the Ebola Outbreak, PFM 
performance (2012 and 2016 assessments) did improve for Liberia during the Outbreak. As 
noted in the previous paragraph, it is therefore plausible to argue that the marginal 
improvements in PFM in Liberia before and during Ebola is associated with its superior 
domestic tax-based revenue/GDP generation capabilities. But my analysis of the fiscal 
accounts and ODA % of GDP of both countries during the period of the mining boom to post-
Ebola (2010-2016) shows that Liberia that Liberia received, by far more ODA than Sierra 
Leone did. As evidenced by its superior PEFA scores for budget credibility (P1, P2, and P3 - 
2009, 2012 & 2016 assessments), Liberia was able to effectively manage inflows from mining 
exports because its development programs were financed almost exclusive by development 
partners.   
 
The country, therefore, had greater discretion about how to spend its domestic tax-based 
revenues and as well as revenues from mining exports. As one of the respondents noted that 
there was a mutual understanding between donor-partners and local authorities that 
requires the government to take care of salaries and other recurrent expenditures, while 
donors-partners fund all development projects in the country (see observations 5t-u). Thus, 
even if the government of Liberia also had ambitious plans in anticipation of increasing 
mining revenues like Sierra Leone, its receipts of huge ODA % of GDP during the period 






Observation 5t: What government really does is to pay the salaries to these 
people who are implementing the project at the ministry of finance.  I will 
say government is spending 90% to 95% of their funds on salaries and this 
is the huge question. If they cannot put funds towards the PFM reform 
process, how can the government take the lead in driving the reforms? 
(Donor representative in LBR: XL102). 
Observation 5u: One minister said to me personally when we raised that 
issue - noting that most of government budget is on recurrent costs. And 
the minister said when they are negotiating with donors, they tell us to 
take care of salaries and recurrent costs.... and let us fund the projects [the 
development budget]. But I think the government has power that is not 
using or is not using it wisely (NSA representative in LBR: XL701). 
 
On the basis of my above analysis of the evidence of the impact of Ebola and fall in 
commodity prices, I strongly argue that these twin-shocks had greater impact on PFM reform 
process in Sierra Leone than in Liberia. My argument is further corroborated by the 
significant decline in domestic revenue as % of GDP and real GDP growth in Sierra Leone 
than in Liberia (see the figures above above). Whiles Liberia’s superior domestic tax-based 
revenue % of GDP did play a role, but receipts from ODA was critical to the country’s 
resilience during the twin-shocks. The high domestic tax-based revenue in Liberia would 
have made little or no impact with the wage bill absorbing more than 70% of its recurrent 
budget. Besides, ODA to the country was consistently higher, representing almost twice the 
national budget in fiscal years 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 (see fiscal tables for 2015/2016 
and 2016/2017 and GoL ODA reports for the same period from the ministry of finance 
website). 
 
The relevance of inflows from ODAs was not uncommon to Liberia alone. Its relevance to 
the PFM reform processes in the two country and across all phases (post-conflict, recovery 
and development) is apparent in the figures above. PFM performance in the two countries 
improved in the aftermath of every surge in ODA across all phases under review.  In the 
period immediately after their civil wars (2002-2005), there was an upsurge in ODA, but so 
too is PFM performance in both countries. Even where ODA did not increase, inflows in the 
form of debt relief at the end of 2007 and 2008 led to improved PFM performance in the 
2007 and 2009 PEFA assessments for Sierra Leone respectively. Similar improvements in 
PFM could also been seen in the 2010 and 2012 PEFA assessments in Sierra Leone and Liberia 





could be explained by the high number of budget support triggers that were related to PFM. 
That meant each time there was an upsurge in ODA, of which, budget was part of, there 
were additional disbursement triggers related to PFM. But as discussed in hypothesis 
relating to donor support, the extent of external support on overall PFM reform progress 
had been limited to mostly upstream and de jure dimensions of PFM.  
 
A more direct relationship was between ODA and domestic revenue as % of GDP, especially 
in Sierra Leone. For most periods domestic revenue declined immediately after an upsurge 
in ODA.  This pattern was observed during the increase in ODA in 2004, 2007 and the increase 
in budget support following the 2008 global economic crisis. Two implications could be 
drawn from this relationship between ODA and domestic revenue in Sierra Leone. ODA 
surged after every crisis: immediately after the civil war and with HIPC debt relief, after the 
global financial crisis and in 2015 following the 2014 Ebola Outbreak. This means ODA was 
used as a countercyclical measure or a response to external shocks that supported 
government functions. But ODA also served as a disincentive to domestic revenue 
mobilisation efforts. Meaning, for every surge in ODA there was a subsequent decline in 
domestic revenue. Similar results were also found in the evaluation of DFID country program 
(Poate et. al., 2008), IFM (2010) and more recently by the budget support evaluation 2004-
2016 (Ecorys and Fiscus FID, 2016:51).  
 
SUMMARY 
My process-tracing analysis of the empirical evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone and the 
extant literature in this area, shows less support for the hypothesis that improved PFM 
systems are associated with strong economic performance as originally alleged by many 
scholars (de Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 2010; xxx). Rather, the evidence points to a reverse 
causal relationship between improvements in economic and PFM systems. This proposition 
is largely true for improvements in resource-based revenues, which tend to undermine PFM 
reform progress in the two countries.  Expanding revenues in these countries seem to have 
triggered the impulses of political leaders to more than proportionately double their 
promises or build their political clouts through exponential levels spending towards their 
‘political roots’. There was a natural tendency by politicians to plan too large with the 
expectation that revenue streams from mining will continue to flow.  This led to fiscal 





credibility and frequent in-year revisions of budget ceilings during that period for the two 
countries. This finding fits well into the extant body of literature that suggest that rich or 
resource-based countries tend to have weak PFM systems or poor PFM performance (de 
Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 2010; Fritz, et al., 2014 and 2017). Apart from triggering the 
impulses of political leaders to more than proportionately increase spending, there is also 
evidence from the two countries that expanding resource-based revenues tend to promote 
rent-seeking behaviours which undermine specific aspects of PFM, such as budget credibility, 
planning, budgeting and execution, procurement reforms, led to frequent in-year revisions 
to the budget ceilings and promoted huge extra-budgetary expenditures. The huge inflows 
from mining exports even undermined efforts towards bolstering domestic tax-based 
revenue generation in the two countries. These findings resonate with earlier propositions 
about the impact of rent-seeking behaviours on reform implementation, especially in 
resource-based economies (Khan and Jomo 2000; Barma, Kaiser, and Le 2012; Okonjo-
Iweala 2012; Levy 2014; Fritz, et al., 2017).  
 
Even with increasing domestic tax-based revenues, the evidence suggests negative effects 
of improvements in resource-based revenues on PFM systems and overall PFM performance 
surpassed by far, any potential benefits that might have resulted from improvements in tax-
based revenues from the two countries. But more so, the conditions (increased public 
pressure for better services and demand for greater accountability) under which 
improvements in domestic tax-based revenue according to Moore (2004) and Prichard and 
Leonard (2010) could lead to improvements in PFM performance were almost non-existent 
in the two countries. The evidences from the two countries point to a reverse causal 
relationship between improved economic performance and PFM reform progress. Several 
reforms, especially improvements in revenue reforms were cited to have contributed to the 
improved economic performance in the two countries. But Liberia’s superior revenue 
administration capabilities were specifically noted to have contributed to its superior 
domestic tax-based % of GDP over Sierra Leone.  
 
While there is a general recognition that fall in commodity prices and the Ebola Outbreak 
did affect the economic situations of both countries, there direct impact of PFM 
performance is less obvious. This is primary based on the fact that PFM performance in Sierra 





Ebola Outbreak could have only worsened the situation because the governments in the two 
countries had already bitten more than they could chew. In other words, they had already 
planned so big in anticipation of the increasing inflows from mining exports. This argument 
is further supported by the experience in Liberia. The country did have moderate 
improvements during the fall in commodity prices and the Ebola outbreak. But Liberia’s 
resilience to the twin-shocks was largely because of its reliance on external aid, which helped 
cushioned the effects of the twin-shocks on government functions.  
 
The relevance of inflows from ODAs was not uncommon to Liberia alone. Its relevance could 
be traced to the PFM reform processes in the two country and across all phases (post-conflict, 
recovery and development). ODA was used as a countercyclical measure or a response to 
external shocks that supported government functions immediately after the civil wars, in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis and following the fall in commodity prices and the 
Ebola Outbreak. Even where its ODA did not increase, inflows from debt relief was critical to 
economies of the two countries. A patter therefore emerged wherein, PFM performance 
improved following every spike in external financial support, especially during the post-
conflict era and after ODA receipts following the global financial crisis. However, every spike 
in ODA or inflows from debt relief created disincentives that affected domestic tax-based 
revenue mobilisation efforts, especially In Sierra Leone (see Poate et. al. 2008; IFF, 2010; 
Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016:51). 
GROUP SIX HYPOTHESIS (Institutional Factors, Design and Management 
arrangements of PFM Reforms)  
Hypothesis 5: Formal institutional development, legal and management arrangements 
have significant influence/implications on current PFM reform progress and overall PFM 
systems quality in developing countries. 
 
FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, LEGAL AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENT OF 
PFM REFORMS 
The process tracing exercise carried out here illuminates on our understanding of the role of 
institutional environment in driving PFM reforms and improving the quality of PFM systems 
through analysis of several institutional components, their structures and interrelationships 
in the two case study countries. These components and interrelationships cover the PFM 





Intergovernmental Relations and the role of NSAs in PFM. The technical-political interface 
includes relations between the MoF and the legislature, relations within the executive and 
relations with donor partners. Intergovernmental relations cover PFM institutional set up 
and governance arrangements in sectoral ministries and subnational government, the 
nature of intergovernmental relations between the MoF and subnational government.  
 
Through observations from primary and secondary sources, I present several evidences for 
each component within the PFM institutional environment that illustrate how formal 
institutional environment and management arrangements alone may not have the desired 
effect on PFM reforms and the quality of PFM systems in the two case study countries. The 
objective of the process-tracing analysis of the various forms of evidence is to either increase 
or decrease support for the hypothesis examine in this section of the appendix.  First, I start 
with the first component, which is the PFM legal provisions that set out the rules and 




COMPONENT ONE: THE PFM LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
I present in this section observations from published sources and interviews from key 
stakeholders in the PFM reform process in the two case study countries to show that while 
there has been tremendous progress in the legal and regulatory framework, significant gaps 
still exist between PFM laws and regulations and their actual implementation in practice in 
these countries.  
OBSERVATIONS: 
Observations 6a: A stock-take of PFM laws, institutions, systems and 
policies I carried out from various sources shows that the legal and 
regulatory framework was the most prominent PFM reform intervention 
area by the end of the 11-year civil war in 2002 in Sierra Leone (Appendix 
A, table A.1) 
Observations 6b: Table 5. 4 PFM Reform Interventions and Activities in 
Sierra Leone also show that the legal and regulatory framework of PFM 
continue to feature significantly in the post war era in Sierra Leone up the 





Observations 6c: Like Sierra Leone, PFM reform interventions and activities 
in Liberia from 2003 to 2016 show similar level of focus and depth in the 
legal and regulatory framework (Appendix B, Table B.3). 
Observations 6d: I also show in observation 1C under hypothesis one that 
much of the made in the two case study countries made (reform outputs 
and outcomes) relate to upstream and de jure dimensions of PFM (see 
Appendices A & B).  
Observation 6e: The scale and depth of progress made in the legal and 
regulatory framework (de jure dimension of PFM) of PFM in developing 
countries is also widely acknowledged in recent PFM literature (de Renzio 
and Dorotinsky, 2007; De Renzio, 2009; Lawson and de Renzio, 2009; de 
Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 2010; Fritz, Sweet, Verhoeven, 2014).   
 
INFERENCE: It is clear from observations 6a-e above that initial PFM reform efforts in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, like of many developing countries were heavily concentrated in building 
the legal architecture.  The detail stock-take and analysis in chapters five and six show 
significant uniformity in the nature and type of laws and regulations enacted in these 
countries - ranging from the organic budget laws and associated regulations, procurement 
law, external oversight, debt management, etc. The stock-tale also reveals most of these 
laws and regulations have been revised, and for some even up to three times in the last 
decade and a half in both countries. The coverage and depth of these laws vary greatly in 
both countries and even between earlier and later versions. The divergence in coverage and 
depth between the two countries are the result of country differences in governance 
structures and systems, while differences between earlier and later versions of specific laws 
emanate largely from the inappropriateness of earlier versions to the local context in these 
countries, often necessitating revisions or enactment of new laws. For example, the latest 
PFM law in Sierra Leone is much wide in scope and depth than the PFM law in Liberia 
because it captures the PFM operations of the national and subnational governments and it 
has new components such as the TSA that was absent from the earlier PFM Act.  
 
Irrespective of the significant gains in enacting new laws and reforming old ones, I also 
provide evidence from both published and primary sources in observations 6f-6k below that 
point to the lack of implementation of the laws and regulations in the two case study 
countries. The reasons cited in the literature (see de Renzio and Dorotinsky, 2007; De Renzio, 
2009; Lawson and de Renzio, 2009; de Renzio, Andrews and Mills, 2010; Fritz, Sweet, 





regulations range from technical to nontechnical factors. But I argue in this section, and 
elsewhere in this thesis that, the apparent lack of implementation of PFM laws, regulations 
and policies are explained largely by nontechnical factors as shown in observations 6f-k. 
Observation 6f: According to the World bank the most critical reason for 
variations in PFM performance in Liberia has been the apparent "gap 
between formal laws, rules and systems and their actual implementation 
in practice" (Bank, 2011c). (Appendic B). 
Observations 6g: The lack of implementation in Sierra Leone applies to the 
PFM Act, regulations and other PFM laws such as the procurement and 
audit laws (See observations 2f & 2j from hypothesis two and 3ag from 
hypothesis three).  
Observation 6h: How effective are these institutions those are issues we 
have to think about, and we are good at that. We are good at developing 
policies. Laws, etc., but when it comes to implementation is the problem 
(Donor representative and who also worked as LTA in SL: XX105_303).  
Observation 6i: There is also evidence from the wider governance and 
public sector reforms literature that suggest the lack of implementation of 
policies, laws and programs is ubiquitous across different reform 
interventions in Sierra Leone (Jackson, 2006; ICG, 2008: Robinson, 2008; 
Fanthorpe & Gabelle, 2013; Jibao & Prichard, 2013; Roseth & Srivastava, 
2013; Srivastava & Larizza, 2013).   
Observation 6j: A number of factors have been argued to contribute to the 
apparent gap between laws and the actual implementation in practice in 
Sierra Leone. The factors cited include the disregard for legal rules and 
procedures; inconsistency between PFM laws and the 1991 constitution 
and LGA of 20004; top-down political decisions; and inappropriateness of 
the laws to the local context and other legislations such as the PPA, LGA 
and Anti-corruption Act (Appendix A). 
Observation 6k: Inappropriateness of the initial PFM laws and regulations 
and political-economy factors were also cited by many interview 
participants among reasons for the implementation gap (See observations 
2o, 2r - 2t from hypothesis two).  
 
INFERENCE: The nontechnical factors present a more compelling argument because there is 
consistency in their presence, and often have greater causal power. On the other hand, the 
existence and influence of technical factors such as the inappropriateness or inconsistencies 
of PFM laws with other laws and regulations could be hard to justify after those initial PFM 
laws and regulations were revised to match the local contexts or eliminated the 
inconsistencies in the two case study countries. The technical inconsistencies in the various 
laws can be corrected, and they have been corrected, which means their mere existence is 





all the PFM laws and regulations will be fully implemented. These technical factors therefore 
only pass The Straw-in-the-Wind test.  
 
The nontechnical factors such as top-down political directives and informal client-patron 
networks are difficult to eliminate, which Hydé famously note are “…embedded in society 
and its culture, they will remain ‘necessary evils’ that the donor community can at best 
contain, not erase altogether” (Hydén, 2005, p. 17). And these nontechnical factors could 
therefore derail the implementation of these laws or reform efforts. In the same token, 
political support and commitment to PFM reforms for example, could almost certainly 
guarantee the implementation of PFM laws.  
In fact, these nontechnical factors explain largely if a law gets passed at all, when or if a law 
fails to pass or stalls. There are numerous observations to illustrate on this claim, but I use 
four specific instances to make the case for this claim. 
Observation 6l: The 2007 stand-off in Sierra Leone between parliament and 
donors who had refused to amend a parliamentary standing order called 
SO75 to allow the Auditor General to make her audit report public 
(observations 3ao from hypothesis three, MoF offificial in SL: XX308, 
Evaluation of GBS 2002 to 2015 - Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016). 
Observation 6m: The new procurement act in Sierra Leone stalled for three 
years before it finally got enacted by Parliament, despite its submission to 
Parliament being included as a PAF indicator in 2012. (Evaluation of GBS 
2002 to 2015 - ( Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016, p.65)). 
Observation 6n: The Parliament of Sierra Leone to date has refused despite 
all the external pressure from donor partners to amend their standing 
order to transfer leadership of the PAC to the opposition as widely practice 
is most Commonwealth countries (See observations 3ap from hypothesis 
three) 
Observation 6o:  The Single Treasury Account only became part of the new 
2016 PFM law in Sierra Leone several years after it was initially proposed, 
and with substantial pressure from the IMF (Interview: XX101). Liberia is 
yet to include TSA in its PFM law, also after several years since it was 
initially suggested by donor partners and MoF officials.  For example, a 
respondent from Liberia made these remarks about the delay in having the 
TSA: “another example is we have been talking about the TSA for the last 
five years, but this has not come to past yet. This is just one example of 
those projects that do not have any financial incentives attached to them” 
(MoF official in LBR: XL306). 
 
INFERENCE: The above observations or evidences (observations 6l-6o) show that 





given their high relevance in determining not only whether a law gets passed, stalled or not 
passed at all, but they also largely explain the lack of implementation of PFM laws and 
regulations. Based on the evidences presented above, one could argue that the deeper the 
roots a specific PFM law has in nontechnical factors, such as political economy issues or 
threaten the political survival of politicians, the greater the likelihood it will encounter stiff 
resistance or derail its implementation. This premise holds true in the two case study 
countries, and it so irrespective of the nature of governance structures or extent of 
complexity of a country’s institutions and wider authorising environment.  With respect to 
the latter, I examine through process-tracing in the next couple of sections about how 
governance structures in the main PFM institutions, their relations with political actors and 
intergovernmental relationships affect PFM reforms and overall PFM systems in the two 
case study countries. 
 
COMPONENT TWO: THE MAIN PFM INSTITUTION (THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE) 
I show in this section that the establishment of new institutions or merger of PFM 
institutions or both and their institutional set up have limited impact of PFM reform progress 
and overall quality of PFM systems. I also show that although it is generally true that more 
complex governance structures and institutional set up may affect reform progress or the 
quality of PFM systems, I present a number of evidences here to show that PFM reform 
efforts and systems could still be derailed or stifled in developing countries with even less 
complex governance structures and institutional set up. Rather, the evidence points to the 
lack of functional improvements in the main PFM institutions in the two case study countries.  
Having emerged in the early 2000s from decade long civil wars, PFM institutions in the two 
case study countries were in a state of complete collapse. But with the new wave of reforms 
immediately after their respective civil wars, these countries have made significant progress 
in building new institutions, set up new departments, units, build capacity, etc., and 
sometimes streamlining their institutions making them less complex. The later in typical with 
the merger in both cases of the ministries of finance and developing planning (see 
Appendices A & B). Although Sierra Leone has subnational governments with some devolved 
service delivery functions and Liberia has county authorities and currently piloting treasury 
functions in four of fifteen counties, the PFM architecture in both countries is less complex 
and financial management functions are highly concentrated in the MoF (observations 6p-





be considered elsewhere career civil servants are political appointees or are appointed 
directly by the presidents in the two countries.  
But even with such highly centralised, simplistic and concentrated financial management 
functions within the MoF in both countries, their MoF still struggle to effectively carry out 
some of their basic functions such as planning, budgeting and execution. For example, the 
performance of the main budget planning, preparation and monitoring instrument MTEF 
has been appalling since it was first launched almost two decades ago in Sierra Leone and 
since 2003 in Liberia (see observations 6r-v). 
 
OBSERVATIONS 
Observation 6p: The PFM laws in both countries place central control and 
significant responsibility to the ministries of finance (The PFM Act of 2016 
in Sierra Leone and the PFM Act of Liberia 2009).  
Observation 6q: PFM reform in Sierra Leone and Liberia like in many other 
countries have been heavily concentrated in the ministry of finance 
{Pretorius & Pretorius, 2008; Allen & Krause, 2013; Allen et al., 2015). In 
Sierra Leone for example, this high degree of concentration in the ministry 
of finance attributed to the fact that nearly all key financial managements 
functions fall within the realm of the MoFED (Welham & Hadley, 2016: 16-
17).  
Observation 6r: Repeat PEFA scores for the two countries indicate 
significant weaknesses in policy-based budgeting and declining 
performance (see appendix E). 
Observation 6s: The MTEF has been cited as being at the heart of the 
problem that continue to plague policy-based budgeting. XL306 an 
interviewee from Liberia MoF  for instance, note “for the MTEF, I honestly 
don't think we have implemented anything in this country.  People feel that 
it is just about having the medium-term budget and the forward estimates”. 
Interviewees also cite the complete disregard for the MTEF principles and 
weak costed sector strategies among other problems affecting its 
implementation (see observations 1g, and 2ap) 
Observation 6t:  MTEF is also widely regarded as one area of PFM that 
gained much attention at the early stages of the reform process in many 
developing countries but continue to perform poorly relative to other areas. 
And they mostly attribute this poor performance of MTEF as part of a larger 
contextual problem with reforms in developing countries (Pretorius and 
Pretorius, 2008; World Bank, 2012, see also Appendix A).  
Observation 6u: MTEF is regarded by many interviewees as a tool to drive 
political agenda, which makes it extremely difficult to separate it from 
everyday political processes in the two case study countries. Other 
interviewees believe MTEF is failing because many in the public sector 





competing objectives and changing preferences among politicians and 
sectoral ministers (see observation 2u, 2ao, 2aq-r). 
Observation 6v:  The way they came up [with MTEF was] not consistent 
with how they were derived in Ghana. Here this started first, and then 
second and third. May be in other countries they got a fundamental system 
at once or may be something led to the other. Here, if you look at the trend 
of all of these developments, they affected us because … before we started 
the MTEF we should have got good governance, and somehow, we didn’t 
have a roadmap of consistency. (MoF official in SL: XX304). 
 
INFERENCE: The evidences presented in observations 6r-v show that even the most powerful 
PFM institutions by law and by institutional set up within PFM in the two countries could not 
effectively perform their roles and responsibilities in driving the reforms or improve PFM 
systems in those countries. The above evidence also shows that the inability of the MoF in 
the two countries to effectively carry out some of their most basic functions are deeply 
rooted in structural, technical and political-economy issues.  And more importantly, the 
evidence found in the two countries about highly centralised PFM functions in the MoF and 
their ability to effectively function is also widely acknowledged in the literature of PFM 
(observation 6t).  
 
 
The Lack of Functional Improvement in the Main PFM Institutions:  
The inadequate functional improvement of the MoF in the two counties irrespective of the 
significant progress made could also be found in most PFM institutions and wider public 
institutions in those countries. This gap between the level of progress made in building PFM 
institutions and their actual functional improvement is presented in the following 
observations (observations 6w-xx) and discussed in the paragraphs that follow.  
 
OBSERVATIONS: 
Observation 6w: Chapters five and six establish the limited functional 
improvements across PFM institutions and the wider public sector. The 
evidence from published sources on Sierra Leone and Liberia are also 
supported by one of the leading scholars Matt Andrews in institutional 
reforms in developing countries (Chapter five and six, sections 5.6.3; 
6.3.2.1 and Andrews and Turkewitz, 2005; Andrews 2011, 2012a, b&c; 
Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, 201; Andrews, 2013). 
Observation 6x: Basically, the notable change regarding PFM reform issue 
in Liberia has been the fact that we have moved from calling for reforms to 
monitoring reforms and demanding accountability within reform itself. For 
instance, we have called for the creation and establishment of structures. 
These structures have been established. The laws have been enacted but 
the laws are being abused by those in power charged with implementing 





accountability from those who hare managing these institutions of PFM 
(NSA representative in LBR: XL703). A civil society activist describing his 
frustrations with the lack of functional improvement in PFM institutions, 
which has led to civil societies shifting their efforts towards improving 
performance and accountability in PFM institutions in Liberia.  
Observation 6y: Unlike the anti-corruption commission (ACC) we don't 
have much with them because in 2010 the three committees in parliament 
signed memorandum of understanding in terms of issues involving 
corruption. What happened - for example with the Ebola report? When the 
report was out the ACC, they jumped ahead they even went to the media 
told the people that... because the PAC in parliament was delaying 
implementing some of the recommendations from the Ebola audit report. 
They went ahead they were in the media saying all sorts of things. We had 
taken ownership of the report at the time and we investigated the culprits 
in the report. But this was not the job of the PAC, rather the attorney 
general. Even the house majority leader also went to the media saying that 
no! the ACC should wait for the PAC - after deliberations then the ACC 
should then come on board. So, there is conflict between the functions of 
the PAC and that of the anti-corruption (Parliamentary Clerk in SL: XX601). 
A member of the parliamentary PAC in Sierra Leone rationalising failures of 
his committee and weaknesses in the institutional set up in the wider 
institutional environment that affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
PAC.  
Observations 6z: Sierra Leone and Liberia have been criticised by many 
local observers, donor partners and independent researchers about the 
continuous failure of their institutions to implement recommendations 
from annual audit reports. The institutions that were cited frequently by 
interviewees were internal audit, procurement, and parliament external 
oversight (Observations 2q; Senior reformer in SL MoF: XX305). 
Observation 6aa: I think I share your views, because sometimes donors 
come, we chat with them, but I always tell them we are good at law-making. 
Look! If it is box-ticking, we do have all the institutions good governance in 
this world – one of the best. When you look at good governance issues we 
have for example, national electoral commission, the ombudsman, anti-
corruption commission, and everything (Donor representative who also 
worked as LTA in SL: XX105_303). This respondent was reflecting on the 
need to have functional improvements not only in PFM institutions but 
across the public sector.  
Observation 6ab: So, if you ask me whether there are structures and 
institutions, my answer is there are systems and structures, but they are 
often abused. Why are they abused? It is because maybe these where 
donors’ ideas (Donor representative in SL: XX106). A donor representative 
in Sierra Leone pinning the disregard or abuse of formal institutional 
structures, systems and norms because they were externally imposed by 
donor partners. 
Observation 6ac: Institutions in the sense that we should rationalise our 





duplications such that it will also not be a bottleneck in the 
implementations of reform programs. Each Institutions has a clear and 
distinct role to perform such that we would have all these stuffs I just 
mentioned in terms of bottlenecks, duplications, delays, etc. Anything else 
given the status-quo will just lead to friction, etc. (MoF official in SL: XX304). 
A MoF official in Sierra Leone suggesting measures to curb inefficiencies or 
dysfunction in PFM institutions. 
Observation 6ad: Again, in terms of my experience, most of these 
government institutions lack monitoring and evolution.  They could be 
making progress, but they will not know because the programs are not 
properly monitored.  It is now time for governments to invest in monitoring 
and evaluation. … In Sierra Leone, we could have a cash management 
committee chaired by the minister of finance, but they don't follow the 
policies and processes in terms of cash management (Consultant who 
worled in both LBR and SL: XL308_XX306).  
 
INFERENCE: The above observations (observations 6w-6ad) present substantial evidence 
from diverse range of sources that also provide additional evidence about the limited impact 
of formal PFM institutions on PFM reform efforts and overall PFM systems quality. And I 
show in the above observations that the inability of PFM institutions and wider authorising 
environment to drive reforms or improve PFM performance are because of lack of functional 
improvement in those institutions. This function gap is measured by the difference between 
the level progress made in the two countries in building new PFM institutions and systems 
and the actual functionality of those institutions. Insert diagram here. The widespread 
dysfunctional nature of main the PFM institutions in Liberia and Sierra Leone could be traced 
to several factors that have their roots in the third component the technical-political 
interface in the two case study countries.   
 
COMPONENT THREE: THE TECHNICAL-POLITICAL INTERFACE  
The technical-political interface in the PFM architecture Liberia and Sierra Leone has three 
facets - relations between the executive and the legislature, relations within the executive 
and relations with donor partners. These three facets of technical-political interface are 
jointly discussed, given the inter-relationships especially between the executive and the 







Observation 6ae: The 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone and the 2016 PFM 
Act and the 2018 Financial Management Regulations lay out clearly the 
roles and responsibilities of the three parliamentary Committees (Public 
Accounts Committee, Finance Committee and Transparency Committee) 
that exercise oversight and accountability over PFM in that country.  
Observation 6af: The 1986 Constitution of Liberia and the 2009 PFM Act 
and the 2009 Financial Management Regulations detail the various the 
roles and responsibilities of the various Parliamentary Committees (Public 
Accounts and Expenditure, Committee, Ways, Means and Finance, and 
Committee on Planning and Economic Affairs). These committees have 
overall responsibility for oversight and accountability in PFM in Liberia. 
 
Observation 6ag: The legislature makes the decisions to pass laws and 
decides what kind of budget to pass.  And it also decides what kind of 
projects should be implemented based on their priorities.  For example, in 
the last five years the budget has never been approved before the 
scheduled date, and it has always been approved 3 or 4 months after the 
due date, which is on 30th June every year. (MoF official in LBR: XL306). 
Observation 6ah: Unfortunately [the] budget is mostly approved when we 
are in the raining season. Another issue that came up even in the open 
budget initiative is how we change the budget calendar, instead of July to 
June we move to January to December. The amended PFM law that is one 
of the provisions (NSA representative in LBR: XL701). 
Observation 6ai: The executive right leads the budget formulation process! 
And the budget approval and execution process are led by the legislation. 
That is the separation between the two arms of government. If you look at 
the opportunities that exist within the executive process of the budget 
formulation, there are direct institutional links there. The budget hearings, 
for example, the monitoring of the budget, and looking at the financial 
account for every year and all that. But when it comes to the approval stage, 
interestingly enough where there could have been more opportunities for 
COS in the legislative process of the budget approval process is where there 
is a weak provision institutionally for CSO participation. Unlike other 
countries where you have like during the committee stage, you have public 
hearings. They will invite the public directly to come and witness the 
discuss and review the process on the performance of the budget from 
MDAS. In SL, those committee stages are closed to CSOs. They do not allow 
participation there. The MPs do not seem to be representatives who trust 
or want to work with civil society regarding impacting their decision on 
approving the budget; they do not seem to be open, except for the fact 
that the opposition MPs they seem to be having this kind of analysis. They 
seem to love working with CSO to help them trigger their desires. I will give 
you an example of what happened last year. When the budget speech was 
released last year, CSOs horridly put together a reaction to the budget 
pointing out the weakness and the strength of the budget. Could you 
believe that documents extensively used by the opposition MPs in 





what came from civil society. So, you could see that the legislature is weak 
regarding their analysis of the budget process. At the same time those in 
the majority in parliament does not seem to want to use the criticisms of 
the CSOs not to approve the budget. So, it is the structure of the parliament 
itself that could partly be blamed for that (NSA representative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 6aj: No, that is the budget line for the entire parliament not 
for the PAC alone you see. …We have questioned the clerk of parliament 
there is no good answer from him. Even the chairman I was in his office -
asking him why there is no direct budget line for PAC activities. He said to 
me the funds from ministry of finance was very minimal. Just imagine we 
have about 33 committees and we are the only ones without direct funding 
from central government (Parliamentary Clerk in SL: XX601). 
Observation 6ak: In 2015/2016 fiscal year (known as the year of budget 
short fall) the GoL instituted an austerity policy that saw the budget of 
nearly every ministry slashed significantly. And according one civil society 
activist I interviewed; he had expected that the legislature that has the 
decision-making power would have been affected too by the cuts. 
According to the interviewee, the   legislative budget had grown from 9m 
dollars since 2006 to 54 million dollars in 2016. By 2016 and before the cuts, 
the legislative budget had grown to 41m dollars. After effecting the cuts for 
other institutions, the legislative budget increased by another 3m to 45m. 
He continued by drawing on a specific example involving the budget of the 
Pro tempore in the Liberia Senate: “despite the fact that there are PFM 
laws and regulations, politicians are abusing the system by budgeting 
corruption. What I call budgeting corruption is instead of... out-rightly 
taking money that does not belong to a particular politician, he/she has to 
do it in collaboration with other higher profile politicians and top 
government bureaucrats and ... insert that into the budget. Nobody cares 
about anything in this country. So, you have budget that is 500 pages thick. 
Nobody cares about that. You have a situation where the president or the 
head of Liberia senate has a budget of 1.5 million dollars. Which was 
initially 245,000 dollars for the year, but which has been inflated... this led 
to a public outcry that politicians are taking the money at the expense of 
service delivery” (NSA representative in LBR: XL703). 
Observation 6al:  In a recent press release on February 16 from a Human 
Rights Organisation basically alleging that the president is committing 
economic treason. And in the tat press release, they point to the high 
salaries of legislators and the president was even quoted of admitting to 
their claim on national radio? When do you see developments like that 
happening in a country you are supporting what comes to your mind? 
(Donor representative in LBR: XL103). 
Observation 6am: The legislative sees itself as the people. And so, when 
the budget is presented to them, they see it as the government 
budget, and they as the people could play with it for their people – but not 
necessarily for the people but to score some political point. The legislature 
also uses the budget as a means of getting re-elected (NSA representative 





Observation 6an: We have a patronage government system. When people 
are appointed, and their hands are caught in the cookie jar, and by trying 
to disgrace them can bring credibility issue to the entire political party. So 
sometimes they are just dismissed (NSA representative in LBR: XL702). 
Observation 6ao: There was no one talking about what was happening 
around tax incentive issues.  So, because we wanted to engage on tax 
incentives issues, we did a study titled “Loosing Out”. In that study, we 
looked at few companies and we estimated that USD 2,24,000 was what 
we were losing from tax incentives annually for those few companies and 
that money by then, i.e. 2011 was seven times the education budget plus 
eight times the health budget so that we were losing from tax incentives 
(NSA representative in SL: XX701).  
Observation 6ap:  Coming to the public hearings it is just sometimes to 
confront the real problems. The public hearings are already done among 
themselves before they come public. So, it is a real public hearing, it is just 
a kind of ex-post factor that we are hearing.  What is the essence of the 
public hearings? It is just cosmetic or shows low efforts to show that we 
are now becoming accountable (NSA representative in LBR: XL702).  
Observation 6aq: The political risk is always there — the risk for them not 
wanting to implement the reforms because this is limiting them. They want 
to operate freely without being monitored. We have all these indicators 
and triggers limiting their visions or what they want to do that makes them 
less transparent and accountable. And some political leaders will have a 
different opinion of how FPM should work, and those are all issues (Donor 
representative in SL: XX107).  
Observation 6ar: When reports like that are out in the public, they only get 
the desired attention for a few days, and then everything dies down. 
Honestly, we feel bad that we do not get our recommendation 
implemented to the letter (GAC senior official in LBR: XL402) 
Observation 6as: I would add political patronage. This is very significant. 
For example, we have an IFMIS system and we say once the allotment has 
been made another allotment cannot be made until the procuring entity 
draw-down and report on the spending. And here is an entity that has not 
reported, and you command come from somewhere requesting transfer of 
funds to that entity (NSA representative in LBR: XL701) 
Observation 6at: We have a system of government wherein the legislature 
approves the budget submitted by the executive head of government the 
president. It has a marriage between actors in the legislature and actors in 
government to enrich at the expense at the population. All they have to do 
is to appease the judiciary with lucrative allowances which are also 
commensurate with the status of the judiciary. These are judges who have 
no power to declare anything that in unconstitutional in this country. …  
What happens the legislature has oversight role to put a hold to that, but 
what happens there is a negotiation between the executive and the 
legislature to increase their allowance ad the executive will do whatever 





Observation 6au: We have a patronage government system. When people 
are appointed, and their hands are caught in the cookie jar, and by trying 
to disgrace them can bring credibility issue to the entire political party. So 
sometimes they are just dismissed (NSA representative in LBR: XL702). 
Observation 6av: When it comes to the legislature you would hear on the 
radio after October 2014. You will hear that probably 90% of the current 
legislator where not re-elected. That is one-way Liberians get them to 
account. And so those who get elected when they realised that they can no 
longer fool the people, it puts them on the spot, and they try to be 
accountable. [How sure are you that 90% will not get re-elected?) Mark my 
words. It happened in 2012, 2014 and it will happen 2017 (NSA 
representative in LBR: XL701). 
 
INFERENCE: the evidence relating to the relationships between the executive and the 
legislature, relations within the executive and relations with the donor partners are 
presented in observations 6ae - 6bk above. First, observations 6ae - 6au specifically deal with 
the role of the legislature and the relations between the executive and the legislature. A 
number of similarities exist in the legislative role in exercising oversight and accountability 
over PFM, but there are significant differences in the legislative set and relationships 
between the executive and the legislature in the two countries.  
 
Both countries have an executive system of government but with different legislative 
architecture. Liberia has a two-tier legislature structure with a house of representative and 
the senate. While Sierra Leone has a single-tier parliamentary set up.  These differences 
affect the power-relations between the executive and the legislature. Liberia’s two-tier 
parliamentary structure gives the legislature greater power and leverage in its oversight role 
in the annual budget process, while the Legislature in Sierra Leone seem to be much more 
aligned and supportive of the executive’s decision and policy directions. While there is a 
marriage between the legislative and executive arms in the annual budget process in the 
two countries, the nature and depth of the marriage differ between them. In Liberia the 
marriage is much stronger between the legislature and top-level bureaucrats in the MoF 
than between the presidency and the legislature. In Sierra Leone however, the marriage is 
mostly between the presidency and the legislature.  
 
These distinctions are important because they affect the amount of power and leverage 





election/re-election of Parliamentarians, and the government has always maintained a 
majority in parliament.  Unlike Sierra Leone, Liberia has a more diverse parliament with 
many independent parliamentarians and with little control from the executive (Observation 
6ae-6ao). The president in Liberia has little or no control over the legislature or members 
from her/his political party. The Liberian president for example, was on radio explaining to 
the Liberian people that she did not approve of the huge allowances taken by 
Parliamentarians (Observation 6al).  
 
The above institutional set up of the legislature in the two countries, power-relations and 
marriage between the executive and legislature have enormous implications during the 
annual budget process. The legislature in Liberia has much control over the budget 
preparation and approval which has always resulted in significant delays in approving the 
budget (Observations 6ag-h). But more so, they have greater leverage over resource 
allocations and can manipulate the process in favour of their personal and political interests 
(Observations 6ak-o). There is a much more coherent budget preparation process in Sierra 
Leone with no substantial delays in approving the budget. Much of the institutional 
problems in budget preparations happen during the approval stage, where Parliamentarians 
from the ruling party appear to undermine the process as a way of protecting the executive’s 
budget from scrutiny from opposition MPs and CSOs (Observations 6ai and 6ao).  
 
The institutional set up, power-relations and marriage between the executive and the 
legislature also affect budget executive and accountability in similar ways in the two 
countries (observations 6ap-s). Although Sierra Leone ranks highly than countries like Ghana 
in the sub region in the open budget survey in recent years (Open Budget survey 2015), 
interview participants share similar sentiments regarding the lack of accountability from 
political leaders. They mostly reference this to the lack of implementation of audit 
recommendations of the PAC. But the problem is greater than just the failure to implement 
audit recommendations. The evidence from observations 6ap-6av reflect at worse client-
patron network or at best partisan politics and entrenched in relations within the executive 
and between the executive and the legislature. And this has an entanglement and dilemmas 
for all parties, as one respondent note “when people are appointed, and their hands are 
caught in the cookie jar, and by trying to disgrace them can bring credibility issues to the 





setup of PFM institutions, including the legislature and interrelationships between the 
executive and the legislature and relations within the executive branch present far greater 
problems relating to power-imbalances, top-down political pressures and technical-political 
dilemmas, which are covered in the next set of observations (observations 6aw - 6bl), and 
discussed below. 
OBSERVATIONS 
Observation 6aw:  Why do we always have huge fiscal imbalance? The 
proof of how good the revenue administration of the country could be 
determined from the fiscal imbalance. And if you have a situation where 
you have a president who always signs extra-budgetary expenditures and 
executive order to the minister even when those expenditures are not on 
budget, then he is effectively undermining the budget. The passion of 
trying to satisfy political people he promised would also add additional 
constraints on the budget. And we are here fooling ourselves that we have 
approved a budget and all. You the minister has to limit the executive's off-
budget spending, and there has to be a mechanism to achieve this (NSA 
representative in SL: XX702) 
Observation 6ax:  … if you have too much power that the president enjoys, 
then the minister of finance does not have that leverage to challenge 
whatever orders that are coming from the president. These are issues that 
undermine the plans and the whole budget. And they even undermine the 
discretion of technical heads within ministries to be able to achieve their 
respective objectives (NSA representative in SL: XX702).  
Observation 6ay:: The problem is that these guys are appointed, and the 
government pays their salaries and it is the same government who can 
dismiss them. This is the problem instead of being professional in doing the 
work I have to be political and sometimes I have to satisfy or go the extra 
mile to satisfy our political masters.  Honestly, it depends on the authority 
in place. I can tell you if you could compare PFM reform now and maybe 
PFM reform five years back, I believe that the environment is not vibrant 
to speed up or to take advantage of the implementation of reforms even 
when the minister is said to be a reformer.  He is somebody who wants to 
see changed in the right way. He has an interest in pursuing reforms. Take 
for example, the former minister he was also a very nice guy, but I can tell 
you he wanted reforms to flourish. But the coordinators who act as 
advisers to the minister on PFM reforms mostly do not take advantage of 
those opportunities. And you find out that the reform coordination unit or 
head of the unit become so political that his focus is to satisfy his promise 
to his political masters (MoF official in LBR: XL306) 
Observation 6az: XL701: When I talked about 40% political and 60% 
professional, for example, a particular job may be available and all of us 
have the qualification. But who is much more politically connected stands 





it relates to the work we do as NSA, we have to be assertive politically. We 
have to constantly fight (NSA representative in LBR: XL701). 
Observations 6ba:  Take for instance one of the reforms that we have in 
this country to continue to control or mitigate corruption. Ask for instance 
how many government officials have declared their assets even though this 
is prescribed by law? Why is the president who they say is a reformer is not 
taking action against people who she has the right to appoint or dismiss 
and refuse to comply with the asset’s declaration? What is the reason for 
her failure to enforce this? (NSA representative in LBR: XL702).  
Observations 6bb: The current minister of finance and anti-corruption 
commissioner are kind of critical on issues like corruption. But let's wait 
and see their willing to go on and their position on some of these 
institutionalised corrupt practices. The anti-corruption commissioner for 
example, has a president who defends every corrupt practice in this 
country. Let wait and see if he is going to go after the president (NSA 
representative in LBR: XL703). 
Observations 6bc: Yes, I think for all reforms like the decentralisation, PFM 
reform and civil service reforms some people are keen that these reforms 
happen. But the collective ownership by legislators and the cabinet that 
can be questioned. Steps have been taken in PFM reform that show 
ownership to a certain level, but it does not show they [bureaucrats and 
political leaders] really want to go in-depth to solve the problems. Yes, 
there are groups [who want to see change] but are they powerful enough? 
I will say they are not. But I definitely say those who own them are civil 
servants who like to have more transparent, accountable and professional 
management in the public sector (Donor representative in LBR: XL103). 
Observations 6bd: I would ask you the same question, what’s the 
guarantee that the taskforce created by the same president would get it 
done? It is just a time-wasting game and wastage of resources. Who owns 
the taskforce, do you think these are 'highly credible' people compared to 
the ministry of justice? So, why do we waste a lot of resources and time? 
What if the global witness did not come up with the Sogbon mining report, 
would the president had set up a taskforce? We had the GAC report, and 
then the PAC submitted a consolidated report a long time before Global 
Witness released their report on Sogbon mining. So, what if Global Witness 
had not released those reports, would the president have set up a task 
force to follow up on the PAC report? Journalist were taking to jail only 
because they were quoting the audit report. For me personally, I see it as 
another way to just delay and say we have a taskforce, when the justice 
ministry should be doing it (NSA representative in SL: XL701) 
 
Observations 6be: You know reforms are not something that is easy. There 
are a lot of players and some will still want to protect their small enclave. 
Some want to protect their job and some to protect whatever they think is 





Observations 6bf: The technicians want to be push and how they should be 
pushed the question?  The only move to implement certain things when 
they know it they will bring some economic benefits to the government. 
Activities that are planned to be implemented within a six-month period 
only gets to be implemented in the last week of the program.  It is like the 
reforms are implemented only to satisfy the donors, to create that kind of 
impression on the donors that they're doing well (MoF official in LBR: 
XL306). 
Observations 6bg:  They are influenced more or less by the need for 
authorities to be able to finance the budget deficit. Most of these programs 
come with additional financing and budget support. The authorities push 
on most of these programs for... in the case of the IMF they provide a major 
source of balance of payment support and balance of payment deficit 
financing. So, the authorities are most interested in closing the gap in the 
deficit for balance of payment in obtaining additional budget support. Their 
failure in not having such supports will lead to widening of the deficits. 
These are some of the reasons I think donor partners will have to take into 
considerations (MoF official in LBR: XL302). 
Observations 6bh: But the reality is these politicians have their hands tied 
and they need the money and that is why you see them doing anything 
about the kind of conditions or provisions that are included in some of the 
contracts with donors (MoF official in LBR: XL306). 
Observations 6bi: XX402: If the one that is supposed to implement cannot 
get a direct benefit, his/she starts behaving lethargically, and this is the 
attitude (Sector Ministry official in SL: XX402). 
 
Observations 6bj: This is very true, there is nothing to hide. Especially when 
you are at the higher realm of affairs, minister of deputy minister, you can’t 
always argue with that donor want. Donor can sometimes recommend that 
they can’t work with particular personnel. This means simple madam 
president can you fire the person? (MoF official in LBR: XL301).  
Observations 6bk: When you are in government, and you are attached to a 
project people perceive you as 'somebody wea don beteh'. That means 
people consider someone working on a donor-funded project to be 
benefiting extra, and when you look at most of them, their lives start 
changing in a few months. What do you think is happening? We do not 
need to tell you something is wrong somewhere. (Sector Ministry official 
in SL: XX402). 
 
INFERENCE: The first set of observations (observations 6aw-6ba) present several evidences 
of a straightforward top-down relationships within the executive branch of government in 
the two countries. The evidence suggests a top-down political pressure face by bureaucrats 





not always top-down, as could be seen from observation 6ay and 6ab technical leaders or 
bureaucrats in the MoF do also benefits from their connections with political leaders through 
their appointment to positions and zero bottom-up accountability. This means there is an 
effective struggle among bureaucrats to align themselves with the political class for their 
survival and to achieve their personal and departmental/program objectives (observations 
6ay and 6az). This so-called marriage has effectively circumvented any formal institutional 
checks and balances, which has resulted in significant extra-budgetary expenditures that do 
not go through the due approval process in the two countries, limit the discretions of 
bureaucrats and undermine the entire PFM architecture (observations 6aw-6az).  
 
The second set of observations (observations 6bb-6bk) present evidence that show far more 
complex relationships among the three facets of technical-political interface. The evidence 
from these observations show the complexity in the relationships among these facets are 
rooted in the influence, interests, and motivations of bureaucrats and political leaders. This 
means the mere categorisation of stakeholders as champions or supporters and opponents 
will not contribute to our understanding of these complex stakeholder influences, interests 
and motivations. The evidence presented above observations and those in the next section 
(institutionalisation of PFM reforms around specific individuals), shows that in both 
countries the debate has been on whether the minister of finance is supportive or opposed 
to a particular reform intervention. Such as categorisation is to some extent misleading 
because a finance minister might express support for a particular reform, but might face a 
conundrum, or may sometimes be cautious about how far to push certain reforms or enforce 
certain policies or laws. This conundrum applies even to other top-level bureaucrats who are 
also regarding a ‘professionals’ and therefore would be supportive of any reform efforts 
(observation 6bb-6bc). Perhaps, a better approach will be to examine whether reform 
champions or supporters are powerful enough to influence changes more broadly or push 
through difficult reform programs. Political leaders also encounter similar dilemmas and 
difficult choices, which reflects the lack of implementation of recommendations from the 
PAC and overall poor performance in accountability dimensions of PFM (see observations 
6ap-6as in the previous section and 6bd in this section). 
 
Another approach is to examine the interests and motivations of reformers and political 





understanding of what reform programs are likely to be initiated, pushed and sustained. This 
examination should include ascertaining the bureaucratic incentives and inertia that exist 
within the technical-political interface and the overall public sector that might drive or derail 
PFM reform efforts. As shown in observations 6be-6bi, these incentives may include both 
financial and non-financial rewards. And there is also strong inertia among stakeholders to 
maintain the status-quo in the two countries and to protect their enclaves. The evidence 
also suggests these complex motivations and interest have implications on the relationships 
with donor-partners (observations 6bf-6bk). The incentives regarding donor support to PFM 
include both personal benefits as well as at the institutional level.  For example, bureaucrats 
and other technical personnel would relish working on a donor-funded PFM reform project 
because of the improved allowances. But their ability to engage with donor-partners might 
also be affected because they might not want to be seen as challenging donor or their 
interests.  
 
It might appear perfectly fine to have reform champions with most of the allowance paid by 
donor partners or have a budget support trigger attached to a particular activity, but there 
are numerous examples (observations 6bf-h, 6bj-k) from both countries where these 
arrangements might create perverse incentives for bureaucrats and political leaders. For 
example, in response to the serious budget credibility problems emerging from non-
transfers of allocations to local councils in Sierra Leone and county authorities in Liberia, the 
EU tied a significant amount of its direct budget support to disbursements to local 
government. This move by the EU did help improve the situation as one interview note, 
“because money was attached to this kind of activity, we had people trying to achieve this 
particular target. This effectively diverted all the efforts of bureaucrats and political leaders 
away from other critical reform interventions at the time”.  
 
The key implication from the above analysis is that in order to understand what reform 
initiatives are likely to be initiated, push through in the case of difficult reforms, 
implemented and sustained by bureaucrats and political leaders in the two countries, donor-
partners and local reformers must refrain from the usual categorisation of stakeholders into 
champions, proponents and opponents, interested and opposed. Rather, deliberate efforts 
must be made to try to understand the level of influence/power-relations within the 





motivations of all stakeholders involved in the reform process. The above distinctions could 
be explained more clearly examining the joint strategy pursued by donor-partners and local 
authorities in institutionalising PFM around key individuals/Champions in the two case study 
countries. 
 
Institutionalization of PFM Reforms around key individuals/Champions 
OBSERVATIONS: 
Observation 6bl: leadership is key for any reform to succeed. The minister 
of finance is the one driving the reforms regardless of which sector the 
reforms target (Donor representative in SL: XX107).  
Observation 6bm Yes, definitely I do [see myself as a champion for PFM 
reforms] but then I have my limitations.  And those limitations can only be 
removed if I get the blessing from senior management. Like in the form of 
public statement the minister has said this for example, that will empower 
me to move on with different programmes.  In the absence of that political 
support or the absence of support from senior management then we are 
going to fail.  Is like the president everybody looks up to the president if 
the president says you have to do this thing or if the minister says you have 
to do x y and z on PFM reform, we will have to do it (MoF official in LBR: 
XL306).  
Observation 6bn: The main stakeholder for PFM development is the 
ministry of finance which is the ‘godfather’ of PFM development and that’s 
why most issues come first from the ministry of finance (Donor 
representative who also worked as LTA in SL: XX105_303).  
Observation 6bo:  And how effective are our institutions devoid from 
personality? (NSA representative in SL: XX702). This interviewee was 
making reference about the level of informality that exist within formal 
PFM institutions.    
 
Observation 6bp: A World bank study on political economy of PFM 
concluded that PFM reforms in Sierra Leone resulted in winners and losers, 
championed mainly by Local Technical Assistants (LTAs) in MoFED who 
were paid by DPs and the reforms never gained momentum at the highest 
echelon of state-authority (World Bank, 2008 - see also Appendix A).   
Observation 6bq: One key factor sighted by experts to contribute to PFM 
reform progress in Sierra Leone was the increased technical capability in 
MoFED, which was largely attributed to the recruitment of donor funded 
LTAs, with augmented salaries far above the national pay scale. But also, 
with such strong technical expertise, LTAs were able to exercise control and 
provide leadership in the management of reform ({Srivastava & Larizza, 






Observation 6br: Yes, you have to be powerful, and power is about decision 
making. If you do not have that decision power people make away with 
millions of dollars away from the projects, for which they were intended. 
They need that power to hold top officials accountable for disbursements 
made to them before additional tranches are release. If this is what power 
is then we need it in the PFM system (MoF official in LBR: XL309).   
 
Observation 6bs: Ha-ha Winston was also part of the team we were 
working together right. …maybe not really there were no people to work 
with at that time.  Our (LTAs) capacity was very high and we need to pass 
this to other people - so it takes capacity to build capacity. It was also a bit 
difficult to get at that time (Donor representative who also worked as LTA 
in SL: XX105_303). This interviewee is among a several LTAs I interviewed 
during my fieldwork in Sierra Leone.  
Observation 6bt: It takes capacity to build capacity (Sector Ministry official 
and formerly official in the MoF in LBR: XL405_307). This interviewee was 
making the case about the relevance of the joint capacity building 
initiatives that we rolled out in the early years of PFM reforms in Liberia.  
Observation 6bu: At that time, we started bringing a lot of more local skills, 
especially coming from abroad and those that were newly graduating from 
our institutions here. We tried to bring them in to ensure we backed up 
whatever capacity we had to enhance capacity within the government. It 
was a two-prong approach – you can train those already in government but 
also bring in fresh brains to push the reform agenda (Donor representative 
who also worked as LTA in SL: XX104_302). 
Observation 6bv: The enthusiasm was there. At that time, especially in 
MoFED they were trying to bring professionals. So, there was enthusiasm 
among the so-called qualified professionals who find themselves at least 
lucky at that time because like the environment was ripe for their 
participation and to show their workmanship and skills and government 
and donors were ready to give incentives in the form higher salaries etc. 
(MoF official in SL: XX304). 
 
Observation 6bw: Let me give you a typical example, the PFM reform being 
supported in Liberia is not just within the govt as in the line ministries. PFM 
reforms have been supported even in the University of Liberia, and, even 
with the professional accounting organisation. Prior to our interventions, 
we had just about three CPAs in Liberia. We started that support and as we 
speak, we have 76 CPAs in the country, and more are actually qualifying. 
You can see yes; the capacity is still not there because some of these people 
are also in the private and not only in govt. But have definitely built capacity 
that is joining the system (Donor representative in LBR: XL101). 
Observation 6bx: XL405_307: From a personal perspective I think the 
financial training program has worked, because I am a product of that 





most of those processes where you need to arrange for a TA, we tend to 
mix it and failed to get the right calibre of people as TAs. Also, there has 
been a problem of attaching the right candidate to work with TAs. But on 
the overall, it has helped to some extent (Sector Ministry official and 
formerly official in the MoF in LBR: XL405_307). 
Observation 6by: I firmly believe those programs were not about the 
capacity transfer. It was only about bringing Liberians from the diaspora to 
work in the country for a couple of years and then return. The question 
that always comes to mind when I heard donor say the SES and TOKTEN 
were about the capacity transfer. The reality was, who those experts were 
supposed to transfer capacity to when we had mostly school dropouts and 
at best new university graduates. It was just not practiced having someone 
experts from the USA transferring knowledge to someone who was a 
school dropout or someone who had very limited technical ability to 
receive the knowledge that was supposed to be transferred (MoF official 
in LBR: XL309). 
 
Observation 6bz: LTAs in fact just created tension, in the sense that 
because of the difference in pay with people working in the same 
institution just differentiated by pay scale. Somehow it created a lot of 
tension, somehow it created a lot of many other problems, which even now 
is affecting our payroll aspect, which government is trying to address now. 
In terms of bringing them on board - to the payroll. Also, in terms of 
capacity they helped, because they were able to take a lot of the technical 
and professional aspects which were lacking at that time, because of the 
capacity suffered after the war (Senior official in SL MoF: XX304). 
Observation 6ca: I think there were resentments in the workplace, to be 
frank with you. Because as I mentioned to you, whoever sits on the top 
depends on the people you work with (Sector Ministry official and formerly 
official in the MoF in LBR: XL405_307).  
Observation 6cb: LTA s were convinced they were well qualified and 
represented the best talents in-country. They successfully projected this 
notion to their donor masters who paid their salaries, which further 
cemented the level of marginalisation of local non-technical civil servants 
(Donor  representative who worked as LTA in SL: XX105_303). 
Observation 6cc: [There was a plan to transfer LTAs into the civil service. 
Are you satisfied with that process?] No, I am not satisfied with that 
process – and it’s unfortunate we all found ourselves in that situation. To 
me the strategy should be if you bring in an adviser is to build the capacity 
of the civil servant. We have more civil servants who are holding those 
positions and we should concentrate building their capacity and may be 
move out and allow them to take control (Donor  representative who 
worked as LTA in SL: XX105_303).  
 
Observation 6cd: What I would say about PFM reform is that it gave a lot 





say political power. Where he uses that financial power to influence 
political decision within the government, and I think the revision will look 
at reducing that power (Internal Audit official in LBR: XL401). 
Observation 6ce: Maybe because he/she sees that entity is not relevant or 
maybe the work of that entity challenges his work or forces him to comply 
with the certain policy. Every entity is interconnected to a certain extent so 
if you see the work of one entity entering yours or with your friends, you 
could decide to cut or not include them in your budget (Audit Service SL 
official:XX401).  
Observation 6cf: It will be interesting if in the appointments of finance 
ministers’ considerations are given to how they champion PFM reforms. It 
will be interesting that MPs interrogate those ministers or may probably 
include those kinds of deliverables like performance contracts. That would 
have been interesting because that could have led to really showing 
meaningful progress on FM reforms. That would kind of mitigate any 
lacklustre attitude. As it is it right now the technical professionals here in 
the ministry of finance, I do not think they feel any pressure from the top 
to implement those programs. They do not feel any pressure, and this is 
my opinion. They spend months to implement one activity and will end up 
given too many excuses (NSA representative in LBR: XL702). 
Observation 6cg: “The Ministry’s current way of operating – with key 
decisions made informally within a small circle of trusted and long-standing 
ex-LTA senior officials – appears to deliver on the basics of economic 
management, but it works against the long-term development of rules-
based budgetary institutions that might deliver a step change in other 
areas. The heavy reliance on this cadre of ex LTAs also raises important 
questions about long-term capability of the Ministry if more formalised 
workforce management and succession planning is not introduced” 
(Welham and Hadley, 2016:33). 
 
Observation 6ch: Although success in PFM has been uneven, and this could 
be changed if we get more stakeholders involved in the reform process.  
Especially in Africa where institutions are developed around a particular set 
of individuals. And where these set of individuals are not interested in 
certain reforms the chances are that those reforms will collapse (MoF 
official in LBR: 306).  
Observation 6ci: Whatever happens the incentives might be coming from 
the top. For example, under the then minister Marah around 2012 we had 
a lot of action on PFM than now. I do not think the present minister sees 
PFM as central to his work. To me, if you want to ascertain the appetite for 
reforms, you should focus on those at the top (NSA representative in SL: 
XX702). 
Observation 6cj: Reform is not possible without the minister: To some 
extent yes, but I can tell you that you reform is not possible without the 
minister. He is such a key player.  What I mean by this is that if the minister 





home about.  Even if the donor comes here and says we are going to give 
you 5 million dollars. And if the minister is not interested in the program or 
in strengthening the PFM institutions, if the minister is not interested in 
the fiscal discipline you will try for nothing (MoF official in LBR: XL306).  
Observation 6ck: R: I will say yes but within what time frame?  The current 
minister yes, [he has been a champion for reforms], and who has been 
there for just a couple of months but at the end of the day he will be there 
only up to election. So, right after elections we are going to be having a 
new administration and the current minister will not be there. So, if you're 
making progress now the question is what will happen when the current 
minister leaves and the next minister comes in?  Those are the things we 
are looking at from the donor community so that we do not want the 
process in PFM reforms to fall apart when we have a new minister who 
may not buy in on current PFM reform programs (Donor representative in 
LBR: XL102). 
 
INFERENCE: First, observations 6bl-6bo show there was a clear strategy by donor partners 
and local authorities in the two case study countries to pursue PFM reforms through core 
set of individuals within the ministry of finance. There was a lot emphasis in particular on 
the role of the minister of finance in championing PFM reforms in the two countries.  This 
approach to anchor PFM reforms around certain set on individuals is reflective in the various 
PFM legislations show in the section on PFM legal and regulatory framework in the two 
countries, which confer greater power and responsibility for overall PFM in the minister and 
the MoF more generally. The minister of finance is highly respect in the two countries, which 
one respondent from Sierra Leone described him/her as the ‘godfather’ of PFM 
development. Some in Liberia even regard public statement from the minister of finance in 
support of PFM reforms as a powerful tool they can use to drive different programs and 
activities. Interviewee XL306 who is one of the key players within the PFM reform 
coordination unit in Liberia responding to my question whether he considered himself as a 
champion for PFM reforms make this remark “yes, definitely I do [see myself as a champion 
for PFM reforms] but then, I have my limitations.  And those limitations can only be removed 
if I get the blessing from senior management. Like in the form of public statement the 
minister has said this for example, that will empower me to move on with different 
programmes” (MoF official in LBR: XL306). 
 
The evidence in observations 6bp-6br does show that the joint strategy by local authorities 





immediate post-conflict contexts in the two countries. The strategy created easy entry 
points for donor-partners and gave donor partners confidence that they could rely on those 
key individuals to manage the reform process. Publications from independent researchers 
and reports from donor partners also point to the influence of those key individuals in driving 
PFM reforms. The strategy created much need technical expertise in the MoF to exercise 
control and provide leadership in the management of PFM reforms in the two countries 
{Srivastava & Larizza, 2013; Roseth and Srivastava, 2013; Welham & Hadley, 2016}. See also 
observation x that speaks to power and level of control the finance minister has of PFM in 
Liberia. A World bank study on political economy of reforms in Sierra Leone concluded that 
PFM reforms in Sierra Leone resulted in winners and losers, championed mainly by Local 
Technical Assistants (LTAs) in MoFED who were paid by DPs and the reforms never gained 
momentum beyond the MoF (World Bank, 2008; see Appendix A).   
 
A core component of the joint strategy to anchor PFM reforms around key individuals was 
to build capacity locally and knowledge transfer to civil servants (see observations 6bs-6bv).  
Although there were nuances in the approach to capacity building and knowledge transfer 
in the two countries, the central idea in both countries was to recruit qualified Sierra 
Leoneans and Liberians at home and abroad to fill in key technical positions in the ministry 
finance. Sierra Leone recruited professionals who later became known as Local Technical 
Assistance (LTAs). The LTAs were mostly qualified professional who had furthered their 
professional careers overseas. Liberia however, adopted a multi-pronged approach to 
capacity building and transfer through several programs, namely; Senior Executive Service 
(SES) program; Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programs and 
the World Bank funded Financial Management Training School and support to the 
department of accounting and finance in the University of Liberia.  The financial 
management training school and support to the University of Liberia are widely regarded as 
largely successful in injecting a lot of capacity in PFM institutions in Liberia (observations 
6bw-6bx). Apart from these two programs, there has been a mixed picture regarding the 
performance of the SES and TOKTEN programs (observations 6bx-6by). 
 
In both countries the focus on strategic technical individuals in key PFM institutions created 
in the view of many interview participants a lot of challenges in the PFM reform efforts in 





and low-level personnel in the MoF in the two countries. Second, those top-level technical 
personnel were paid augmented salaries paid by donor-partner that were significantly 
higher than the average pay or other local civil servants within the ministry of finance and 
between the ministry of finance sector ministries and local government. The huge salary gap 
created a lot of resentments among lower cadre staff in key PFM institutions in the two 
counties. It is nonetheless difficult to establish the extent of the impact of these resentments 
on the overall PFM reform effort in the two countries (observations 6bz-6cb). And finally, 
perhaps, the biggest challenge to PFM reform efforts in the two countries posed by those 
programs was the transfer of LTAs and personnel under the SES and TOKTEN into the 
mainstream civil service in Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively. Those technical personnel 
had salaries that were far above the highest pay scale in the government payroll in the two 
countries and contributed to significant increase in the governments’ wage bills. This 
problem continue to affect ongoing civil service reforms through the  Pay and Performance 
project and Public Sector Modernisation Project in Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively 
(observation 6cc; Roseth  Srivastava, 2013: Engaging for Results in Civil Service Reforms: 
Early Lessons from a Problem-Driven Engagement in Sierra Leone; Srivastava and Larizza, 
2013: Working with the grain for reforming the public service: a live example from Sierra 
Leone; World Bank, 2014: Liberia - Public Sector Modernization Project, Project Appraisal 
Document ).  
 
A further consequence of the strategy to institutionalise PFM reforms was the fact that 
power and influence became so entrenched within the few officials in the MoF in the two 
countries. This concentration of power and influence among few officials gave them a lot of 
freedom to operate, often with zero accountability for their policies and actions regarding 
PFM and allocation of resources (observations 6cd-6cf). But more so, the high concentration 
of power and influence among few officials created a lot informality within the institutional 
set of PFM institutions that meant few individuals had access to the management 
information systems in the MoF. The evidence is particularly strong in Sierra Leone as 
Welham and Hadley argue “the heavy reliance on this cadre of ex LTAs also raises important 
questions about long-term capability of the Ministry if more formalised workforce 
management and succession planning is not introduced (Welham and Hadley, 2016, p. 33: 






The most widely shared and critical concern about efforts to institutionalise PFM reforms 
around key officials in the ministry of finance is rooted in its implications for the survival and 
sustainability of PFM reforms (observations 6ch-6ck). As the evidence suggests such a 
strategy meant an existing minister with little or no interests in specific reforms or a new 
minister of finance with different policy background and interests in PFM reforms will certain 
derail ongoing efforts and undermine the sustainability of the reforms. This concern is share 
local reformers and donor-partners. As one donor-partner specific note “The current 
minister yes, [he has been a champion for reforms], and who has been there for just a couple 
of months but at the end of the day he will be there only up to election.  So right after 
elections we are going to be having a new administration and the current minister will not 
be there. So, if you're making progress now the question is what will happen when the 
current minister leaves and the next minister comes in?  Those are the things we are looking 
at from the donor community so that we do not want the process in PFM reforms to fall 
apart when we have a new minister who may not buy in on current PFM reform programs” 
(observation 6ck).  
 
Finally, the evidence presented from all the above observations shows that the joint strategy 
by local authorities and donor-partners to institutionalise PFM reforms around key officials 
in the main PFM institutions in the two countries created a lot of impact in the immediate 
post-conflict environments in the two countries. Part of this success is explained largely the 
strategy cultivated strong relationships and build trust between bureaucrats in the MoF and 
donor-partners. But whatever impact was created by this approach was derailed by the 
tensions and resentments that emerged among low cadre staff in key PFM institutions and 
the public sector. The approach also created significant long-term in the long-term and 
continue to undermine reform efforts in the two countries. 
 
COMPONENT FOUR: Intergovernmental relations - Central Finance Agency (MoF), Sectoral 
Ministries and subnational government:    
The fourth component within the institutional set up and management arrangement of PFM 
reforms discussed in this section of the appendix concerns the relationships between the 
MoF and MDAs, including subnational government in the two case study countries. The 
analysis here will cover the PFM institutional set up and governance arrangements in 










Observation 6cl: It is good but what happens from the health centres they 
receive subsidies from govt. Unlike the county services centre they have a 
direct budget line from the budget. So, they have to follow all the PFM law 
and procedures before the county government can get their money. Before 
all counties used to go to the internal affairs ministry for everything they 
need and the ministry in turn go to the ministry of finance to solicit the 
funds. Now counties like mine have their budget lines for nearly everything 
ranging from services, fuel and general admin expenses. Our job now is to 
help them follow the procedure and solicit their funds directly from the 
ministry of finance (County official in LBR: XL501). 
Observation 6cm: what I noticed about Sierra Leone is that they quickly 
decentralised. All MDAs have their own PFM rule. So, to really account, for 
example, they were unable to account fully for the Ebola fund as a 
government. Because MDAs did their own implementations and did not 
report well. These affected the general report for the nation. For that 
reason, they want to adapt the Liberia approach, let there be one PFMU. If 
we are comfortable that this ministry or a particular agency has the 
capacity and able then you could roll out to the ministry or agency. With 
the exception of PFMU, that has been the approach we even have with 
IFMIS. We have even the ministry of finance everybody come in here and 
do theirs (NSA representative in LBR: XL701). 
Observation 6cn: I am not looking at it from either concentration or 
deconcentration. What I am saying is that at least the minister of finance 
should be the custodian of PFM. He should be in position to have control 
either directly or indirectly of all those resources, such that it would be 
prudent as a country to use those resources effectively. You cannot say the 
minister of finance is in charge and you give the mandate to oversee the 
PFM reform program to outsiders. It is not like taking too much power, but 
like he should be accorded the opportunity either by mandate or whatever 
for him to take full responsibility in terms of managing those resources. He 
should not be handicapped one way or the other (MoF Official in SL: 
XX304).  
Observation 6co: Yes, we know about the PFMICP but to be candid our level 
of involvement in most of these reforms that they are doing is very minimal. 
We are not fully involved in most of these reforms that these people 
undertake (Local Council official in SL: XX502). The interviewee is a local 
council official about the limited involve of his council in the design of the 
ongoing PFM reform project the PFMICP. 
Observation 6cp: I don’t know it had gone that far because we were invited 
to one workshop to look at only our part. Because when the PFM was being 





using), the internal audit agency was not autonomous at the time. It was a 
secretariat. So, we had the finance minister at that time as the head of the 
unit. We had a conflict of interest during the process s we had to fag up 
those issues. Not we are autonomous and report to the president and also 
to head of entities. That was the only meeting we were invited to flag up 
the changes as it relates to internal audit (Internal Audit official in LBR: 
XL401).  
Observation 6cq: We also need to do a lot of engagement and awareness 
raising about PFM reforms especially from the ministry of finance who are 
supposed to be the champions. When you talk to a lot of people they do 
not know about the reforms and even when you speak with people from 
councils (Local Council official in SL: XX502). 
Observation 6cr: The funding to capacitate councils is no more forthcoming. 
We need more capacity building support. The capacity building efforts have 
been lethargic maybe because of the incentives people are kind of no 
longer motivated to proceed with the reforms (Local Council official in SL: 
XX501).   
Observation 6cs: Well to be candid I believe capacity is something that 
should be ongoing, and for the last two years when the former Director 
who was there left for another job since then much has not been dome to 
the council. Less attention is being paid to the council. They are looking 
council have been trained in most of the things, but they forget that 
councils need to be upgraded to be able to continue to deliver, and it 
should be a continuous process (Local Council official in SL: XX502).  
 
Observation 6ct: The lack of accountability in the PFM sector has in fact 
created tension within intergovernmental entities (NSA representative in 
LBR: XL702).  
Observation 6cu: Yes, tensions will come normally when a ministry refuses 
to take ownership for example, with the IFMIS. When there were 
operational difficulties. They had damaged equipment and they had to 
requisite the LAN and the ministry didn’t want to take ownership for that 
and instead wanted the reform unit to use funds from the project. Even 
after agreeing to a MOU stating that line ministries should take such 
responsibility (MoF official in LBR: XL302).  
 
INFERENCES: Regarding the institutional set up and governance arrangement, Sierra Leone 
has subnational governments with some devolved service delivery and some 
deconcentrated PFM functions. Liberia on the other hand has 15 counties with highly 
concentrated PFM functions. But it is currently piloting treasury functions in four of fifteen 
counties. The overall PFM architecture in both countries is meanwhile less complex and 
financial management functions are highly concentrated in the MoF (see observations 6p-q 





institutional set up and management arrangement in the PFM architecture in the two 
countries present a huge opportunity to improve service delivery in these centralized 
systems - with MoF having direct control during the budget planning, preparation, execution 
and reporting over service delivery units (sectoral ministries, departments, agencies and 
subnational government).  
 
Despite initial efforts in Sierra Leone in particular to take advantage of the above opportunity 
and improve service delivery through the decentralisation (GoSL, 2004: Local Government 
Act), much has not been achieving on the service delivery front (repeat PEFA scores for 
subnational government). The decentralisation process and devolution of service delivery to 
county authorities in Liberia had been much slower, but the country has made important 
gains recently in improving services, which have been credited by observers and some 
interviewees to the setup of country treasuries in four countries as part of its pilot program 
(observations 6cl). The highly centralised system in Liberia and the recent improvement in 
service delivery through its county treasury pilot program have drawn the spotlight on Sierra 
Leone in the aftermath of the Ebola scandal, which some observers link to the level of 
deconcentration of PFM functions in that country (observations 6cm). The Ebola experience 
and the massive scandal that ensued was specifically highlighted in the evaluation of donor 
support to PFM and some interviewees as a product of the deconcentration of some PFM 
functions away from the MoF. For which, they suggest that the government reconcentrate 
some of those function back under the control of the MoF (Ecorys and Fiscus, 2016: 
Evaluation of GBS to Sierra Leone 2002 to 2015; and observations 6cn).  
 
The general low level of performance in sectoral ministries and subnational compared to 
central government in both countries (see repeat PEFA scores for both central and 
subnational governments), is caused in part by the larger to PFM discussed in hypothesis 4c. 
The latter depicts the transactional nature in the approach to PFM reforms in the two 
countries, where central government (mainly the MoF) roll out reform programs to MDAs 
and local government for implementation, often with no real ownership and commitment 
from MDAs and local councils to finance and sustain those reforms in the future (see 
observations 4az - 4ab in the analysis of hypothesis 4c). The evidence in observations 6co-
6cs also indicate clearly that there were no targeted efforts to build capacity in sector 





MTEF and IFMIS reforms. But also, the scale of PFM reform efforts (technical and financial 
support) was lower in MDAs and subnational government compared to that directed 
towards the central government. These disparities and the lack of accountability from the 
central government and political leaders according to some interviewees created tensions 
in the intergovernmental relations in the two countries (observations 6ct-u).  
 
COMPONENT FIVE: NSAs/CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT IN PFM REFORMS  
Non-State Actor (NSA) engagement in PFM reform is discussed in this thesis as the fifth 
component as part of the broader PFM institutional environment in the two cases study 
countries. NSAs in the context of this thesis could mean any local or community-based NGO, 
Civil Society Organisation (CSO) with interests in PFM issues. I argue in this section that 
irrespective of the little impact of NSA, especially on accountability dimensions of PFM, there 
is space for improving NSA engagement in PFM and its relationship with the wider PFM 
institutional environment or the other four components. 
 
OBSERVATIONS 
Observation 6cv: NSA engagement in PFM for the first time in 2009 was 
included in the PFM reform strategy and IPFMRP in Sierra Leone. The initial 
motive was to assist the development of the analytic and dissemination 
capacity of NSAs in exercising scrutiny of the use of public resources, as 
well as building a constituency for reform of the PFM systems across an 
array of non-state and government actors. The component included both 
demand and supply driven activities (World Bank 2009: project appraisal 
document for the IPFMRP in Sierra Leone). 
 
Observation 6cw: The final performance review of the IPFMRP 2009-2014 
which was carried out in 2018 by the World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group (IEG) noted increased scrutiny over PFM by NSA in Sierra Leone 
during the period under review. And the implementation status report of 
the ongoing PFM project (PFMICP) highlighted specific progress made by 
NSAs in scrutinising the annual budget preparation progress, the gains 
made by the NSA secretariat through its support in facilitating policy 
dialogue between NSAs and ministries, institutionalise NSA participation in 
PFM processes, production of Citizens’ budgets, and supports to Audit 
Service Sierra Leone in the development of simplified audit reports 







Observation 6cx: NSA engagement in PFM in Liberia stated in 2011, two 
years behind Sierra Leone. Like in Sierra Leone, NSA was also included as a 
component in the joint-donor support PFM project the IPFMRP (2011-2017) 
to strengthen the capacity of non-state actors as critical watchdogs in 
ensuring transparency and accountability in the use of public finances. It 
was to establish a platform for information-sharing between government 
and the public; build capacity among non-state actors; promote advocacy; 
and offer media training (Project Information Document - Concept Stage 
and IEG Implementation Completion Report Review respective).  
 
Observation 6cy: By the end of the IPFMRP in July 2017 according the IEG 
of the World Bank, “over 100 Non-State Actors (NSAs) were trained in PFM, 
proposal writing, grant management, and/or results-based management. 
One of the early successes include an accountability scoreboard in Bomi 
[county] to provide budget information for citizens as well as local officials. 
The training was focused on laying foundations for citizen engagement. The 
ICR team has interviewed 9 NSAs and heard overwhelmingly positive 
feedback on improved engagement, cooperation between local 
governments and civil society, and great work the NSA Secretariat in the 
MFDP in engaging the NSAs” (World Bank, 2017: Implementation 
Completion and Result Report for the Liberia IPFMRP 2011-2017).   
 
INFERENCE: The evidence from observations 6cv-y show that there has been some general 
progress made in improving the engagement of NSAs in PFM in the two countries. The focus 
in the two countries has been on both supply and demand driven activities to NSAs. But the 
above evidence provides little or no evidence about the level of impact on NSA engagement 
in PFM. I do however recognise the challenge in measuring impact, which is ubiquitous to 
most reforms. But a starting point might be to ascertain what kind of progress has been 
made, when and in which areas within PFM. The evidence from observations 6cx-6dg below 
present a lot more detail picture regarding the nature of the progress made in the two 
countries.  
 
Based on the available evidence, there is no question about the relevance of NSA 
engagement in PFM. But the level of impact of NSA engagement in PFM is still debatable, 
and this depends largely on where the focus has been over the years in the two countries. 
These observations show that NSAs have been actively engaged more on advocacy, 
transparency and issues around the annual budget formulation process than in 
accountability and public participation dimensions of PFM. There is also, a subtle admission 





aspects in the annual budget formulation process represent the first steps in the efforts from 
NSAs to contribute to improvements in accountability and overall service delivery 
(observation 6dh).  
 
Irrespective of the significant gains made in areas such as transparency, advocacy and 
budget formation, the two countries still continue to rank poorly among their pairs in the 
sub region based on the available data from PEFA and Open Budget Survey (OBS) from the 
International Budget Partnership (observations 6di-k). A number of reasons have been given 
by some interviewees in observations 6dl-n. Among these is the fact that local authorities in 
the two countries were sceptical about any NSA engagement in PFM, citing mostly technical 
concerns, which for them were outside the realm of civil society. Others also cite the lack of 
understanding from government officials about the role of NSAs in PFM. Perhaps, a more 
unlikely explanation for the low progress in the two countries with respect to other countries 
in the sub region is the fact that NSA engagement in PFM only gained attention several years 
in the reforms. And this understandable according to some of the respondents because PFM 
was not a priority for NSAs immediately after the civil wars in the two countries. Most NSAs 
at the time were working on issues such as transitional justice, peace building, human rights 
etc. (observation 6dn).   
 
Observation 6cx: We are talking about social engineering process, and this 
takes time. Change does not come in one day. So, if you are asking me 
about the relevance, I would say we are extremely highly relevant. But 
regarding our impact, there is not much impact at the moment. Except that 
policies around budget formulation, development of budget estimates are 
now being scrutinised and are part of civil society scrutiny because of the 
budget hearings. You could say that around budget formulation CSOs have 
been able to make some impact. There is also an impact regarding 
reorienting productive relationship between the state and CSOs which did 
not exist before. We could argue that there is a relevance because there 
was no platform that brought the state/finance ministry and civil society 
before. For example, during the development of the citizens budget, you 
have officials from the ministry of finance, civil society organisations 
putting together the various documents, and deciding what should be 
included or not. And the MoF does not have the total authority to 
determine what should be included or not. Because there is information 
within the citizens budget that could spur a lot of interest and controversy 
among the public. You could say that around budget formulation CSOs have 
been able to make some impact. There is also an impact regarding 
reorienting productive relationship between the state and CSOs which did 





there was no platform that brought the state/finance ministry and civil 
society before. For example, during the development of the citizens budget, 
you have officials from the ministry of finance, civil society organisations 
putting together the various documents, and deciding what should be 
included or not. And the MoF does not have the total authority to 
determine what should be included or not. Because there is information 
within the citizen’s budget that could spur a lot of interest and controversy 
among the public (NSA representative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 6da: We could say that there has been some relevance, and 
regarding impact in the sense of having civil society recommendations are 
directly taken up and included in the final budget statement that is taken 
to parliament. That could an impact because of the work of CSOs. Another 
way of assessing the impact of civil society is on the audit process. Now 
CSOs have developed a keen interest in following up on audit 
recommendations. They go on the media, and shame government officials 
and they shame even the states for their failure to actions some of the 
recommendations. If you look at the rating in the Open budget survey for 
Sierra Leone, you will see that the country has made a lot of progress. 
These are things that we could attribute as our impact or results from our 
intervention as a civil society in PFM (NSA representative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 6db: I think to a larger extent [NSAs have created impact on 
service delivery], but it wouldn't be a magic bullet. There is a recognition 
that things will not be as usual if we want to have change. One thing we 
have been able to work with the government is to popularise the budget 
the budget law as you know is very complicated even for our educate 
people. We are NSA have been contracted to design ways in which we can 
make the budget very easy to be understood by the local people. That 
sometimes helps to address the perception of corruption. But it is at the 
same time to help people appreciate how budgets are allocated and how 
development activities are being prioritised. These are some of the capital 
reasons why we have the NSA set up in the MFDP (NSA representative in 
LBR: XL702). 
Observation 6dc: When our audios about the national budget were played 
on national radio everybody was calling me to thank me for the good 
initiative, we have taken in popularising the national budget (NSA 
representative in SL: XL701). 
Observation 6dd: specifically, there is no specific example. But collectively 
we have advocated for the creation of anti-corruption act for instance and 
the set up anti-corruption commission, PFM reform law of Liberia, general 
auditing commission, public procurement laws and commission. These are 
as a result of advocacy that we launched and the overall idea of promoting 
accountability and combating corruption in Liberia. These measures are in 
response to that kind of advocacy (NSA representative in LBR: XL703). 
Observation 6de: To a greater extent because for the first-time local 
communities are able to see their budget. When the government started 
making the budget public and then we started saying the budget is too 





government said yes and started working on the guide to the citizens’ 
budget. But you would not believe one of our partners in Lofa some of the 
communities they went to that was the first time seeing their county 
budget to even know what goes to the local hospital health centre or 
school. So, they are kind of excited that they can go the county education 
officer or they can go to the county health officer and ask why there are no 
drugs when they have received this amount of money that was supposed 
to buy drugs (NSA representative in LBR: XL701). 
 
Observation 6df: specifically, there is no specific example. But collectively 
we have advocated for the creation of anti-corruption act for instance and 
the set up anti-corruption commission, PFM reform law of Liberia, general 
auditing commission, public procurement laws and commission. These are 
as a result of advocacy that we launched and the overall idea of promoting 
accountability and combating corruption in Liberia. These measures are in 
response to that kind of advocacy (NSA representative in LBR: XL703). 
Observation 6dg:  So, our work now has shifted to call from reforms to call 
for accountability from those who hare managing these institutions of PFM. 
Who are supposed to practicalise the reform measures incorporated in the 
policies and regulations? (NSA representative in LBR: XL703). 
Observation 6dh: The first step is for the people to be aware about what is 
due them. I like to use this example; a man was dying and he was very rich. 
He wrote on his will in the bible and he gave the bible to his son and said 
this is what I have, and I am dying. His son got angry saying with all the 
property, you are only given me a bible. He did not know what his father 
wrote in the bible was all he needed to succeed. I am saying this to highlight 
that without information, citizens cannot participate as they should. They 
are not able to demand accountability without a mechanism for them to 
be able to identify what their priorities are. The mere fact that we have a 
mechanism in place is the first step towards citizen’s access quality services. 
It is through that mechanism that they are able to identify. For example, in 
River Gee County, the county has only one hospital and we [the NSA] … 
realise that there were no waiting homes for pregnant women. I was 
driving to work this morning and I heard they now have a county setting 
and they have identified the waiting home as a project for this fiscal period. 
If those women [in River Gee County] did not have the opportunity to seat 
at the county meetings, they would never have pushed their agenda 
forward (NSA representative in LBR: XL701). 
 
Observation 6di: Results from the 2017 Open Budget Survey show 
significant setbacks for Sierra Leone from 2015, with its scores on 
transparency, public participation and budget oversight dropping from   
52/100 to 38/100; 31/100 to 6/100; and 36/100 to 42/100 respectively. In 
both years, the country provides fewer opportunities for public 
engagement in PFM than in other areas such as transparency and oversight.  
Scoring 6 points lower than the regional average, and ranking third from 





Observation 6dj: Results from the 2017 Open Budget Survey show 
significant setbacks for Sierra Leone from 2015, with its scores on 
transparency, public participation and budget oversight dropping from   
38/100 to 36/100; 21/100 to 11/100; and 33/100 to 54/100 respectively. 
Liberia like Sierra Leone in both years provides fewer opportunities for 
public engagement in PFM than in the other areas such as transparency 
and oversight.  Scoring 1 point lower than the regional average, and ranking 
fourth from the bottom below, only above Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea 
and São Tomé e Príncipe. 
Observation 6dk: Repeat PEFA scores for the two countries also show that 
performance information for service delivery and accountability are the 
weakest dimensions within the PEFA framework (PEFA assessment data 
and reports, available at the PEFA website). 
 
Observation 6dl: The government per se did not play any central role in 
encouraging or fostering civic participation in the budget process. I could 
say this with confidence. Because all these processes where being driven 
by external actors and from within civil society itself. In my view, there was 
mistrust among government circles that PFM is a technical issue, and there 
was no need to involve the public or civil society to be involved in technical 
issues, like the budget structure for example. It does not allow too much 
civil society participation because there are the legal rules around the 
budget ceiling, service levels, and laws governing the way the budget is 
being formulated and designed. So, involving civil society was in their view 
a waste of time, it will protract the process, and could limit the discretions 
of financial authority regarding fiscal trade-offs. These were the thinking 
that was going on in government, and they decided not to push for the 
inclusion CSO in the PFM process (NSA representative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 6dm: For example, it is like your first time including civil 
society in PFM reform. So, even within the MFDP, there are some political 
figures who do not understand what we do. They do not understand, 
because we have a security apparatus called the National Security Agency 
(NSA). One of the key policy makers who worked in the ministry saw NSA 
and she said at the time that we had stated getting security people in the 
building. Because she didn’t understand what we do. A lot of times they do 
not really understand what we do as civil society. So, they don’t give it the 
relevant push that we need so we need to fight for it (NSA representative 
in LBR: XL701). An NSA member speaking about the initial challenges the 
NSA secretariat faced such as lack of knowledge about NSA participation in 
PFM by government officials. 
Observation 6dn: … what has changed since the inception of the reforms 
in the last few years in the interest being developed between civil society 
organisations on budget and PFM issues? Before the onset of the PFM 
reform programs, a lot of civil society organisations that emerged were 
working on issues that were not PFM related. It is understandable the 
reason why it was because they were reacting to the causes of the war that 





women's rights, etc. those were the immediate problems that civil society 
needed to address at the time (NSA representative in SL: XX702). 
 
However, the evidence described above does not explain the whole story on NSA 
engagement in PFM with respect to the nature of their interventions and progress made 
thus far and the opportunities that exist for better civil society participation in PFM. NSA 
engagement in PFM in the two countries has become a lot more complicated than anyone 
would have thought of, which perhaps not surprising is given the ongoing debate about their 
potential impact, especially on accountability and service delivery dimensions of PFM.  NSAs 
continue to face complex problems, ranging from capacity constraints to political and 
institutional challenges that impede their effectiveness (observations 6do and 6dp—6dy). 
And efforts by donor-partners and local authorities to further promote and institutionalise 
NSA engagement in PFM have mostly resulted in serious political and institutional dilemmas 
for NSAs in the two countries.  
 
The evidence in observations 6dp-6dt shows that while there have been some level of 
cooperation and strategic alignment between NSA and other components within the wider 
PFM institutional set up in these countries, internal politics remains both a challenge and an 
opportunity for effective NSA engagement in PFM. There is greater awareness and 
recognition among local authorities than previously about the value of creating a space for 
NSA engagement in PFM (observation 6dp). But some political actors still continue to cast 
doubts on the contribution of NSAs and will go to some lent to stifle their activities by 
denying them the necessary funding (observations 6dq). In recognition of this inherent 
challenge, NSAs have had to make some serious political manoeuvres within government to 
push their policy objectives (observation 6ds). Their work sometimes means they could be 
considered by government as allies and sometimes they could be targets (observations 6dt). 
These situations in which NSAs find themselves have led them to learn and come up effective 
strategies such as dialogue and strategic engagement with local authorities, instead of going 
to the media every time there is an issue. Which, some of the interviewees note often have 
counterproductive effects on NSA and government relations in the two countries. But NSAs 
have also been blamed by some observations for their lack of sincerity and contributing to 
the political divide in these countries (observations 6du-6dv). In the words of one prominent 
NSA, “there are elements of incivility in CSOs. Some are genuine and some are influenced by 






One major effort by donor-partners and local authorities in the two countries to streamline 
and institutionalise the work of NSAs in PFM has been to establish a NSA Secretariat within 
the MoF (observations 6dw). While this has been a laudable effort by many observations in 
bolstering NSA engagement in PFM, it has also added another layer of complications for 
NSAs, who have to now balance between satisfying their political masters in the MoF and as 
well as effectively pursuing their mission. NSAs benefit a lot from working from within 
government, such as having greater access to policy makers and aligning their activities with 
the interests of both government and donor-partners (such as PEFA indicators). But they are 
also been effectively held hostage by local authorities to do their bidding, in terms of pushing 
specific government policies and actions. By having the NSA in the house and under the 
control of the MoF, it has become easier for local authorities to have NSA buy-in to their 
policies and actions, irrespective of whether those policy actions normally fall within the 
interests on NSAs and citizens. At the same time NSAs are not left with little or no leverage 
to strategically engage with the MoF on PFM issues (observations 6dx-6dy). The foregoing 
observations (observations 6dw-6dy) and analysis pose important question about whether 
ongoing efforts by donor-partners and local authorities to improve NSA engagement in PFM 
in these countries constitute state capture or strategic alignment in the relationship 
between NSAs and government. 
Observation 6do: Civil society has to play a critical role than they are 
playing now. But we will need the build the capacity of civil society, because 
most of those who are now in the civil society does not have the capabilities 
to work on PFM and budget issues (NSA representative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 6dp: For us here there is more willingness on the part of the 
ministry of finance or the government to work with NSA. Do not forget that 
the president announced that every citizen should have rights to inspect 
public spending. And the government has this big agenda, and the donor 
has now opened a lot of opportunities for NSA. There is a kind of awareness 
on the part of the ministry that for the development of any document or 
policy they should include civil society (NSA representative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 6dq: With donors out of government is different a bit. In 
government it’s a bit different as well. I think the donors have some level 
of influence but not totally. It’s perceived that the doors dictate to 
government, but in some case no. For example, the donors gave money for 
a particular program. The EU for example, gave $3 million to support civil 
society. Somebody later in government (MFDP) decides that $3 million is 
just too much to go to civil society and civil society gets less than 1% of that 






Observation 6dr: XL703: Again, the NSA and the anti-corruption should be 
given a central role to play in PFM reforms. They have a role to play but I 
think the role has been politicised. There is a lot political interference in 
their decision making and in the judicial system (NSA representative in LBR: 
XL703).  
Observation 6ds:  We have not been able use political influence, even 
though sometimes when I was outside. Yes, so for example, you want to 
get to the minister of finance. You will also find an intermediary, we call 
them secondary targets. People who are connected to the policy maker 
you want to influence. So, even at the level of NSA secretariat, if I want 
certain things accomplished, I still have to find that political link so that the 
policy maker sees what is it that I am really driving (NSA representative in 
LBR: XL701). 
Observation 6dt: Our relationship has been in two ways: one at times they 
can be our allies and at times they can also be our target. What we try to 
do we try to maintain a professional relationship with them. We try to 
dialogue with them constructively. In fact, in most cases we prefer 
engaging them than going to the media. For example, when we are about 
to launch the “Loosing Out Report” I mentioned, we had a meeting with 
the minister of finance by then Dr. Kelfala   Marah. There were two 
discussions the first title of the report was “how to lose two trillion Leones”. 
That title didn’t go down well with the minister of finance. And then there 
were pictures of bad roads which also didn’t go down well with him. So, we 
dialogued with him saying nor, we agree there are bad roads, but the 
government has made a lot of efforts to make roads. So, we settled to show 
both some bad roads and some good ones as well on the front cover of the 
report.  Even in terms of the title of the report he felt offended that how 
to lose a trillion Leones might be something apprehensive against the 
minister of finance. We said okay and then changed the tiled to “Loosing 
Out”. Therefore, we agreed on the principle that we can make some 
changes but not to the contents of the report (NSA representative in SL: 
XX701). 
 
Observation 6du: The NSA of course has a lot do to do, but we are all Sierra 
Leones and we all see things that are happening! To me even the NSA is 
not doing much itself. You look at the papers and then see how divided the 
papers are on political lines. You look at the civil society and see how 
divided they are on political lines. Civil society is supposed to be champions 
of the people, but if as a civil society you have already toed the line with 
government and always trumpeting government even when it is not in the 
interest of the general public (Donor representative in SL: XX106). 
Observation 6dv: At times there are elements of incivility in CSOs. Some 
are genuine, and some are influenced by the government to be talking 






Observation 6dw: XX702: They did not want a situation where CSO would 
be out there and poorly informed about fiscal issues and challenging the 
state and then making a poor contribution to decision making along budget 
programs. They decided to set up the secretariat, provide training, create 
the institutional linkage, and then let them see our position and let us see 
whether we can negotiate and involve voice to impact on our decision-
making processes on budget matters (NSA representative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 6dx: It is frustrating sometimes and sometimes it is 
encouraging. Encouraging in the sense that when it comes to issues that 
the minister of finance wants to showcase as an open ministry regarding 
its dealing with civil society, you find your work a lot easier. Because, they 
will ask you directly to engage with CSOs and sometimes convene meetings 
on behalf of the ministry of finance. It is more like consultative interactions. 
It is not like deliberative discussions, where you share ideas that could lead 
to better outcomes. In that case, your job is made easier, and you would 
be encouraged. You could exploit those spaces to your advantage by having 
civil society participate very well. When the CSOs also need information 
from the ministry of finance you would be able to facilitate that, this that 
makes the job interesting. Regarding the frustrating aspect of it is that if 
the ministry of finance makes a decision, say, for example, the recent 
austerity measures that resulted in increased fuel prices. They would want 
to have a civil society buy-in, and at the same time, the civil society is critical 
of those decisions because of their implications on the ordinary citizen. 
They would want to put us into advocating and justifying their decisions on 
fuel increase and the austerity measures. That is one frustrating aspect of 
our job because we would not like to see as siding with the ministry of 
finance in taking those decisions which other colleagues perceive as 
unrealistic regarding improving the living conditions of the ordinary citizens. 
I had that challenge the last time, and I had to find ways to circumvent that 
mandate to be going on the radio calling n civil society to support the plan 
of the ministry of finance (NSA representative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 6dy: You are paid, although the funding comes from a project, 
which is external, but indirectly the government has control over it. And so 
you are paid. And you wouldn’t want to kick yourself out of a job by 
antagonising your political masters. But at the same time, you have to be 
skilful not to antagonise your civil society colleagues whom you purport to 
serve (NSA representative in SL: XX702). 
 
Meanwhile, the future for NSA engagement in PFM is not as gloomy as the above evidence 
and analysis suggest. Several opportunities still exist within the current PFM institutional 
framework in these countries to improve NSA engagement in PFM. The observations 
(observations 6dy-6ef) below present three specific opportunities where involvement of 






First, NSAs could do better if they focus on shaping governments’ policy directions and 
providing credible alternative policy options through evidenced-based, backed by 
constructive engagement with local authorities (observations 6dx-6ea). Authorities in the 
two countries always seek to discredit reports from NSAs by identifying inaccuracies or lack 
of evidence to support assertions in those reports. It is critical that NSAs get their facts 
correctly if they are to effectively engage on specific PFM issues and policies. There are 
several evidences in Sierra Leone where NSAs have created impact through evidence-driven 
research. Among others, such as the ‘losing out’ report on tax waivers, CSOs report on 
austerity measures after the Ebola Outbreak and the recent work by the Budget Advocacy 
Network on the misappropriations of public funds set out in the Audit Reports. But for NSAs 
to be able to achieve this, donor-partner and local government must be prepared to increase 
their current level of support towards improving the technical competence of NSAs working 
in PFM.  
 
A second opportunity for NSA engagement in PFM reforms is by improving the institutional 
links between NSAs and the legislature (observations 6eb-6ec). There are currently weak 
institutional links in the budget process and accountability aspects involving the legislature. 
The legislature in the two countries have little or no capacity to effectively perform their 
oversight role in the annual budget process and provide accountability mechanisms within 
PFM. NSAs could therefore, support the legislature by providing them with evidence-based 
research on the annual budget and other PFM matters. There is a greater degree of 
convergence in the interests (oversight in the annual budget process, boosting pro-poor and 
other social spending, etc.) of NSAs with that of the interests of MPs. Like in Sierra Leone 
where the government holds the majority in the legislature, there is even greater 
opportunity for NSAs to create more impact by providing support to opposition MPs. But 
such support must be provided indirectly through dissemination in the media and to make 
copies of their reports available to the general public, so as to avoid any unintended 
retaliations from the central government. Community-based CSOs should be able to support 
their members of parliament with policy recommendations based on research conducted in 
their respective communities and as well as support them in conducting oversight over the 






The third and final avenue for future NSAs engagement in PFM is in the area of supporting 
donor-partners determine appropriate budget support triggers and provide a mechanism to 
monitor performance against those triggers (observations 6ed-6ef). NSAs can also provide 
support in donor-partner review missions and make recommendations about areas where 
donor conditions might be appropriate for specific reform programs.  DFID for example, has 
been cited by some NSA representatives as one of the donor-partners that has taken the 
lead in building better collaborations and working directly with NSAs in Sierra Leone. To 
provide specific training and other capacity building support to NSAs directly (observation 
6ed). As shown in observation 6ee, the idea of NSA supporting donor-partners in setting 
budget support triggers is a bit complex, given that donor-partners would have to reconcile 
between having measurable and short-term objectives with often long-term solutions from 
NSAs. Observation 6ef set out some of the arguments in favour of having NSAs collaborate 
with donor-partners to determine budget support triggers.    
Observation 6dz: First, there is no government processes that civil society 
are not involved especially if it has to do with accountability and budget 
oversight. So, because of the role we have been playing in terms of coming 
up with credible alternatives and research that are not contestable. We 
have seen other institutions come out with research and government will 
just bash the report. But for ours we do them thoroughly – for example the 
news night report we took one year six-months just to validate that report. 
So, we do work with government to validate our report and this is why we 
think we are making progress. For example, in the Open Government 
Partnership (OGP) we serve as a steering committee and our role there has 
helped shaped the implementation of the OGP in the sense, ensuring that 
commitments are actually being implemented. We are also making impact 
in the sense that we are provided alternative policies which government 
has used as part of its own microeconomic policies (NSA representative in 
SL: XX701).  
Observation 6ea: Another lesson I have learnt as CSOs we have to ensure 
that our reports are credible. Our figures are based on facts and 100% 
correct. The moment you have 99% correct and 1% wrong, they will use 
that 1% to bash the whole report. So, I have also learnt that particular 
lesson in terms of the PFM work (NSA representative in SL: XX701). 
Observation 6eb: [how can the NSAs work with the legislators to improve 
accountability and provide alternative policy directions to government 
policies and programs?]. We do not have any direct relationship per se, 
normally we do provide them with our policy briefs and analysis as to what 





we do have any direct relationship with them. For example, during the 
course of the Ebola in 2015, we did a policy brief titled what expenditure 
and revenue are available to government. In that policy brief, we itemised 
some of the things government should do to ensure that the keep the 
government running and we do not run into serious problem. And most of 
the issues we sighted in that report are what they government used for the 
austerity measures. Let me just show you one of the reports of what I am 
trying to say. Because we cannot provide physical support so we said to 
ourselves let us provide ideas of how we can help the government with our 
work titled “fiscal challenges in the face of Ebola – what expenditures are 
happening for the government”. The whole report talks about how we 
want more money to go towards health, this and this but we want 
government to cut down on admin, fuel, traveling expenses, office supplies 
and miscellaneous. And we want government to put more strength on 
property rental tax because is a huge source. We talked about personal 
income tax for higher earners and we also talked about discretionary tax 
waivers. These were the advice we provided to government. Now look at 
the austerity measures they speak directly to this report and it was one 
year after we published this report. This shows that we are actually 
providing alternative policies in helping the government. I can give you a 
copy of the report, but you can also find it on our website (NSA 
representative in SL: XX702).  
Observation 6ec: If you look at the opportunities that exist within the 
executive process of the budget formulation, there are direct institutional 
links there [for NSAs]. The budget hearings, for example, the monitoring of 
the budget, and looking at the financial account for every year and all that. 
But when it comes to the approval stage, interestingly enough where there 
could have been more opportunities for CSOs in the legislative process of 
the budget approval process is where there is a weak provision 
institutionally for CSOs participation. Unlike other countries where you 
have like during the committee stage, you have public hearings. They will 
invite the public directly to come and witness the discussions and review 
the process on the performance of the budget from MDAs. In Sierra Leone, 
those committee stages are closed to CSOs. They do not allow participation 
there. The MPs do not seem to be representatives who trust or want to 
work with civil society regarding impacting their decision on approving the 
budget; they do not seem to be open, except for the fact that the 
opposition MPs they seem to be having this kind of analysis. They seem to 
love working with CSOs to help them trigger their desires. I will give you an 
example of what happened last year. When the budget speech was 
released last year, CSOs horridly put together a reaction to the budget 
pointing out the weakness and the strength of the budget. Could you 





parliament to argue when they were debating the budget? They highlight 
what came from civil society. So, you could see that the legislature is really 
weak regarding their analysis of the budget process. At the same time 
those in the majority in parliament does not seem to want to use the 
criticisms of the CSOs not to approve the budget (NSA representative in SL: 
XX702). 
 
Observation 6ed: There is some progress on procurement, there is now the 
act, transparency but when it comes to practice, we have problems. I have 
recommended to DFID for supporting CSOs, and next month they will be 
training CSOs and will provide the opportunity for CSO to be represented 
in the bidding process and award of contracts. But then the CSOs 
recommendations and inputs, to what extent will that influence bigger 
policies in the future? DFID for now has taken a very good step. I have 
provided the names of 100 CSOs to DFID who should be trained on 
procurement. If that goes on well for example, maybe we will be able to 
make some progress on procurement (NSA representative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 6ee: Recently the EU came to me, and they were seeking some 
information as to what the EU budget support could recommend as part of 
triggering the conditions for their support. And I recommended some 
triggers. I recommended for example that there should be kind of like the 
budget committee with each ministry should have a civil society 
representative. By having a civil society representative in each ministry, 
which would limit the opportunities for corruption. Mind you the civil 
society could also be corrupted. But if they are not corrupted, they could 
be a better outside lens to be actually challenging what ministries are doing, 
and debating whether MDAs are executing their functions properly or not. 
And that could be an important mechanism for checking corruption and 
increasing accountability. So, after that what he [The EU head of Mission] 
told me about most of what I said to me, he realised that most of my 
recommendations he didn’t want to take them on board, because my 
recommendations are not measurable, and they take a long time. And 
within one year he needs to show results for meeting those conditions and 
then tick the box and award the next grant. So, you see the disjoint 
between having something measurable or SMART targets as against having 
something that can bring real change but take time to achieve (NSA 
representative in SL: XX702). 
Observation 6ef: The realistic nature of the triggers to me it is limited. You 
see one has to be very careful regarding the quick fix triggers; we could say 
yes government seems to be meeting most of them because they continue 
to receive donor support. But if you ask yourself now, what has actually 





have been improved and there some improvements in water supply, 
sanitation and electricity, etc. It will not be fair to say nothing has been 
happening, because things have changed than the way they were after the 
war. To some extent, you could say the triggers are realistic, but we still 
need triggers that really open up transparency and accountability. There is 
some progress on transparency, but there is little process on accountability. 
And transparency does not necessarily foster accountability. Information 
out there does not necessarily mean that citizen make use of it and hold 
government accountable. So, you will find out that for example, the right 
to information access has been enacted as one of the [budget support] 
triggers. But, then how well do we use the right to access information? 





I have effectively presented through analysis of the five components of PFM institutional 
environment, their structures and interrelationships in the context of the two case study 
countries by presenting evidence from diverse sources that increase support for the 
hypothesis discussed in this section. The process-tracing analysis carried out present 
compelling evidence from the two countries that explain how and why PFM laws and formal 
institutional development may still have limited influence on PFM reforms and PFM systems 
even where the institutional set-up/structures within the four components examined and 
the interrelationships between them are less complex.  
 
The evidence further shows that Formal institutional set up, systems, policies and 
governance structures are only a necessary for advancing PFM reforms or improving PFM 
systems quality. Hypothesis five therefore only passes a hoop test, because there is sufficient 
evidence to show that these formal institutional set up, governance arrangements have 
limited impact in driving PFM reforms, sustaining the gains already made or improving 
overall PFM systems in the two case study countries. Significant gaps exist between PFM 
laws and their actual implementation in practice, and between formal institutional 
development and their functionality/functional improvements in the two case study 
countries. And how far PFM laws and formal institutions go in influencing PFM reforms or 
improving PFM systems is explained by the nature and extent of the local political economy 





and the structural relationships that exist between them. The process-tracing evidence and 
analysis have also effectively argued against the thinking that highly centralised and less 
complex PFM institutional set up are the solutions to driving PFM reforms in developing 
















GROUP SEVEN QUESTIONS AND SCENARIOS  
 
The process-tracing evidences and ensuing inferences in hypotheses 1 to 4 established how 
and why the nature, level and extent of PFM progress made still does not deliver real change 
in the two case study countries; explained how and why the PFM performance varies across 
the two cases and the budget cycle; and provided an understanding of the behaviours of 
various stakeholders and the extent of their support to the reforms in the two countries. 
Given the latter, this section therefore explores why various stakeholders behaved the way 
they did in different phases of the reform process? This will include an analysis of the Political 
Economy dynamics, leadership and ownership of the reforms, incentives/motivations and 
opportunities that emerged, and the impact of all of these in the reform processes in the 






Unlike the analyses presented in previous sections, the process-tracing analysis in this 
section asks a number of high-level questions with regard to the political economy dynamics, 
leadership and ownership of the reforms, incentives/motivations and opportunities that 
emerged, and the impact of all of these in the reform processes in the two case study 
countries and presents various forms of evidence that explain each question. It must be 
understood that the analyses in this section must not be treated in isolation, rather they 
must be considered together with those set out in hypotheses 1 to 4. 
 
CONCEPTUALISATION AND PRE-DESIGN PHASE: How did the specific PFM reform agenda 
emerge? Were they developed in reaction to a particular crisis/challenge (such as post-
conflict, Ebola, crash in commodity prices)? Or in reaction to donor demands - such as 
program triggers? Debt relief triggers? And/or after a donor funded PFM assessment? 
 
Observation 7a:  Reform was a very necessary condition! In fact, I can give you the 
history of all of these. First, it started with period of post-conflict. It was called a 
post-conflict recovery support and all that coincided with the Jubilee Campaign that 
maybe you are aware of. And then another period was late 1990s and early 2000. 
When the conflict ended officially in February 2002, and then Interim Debt Relief 
came in and countries were benefiting from interim debt relief and Sierra Leone 
happed to have gotten debt relief before Liberia. The interim debt relief which we 
called the HIPC decision-point – I was at MoFED at the time… when they decide 
(donors) that they are going to cancel your debt. And then your total debt stock will 
be calculated. Ours was $1.6 billion dollars. And then you work towards it. How you 
work towards it is where the PFM reform came in. So, how you work towards first, 
meeting your HIPC decision-point, you have to work towards coming up with your 
first PRSP. So, the country (Sierra Leone) did that (Interview: XX101 - former ministry 
of finance official but now working for the IMF in Sierra Leone).  
Observation 7b: And the reason why I say the failure of most PFM reforms is because 
they are not home-grown. In other words, it is not only something that the 
government is saying look, but you also know what the things that are necessary for 
us are and it is a must that we must do it. It [PFM reform] is most of the time thought 
of by development partners and discussed with the government. But because of the 
carrot behind the stick, the government will say okay we will try, or we will do it. 
And they will do the few actions that donors want and then disbursement is done. 
And after that, nothing else (Interview: XX106 - A Sierra Leonean formerly with the 
WB but now with the AfDB as a consultant). 
Observation 7c: Starting with the early 2000s immediately after the war, EU decided 





during the protracted civil war. They called it the EU’s structural adjustment 
program and by that time and I was in charge of revenue in the reform process. Yes, 
at the time because there was a lot of capacity problem at the time and the donor 
was trying to push reforms because definitely you know now after a war situation 
country attract a lot of revenue and for proper accountability and some of these are 
peoples’ money when they come to this country we have to set up structures and 
so on. And the attempt by EU at that time was to put structures in place given the 
broken structures at the time for PFM reforms going forward. That was basically the 
idea (Interview: XX105_303 - A former direct of budgets in the MoF but now working 
as a consultant for the EU state building PFM project). 
 
Observation 7d: Most times reforms are not locally driven. It is not only with PFM 
reform. We have also seen this with the SDGs. I do not know whether you are aware 
of the new deal as well. It is the same with the new deal, and the open government 
partnership and Millennium Challenge Corporation. Our PFM reform, I may be 
wrong it came as a result of donors trying to reach the HIPC. Through getting debts 
out of the way. So, we needed certain reforms. And it is the same because we have 
seen to all of these reforms, different instruments but they are deeply rooted - they 
are not locally owned (NSA representative in LBR: XL701). 
Observation 7e: The overall aim of our development cooperation is Liberia is state 
building/peacebuilding, and that includes democratic development and human 
rights. Working in poverty reduction and development resources are essential, so 
you will need to have an effective PFM system in place, which is transparent, 
accountable and participatory too. So, that is the main kind of rationale for our 
operations in Liberia. And in post-conflict countries like Liberia, where the 
institutions are basically, if not collapsed but they exist only on paper thank the real 
capacity to deliver what the minister of finance or minister of education is supposed 
to provide.  I would say it [PFM] is an important aspect of democracy and state 
building. Maybe one of the most important democratic processes is the budget 
process. In Liberia, it is not yet very participatory. It is a long process like we have 
been in Tanzania supporting PFM for 50 years. We know this is a slow process and 
needs time (Donor representative in LBR: XL103).  
Observation 7f: We look at specifically how we can support the government into it 
reforms especially with regards to both for natural resources and governance, 
especially after the Civil War and then the outbreak of Ebola. We have our own 
strategy called the country strategy paper for Liberia or all of our intervention in 
Liberia. They're all geared towards or assisting the government foster it agenda for 
transformation to supporting various pillars. So, in Liberia, we support the agenda 
for transformation, which is the AFT through two pillars … and where you find we 
are doing PFM is pillar four of the AFT, which is more or less governance. So, our 
pillar is more or less governance and effective management natural resources 





Observation 7g: Donors come because the government has invited them to come, 
so more or less government accepted that they needed reforms. Taking into 
consideration again government wanted to continue with the IMF program and with 
that we needed to reform our systems and processes so that we transform into a 
very vibrant PFM system so that you will be able to generate financial statistics for 
informed decision-making as well as making proper decisions on certain things with 
a very good system in place (Donor representative who also worked as LTA in SL: 
XX104_302). 
Observation 7h: It is a combination of both. I remember, the post-war or the end of 
the war was not just the country's efforts. It was a combination of the international 
community and it was like a roadmap was envisaged such that countries will not slip 
back to those kinds of things in the past. It was a collaborative effort on the part of 
both the government and the donors. It was not like a purely country effort to be 
frank about it (MoF official in SL: XX304). 
 
INFERENCE: From the evidence presented in observations 7a-h, both countries do share a 
number of features with regards to how PFM reforms were conceptualized or how the PFM 
agenda emerged in these countries. Several factors explain how the PFM reform agenda 
emerged, which are broadly categorised into two:  
 Reaction to various crises - post-conflict situations and there was the need to rebuild 
PFM institutions in both countries, decline in commodity prices (such as iron ore) 
and the Ebola Outbreak 
 To meet donor demands - such as debt relief triggers, budget support conditions and 
donor funded PFM assessments, which were mostly used to inform the design of 
new PFM reform programs.  
 
These findings are also consistent with findings from previous published research and PFM 
assessment reports as sent out in observation 7i below. 
 
Observation 7i: See AppendicesA & B - Analysis and Build Up to the 
Reforms: How PFM Reform got to the Agenda of Government, also set 
out evidence from other published sources such, donor reports, 
governments’ reports and independent research from practitioners 






However, the distinction between the two categories is not clear-cut, because donor 
interventions in PFM in both countries were in fact, at their peak in the aftermath of each 
set of crises in these countries. Except with regard to the HIPC debt relief which was a global 
agenda that benefited many developing countries, including the two case study countries. 
Donor intervention in PFM reforms has therefore always taken a lead-role, irrespective of 
the nature of the crisis in these countries. PFM reforms in the view of one respondent is 
“mostly though of by development partners and discussed with the government” (Donor 
representative in SL: XX106). Even for some local actors who share the view that PFM reform 
was also partly conceived locally (Observations 7g-h), they indirectly admit that, any local 
effort towards PFM was also influenced by some form of external incentives from 
development partners.  It is noteworthy that, although, the objective of various PFM reforms 
varies considerably - from post-conflict to the decline in Iron Ore prices and the Ebola 
Outbreak in 2014, what is striking is that there is significant similarity in the 
components/activities of those reform programs. The latest examples are the DFID Building 
Core Systems and the EU State Building projects, both of which take a U-turn, with more 







Were the specific features of the agenda set by domestic stakeholders, or were they 
strongly influenced by external ‘scripting’? (For example, were international consultants 
significantly involved in the drafting of reform plans? Or were these developed mostly 
within the public administration? 
Observation 7j: Now you have various areas like having a complaint mechanism in 
place, having a website for information sharing so the trend is moving. And it is fine 
- so based on that you get people to move from the traditional PEFA to the all revised 
PEFA. This is all part of the reform process, because we use PEFA as a tool to assess 
ourselves and improve on areas that we think we are weak on. That is why we are 
always looking at, especially the procurement and budget credibility (Senior 





Observation 7k: The government still owns the process. Let us be practical, even in 
the donor community, there is politics. Put your mouth where your money is. Most 
times developing countries like Liberia are not in a comfortable position to actually 
negotiate. And so, we need support, we need funds. This is where I say most times 
the reform is not locally driven, because we need the support and it is ‘international 
best practice’ (NSA representative in LBR: XXL701). 
Observation 7l: I think we need a reform we can finance. Local ownership is actually 
important. If the donor funding wears out, how can we go ahead? Do we have the 
means of maintaining and sustaining these reforms? The sustainability is something 
we should be thinking about! If the donor come in with all the money and do all of 
these flashy things and we do not have the means of sustaining that is a waste... 
(MoF official in LBR: XL301).  
Observation 7m: Yes, we try to champion the reforms. But again, we have to have 
the political will and again the development partners because we do not know the 
angle they will be coming from. Because if they come today and say this is what we 
want to do. Because as we speak now, we have the PFMICP funded by the DP. But 
again, we have Adam Smith funded by DFID, and EU funding the states building 
projects (Senior reformer in SL MoF: XX305).  
Observation 7n: well these reforms are mainly donor-imposed. The reason why I 
said this is that from the outset after the coming to force of the interim government 
from 2004 to 2005, the donors came in. The first attempt was GEMAP. The donor 
partner believes the cause of the conflict was resource allocation and corruption. 
So, the first attempt from the EU, USAID they selected key govt ministry and 
agencies, so they could recruit several comptrollers and the EU took over to help 
the GAC regarding accountability. To ensure that the resources were not misused. 
That was the first significant attempt which came from international partners. The 
ECOWAS and other countries were also involved. That was international partner-
driven because of the fair that huge cost of the crisis in Liberia was the uneven 
distribution of resources and corruption (Senior GAC official in LBR: XL402).   
Observation 7o: To be honest my answer is not the government is not in the driving 
sit. And I can tell you the reason why. When a country is in the driving sit you will 
recognise that in a number of ways (NSA representative in LBR: XL702). 
First and foremost is that the deployment of sometimes expatriate and the 
unlimited ground that expatriate has in terms of what we do as a country and what 
we are doing to curtail their influence.  
Second, there is this push or coercive approach for compliance or what they call 
‘best practice,’ even that best practice had not shown to be best, but you are obliged 
to comply with those best practices. I found it sometimes difficult to understand, 
with just a handful of the elites from a country being taken to understand the 





participation in the country’s development agenda, but they accept whatever is 
thrown at them [from development partners] under the framework of inclusivity 
(NSA representative in LBR: XL702).     
Observation 7p: Some international consideration drives most of the government 
policies and things that we do here. Those affect how we do certain things here. 
Some of the things we where we think that it will affect our international standing 
or it will cause donors not to give us money, we will take action immediately (MoF 
official in LBR: XL309).   
Observation 7q: Well very slowly because if you do not have the level of financial 
capability you do not really take ownership or drive the process.  I think the GEMAP 
could have been more successful if they had taking some level of ownership at that 
time.  Even the PFM, the current PFM they are not the ones driving the reform 
process (Donor representative in LBR: XL102).     
Observation 7r: The reason why I am emphasising ownership is the ownership was 
lacking from the government. Most of the program measures were donor-driven 
and people did not understand them in the first place (MoF official in LBR:: XL302).   
Observation 7s: The donor is not in the driver seat we only support the process, but 
the ministry of finance I can tell you is in the driving seat in the PFM reforms process. 
The MoF is the counterpart that all the partners must work with them (Donor 
representative in LBR: XL101).   
Observation 7t: No, what you should know is if world bank is coming with a project 
they don’t just come in and do a one-size-fits-all thing for example the IRCBP was 
done in consonant with government and they actually agreed for the reforms to 
happen because government badly needed local councils to be re-activated – it was 
the interest of government right (Donor representative who also worked as LTA in 
SL: XX105_303).   
 
INFERENCE: The evidence is overwhelming from the various accounts of interviewees above 
(observations 7j-t) to justify the strong international footprint in the design of PFM reform 
programs in the two case study countries. The donor influence on PFM reform programs 
have taken different shapes and forms: 
 Recommendations from specific donor PFM assessment missions/reports used to 
design new PFM reform programs 
 In response to findings from PFM assessment reports such as PEFA, Open Budget 





 Donor partners directly funding specific reform programs or PFM institutions such as 
external audit agencies, parliamentary finance and account committees and 
domestic revenue authorities 
 Developing countries need to comply with international standards or ‘best practice’. 
 Placement of international consultants who influence policy directions and take the 
lead in the design of PFM reform strategies and programs 
 
Most often than not, they two case study countries designed various PFM reform programs 
at the direction, or at least with the guidance and in exchange for financial incentives from 
donor-partners. However, caution must be taken in interpreting these findings as the 
evidence also point to the fact that international footprint in the design of PFM reforms have 
gotten less visible as these countries graduated from post-conflict, crisis to development. 
The decline in international foot-print is perhaps, according to a common phrase ‘put your 
money where your mouth is’, which is a direct result of the declining international financial 
support to PFM in these countries. This decline in donor influence in the design of PFM 
reform strategies and program is definitely a good sign for local ownership, driven largely by 
the establishment of PFM reform coordination units (funded by donor-partners) with 
technical expertise to take the lead in the design of future PFM reforms.  
 
The evidence also raises a number of issues that deserve further attention. For example, 
some of the interviewees seem to make direct connections between the levels of influence 
of donor-partners with the inability of domestic governments to fund the reforms 
themselves. So, one would ask would the outcome have been different if those reform 
programs were solely designed by local actors? This question is a bit tricky to answer given 
the lack of evidence from the two countries of specific reforms that have been thought of 
and designed exclusively by local actors. But it might also be interesting to also understand 
for example, whether domestic authorities could have said ‘No’ to donor assessment 
missions? It might also be useful to attempt to understand the power dynamics between 
donor-partners and the country governments? Observations 7u-v provide some insights in 
answering these questions.  With the former question, again, there is no evidence in the 
case study countries of any instance where local authorities rejected donor assessment 
missions or interventions in PFM or in any other area, as a matter of fact. However, local 





there is a recognition of this power/leverage within local government cycles, and whether 
local actors know how to play their hands when dealing with donor-partners is another 
question altogether.  
Observation 7u: First of all, let me say that the partners would not have been able 
to conduct those assessments without a national counterpart. And so, until the 
national counterpart has accepted no donor will come in to conduct that 
assessment. That tells you that local authorities are on the driving seat, because the 
government accepts for you to come before any donor mission comes in to conduct 
those assessments (Donor representative in SL: XX101).     
Observation 7v: The World Bank at the time was furious, and they refused, had to 
argue a lot about the rationale and the trade-offs. They couldn’t convince the 
government entirely, and they had to yield to the demand of the government. I think 
that transition process didn’t go down well with the World Bank, and I can see the 
highhandedness of the Bank regarding approving and managing the project. 
Because, they have to send in a lot of audits, fearing that there might have been 
some games in term of implementing the reforms (NSA representative in SL: xx702). 
This remark was made in connection to the demand from domestic authorities to 
transfer the management of the current PFM reform program to a project unit away 












The following questions are be explored under this phase in the reform processes in both 
countries. 
Has there been enthusiasm for particular types of reforms (such as program budgeting)—







Observations 2v to 2ad from hypotheses one two provide substantial evidence to support 
the high level of enthusiasm for IFMIS reform in the two case studies. The evidence suggests 
enthusiasm for IFMIS is explained by three factors as shown below: 
 There is generally high level of enthusiasm for reforms for countries starting from a 
low-base: this enthusiasm is in large part because of IFMIS as it brings automation 
and make work easier for central financial ministry officials. IFMIS is also a 
mechanism for CFA to exercise control over MDAs. 
 IFMIS reform often come with huge financial implications, through large 
procurement contracts and it is also linked to donor disbursement triggers 
 
IFMIS is an accounting system and routine processes that does not interfere with high-level 
political economy dynamics. Unlike other reforms such as TSA and MTEF, which present 
political economy dilemmas from senior CFA officials, IFMIS reforms encounter less 
resistance from high-level political actors because senior CFA officials can carry it out safely 
without any confrontations with their political masters. 
 
 
How long were reforms on the agenda before being adopted and implemented? (Or 
failed to be implemented despite commitments made)? 
 
Most reform programs get adopted but their actual implementation in practice have been 
the challenge. Even the most complex and most expensive reforms such as IFMIS get 
adopted and their implementation at least get initiated. Partial implementation is 
widespread in the two case study countries. But the extent to which a reform program gets 
implement (fully implemented, partial/incomplete or not implemented at all) is driven by 
three factors: 
 The number/level of stakeholders involved in the reform (upstream reforms with 
fewer stakeholders) are more likely to be fully implemented than de factor, 
downstream and deconcentrated reforms). 
 The extent of its impact on political accountability and survival. 
 Its impact on the freedom or leverage political actors have over the resource 






However, there is little or sometimes no clear-cut distinction between these factors. Certain 
reform programs may have impact on political accountability and survival and as well as on 
freedom/leverage of political actors on the resource envelope.  
 
Those reform programs that get implemented completely are mostly upstream reforms and 
those that do not require greater political accountability or limit the freedom/leverage 
political actors have on the resource envelope. The exceptions to this are IFMIS and MTEF 
reforms, which have impact on political accountability and the amount of leverage political 
actors have over resource, but their implementation have been partially successful, in large 
part, because politicians and civil servants have found ways to override them through what 
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19 Budgeting corruption is defined as a marriage in the annual budget process between top-level officials 
in the ministry of finance and political leaders and heads of MDAs, whereby the annual budgetary 
allocations to the institutions of these political leaders and heads are inflated by MoF officials with their 
full knowledge and for the personal and mutual benefits of both parties. This marriage effectively 











An Explanatory account of the underlying causal mechanisms associated with the uneven 
progress in Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms in developing countries and across the 
budget cycle/PFM dimensions. 
 
Research Student:   Mohamed Adama Jalloh 
 
 
Invitation and Recruitment 
 
Apart from providing vital information about the research project, this information sheet also 
serves to invite you to participate in this study. You have been invited as part of the research 
design to speak to stakeholders who were and/or are involved (be it direct or indirect) in Public 
Financial Management (PFM) reforms and the annual budget cycle in the countries covered in 
this research study. These stakeholders range from local policymakers and reformers, 
implementers - sectoral ministries, local government and state owned enterprises, the private 
sector, civil society organisations and external actors – donor representatives and experts in 
PFM. Meanwhile, before you give your consent to participate, I encourage you to take some 
time to carefully read the paragraphs below to help you understand the rationale for this study 
and what it will involve. Please share this information sheet, as you like, in case you want to 
discuss its contents with others. And I will be happy to get in touch to through more light in the 
event you need clarity on any of the issues covered. Thank you for taking time to read the 
remainder of this information sheet. 
 
 
Purpose of the study: 
 
The proposed research is about Public Financial Management (PFM) Reforms in developing 
countries. It will attempt to provide an explanatory account, through case studies and within-
case analysis of the underlying mechanisms associated with, or that may have influenced cross-
country differences and variations across the budget cycle in the implementation of PFM 
reforms in developing countries. Almost two decades on, progress in reforming budgetary 
institutions in developing countries has been limited and uneven, irrespective of the huge donor 
and technical support. While a lot has been written in a bid to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of PFM reform efforts, the PFM literature has largely been driven by the 
emergence of different approaches in trying to find solutions to the initial set-backs and 
challenges encountered. However, the various approaches fundamentally remained 
ideologically different, with many of the approaches being prescriptive reform models rather 
than derived from formal analysis of empirical evidence. Thus, they fall-short of creating an 
appropriate balance in addressing issues such as how and why certain reform initiatives or 
countries are successful, while others do not. The shortcomings of the various approaches are 
in part, a fallout from the idiosyncratic nature of approaches to, and evaluations of PFM reforms, 
but also because PFM reform is complex involving many interactive processes and actors.  Which 
imply reform efforts need for a comprehensive assessment of the cumulative contributions of 





research in providing plausible explanatory accounts to the research question: Why is progress 
in Public Financial Management reforms uneven across developing countries and across the 
budget cycle?, the study will combine case studies approach and process tracing method to 
document and account for the complex interactions during the reforms and in the budget cycle 
in determining how and why some countries PFM systems improved over time, while other did 
not, and variations across the budget cycle. 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
Any decision to participate or not, rest 100 per cent with individual participants. But prior to 
soliciting any consents, potential participants are encouraged to seek, if necessary in private, for 
more information that they think might be helpful in getting their consent to participate in the 
interviews. In this regards, all requests for further information or inquiry should be directed to 
the researcher Mohamed A. Jalloh – via email at maj179@bham.ac.uk. It must be stated here 
that, even after given their initial consent to participate, participants still have the right (without 
any obligation to explain why) to withdraw from the interviews before they actually happen or 
withdraw their data after the interviews have been held. Summary of the interview scripts will 
be shared with interviewees to solicit their confirmation of the contents of the interview. An 
interviewee’s right to withdraw their data ends after she/he has confirmed the contents on the 
interview transcripts. Thus, it is the researcher’s responsibility to ensure that contents in the 
interview transcripts are accurately reflected in the main thesis without material misstatement. 
But what happens if participants give their consents to participate in the interviews? Once you 
agree to participate in the interviews, the researcher will be in contact to discuss arrangements 
for the interviews, including your signing of a consent form. The interview is expected to last 
about an hour, with a list of predetermined general questions that will be asked of participants 
from each country.  
 
 
Possible risks and benefits for taking part in this research study? 
 
There are no known risks associated with participants taking part in the interviews. Nonetheless, 
there are some ethical concerns (such as confidentiality, data protection, etc.) which have been 
given due consideration and addressed in the methodology chapter of the study. There are no 
direct personal benefits to participants, in part, because the research does not directly relate to 
participants themselves. Rather, the research result is expected to benefit wider stakeholders, 
including government institutions from both countries covered, donor institutions and others 
with interest in PFM reforms and the budget cycle. However, the preliminary research findings 
and final copy of the thesis will be shared directly with each participant.  
 
 
Data Protection, Confidentiality and Anonymity? 
 
All personal and professional accounts given by interviewees during the course of the research 
will be stored safely (both electronic and manual data) and managed in accordance with the 
University’s 2015-2016 code of practice for research and the Data Protection Act of 1998. In 
addition, all information from you will be kept strictly confidential and will be accessible only to 
the researcher and supervisors. But where necessary, the data will also be accessible to 
examiners for verification purposes. It must be stated here that it is the obligation of the 





anonymous for a period of 10 years. After the 10-year period has elapsed, all the data stored 
will be destroyed completely. And finally, you are guaranteed that a special coding system has 
been developed to keep all the data anonymised in such a way that both the raw data and final 
thesis would not identify you individually. In this regard, initial draft of the thesis will be shared 





What use will the data collected be put into?  
 
All personal and profession accounts solicited from you will be used solely for the purposes of 
this research. Any evidence you provide will be used anonymously in the published findings. In 
no event will the evidence you provide be traded or shared with third parties other than 
supervisors, examiners and relevant University personnel. In particular, personal details of 
participants, including their names, position, institution, and other identifiable details will 
remain strictly confidential to the researcher and supervisors only. The participant data that will 
be shared will only include interpretations by the researcher, their historical accounts and 
perceptions about the various decisions, events before and during PFM reforms in the countries 
covered. In doing so the special coding system developed will consist of random numbers and 
letters known only to the researcher and supervisors. These random numbers, where necessary 
will be used in presenting direct quotes from participants in the main thesis. And finally, as part 
of the research’s contribution the findings (not the raw data – transcripts and audio recordings 
and all personal details of interviewees) will be made public and might be used by subsequent 
researchers for academic and professional purposes.  
 
 
University of Birmingham Ethical Review Process 
 
This research study has been subject to the University of Birmingham ethical review process. 
The University’s Research Ethics Committee has reviewed the contents of the research and has 
given a favourable opinion to procced with the fieldwork. If you wish to contact an independent 
point at the University about this research, please do so directly by emailing the University of 
Birmingham Ethics Committee at ethics-queries@contacts.bham.ac.uk. You can also directly 
contact my supervisors for any clarifications or concerns you might have about this research 
study at the following addresses: Dr. Simon Delay - delayse@adf.bham.ac.uk and Prof. Paul 





Thank you for saving some time to read this information sheet and for given your consent to 
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progress in Public Financial Management reforms in developing countries and across the budget 
cycle. 
 
Research Student:   Mohamed Adama Jalloh 
 
I have been given information about the PhD. research study on the topic “An Explanatory 
account of the underlying causal mechanisms associated with the uneven progress in Public 
Financial Management reforms in developing countries and across the budget cycle”. I have 
discussed the research project with the student researcher Mohamed Adama Jalloh, who is 
conducting this research study as part of his doctoral research programme in the International 
Development Department at the University of Birmingham. 
 
I have been advised of the potential risks that might be associated with this research; including 
identity as the most significant risks and benefits from the research results. I have been given 
the opportunity to ask the researcher about any questions I may have about the research and 
my participation. I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary, I am free to 
refuse to participate and I am free to withdraw from the research at any time prior to my 
confirmation of the contents of the interview presented in the interview transcripts. My refusal 
to participate or withdrawal of consent will not affect my treatment in any way or my 
relationship with the researcher.  
 
If I have any further enquiries about the research, I can contact the researcher, or any of his 
supervisors or The University of Birmingham Ethics Committee through the following: 
 
1. Researcher: Mohamed Jalloh (Tel: +447590255476, maj179@bham.ac.uk) 
2. Primary Supervisor: Simon De Lay (Tel: +441214147590, delayse@adf.bham.ac.uk) 
3. Secondary Supervisor: Prof. Paul Jackson (Tel: +441214147293, 
P.B.Jackson@bham.ac.uk)  
4. University of Birmingham Ethics Committee (ethics-queries@contacts.bham.ac.uk)  
 
By signing below, I am indicating my consent to participate in the research. I understand that 
the data collected from my participation will be used primarily for the purposes of the research, 




I have read the Participant Information Sheet and I have had the opportunity to ask the 
































APPENDIX F: INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE/FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Phases of PFM 
Reforms 








Could you kindly put into context the role 
of your organisation/department/unit in 
the PFM reform process to date 
Have you/designate been directly or indirectly 
involved in the reform process, when and how? 
    
Did you feel your contribution, if any, was 
important in any way to the reform design 
and implementation? If not, why and what 
problems and challenges did you face 
during reform design and 
implementation?  
      
How would you characterise your 
organisation/department/unit’s 
relationship with the political elite 
(supportive or otherwise) and other MDAs 
during the design and implementation of 
PFM reforms?  
Where there any disagreements or tensions during 
reform design and implementation? 
    
To what extent are you convinced that 
PEFA scores provided an accurate 
description of PFM systems in your 
country? 
Are CFAA and PEFA indicators subjective how and 
why? Does CFAA and PEFA provided perverse 
incentives from both donors and local authorities? 
    
SL/LBR: Ownership:       







Dimension of ownership: Could you kindly 
describe how the seeds of reform were 
planted or conception of the idea of 
reform in your country, by whom, when 
and why?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
How did the issue of reform get on the 
agenda of government decision making? 
Who was involved in the conceptualisation of the 
idea of PFM reform/stakeholders?                                                                                         
• Actor perceptions of where pressure to reform 
originated from                                                                                         
• Was decision making process politics-as-usual or 
was there any specific or isolated and 
extraordinary intervention in the decision-making 
process by top politicians and other state actors? 
• SL: Although the recommendations of the 2002 
CFAA were undoubtedly followed and 
accomplished, but it has been argued by many that 
the extent to which this became the central and 
exclusive reform agenda in the MoFED is unclear. 
What could you say about this claim?        
√ √ 
What were the main policy documents 
with regard to PFM reforms?  
Which documents came first, and under what 
circumstances was reform brought up?  
√ √ 
Depth of Ownership: How convinced were 
stakeholders at the time that PFM reform 
was the right way to go for your country? 
To what extent were you convinced PFM 
reform being necessary or a priority over 
other alternative courses of actions or 
other reforms at the time? 
perceptions from key stakeholders on the level on 
conviction for reforms 
    
Breadth of Ownership:  Were there 
champions amongst technocrats, political 
elites, and wider stakeholders (including 
donor community) over the need for PFM 
reforms? How much consensus was there 
among these stakeholders, how and why?  
Personal reflections and indications of public and 
political support and through speeches and the 
media. 
    
Under the surface political support, but often 
contradictory actions – such as saying one thing 
and doing another. 
    
Were there any oppositions to PFM 
reforms, if any, by whom and what were 
Personal accounts from interviews     




their incentives and impact of their 
opposition? 
SL/LBR: Were reforms the results of donor 
pressure or were they genuine desires by 
local government to institute change in 
PFM and the public sector as a whole? 
Do donor practice what they preach?     
SL/LBR: During reform design towards the 
end of the civil war and immediately after 
the war: 
      
(ii) What inputs went into the design and 
what arguments were put forward, and by 
whom?  
SL/LBR: Inventory of government and donor inputs 
(financial, technical and others).                                                                                                                  
SL/LBR: Which aspects of donor support were 
more influential in driving and sustaining PFM 
reform efforts, where, why and how?:                              
(a) technical advice; (b) by bringing cross-country 
experience to bear; (c) financial assistance; and (d) 
by imposing conditionality linked to the adoption 
and outcomes of reform. Flexibility, consistency 
with Paris Declaration, consistency & coherence 
with wider Donor policies in country and local 
context. 
v   
SL: Do you believe the CFAA, Common 
Action Plan/National Action and IPFMRP 
provided the most appropriate bases for 
PFM reform in Sierra Leone, how and 
why?   LBR: Do you believe PFM plans such 
as establishing the CMCs, GEMAP, MoF 
PFM RSAPs and the IPFMRP provided the 
most appropriate bases for PFM reform in 
Liberia, how and why? 
      
          












Implementation Gap:                                                                                 
SL/LBR: How could you explain the 
implementation gap in PFM reforms in 
your country? In Liberia for example, 
“there is still a noticeable gap between the 
formal laws, rules, and systems and their 
actual implementation in practice”.   
Knowledge and understanding of reforms and 
policy documents and instruments. Which 
problems and deviations from the initial objectives, 
laws, etc. can be observed? Principal agent 
problems, implementation theory, alignment with 
local capacity, breadth of ownership and political 
leadership. Were PFM policies actually get done, 
by whom and why? Did deals overturn policies? 
PFM legislation reviews in both countries in less 
than a decade, why? 
 
  
    
Deconcentration vs. concentration: where 
do you stand and why? 
Examples of concentrated and deconcentrated 
systems that have worked or not 
    
Variations in performance across the PFM 
cycle: 
      
SL/LBR: What do you think explains the 
variations in performance across the PFM 
systems/budget cycle?  Various accounts 
tend to pin this to factors such as reform 
design issues (including sequencing of 
reform measures) and diagnostic 
instruments, which formed the basis upon 
which reforms were launched. 
-Personal reflections, concentration of reform 
efforts (by function, type of reform, type of output 
and organisation level) and expenditure 
compositions, implementation theory and PA 
problems. Causal links between hypothesised 
causal factors and observed changes at output 
level. 
    
SL/LBR: Deviations in reform goals are 
more likely if actions depend upon a 
number of actors who are required to 
cooperate. To what extent is this 
statement true or false in implementing 
PFM reforms in your country? 
- Implementation chain for specific reforms and 
number of actors involved in each. 
    




SL/LBR: Do you believe implementing PFM 
reforms created institutional adaption 
pressures, such as capacity, social & 
cultural issues and traditional admin. 
Norms. If yes, how and justify why you 
have selected a particular ranking?      
Low adaptation pressure, high and moderate 
pressure.   
    
SL/LBR: Institutional change is limited to 
aspects that do not question the ‘identity’ 
of an institution. Did certain reform 
initiatives question the ‘institutional 
identity’ of certain MDAs? 
      
SL/LBR: In both SL/LBR for example, there 
are significant variations in performance 
between linking policy to planning and 
budget (MTEF) and expenditure control 
(IFMIS).  How did these happen and why?   
Indications of political commitment or rhetoric 
(saying one thing and doing another) 
    
SL: What is your take on the significant 
progress made in downstream dimensions 
such as IFMIS of the budget cycle 
Surprisingly, SL unlike many developing countries is 
performing fairly well in downstream dimensions, 
IFMIS in particular.     
    
SL/LBR: What is your view on the influence 
of donor across the budget cycle? It has 
been argued that donor influence 
gradually wanes as one moves down to 
softer/downstream/deconcentrated 
dimensions of the PFM cycle? Could you 
attribute this to variations in performance 
across the budget cycle or otherwise?  
- Compare donor influence at the origin and design 
phases vs implementation phase 
    
How effective are identified reform 
initiatives at the central government levels 
compared to local government and state 
owned agencies?  
Can any variations be attributed to hypothesised 
causal factors and variations across the budget 
cycle? 
    




        
Intermediate and Final Outcomes:       
What have been the intermediate 
outcomes?  
 Documentary evidence…to be done prior to 
interviews for each county 
    
To what extent improvements or could 
changes in intermediate outcomes be 
attributed to the hypothesised causal 
factors? What could have happened to the 
identified reform outputs and outcomes in 
the absence of one or more of these 
factors  
 Map out PFM intervention areas for each at each 
level and function: -HIPC and PEFA indicators - by 
category (revenue, budgeting, accounting, etc.) 
and nature (de jure, de facto, etc.)  
    
To what extent improvements in final 
outcomes could be independently 
attributed to identified outputs and 
intermediate outcomes?  
-Mapping of the independent effects of these 
causal factors on identified PFM reform outputs 
and then to identified outcomes.  
    
Could changes at final outcome level have 
occurred in absence of changes identified 
at outputs and Intermediate Outcome 
level? 
The counterfactual claim (an example of a reform 
initiative that can be traced to an outcome) 
    
        
Sustainability of PFM reform progress:        
To what extent gains identified at the 
intermediate and final outcome levels 
appear to be sustainable? Is the process of 
PFM reform sustainable, how and why? 
Are there organisational structures in place (on 
supply & demand sides) to sustain PFM reforms?                                                                                 
Financial and technical capacity within 
Government to sustain PFM reform.                   
Commitment (at political and administrative levels) 
to continue PFM reforms?  
    
          
Re-think/Re-
design Phase 
What PFM reform measures were re-
designed and why? 
Examples of specific reform measures that we re-
designed 
    




SL/LBR: How much influence did 
incorporating reform experience back into 
reform design had on the overall progress, 
how and why?  
Was re-design borne out of emerging issues and 
experience from implementation or was it just 
based on program design and external influence  
    
What do you personally think went wrong 
in the reform design and implementation, 
how and why?  
What do you think could have been done 
differently and why? 
    





to reform:  
SL/LBR: Do you think the country’s colonial 
heritage and governance systems may 
have impacted reform progress or not, 
how and why? 
LBR: The World Bank IPMFRP for instance, notes 
that “the Project cannot respond to all the political 
economy concerns in Liberia, some of which are 
rooted in the historical legacy that characterize the 
degree of responsiveness to reforms, [rather] the 
Project aims at changing the dynamics of the 
reform process through demonstrated incentives 
that can enable the shifting of the balance of 
power amongst Liberians in the sphere of shared 
accountability in financial governance.  
    
SL: By 2006 Sierra Leone had completed the 
implementation of the recommendations of the 
CFAA and achieved scores equal to those of other 
more stable sub Saharan African countries 
    
Sequencing of 
reforms:  
SL/LBR: Was there any national reform 
path, with clear objectives and 
deliverables and aligned with local 
contexts?  
      




SL/LBR: appropriate balance is required to 
enhance effective and efficient PFM 
systems, for example too much emphasis 
on expenditure control will invariably 
hinder deeper reforms (e.g. MTEF and 
IFMIS).  
What constitutes the basics for LBR/SL? Example, 
control in budget execution - such as setting up 
IFMIS, is this basic? Why not say "do what is 
doable and necessary for lunching into complex 
and difficult reform measures? Because reform is 
more than just basics - say donor coordination, 
using country system, politics, laws, etc. 'Doable 
and necessary Vs. Complex and difficult' because 
reforms comprise more than just technical factors.  
    
SL/LBR: Was there any consensus on what 
constituted the basics between donors 
and local authorities and other 
terminologies such as linking policy to 
planning and Budgeting, MTEF, 
Performance Budgeting, etc.? If any, how 
was this consensus arrived at and why was 
this important, or what were the 
misconceptions and why?   
      
SL: In Sierra Leone for example, budget 
execution functions of the AGD, which 
have been heavily supported since the 
cease-fire, have shown fairly consistent 
improvement. In contrast, however, other 
functions that received similar levels of 
attention over the last 15 years continued 
to deliver relatively poor results, such as 
the MTEF.  
      




Degree of Fit SL/LBR: Scholars have often argued that 
success or failure of technical reform 
models often rely heavily on the degree of 
fit between these models and country 
realities – such as politics, institutions and 
local capacities for example. How would 
characterise the degree of fit between 
reform models and country realities 
during the reform period?  
Capability vs. systems - laws are best in the world 
but in adequate systems, structures and 
institutions to implement them, often leading to 
arbitrary applications of the laws and reforms?                                                                
The nature/ type of PFM and public administration 
system within the country (Anglophone/ 
Francophone/other), the relative status of PFM 
systems at the outset of reforms (how weak or 
strong in relation to PEFA indicators or similar), the 
extent of human resource and other capacity 






PFMRU SL/LBR: Autonomous 
agencies/departments are expected to 
improve policy performance through 
separating politics from administration 
and insulate policy decision making from 
political considerations. This is further 
expected to minimise deviations from the 
original intentions of policy-makers and 
prevent delays. To what extent have these 
been achieved by the PFMRU? 
Also control: Govt-controlled vs. Shared Donor-
Govt management; Use of consultants for 
managerial or purely advisory roles. 
    
SL/LBR: How influential was the PFM 
steering committee in driving and 
sustaining FPM reform progress or was it 
just a consequence of program design? 
Composition, functions and challenges of the 
PFMSC. 
    
SL/LBR: How would describe the tripartite 
relationship between the reform unit, 
politicians and donors? 
Who decided what, how and when to adopt the 
reforms 
    
FM and Overall 
Public Sector 
Reforms: 
SL/LBR: What could you say about the 
timing of PSRs and their overall alignment 
with PFM reforms?   
Control: Govt-controlled vs. Shared Donor-Govt 
management; Use of consultants for managerial or 
purely advisory roles 
    




SL/LBR: Do you believe public sector 
reform program in general have had any 
impact on PFM reforms, how and why?   




SL/LBR: To what extent in all phases of the 
reforms could you say each of the 
following: political support and local 
ownership, institutional and management 
arrangements, donor support and 
practices and economic factors were 
necessary or sufficient conditions, 
complementary or 
endogenous/exogenous factors in 
initiating and driven reform progress, how 
and why?  
Causal links between hypothesised causal factors 
and observed changes at output and outcome 
levels. 
    
SL: In Sierra Leone in particular, many studies point 
to favourable climate immediately after the war, 
political governance and appetite for reform, the 
establishment of LTAs and off-civil servants at 
MoFED and the incentives created by donor 
support and practices as the main drivers of PFM 
reform progress. To what extent could you 
corroborate this evidence and why?    
    
SL: In Sierra Leone for example, budget execution 
functions of the AGD, which have been heavily 
supported since the cease-fire, have shown fairly 
consistent improvement. In contrast, however, 
other functions that received similar levels of 
attention over the last 15 years continued to 
deliver relatively poor results, such as the MTEF. 
Do you think MTEF is more political than budget 
execution systems such as IFMIS, and does this 
difference account for the difficulty in 
implementing MTEFs? 
    




LBR: In Liberia for example, political considerations 
have been associated to the “continuing difficulty 
getting spending entities to adhere to approved 
appropriations and to align their activities with the 
AfT and/or their own approved strategic plans. 
Mistrust and political influence in setting and 
adhering to agreed priorities leads to delays in the 
approval and execution of the national budget” 
What are your thoughts on this claim?  
    
SL/LBR: Which other factors, if any, you 
also consider necessary or sufficient 
conditions, complementary or 
endogenous/exogenous factors in driving 
and sustaining reform progress, how and 
why? 
What could you say was the most important 
element/factor in initiating and driving PFM reform 
design in your country?     
    
SL/LBR: Could you explain the impact of 
the factors you have highlighted as stand-
alone variables influencing PFM reforms or 
do they complement each other or 
otherwise, and how? 
For example, would PFM reforms have evolved 
differently in absence of GBS 
    
SL: In Sierra Leone for example, could you explain 
the impact of the immediate climate after the war, 
LTAs and political support without the incentives 
created by donor support and practices?  
    
SL: A 2010 World Bank study argues that 
there was a higher dimension of political 
support and ownership of reform among 
senior bureaucrats, especially at MoFED 
than at the highest echelon of state 
authority. One reason they sight for 
instance is the fact that there was 
reluctance by government and the 
legislature to remove the embargo on the 
Auditor General publishing his/her annual 
Are you convinced that commitment to PFM 
reform was adequately matched by the political 
establishments beyond MOFED? 
    




audited financial reports, until budget 
support from DFID and the EC was nearly 
suspended owing to a lack of access to 
published audited accounts? What is your 
opinion about this claim? 
SL/LBR: Both technocrats and political 
agents in partner countries often have a 
sense of not being in the driving seat of 
reforms. Do you feel this way? 
      
SL/LBR: Development agencies have often 
maintained that there are also doubts 
over the degree of commitment of 
political leaders in Developing Countries to 
improve the quality of their country 
systems. What is your response to this 
assertion?  
What specific steps taken by political elite can you 
point to that will indicated political willingness to 
drive and sustain PFM reform efforts in your 
country? 
    
Closing 
Questions: 
What fundamental change, if any, do you 
want to see happen in Sierra Leone or 
Liberia? 
What could have done differently without donor 
support or what do you want to do without any 
influence from the international community?       
“The country would progress if only it 
had less corrupt leaders and more capable and 
concerned civil servants. Why bring this down a 
personal level and not societal or systematic level? 





The reform process has been ongoing for a 
number of years. What lessons have been 
learned that can help the process as it 
      




moves forward, and how are they being 
used? 
Is there anything else that is significant 
that we have not covered? 
      
Is there anyone else you feel I should talk 
to? 
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